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Foreword
Food price volatility is a major challenge facing the global agricultural sys-
tem today, most vividly illustrated during the global food crisis of 2007–9 
when prices spiked for key staple commodities such as wheat, rice, maize, 
and soybeans. Given the variety of reactions by countries experiencing food 
price shocks, the crisis offered an excellent natural experiment for gener-
ating knowledge on responses to price volatility in particular, and on the 
political economy of agricultural policy-making more generally.
In 2010, United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) along with collaborating partners—
Cornell University and the University of Copenhagen—enthusiastically wel-
comed Per Pinstrup-Andersen’s proposal to direct a broad-ranging research 
project on fourteen low- and middle-income countries to uncover which 
political economy factors, ranging from the constellation of different inter-
est groups to the nature of political institutions, explain variations in policy 
responses across countries.
The in-depth academic research is valuable for at least three target audi-
ences. First, it informs international organizations and donors about which 
types of policy interventions can mitigate price volatility and whether this is 
feasible given a country’s political economy context. Second, it helps policy 
makers to better understand the trade-offs of certain policy interventions. 
Third, it generates knowledge about the agricultural policy-making process 
in developing countries, which remains incredibly scarce despite the impor-
tance of agriculture to these countries’ economies.
This book is the distilled essence of the large, multi-disciplined academic 
project condensed into a compact form for the reader to enjoy and absorb the 
policy implications.
I hereby express my sincere appreciation and admiration of the academic 
skills of Per Pinstrup-Andersen, along with his three senior advisors, Philip 
Abbott, William Lyakurwa, and Robert Paarlberg, and fellow coordinator 
Danielle Resnick, formerly of UNU-WIDER, for directing the project, build-
ing a top-notch research team, upholding highest-quality academic stand-




UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to its 
research programme from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. This publication is supported by an agreement with 






In 2007–8, international market prices for rice, wheat, and corn all spiked 
sharply upward. By April 2008, the price of maize (corn) available for export 
had doubled compared to two years earlier; rice prices had tripled in just 
three months; and wheat reached its highest price in 28 years. Riots broke out 
in a number of developing countries, and it seemed that hunger was certain 
to increase as well. The New York Times, in a lead editorial, declared these 
surprising changes to be a ‘World Food Crisis’. Robert Zoellick, President of 
the World Bank, warned that high food prices were particularly dangerous 
for the poor, who must spend half to three-quarters of their income on food. 
‘There is no margin for survival’, he said.
A global financial crisis in late 2008 to early 2009 caused international 
food prices to fall briefly, but then in 2010 wheat prices increased sharply 
once more, and just as this second food price spike seemed to be passing a 
severe summer drought in the USA in 2012 sent international corn prices 
spiking upward yet again.
This unusual series of international food price spikes between 2007 and 
2012 reset global expectations and debates over food. The spikes were not 
just disruptive on their own terms, they called into question what had been 
a comforting assumption among most economists that over the long term 
agricultural commodity prices would fall rather than rise, and that interna-
tional food markets would be a reliable source of supply.
Controversies persist over both the causes of these commodity price 
spikes and their impacts on poverty and malnutrition worldwide. In their 
recent State of Food Insecurity in the World (2012), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) reduced their estimates of the incidence of malnutrition 
due to the 2007–8 food crisis, noting that ‘Some large countries were able 
to insulate themselves from the crisis through restrictive trade policies and 
functioning safety nets, but trade restrictions increased prices and volatility 
on international markets’. Moreover, some import-dependent small coun-
tries, especially in Africa, were exceptionally hard hit. A key distinguishing 
feature was the success of food security policy implementation to mitigate 




Most countries pursued a wide range of policies to stabilize their food 
prices at home. Import tariffs were reduced; exports were taxed or banned; 
parastatals imported grain; buffer stocks were released; domestic prices 
and production were subsidized; and safety nets were expanded. Policies 
typically utilized existing institutional mechanisms, designed more often 
to address production shortfalls rather than world price spikes, with few 
innovations in policy regime noted. It was also easier to expand existing 
safety nets than to institute new programmes. Political decision-making at 
times hampered the need to change or expand the scope of those institu-
tions. As a consequence, a wide variety of outcomes was observed, due as 
much to problems of implementing existing policies as to picking the right 
mechanisms.
Contemporary scholarship on this dangerous new market dynamic 
has long been hampered by a poor understanding of how national gov-
ernments make policy decisions when caught in a suddenly destabilized 
international food price environment. Why do most cut tariffs, some sub-
sidize imports, and a few ban exports? Why do some have domestic buffer 
stocks they can release, while others do not? When they release such 
stocks to keep domestic prices low, do they target the poor and vulner-
able, or only the urban middle class and their own power base? Why do 
some try to keep domestic prices low for consumers under circumstances 
of shortage, when a price increase might be necessary to encourage more 
domestic farm production? Why can some governments quickly adjust 
policy settings to adapt to changing international circumstances, while 
others face problematic delays? Why do some countries focus on stabiliza-
tion, helping consumers broadly, while others utilize safety nets to pro-
tect the poor? Reliable answers to these political economy questions are 
elusive because they require carefully structured comparisons of policy 
actions taken within dozens of separate political systems, something that 
can be accomplished only by a large and well-led international team of 
scholars, each with a different country specialty, but all asking the same 
questions under a common research template, applied over a common 
time period.
When the original price spikes of 2007–10 took place, it was Professor Per 
Pinstrup-Andersen, previously Director General of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), who saw the research opportunity, assem-
bled the necessary international team of scholars, and hammered out the 
common political economy template. The results of this careful effort are 
available to all in this newly published book. As advisors to this ambitious 
project, we knew it would be a one of a kind achievement that political econ-
omy scholars would be able to use for years as a valuable resource. We wit-
nessed the diligence and commitment of the research team both in polishing 
Preface
ix
the separate country chapters and then in assembling and comparing the 
findings of these chapters to derive the larger generalizations that finally 
emerged. We commend the research team and its leader, and thank them for 
this important book.




First and foremost I want to thank the United Nations University—World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Director, 
Finn Tarp for unwavering professional, moral, and financial support from 
the initial project idea to the completion of this book. I am very grateful to 
Danielle Resnick for her constructive and timely intellectual (political sci-
ence in a network of economists) and logistic contributions to all aspects 
of the project; to Henrik Hansen for his intellectual insights and contribu-
tions to the preparation of the analytical framework; to Derrill Watson for his 
intellectual contributions to the development of the framework for the polit-
ical economy analyses and the outstanding synthesis; to the three project 
advisors—Philip Abbott, William Lyakurwa, and Robert Paarlberg—for their 
intellectual leadership; to Suresh Babu, Kenneth Baltzer, and Shane Bryan for 
outstanding syntheses; to Lisa Winkler for her editorial and administrative 
support; to Mary-Catherine French for administrative and secretarial sup-
port; to Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen for her advice and support of the prepara-
tion of the book and for facilitating collaboration with Oxford University 
Press; to Adam Swallow for guidance in the preparation of the book manu-
script; and to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the UNU-WIDER, and 
Cornell University for financial support of the project that led to this book. 
My colleagues at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Prabhu Pingali, 
Ellen McCullough, and Tuu-Van Nguyen, provided valuable intellectual 
input to the project. Last, but by no means least, I want to thank all the 
network members for a most stimulating interaction and collaboration, and 
for enhancing my conceptual and empirical understanding of the political 
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How do governments respond to abrupt food price changes and why do they 
respond as they do? Answers to these two questions are important to help us 
understand policy-making, to predict how policy makers are likely to respond 
to future food price volatility and to support policy makers as they confront 
such volatility. This book, which is based on a three-year research project, pro-
vides such answers for fourteen developing countries, the European Union, 
and the USA. Syntheses across country studies draw lessons expected to be 
useful among and beyond the study-countries. The project was undertaken 
by a network of researchers, including the chapter authors, supported by three 
senior advisors (Philip Abbott, William Lyakurwa, and Robert Paarlberg) 
and coordinated by Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Cornell University, and Project 
Director with United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER); Derrill Watson, Cornell University; 
Finn Tarp, UNU-WIDER; Danielle Resnick, previously UNU-WIDER, now 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); and Henrik Hansen, 
University of Copenhagen. The network researchers, advisors, and collabora-
tors met at three workshops and interacted frequently through reviews and 
revisions of draft versions of the working papers posted on the UNU-WIDER 
website. The chapters of this book are based on revised and shortened ver-
sions of these working papers.
Food price volatility since 2007 provides a natural experiment for the 
research. While much has been written about the nature, content, and causes 





2009; Abbott 2009; Dawe and Slayton 2010; Headey and Fan 2010; Abbott 
and Borot de Battisti 2011; FAO et al. 2011; Wright 2011; Martin 2012; de 
Gorter, Drabik, and Just 2013), little is known about the political processes 
that led to the policy responses and the relative power, behaviour, and influ-
ence of the participating stakeholder groups. Understanding how and why 
governments responded as they did will help enhance existing knowledge 
of the political economy of food price policy and assist governments in their 
policy-making as they confront future food price fluctuations.
Although price fluctuations in the world market may influence expecta-
tions and related action at the national level, the response by national gov-
ernments to world market food price fluctuations will depend largely on the 
extent to which the prices are transmitted or expected to be transmitted to 
national markets. Thus, an analysis of the degree of price transmission is 
an important first step towards understanding the political economy issues 
at the national level. Such an analysis is undertaken in each country study 
(Chapters 6–21) and synthesized by Baltzer in Chapter 2. In addition to price 
changes transmitted from the world market, domestic food prices are influ-
enced by domestic factors and domestic policies will respond to both. The 
policy responses are synthesized by Bryan in Chapter 3. The policy process 
will influence the choice of policy interventions and the interventions will 
influence the processes. The processes are presented in each country study 
and synthesized by Babu in Chapter 4. Political economy aspects, the focus 
of this book, are analysed in each country study and synthesized by Watson 
in Chapter 5. An overview of the content of the book is presented in this 
chapter and the last chapter (Chapter 22) draws the main generalizable les-
sons from the research and suggests policy recommendations in preparation 
for future food price increases and food price volatility.
1.2 The Global Food Market
The global food market entered an era of instability in 2007. Large and abrupt 
fluctuations in the world market prices of wheat, rice, and maize combined 
with an increasing food price trend, raised concerns about future food sup-
plies, prices, and household food security. Except for a small upward blip in 
the middle of the 1990s, real food prices in the world market decreased very 
significantly from the middle of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. Beginning 
in 2000, a very slow real food price increase continued until the middle of 
2007, when the world market prices of wheat, rice, and maize began a very 
rapid increase. The increase lasted for 8–12 months, depending on the cereal, 
after which they experienced an abrupt fall. Since then, two more price 




October 2007 and April 2008 is particularly interesting because it was ‘not 
caused by adverse shocks to rice production or low rice stocks’ (Dawe and 
Slayton 2010: 17). This is an illustration of the powerful effects of national 
trade policies and irrational or poorly informed expectations and resulting 
behaviour by the public and private sector or as stated by Dawe and Slayton 
(2010: 25) in the case of rice: ‘government policy decisions were decisive in 
sparking and fuelling the crisis’. Estimates by Headey (2011) and Martin and 
Anderson (2012) found that 45–50 per cent of the rice price increase during 
2007–8 was due to export restrictions.
Several developments contributed to both fluctuations and the increas-
ing price trend.1 As prices continued to fall during the period 1975–2000, 
agricultural development was all but ignored by governments, international 
development banks, and bilateral donors. Public investment in developing 
countries’ agriculture, rural infrastructure, and agricultural research fell 
and the falling prices made private investment less interesting and feasible. 
Relatively little new land was brought under cultivation, primarily because 
the necessary infrastructure investments were not made. A  large share of 
smallholders chose off-farm labour over investments in improved farm pro-
ductivity and many became net buyers of food. The rate of yield growth 
for wheat, rice, and maize slowed while population and income growth and 
the diet transition continued to increase the demand for food and feed. 
Expansion of the production of biofuel from sugar, maize, oil palm, rape-
seed, soybeans, and jatropha competed with food production for land and 
water, and excess demand reduced cereal stocks. Extreme weather events, 
which caused drought, floods, and increased production fluctuations in 
several countries, reduced supplies. Fluctuations in oil prices and the dollar 
exchange rate further contributed to food price fluctuations. Thus, excess 
demand, which was covered by stock drawdown, was amplified by decreas-
ing and fluctuating supply during the beginning of the 2000s.
Food prices are very sensitive to changes in the supply–demand balance 
(both supply and demand are very price inelastic in the short run). Therefore, 
even small changes in supply and demand, caused by, for example, extreme 
weather events and expanded biofuel production, respectively, may cause 
large price changes, particularly if stock levels are low. As international cereal 
prices began to increase, some of the news media painted various degrees of 
doomsday scenarios2 and investors became more interested in the futures 
1 The importance of differentiating between food price increase and price volatility for the 
choice of policy interventions is discussed in Chapter 22.
2 While the news media can be extremely useful in promoting transparency in the action by 
both the public and the private sector, a large share of the media reporting during the food price 
increases in the world market from the middle of 2007 to the middle of 2008, and again in the 
subsequent food price spikes, exaggerated the expected consequences by failing to differentiate 
between a price spike and a long-term price increase. When prices fell during the second half of 
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market for cereals, particularly wheat and maize. Irrational expectations by 
investors who interpreted upward prices as a long-term trend rather than a 
spike, added to price volatility. Export bans and other restrictions by cereal 
exporters, reduced import tariffs by importing countries, and removal of 
VAT on food in several countries placed additional pressures on the supply–
demand situation in the world market.
While as mentioned above, much has been written about the causes of 
the food price volatility and the increasing food prices since 2007, there is 
no consensus in the literature about the relative importance of each of the 
factors mentioned above. Attempts to apportion cause to each of the rel-
evant factors are hampered by the interaction among them. However, there 
seems to be widespread agreement that export restrictions were very impor-
tant. Sharma (2011) found that one-third of the 105 countries he surveyed 
used export restrictions for cereals during the period 2007–11. As mentioned 
above, Headey (2011) and Martin and Anderson (2012) found that 45–50 
per cent of the increase in the world market price for rice during 2007–8 
was caused by export restrictions. Bouët and Laborde Debucquet (2010) esti-
mated that 30 per cent of the increase in the international price for wheat 
was caused by export restrictions. Expanded biofuel producton is estimated 
by Rosegrant et al. (2008) and Abbott, Hurt, and Tynes (2011) to account for 
30–40 per cent of the cereal price increase during 2007–8. De Gorter and Just 
(2007), de Gorter (2008), and Collins (2008) concluded that biofuel policies 
were the principal cause of the cereal price increases.
Sanders et al. (2008), Wright (2009), and Martin (2012) reason that specu-
lation on the futures market was not a significant contributor to cereal price 
fluctuations while Ghosh (2010: 72) concludes that ‘The dramatic rise and 
fall of world food prices in 2007–8 was largely a result of speculative activity 
in global commodity markets’. Timmer and Dawe (2010: 7) conclude that 
‘the sudden spike in wheat and corn prices was due to financial speculation’. 
They further argue that increasing futures prices affect storage and hoard-
ing behaviour by farmers and traders, which itself would affect supply and 
prices. Using data from the Chicago Board of Trade, Torero (2011: 4) reports 
that the volume of commodity index funds traded increased ‘by 157 per 
cent, 200 per cent, and 169 per cent for maize, soybeans, and soft wheat 
during the period 2006–11 and that only 2 per cent of these futures con-
tracts has resulted in the delivery of real goods’. He further states that the 
2008, the media was very quiet. Predictions of continued rapid food price increases leading to a 
situation of absolute global food scarcity and an implicit assumption of perfect price transmis-
sion of international cereal prices to low-income people in low-income countries lead much of 
the media and unfortunately also some international organizations to conclude that global food 
price fluctuations resulted in widespread increases in poverty, food insecurity, and malnutri-
tion, developments that, in fact, did not happen.
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volume of maize futures traded worldwide ‘is more than three times greater 
than the global production of maize’. Such statistics lends credibility to 
the argument that speculation had a major influence on the prices of three 
commodities.
Trostle (2008) and Wright (2011) conclude that imbalance between sup-
ply and demand resulting in stock drawdown to very low levels followed by 
supply expansions and stock build-up is the key explanation for the recent 
food price fluctuations. A large share of recent analyses supports the con-
clusion that market fundamentals, i.e., the supply–demand situation, are 
the primary cause of the recent food price volatility. However, in a world 
with poorly integrated food markets, the global supply–demand situation 
may say little about the situation in particular national and local markets. 
Enhanced export restrictions and reduced import restrictions reduce supplies 
and increase demand in the world market with resulting increasing prices, 
with the opposite effect in the participating countries. Variability in produc-
tion and policies in a few major cereal exporters may result in large supply 
changes and associated price volatility in the world market, irrespective of 
what happens in the rest of the world.3 As illustrated in the chapters to follow, 
the above mentioned factors are integrated with action by governments and 
the private sector based on lack of information, poor predictable ability, and 
irrational expectations. Conflicting goals and relative power among stake-
holder groups have played an important role. An understanding of these and 
related political economy factors are essential to understand the behaviour 
of both the public and private sector.
Whether resulting from world market price changes or national factors, 
national governments and the private sector responded to the actual and 
expected food price changes in the world market in different ways. In some 
cases policy interventions, particularly trade interventions by large export-
ers and importers, and private sector action contributed to further price 
volatility in the world market while in others the effect was to dampen the 
volatility. Similarly, poorly implemented policy interventions and private 
sector action increased domestic price volatility in some cases, while they 
improved price stability in most. An understanding of the constellation, 
goals, and relative power of stakeholder groups—the political economy 
issues—and how they vary among countries is important to explain the 
observed differences in the response to food price volatility by the public 
and private sector. That is the focus of the rest of the book.
3 According to Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Division (FAOSTAT) (accessed 24 
June 2013) the USA accounted for 50 per cent of worldwide maize export in 2010; the USA and 
Canada accounted for one-third of all wheat export; and Thailand and Vietnam accounted for 
about 50 per cent of all rice export (on a milled equivalent basis).
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In Chapter 2, Baltzer provides a synthesis of the estimates of price trans-
mission in the fourteen study-countries. He concludes that several of the 
countries are poorly integrated into world cereal markets and domestic food 
price volatility tends to result primarily from domestic supply shocks caused 
by extreme weather events, political turmoil, inappropriate macro policy, 
and mistrust and miscommunication between governments and the private 
sector. The price transmission from the world market to domestic markets in 
these countries tended to be low and in some countries the domestic price 
volatility exceeded the volatility in the world market. Low price transmis-
sion was also found in large middle-income countries such as China and 
India because of trade restrictions to maintain domestic price stability, while 
other large middle-income countries such as Brazil and South Africa allowed 
a high degree of pass-through of international prices of some cereals, nota-
bly rice and wheat, to the domestic markets. On the basis of an analysis of 
food price volatility in the world market and in 15 African countries dur-
ing 2007–10, Minot (2012: p. v) found increased food price volatility in the 
world market but no evidence that ‘food price volatility has increased in the 
region’. While high food price volatility in the world market may draw more 
attention by the news media and decision makers, country-specific factors 
such as extreme weather events and adverse policy interventions, may have 
much more serious implications for domestic food prices and household food 
security.
Most of the study-countries experienced large food price fluctuations 
during the period 2007–12, whether transmitted from the world market 
or caused by national factors. As synthesized by Bryan in Chapter 3, their 
policy responses varied widely. Bryan concludes that the responses were 
often uncoordinated, sometimes contradictory, poorly targeted, and some-
times mismanaged. The policy outcomes varied among countries but were 
frequently disappointing. Attempts to manage the supply of cereals on the 
domestic markets through procurement and release from storage and trade 
policy were unsuccessful in some countries but successful in others, nota-
bly China and India. Export bans and removal of import tariffs were effec-
tive in reducing price fluctuations in some countries but contributed to price 
increases in the world market by reducing supplies and increasing demand. 
Food and fertilizer subsidies implemented in several countries were difficult 
to manage and the fiscal costs were high. Where targeting was attempted, 
leakage was large. Expansions of existing social safety net programmes suc-
cessfully helped to compensate low-income people for higher food prices in 
some countries, notably Brazil and South Africa. Bryan draws four lessons 
from the synthesis: First, consider costs before deciding on policy action; sec-
ond, consider trade-offs between short-term emergency measures and meas-
ures with longer term effects; third, base the crisis responses on evidence 
An Overview
9
from experience from past policies; and fourth, spend the time between food 
price crises to generate the evidence needed to make evidence-based policy 
decisions.
In Chapter 4, Babu discusses various frameworks for analysing policy pro-
cesses and concludes that a combination of such frameworks is required to 
describe the processes and how the various stakeholder groups participate in 
them. The policy response to the food price fluctuations in a particular coun-
try depends on the existing policy process as well as the resources available, 
experience from past policies, and the policies currently in place. The policy 
process followed was influenced by the nature and degree of decentralization 
as well as the size of the country, the existing institutions and the degree of 
participation in policy-making. On the basis of the country studies, Babu 
concludes that democratically elected governments are more likely to select 
policies that benefit or at least do not antagonize powerful stakeholder groups 
over first-best policies from an efficiency point of view. The news media, 
the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played an 
important role in the choice of policies. As might be expected, authoritarian 
regimes tended to take action to maintain political stability and promote 
economic growth, taking into account the wishes of non-government stake-
holder groups only as needed to achieve those two goals. The policy process 
tends to be different in a period of crisis than between crises. The capac-
ity by governments and other stakeholder groups to engage in the design 
and implement interventions to deal with future food price crises should be 
strengthened. In particular, there is a need for more action-oriented research 
to enhance the evidence base for future policy interventions.
In Chapter 5, Watson combines the diverse policy responses and processes 
reported in Chapters 6–21, and synthesized in Chapters 3 and 4, with political 
economy theories in order to address the key question of this book: Why did 
governments take the action they took? Three models of government behav-
iour underlie the country-level analyses. The first, which Watson calls the 
‘naive model’, is based on the assumption that the government is a unitary, 
benevolent entity that aims to maximize social welfare in the most efficient 
way. While a large share of economic analysis of government decision-making 
is based on that assumption, it is rarely found. The second model, which 
represents the behaviour reported in several of the country studies, deviates 
from the first by including fragmented government, self-interested govern-
ment actors, and path dependence. The third model, which is reflected in the 
behaviour of some of the governments studied, is what is normally referred 
to as the rent-seeking model. It aims to maximize a weighted social welfare 
function in which the weights reflect the relative power and goals of the vari-
ous stakeholder groups. Fragmented government decision-making resulting 
in contradictory policy interventions; uncertainty and incorrect estimates 
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and forecasts; rent-seeking by policy makers and private sector groups; and 
mutual mistrust between governments and the private sector, contributed 
to policy failure to varying degrees in most of the countries. Path depend-
ence, i.e., modifying existing policies and institutions rather than designing 
and implementing new ones, was characteristic of the policy responses to 
the food price volatility in virtually all the countries. Similarly, even when 
the evidence showed that the rural poor suffered more than the urban poor 
from the food price volatility, existing urban bias in policy-making was 
enhanced. Protection of government legitimacy trumped poverty allevia-
tion. Contrary to the heavy-handed dictates by the international community 
forcing national governments to take specific action during the period of 
widespread economic adjustment, policy responses by national governments 
to the food crisis were rarely dictated, but rather supported, by donors and 
international organizations.
While the above mentioned syntheses attempt to draw generalizable les-
sons from the country studies, a more complete understanding of the politi-
cal economy of food price policy is obtained from in-depth country-specific 
analyses reported in Chapters  6–21. The country studies are presented 
according to the degree to which each country is expected to be integrated 
with world food markets. Low-income landlocked countries (Chapters 6–8) 
are followed by other low-income countries with limited dependence on 
food import (Chapters 9–10). Then follow low and middle-income countries 
heavily dependent on food imports (Chapters 11–14). Major food exporters, 
including Vietnam and four of the five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa) countries are presented in Chapters 15–19 and selected 
political economy issues in the USA and the European Union (EU) expected 
to affect developing countries are discussed in Chapters 20 and 21.
As reported by Admassie for Ethiopia (Chapter 6), Chinsinga and Chirwa 
for Malawi (Chapter 7), and Chapoto for Zambia (Chapter 8), the government 
food policy of these landlocked African countries focused on maize. This is 
so because of the importance of maize in the diet of people in these countries 
and because maize availability and prices are key factors in maintaining gov-
ernment legitimacy. The price transmission from the world market was low 
and weather-related production fluctuations and policy interventions were 
the primary causes of domestic food price fluctuations. Malawi and Zambia 
were successful in expanding maize production and storage facilities were 
stretched to the limit and beyond. However, maize prices did not fall. Malawi 
introduced price controls, domestic trade restrictions and export bans which 
all failed because of lack of implementation capacity by the parastatals and 
opposition by private traders. In Zambia, large farmers and millers benefit-
ted from direct access to high-level policy makers. Chapoto reports that 
Zambia’s response to increasing maize prices was a clear illustration of path 
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dependence void of policy innovation. Policy implementations were delayed 
and in some cases ineffective because of mutual mistrust between the gov-
ernment and the private sector, adverse behaviour by traders and millers, 
and opposing self-interests among key stakeholder groups. Rent-seeking 
behaviour was common.
Admassie (Chapter  6) found that increasing aggregate food demand in 
excess of supply expansions placed upward pressures on domestic food prices 
in Ethiopia and made the market more susceptible to abrupt fluctuations 
caused by adverse weather and policies. Admassie found that the executive 
branch of the Ethiopian government was all powerful. Neither the opposi-
tion parties nor other stakeholder groups, such as the private sector, NGOs, 
and the news media, appear to have had significant impact on the design and 
implementation of the policy responses.
Many of the political economy issues found in the two countries character-
ized as low-income countries with limited dependence on food import (Kenya 
and Mozambique) are similar to those found in the three landlocked coun-
tries discussed above. Although they imported significant amounts of cere-
als, they experienced low levels of price transmission from the world markets 
to domestic markets. Both of them experienced large food price fluctuations 
caused primarily by weather events and policy interventions. Ethiopia and 
Kenya (Nzuma, Chapter 9) followed a similar set of policy responses, which 
included export bans and reduced import tariffs for cereals, release of cereal 
stocks, subsidies for agricultural inputs, and social safety nets for urban con-
sumers in Kenya and the rural poor in Ethiopia. Avoiding social unrest and 
maintaining legitimacy appear to have been important goals. According to 
Nzuma, the policy responses in Kenya suffered from several policy rever-
sals, ineffective export restrictions and post-election political turmoil. Kenya 
experienced massive production shortfalls due to drought and political tur-
moil. Uneven distribution of power with the Kenyan government and a weak 
policy-making process contributed to the reversals and inefficiencies. Both 
countries pursued policy interventions to increase agricultural productivity, 
with emphasis on subsidies for fertilizers and other inputs. While, as men-
tioned above, such policies resulted in large production increases in Malawi 
and Zambia, the impact is less clear in Ethiopia and Kenya and, according 
to Nhate, Massingarela, and Salvucci, they failed to increase productivity in 
Mozambique (Chapter 10).
Four of the study-countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Nigeria, and Senegal) 
depend heavily on rice and wheat import. The food price transmission from 
the world market to domestic markets would be expected to be high but, as 
discussed by Baltzer in Chapter 2, the degree of transmission varied among 
the countries due to differences in foreign trade policy. While self-sufficiency 
in rice has long been a national objective in Bangladesh, domestic production 
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has fluctuated widely because of weather-related calamities and policy inter-
ventions causing large fluctuations in import demand (Raihan, Chapter 11). 
During the period 2007–8, the country was run by an unelected caretaker 
government backed by the military and the role of other stakeholder groups, 
including the private sector and NGOs, was very limited. Similar to the case 
of Kenya, the distribution of power in the Bangladeshi government was very 
uneven, with the Ministry of Finance having overall decision-making power 
over food and agricultural policy initiatives. This, together with extortions 
and unofficial payments in the supply chain caused delays and inefficiencies. 
The government undertook several initiatives to promote agricultural devel-
opment such as fertilizer and fuel subsidies as well as expanded funding of 
agricultural research and agricultural credit. The impact of these measures is 
yet to be measured.
Ghoneim (Chapter 12) estimates that 30–40 per cent of the price fluctua-
tions in the world market were transmitted to Egypt’s food market. This is 
less than what might be expected in view of the country’s heavy dependence 
on food imports and is a result of the Egyptian government’s heavy inter-
vention in the food sector along with fragmented markets, anti-competitive 
behaviour, and inefficiencies in the subsidy system. Declining real wages, 
increasing poverty, inefficiencies in the social safety net, and increasing 
media attention, together with increasing and fluctuating food prices have 
placed pressures on the government to focus on food policy. By reducing 
import tariffs on various food commodities and banning rice exports while 
maintaining large fuel and food subsidies without effective targeting, the 
action by the Egyptian government illustrates the path dependence dis-
cussed by Watson in Chapter 5. Although the fiscal costs of these policies are 
very high and possibly unsustainable in the longer run, Ghoneim concludes 
that the current political leadership favours the status quo to avoid negative 
social and political repercussions from any reform, particularly because of 
the political uncertainties following the recent revolution.
In Chapter 13, Olomola reports that, contrary to Ethiopia, Vietnam, China, 
and other countries with a highly centralized policy-making arrangement, 
Nigeria’s policy response was heavily influenced by several stakeholder groups 
including the federal government, politicians, the news media, and producer 
associations. Because of the conflicting stakeholder goals and desires, the 
development of a policy agenda was slow and difficult, although the output 
from a meeting of the state governors and the president resulted in a set of 
policy interventions (release of cereals from reserves, import of half a million 
tons of rice for distribution at subsidized prices, and suspension of import 
tariffs on rice) that were approved and implemented within a short period of 
time. Producer associations, the news media, and millers played important 
roles in the design and implementation of the policy responses. Although the 
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influence by consumers is unclear, they benefitted from the policy interven-
tions, such as expanded rice import and the import tariff waiver, because 
they were successful in reversing food price increases. A guaranteed mini-
mum price aimed to compensate farmers for the potential income loss from 
that reversal.
Resnick (Chapter 14) reports that Senegal was particularly vulnerable to 
food price increase in the world market because of its heavy dependence on 
imports coupled with two seasons of poor cereal production. The price trans-
mission from the world market to the Senegalese market was particularly 
high for rice but also significant for other food commodities such as wheat 
and dairy products. A  lack of an agricultural strategy to expand domestic 
food production and the urban population’s preference for imported food 
added to the severity of the impact of the global food price fluctuations. In 
response to demands and pressures from various stakeholder groups includ-
ing consumer groups, trade unions, the news media, and five major street 
demonstrations, the government introduced an array of policy interventions 
such as consumer subsidies, social protection schemes, and suspension of 
import duties and value added taxes at very high fiscal costs. The govern-
ment also launched a high-profile agricultural initiative which, accord-
ing to Resnick, was too focused on achieving short-term goals rather than 
long-term structural changes to the agricultural sector needed to achieve the 
stated goal of food self-sufficiency. In an attempt to satisfy the broad range of 
well-organized stakeholder groups that advocated for specific interventions, 
Resnick concludes that the government failed to properly target and imple-
ment the many policy interventions and forfeited the opportunity to devise 
a financially viable, social protection programme and a long-term agricul-
tural strategy.
The policy response to the global food price volatility differed among 
the five major food exporting developing countries included in this book 
(Vietnam and the four BRICS countries). Three of the countries (China, India, 
and Vietnam) protected domestic food markets from the price fluctuations in 
the world market through trade policies (primarily export restrictions) that 
reduced price transmission. By keeping domestic food prices lower than they 
would have been with full pass-through, consumers gained while producers 
lost. In all three countries, rapidly increasing prices of the main staples (par-
ticularly rice and wheat) might lead to political instability and the main goal 
of the policies to reduce price transmission was undoubtedly related to politi-
cal legitimacy, dressed formally as a food security goal. The other two major 
exporters (Brazil and South Africa) continued exports and permitted inter-
national prices to reach domestic markets, thus benefitting farmers while 
expanding existing subsidy schemes and other social safety nets to compen-
sate low-income consumers. Both Brazil and South Africa have strong farmer 
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associations with direct access to the policy-making process. Brazilian con-
sumers were partially protected by a strong currency appreciation.
Although the political power in Vietnam is relatively centralized, Nguyen 
and Talbot (Chapter 15) report that there is political space for other stake-
holder groups, including civil society, international organizations, research 
institutes, and the news media. Although the central government sets quan-
tity goals for rice export, several government entities are involved in policy 
implementation and Nguyen and Talbot found a mismatch between policy 
instruments implemented by two distinct sets of actors with two distinct 
objectives: to insulate consumers from increasing rice prices and to ensure 
profits for rice farmers. Such mismatch may result from the government’s 
attempt to balance the competing interests of consumers and producers. 
Lack of information and deficient forecasting for rice production led to pol-
icy reversals.
India’s export bans for wheat, common rice and large stocks of cereals basi-
cally de-linked world market prices and domestic prices for rice and wheat 
during 2007–8 (Ganguly and Gulati, Chapter 16) and added significantly 
to price volatility in the world market. Domestic prices remained stable 
until mid-2009 when severe droughts caused production shortfalls and rap-
idly increasing prices. Ganguly and Gulati conclude that the Indian gov-
ernment’s heavy emphasis on policy interventions, such as food subsidies 
and rural employment guarantee programmes, expected to have short-run 
impact, diverts public funds away from investments in agriculture and rural 
infrastructure, which would have a much greater impact on poverty allevia-
tion and economic growth in the longer term.
In response to the rapidly increasing world market prices for cereals, the 
Chinese government decided to stabilize domestic food prices and did so 
very successfully (Huang, Yang, and Rozelle, Chapter 17). A set of policy 
interventions consisting of the release of government cereal stocks, long-
term futures contracts with exporting countries, increasing agricultural 
subsidies, support of farmers’ risk management, higher food subsidies and 
enhancement of the social safety net for urban consumers, the suspen-
sion of any expansion of biofuel production which competed with food 
production and increased investment in agricultural technology, and 
water availability, served both the rural and urban populations well while 
strengthening the government’s legitimacy. The highly centralized gov-
ernance system, amply supported by relevant evidence of expected impact 
of alternative policy interventions, was able to respond rapidly and effec-
tively to the emerging food crisis. Together with the Indian trade policies 
mentioned above, the Chinese policy interventions amplified the food 
price increase and volatility in the world market. To avoid such beggar-
thy-neighbour policies Huang, Yang, and Rozelle suggest that a new global 
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governance system is needed to coordinate actions among major food 
importers and exporters.
According to Mueller and Mueller (Chapter 18), past inequalities and hyper-
inflation have guided the Brazilian government to prioritize fiscally sound 
social inclusion. The international food price increases in 2007–8 might 
therefore be expected to cause concern because they might undermine both 
social inclusion and price stability. Yet, the policy response and the reac-
tion by society were very limited. Domestic cereal prices did increase during 
2007–8, but much less than the increase in the world market. Rather than 
restricting cereal exports to control domestic prices, as done in China, India, 
and Vietnam, exports were continued at the higher world market prices. 
Farm incomes increased and increasing wages of the rural labour force largely 
compensated for the higher food prices. The existing extensive system of 
social protection targeting transfers to low-income people was expanded to 
compensate for higher food prices and no new policies or programmes were 
designed. According to Mueller and Mueller, the global food price volatility 
caused very limited disagreements among the various stakeholder groups.
Similar to Brazil, South Africa (Kirsten, Chapter 19) did not implement any 
major policy change in response to the international food price volatility 
beginning in 2007. Existing trade policy for food and agricultural commodi-
ties (basically undistorted) were not changed. The comprehensive social 
welfare programme that had been in place since 1998 was expanded to com-
pensate for the negative effects of price increases, but no new policies were 
designed. Lobbying by farmers may have been instrumental in maintaining 
an unfettered trade regime for agricultural commodities and lobbying by 
trade unions and consumer groups probably contributed to the expansion of 
the transfer programmes. Although the news media was actively engaged in 
the debate about the food price volatility, Kirsten concludes that it had very 
little or no policy impact.
As in the case of Brazil and South Africa, the USA’s direct response to the 
international food price increase and volatility was very limited, but the 
impact of US policies, particularly the biofuel policies, on international food 
prices, was very significant (Rausser and de Gorter, Chapter 20). Although 
the direct effect was on maize and soybean prices, spill-overs to wheat and 
rice were large. Several stakeholder groups within the USA including growers’ 
associations, fuel transporters, biofuel producers, and some environmental-
ists, and the energy security community supported the promotion of biofuel 
while others, including livestock producers and food processors, opposed. 
Rausser and de Gorter suggest that US macroeconomic policies as well as 
energy and sugar policies also contributed to global food price volatility.
The common agricultural policy of the EU had little or no impact on 
food price volatility in the world market since 2007 and the potential for 
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influencing the world market prices is very limited. Food prices in the EU 
followed the changes in world market prices, but the scale of change was 
much smaller (Swinnen, Knops, and van Herck, Chapter 21). Average prices 
for EU producers increased by less than 20 per cent in real terms during the 
first price spike and less during the second spike. Real consumer prices for 
food increased by only 5 per cent during 2005–12, with very little volatility. 
Food price changes triggered several policy initiatives within the EU, includ-
ing increased social spending to protect poor consumers and revisions of 
the EU biofuel policies to reduce the use of food crops for biofuel. Instead of 
expanding food aid to developing countries, the EU established a €1 billion 
food facility and supported initiatives by G20 to reduce price volatility and 
improve market information.
In Chapter  22, Pinstrup-Andersen presents a brief summary of the 
major policy lessons from the work reported in the book. The objective is 
to complement rather than repeat the many lessons reported in the syn-
thesis chapters by Baltzer, Bryan, Babu, and Watson. Recommendations 
about specific policy interventions and their political feasibility are likely 
to be most successful if made within the specific political economy context. 
However, on the basis of the findings reported in this book, some policy 
recommendations are likely to be relevant for many countries. Eight such 
recommendations are presented in Chapter 22. They are: the strengthen-
ing of the policy-relevant evidence base; the appropriate use of trade policy 
and limiting the interference in price signals; the reduction in fiscal costs of 
short-term interventions; investments to increase the food supply elasticity; 
facilitating effective risk management tools; improving the management of 
public sector grain stocks; making the demand for raw materials for biofuel 
price-related; and improving the collaboration between the public and pri-
vate sectors.
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International to Domestic Price 
Transmission in Fourteen Developing 
Countries during the 2007–8 Food Crisis
Kenneth Baltzer*
2.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes the evidence of price transmission from interna-
tional markets to domestic markets during the 2007–8 food crisis experi-
enced by the fourteen countries studied in this volume. It covers the markets 
for three grain commodities: maize, wheat, and rice.
The degree of price transmission from international to domestic markets 
during the 2007–8 food crisis varied significantly across countries. The coun-
try studies reviewed in this chapter discuss a wide range of factors that may 
serve to explain this variation, notably active stabilization policies and poor 
market integration due to high transportation costs and market imperfec-
tions. In several countries, domestic prices are largely unrelated to interna-
tional prices and therefore reflect purely local shocks, such as harvest failures 
and political turmoil, which are independent from, but coincide with, the 
global crisis.
The empirical literature on price transmission that has emerged since the 
crisis generally comes to similar conclusions. Abbott and Borot de Battisti 
(2011) investigate price transmission patterns for a number of African coun-
tries (including a few others, such as China and Brazil, for comparison) by 
* The author would like to thank all the authors of the fourteen case studies, upon which this 
synthesis is based, for their useful comments and quality control of an earlier version of this 
study. Also, the study has benefitted greatly from constructive input by Shane Bryan, Derrill 
Watson II, Per Pinstrup-Andersen, and an anonymous reviewer. Finally, a special thanks to Per 
Pinstrup-Andersen for his encouragements and great patience throughout the process.
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plotting international and local commodity price indices and estimating 
price transmission elasticities. They find great variation in price transmis-
sion from almost none in China to virtually complete in Brazil. In Africa, 
countries like Nigeria and Ethiopia appear to be closely linked to the world 
markets, whereas most of the other countries show limited and/or lagged 
responses, suggesting that world market pressures are resisted by domestic 
market institutions. Abbott and Borot de Battisti also identify certain pat-
terns, such as much greater price transmission for highly traded commodi-
ties (for instance rice) compared to non-tradable ones (millet and sorghum), 
and higher price transmission rates for import-dependent countries, includ-
ing rice in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Malawi, and Uganda; maize in 
Malawi and Uganda; and wheat in Ethiopia.
Such findings are supported by other studies on countries in Africa (Benson, 
Mugarura, and Wanda 2008; Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao 2010; Minot 2011), 
Asia (Dawe 2008; Robles 2011), and Latin America (de Janvry and Sadoulet 
2010; Robles 2011).
Most African countries experienced commodity price increases which were 
lower than the international prices, but in a few countries, notably Ethiopia 
and Malawi, food prices grew more rapidly than on the world market (Minot 
2011). This suggests that other shocks than the world market prices were at 
play. Similarly, Benson et  al. (2008) argue that the increasing food prices 
in Uganda could be better explained by domestic or regional factors (for 
instance, spill-overs from harvest shortfalls in neighbouring Kenya) rather 
than by the global food crisis.
Transmission of rice prices in Asia was limited in most cases, notably 
India, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Dawe 2008). Interestingly, Dawe finds 
a relatively high degree of pass-through (64 per cent) in China, which is in 
stark contrast to the almost flat local prices shown by Abbott and Borot de 
Battisti (2011). However, Dawe’s paper was one of the first analyses on the 
global food crisis, and the prices of rice were only available up to late 2007, 
i.e. before the international rice prices accelerated. Based on more recent 
data covering the international spike in rice prices, Robles (2011) finds that 
the pass-through of rice prices was actually lower in Bangladesh (34 per 
cent), a rice importer, than in Pakistan and Vietnam (around 51 per cent), 
two rice exporters.
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2010) and Robles (2011) report quite low price 
transmission elasticities in a number of Latin American countries (Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, and the Dominican Republic). Indeed, in Nicaragua (maize), Honduras 
(maize), and the Dominican Republic (rice), the pass-through may even have 
been negative. In general, price transmission elasticities are estimated to 
be below 20 per cent, with notable exception being rice markets in Mexico 
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(almost 50 per cent) and wheat-to-bread price transmission in Ecuador (just 
over 40 per cent).
Through a synthesis of the fourteen country studies and with the support 
of food price data from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Global 
Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), this study provides an 
overview of the price transmission patterns experienced by the countries 
during the food crisis period. The data is summarized graphically by plot-
ting monthly series of local maize, rice, and wheat prices against interna-
tional benchmark prices. Additionally, the wealth of information offered by 
the country-study authors is reviewed in an attempt to gather some broad 
insights into how food price policies, domestic institutions, and other factors 
affected price transmission.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
2.2.1 What is Price Transmission?
The fundamental theoretical basis for price transmission is the law of one 
price (LOP) (Fackler and Goodwin 2001). The LOP can be written as
 p p tw d− ≤     (1)
where  pw and pd are the prices of a commodity on the world market and the 
domestic market respectively and t represents the transaction costs associ-
ated with importing or exporting the commodity.1 Equation (1) states that 
the gap between the international and the domestic prices of a commodity 
should never be larger than the transaction costs.
The positive transaction costs effectively create a price band between 
import parity, pw + t, and export parity, pw − t. If domestic supply and demand 
conditions are such that the domestic price lies within the price band, no 
international trade is profitable. In contrast, if domestic supply is sufficiently 
large relative to demand to press domestic prices below export parity, incen-
tives for international arbitrage should ensure that domestic prices do not 
stay too far below export parity for too long. Similarly, relatively tight domes-
tic supplies, which push domestic prices close to or above the import parity, 
should invite importers to satisfy the excess demand at import parity. In 
effect, if the domestic price is within the parity bounds and the commod-
ity is non-traded, we would expect the domestic price to be determined by 
domestic supply and demand condition and be unrelated to international 
1 Transaction cost is a general concept used to capture a variety of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
costs associated with trading, such as transportation costs, import tariffs, waste, spoilage, and 
opportunity costs due to delays, profit margins, etc.
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prices. Instead, if the commodity is traded, the LOP predicts a close relation-
ship between the international and domestic prices.
In reality, the distinction between isolation from the international markets 
and world market integration is not as clear-cut as the theoretical discus-
sion above would suggest. For instance, Mozambique and Kenya are both 
import-dependent in cereals, yet some studies (e.g. Minot 2011) have found 
that these countries are poorly integrated with the world markets. In con-
trast, even isolated markets, like the maize market in Ethiopia, appear to dis-
play some long-term relationship with the international markets (Loening, 
Durevall, and Birru 2009). In general, we are likely to find that domestic 
prices in all countries are determined by a mix of domestic factors as well 
as transmission from international prices. The relative strength of domestic 
versus international factors varies greatly from country to country depend-
ing on how well countries are integrated with the world market. The rest of 
this section discusses briefly a number of factors which may influence market 
integration.
2.2.2 Imperfect Market Integration
Transaction costs cover costs of transportation due to poor infrastructure 
(particularly if countries are landlocked), imperfectly competitive markets, 
regulatory costs, and tariffs as well as taxes. The higher the transaction costs 
are, the more likely it is that domestic prices fall within the parity bounds 
and commodities are non-traded. This is often the case with some of the 
basic staples in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), such as millet, sorghum, cassava, 
and teff, but it also sometimes happens with internationally traded com-
modities. In such cases, the LOP no longer applies and we should not expect 
significant price transmission across borders. Yet, sometimes it still takes 
place. Demand substitution may link non-traded with traded commodities. 
As the price of the traded commodity increases following an international 
price shock, demand may shift towards non-traded commodities resulting in 
higher prices on these as well. Such cross-commodity price transmission may 
be weak, as Resnick (Chapter 14) indicates in the case of Senegal; or relatively 
strong, as appeared to have been the case in Ethiopia (Rashid 2011).
The trade status of an individual country tends to persist over time. 
Countries are often consistently net importers, net exporters, or separated 
from international markets. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, 
due to improvements in agricultural productivity, Malawi has shifted from 
import dependence to becoming largely self-sufficient in maize (Chirwa and 
Chinsinga, Chapter 7). South Africa, which is a regional trade hub for many 
commodities, varies between being net importer and net exporter of maize. 
Such trade regime shifts complicate price transmission analysis. Moving 
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from trading to non-trading status may disrupt the price transmission mech-
anism. Shifting from exporter to importer (or vice versa) may cause sharp 
changes in domestic prices independently from international price move-
ments as the domestic price changes from export parity to import parity. 
Needless to say, considering the trade status and particularly changes in trade 
status is important for evaluating price transmission.
Many of the country studies in the sample, notably for Egypt, South Africa, 
Bangladesh, Senegal, and Zambia (Chapoto, Chapter 8; Ghoneim, Chapter 12; 
Kirsten, Chapter 19; Raihan, Chapter 11; Resnick, Chapter 14), suggest that 
the domestic food supply chains are characterized by high concentration and 
non-competitive behaviour. Imperfect competition in the supply chain adds 
additional margins to the transaction costs and thus influences the degree 
of price transmission. A large literature on supply chain price transmission 
argues that imperfect competition may be an important explanation for 
asymmetric price transmission, i.e. the observation that increasing prices are 
transmitted relatively strongly down the value chain, whereas lower prices 
are transmitted incompletely and/or with significant lag. Such asymmetries 
also complicate price transmission analyses.
Public policies may heavily influence the degree of price transmission. All 
countries in the sample use fiscal regulatory instruments such as tariffs, sub-
sidies, and value added tax (VAT), which directly add to or subtract from 
the transaction costs. Non-fiscal government market interventions, such as 
non-tariff trade barriers, parastatal grain traders (China, India, Vietnam, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia, and Egypt), and price controls (notably Senegal), 
disrupt the price transmission mechanisms in ways that are harder to gener-
alize. Most countries responded to the global food crisis by expanding exist-
ing policies or introducing new regulations. The next section investigates in 
more detail these policy responses’ likely impact on price transmission.
2.3 Political Intervention
During and after the global food crisis period, most governments in develop-
ing countries pursued a range of policies in attempts to reduce the transmis-
sion of the higher international prices to the domestic markets or to limit 
their adverse consequences (e.g., see Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2011 for 
a review). The fourteen country studies in the present sample describe simi-
lar policy responses (see Bryan, Chapter 3, for a comprehensive synthesis). 
The discussion of the possible impacts of policy interventions on price trans-
mission is organized under three types of policies: trade policies, domestic 
policies, and macroeconomic policies. I end this section by briefly discussing 
issues surrounding design and implementation of policies.
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2.3.1 Trade Policies
Border policies were pursued by many of the countries in the form of export 
restrictions and reductions of import tariffs (see Bryan, Chapter 3). Export 
restrictions are discussed first and import tariff waivers second.
By restricting exports, governments sought to reduce or completely disrupt 
the link between the international and the domestic prices. Obviously, the pol-
icy is likely to have the greatest effect when the export restriction is binding, 
i.e., if the country is already exporting the commodity or would have done so 
in the absence of the restriction. This is not to say that export restrictions are 
necessarily ineffective for an importer. If a cereal importer’s price stabilization 
policies are effective or the country experiences a bumper harvest, domestic 
prices may drop below export parity, thus creating incentives for exporting to 
neighbouring countries that are stabilizing local prices less aggressively. Still, 
a consistent food importer may face additional obstacles to changing trade 
status in the short term as prospective exporters need to establish new export 
channels, demonstrate compliance with quality standards, etc. (Dawe 2010).
Export restrictions were implemented by China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, 
Kenya, Malawi, Vietnam, and Zambia (Bryan, Chapter 3). They were, how-
ever, not likely to be equally binding everywhere. China, India, Vietnam, 
and Egypt appear to have had both the capacity (indicated by exports in the 
recent years) and the incentive (the international prices being higher than 
the domestic equivalents) to export rice, and in India’s case, wheat. In con-
trast, it is doubtful that the export bans in Ethiopia and Kenya had much of 
an impact on price transmission. Although these countries have exported 
small quantities of maize in the recent past, the local prices have been much 
higher than the international prices. Malawi and Zambia are borderline 
cases: both have been exporting a small maize surplus to neighbouring coun-
tries recently. The domestic prices were roughly at par with international 
prices during the summer of 2008, whereas the prices in neighbouring coun-
tries, such as Mozambique and Kenya, were considerably higher. It is there-
fore quite possible that exports could have continued had the ban not been 
in effect (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7, and Chapoto, Chapter 8, both 
report that some informal trade did take place in spite of the bans).
Suspending import tariffs may briefly halt or reverse the increase on 
domestic prices, but it will not sever the link to international prices. On the 
contrary, eliminating tariffs reduces transaction costs which may strengthen 
rather than weaken the market integration. Several countries suspended 
import tariffs on grains to partially compensate for the increasing interna-
tional prices (Demeke et al. 2011). However, in many cases the tariffs were 
very low to begin with and hence the tariff waivers might only have had a 
marginal effect on price transmission.
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Bangladesh, Egypt, and Senegal temporarily removed tariffs on rice and 
wheat, but they were already relatively low, between 2 and 10 per cent, so the 
impact must have been modest (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) 
database). Tariffs were much higher in Kenya and Nigeria and the tariff waivers 
have likely softened the impact of the higher international prices. It is notewor-
thy that these two countries experienced significant domestic price shocks in 
spite of the policy responses (see the discussion on price transmission in Kenya 
and Nigeria in sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 below).
2.3.2 Domestic Policies
Domestic policies cover interventions that are designed to adjust domestic 
prices directly (e.g., food subsidies, suspension of VAT, or direct price controls), 
policies implemented to increase domestic food supply (e.g., release of grains 
from strategic grain reserves and long-term improvements in agricultural pro-
duction), and social protection policies. Investments in agriculture and other 
efforts to improve agricultural productivity are long-term measures which 
are unlikely to have a major effect on price transmission patterns within the 
food crisis period. Also, social protection policies (such as income transfers 
and food for work programmes) should not affect price transmission directly, 
although they may contribute to maintaining food demand (Demeke et al. 
2011). These policies are therefore not the focus of this synthesis.
Food subsidies and elimination of domestic duties work largely the same 
way as tariff waivers, except that they affect domestically produced commod-
ities and not just imported food. The impact of higher international prices on 
domestic retail prices is reduced, but market integration should, if anything, 
be strengthened by the lower transaction costs. Such price support policies 
were attempted in Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Senegal, Vietnam, and Zambia (Bryan, Chapter 3), but it is not possible to get 
a complete overview of their likely impact. We have little information on the 
size of the subsidies and VATs, and we know generally little about the extent 
to which subsidies were applied (universally or specifically targeted).
Price controls may completely disrupt the price transmission mechanism 
if they are successfully enforced. Among the fourteen study-countries, only 
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal attempted to control prices directly. The expe-
riences of Malawi and Senegal demonstrate the difficulties associated with 
fixing prices when enforcement mechanisms are lacking. In Malawi, a price 
band was supposed to be maintained through open market grain procure-
ment and sales by ADMARC, a parastatal trader, but the agency lacked the 
necessary funds for its operation (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter  7). In 
Senegal, the government promised to subsidize rice distributors in return for 
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observing the price ceiling, but the policy backfired when the government 
was unable to disburse the funds on time (Resnick, Chapter 14).
Releasing grain from public stocks should not by itself directly affect price 
transmission if domestic markets are perfectly integrated with the world mar-
ket. Any excess supply at prevailing world market prices would simply be 
exported. However, if markets are imperfectly integrated, possibly as a result 
of export restrictions, expansion of domestic supply should help depress 
domestic prices.
Among the fourteen study-countries, Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, India, 
and Nigeria attempted to expand domestic supply by releasing stocks (Bryan, 
Chapter 3). It is difficult to evaluate the likely impact of such policies. Most 
of the country studies do not specify exactly how much grain was released, 
and the ones on Bangladesh, Egypt, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia report that 
private traders responded to their governments’ attempts at stabilizing prices 
by hoarding grain. If such behaviour is widespread, private stockpiling of 
grain could render public efforts at stabilizing prices largely ineffective.
2.3.3 Macroeconomic Policies
Macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal and monetary policies, tend to be 
blunt instruments for achieving food price stabilizing objectives. However, 
the food crisis and the food price policies discussed above have macroeco-
nomic repercussions, so it is instructive to briefly review the role played by 
macroeconomic policies during the food crisis period.
Consider first fiscal policies. Attempting to stabilize food prices or alleviat-
ing the impacts of higher food prices is very expensive. Most of the food price 
policies pursued by the fourteen countries either reduce government revenue 
(suspension of import tariffs and VAT) or increase outlays (food subsidies, social 
transfers, and agricultural investments). They are not likely to be sustainable 
if needed for an extended period of time (Abbott and Borot de Battisti 2011). 
As a result, food price policies may temporarily reduce price transmission, but 
once fiscal constraints force governments to roll back the policies, the link 
between the international and the domestic prices is re-established, possibly 
with a lag. Several countries in the sample approached the fiscal limits during 
the crisis, partly due to aggressive grain market regulation. For instance, Egypt 
managed to expand relatively generous food subsidies by cutting other gov-
ernment expenses (such as fuel subsidies) (Ghoneim, Chapter 12), while price 
policies in Malawi and Senegal were rendered ineffective by lack of funds 
(Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7; Resnick, Chapter 14).
Several of the country studies view the food crisis from a monetary per-
spective. Admassie (Chapter  6) suggests that relatively accommodating 
monetary policies in the years prior to the food crisis were responsible for a 
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significant portion of the observed Ethiopian food price inflation. In addi-
tion, the food crisis also coincided with rising general inflation in India and 
Bangladesh (Raihan, Chapter 11; Ganguly and Gulati, Chapter 16). One of the 
key responses to the crisis in these countries was tightening monetary policy. 
In contrast, Brazil found room for loosening monetary policies slightly by 
extending public credit, despite a strong focus on anti-inflationary policies 
(Mueller and Mueller, Chapter 18).
In a theoretical fully flexible economy, monetary policies should not influ-
ence the price transmission mechanism. Demand-driven inflation would 
increase domestic cereal prices denominated in local currency, but the 
exchange rate would depreciate by the same rate thus cancelling the effect 
of inflation on prices measured in foreign currency (US$). Economies are, 
however, not fully flexible and it is unlikely that exchange rate movements 
completely negate inflationary pressures, particularly in the short run. For 
instance, Ethiopia pursued a strongly inflationary monetary policy up to and 
during the food crisis period while placing strict controls on foreign exchange. 
As a result, the currency depreciated only marginally and the general infla-
tionary pressures drove US$-denominated cereal prices higher (Minot 2011).
Exchange rate movements also greatly affect how US$-denominated price 
increases are transmitted to local-currency prices (Dawe 2008; Abbott and 
Borot de Battisti 2011). In this study, all price transmission evidence pre-
sented is measured in US$ prices in order to fully concentrate on the price 
transmission mechanism. Still, it is worthwhile briefly considering how 
exchange rate variations impacted on how domestic consumers experienced 
the food crisis. Consider for instance Brazil, where the price of maize rose by 
122 per cent in US$ terms between June 2006 and June 2008. However, as the 
Brazilian real appreciated relative to the US$ over the same period, local cur-
rency denominated prices increased only by around 60 per cent. Most coun-
tries in the sample saw currency appreciation relative to the US$ (although 
not to the extent that Brazil did), but there are also exceptions. Due to the 
inflationary monetary policies in Ethiopia, the birr depreciated during the 
food crisis period and the price of maize rose by 189 per cent in US$ terms 
and 220 per cent when measured in local currency units.2
2.3.4 Policy Implementation
Policy interventions only work as intended if they are designed and 
implemented properly. Many of the country studies provide examples of 
2 The numbers are own calculations based on price data obtained from the FAO GIEWS food 
price database and exchange rates from International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial statistics.
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interventions that have gone awry due to lack of information, poor govern-
ment capacity, and political concerns, or corrupt practices.
Policy makers do not operate in an environment of perfect information, 
particularly when dramatic events, such as the global food crisis, call for 
swift action. Many of the studies indicate that government interventions 
based on poor information have been less effective or have even exacerbated 
the situation. For instance, incorrect harvest forecasts led the government 
of Vietnam to reduce the number of export licenses in a situation where 
Vietnam could have benefited from improved terms of trade (Nguyen and 
Talbot, Chapter 15). In contrast, the government of Malawi apparently over-
estimated the maize harvest and entered an export contract with Zimbabwe 
that could not be filled (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7). One of the key 
lessons learned by the South African government from an earlier local food 
crisis in 2002–3, was the importance of accurate and timely information 
which led the government to establish a network for monitoring food prices 
more closely (Kirsten, Chapter 19).
Whether or not appropriate policies are designed, many governments, par-
ticularly in SSA, have limited capacity to implement the policies properly. 
Several of the country studies report that policies could not be enforced. For 
instance, substantial informal cross-border trade took place in Kenya, Malawi, 
and Zambia in violation of export bans (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7; 
Chapoto, Chapter 8; Nzuma, Chapter 9). Malawi and Senegal imposed price 
controls, but they were largely ignored (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7; 
Resnick, Chapter 14). Also, many of the policies pursued by the governments, 
such as food and input subsidies, import and VAT waivers, and social safety 
nets, put severe strain on the countries’ fiscal resources.
An important constraint on policy implementation is the political econ-
omy of food price policy generating rent-seeking behaviour. The political 
environment shapes the choice, specific design, and implementation of food 
price policies, and policy implementation is also often influenced by politics 
and corruption. For a more in-depth analysis of the political economy of 
food price policy, see Watson (Chapter 5).
2.4 Price Transmission Patterns
The local grain markets in each of the fourteen countries in the country-
study sample responded to the rising international grain prices in a variety 
of ways. Although no two stories are exactly the same, I attempt to identify 
some common patterns by classifying the fourteen countries into four cat-
egories: ‘free traders’, ‘exporting stabilizers’, ‘importers’, and ‘the isolated’. 
This classification is based on an assessment of the local markets’ exposure 
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to international price shocks, largely determined by the countries’ trade sta-
tus and the strength and effectiveness of the food price policies pursued by 
the countries as detailed in the country studies. I chose the classification 
scheme to provide a rough guide to what kind of price transmission patterns 
we should expect to find. The classification is as follows:
1. Free traders: Brazil and South Africa are well-integrated into the global 
cereal markets as net importers, net exporters, or both (depending on 
harvests). They responded to the food crisis with few and relatively weak 
food price policies and we would therefore expect them to display a high 
degree of price transmission. As we will see, this is also largely what we 
find, although the picture is distorted a bit by trade regime shifts.
2. Exporting stabilizers: China, India, and Vietnam are all net exporters of 
rice, and they reacted forcefully to the rising international prices with 
strong food price policies. We would expect to see relatively weak price 
transmission in these countries as they have a powerful instrument, 
export restrictions, at their disposal. We find that in China and India 
these policies effectively stabilized local prices during the period, but 
the Vietnamese policies appeared to have had a limited impact.
3. Importers: Bangladesh, Egypt, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal are 
consistently dependent on imports of their main staples. They are 
exposed to international price volatility and in contrast to exporters 
they have very few means available for stabilizing local prices. Thus, we 
would expect price transmission to be relatively high. As we will see, 
the picture is rather mixed due to local factors and distorting policies.
4. The isolated: Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia are poorly inte-
grated into global cereal markets and are largely self-sufficient in their 
main staple. In these cases, we would expect that domestic prices are 
primarily determined by local supply and demand factors and largely 
unrelated to global prices. Interestingly, we find that in spite of the coun-
tries’ relatively isolated status, they all experienced sharply increasing 
food prices during the crisis period.
In the following, I summarize the price transmission patterns observed in 
the countries in these four groups, and discuss some of the main factors 
influencing the patterns. Ideally, this summary would present estimates of 
price transmission elasticities. There are, however, technical and concep-
tual problems involved with such methods, when applied to the food cri-
sis period, primarily that the standard methods may not be strictly valid.3 
3 Technically, the price series are likely to be strongly non-stationary during the food crisis 
period, even in first-difference form, and standard inference methods may therefore not be valid.
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Although these issues may be solvable, such attempts are beyond the scope 
of this synthesis. Instead, to give as clear and transparent picture of the price 
transmission patterns as possible, I provide a graphical representation of the 
international and domestic prices, and discuss in a bit more detail the main 
factors influencing the patterns.
2.4.1 Free Traders
The first group of countries consists of Brazil and South Africa. I call the 
group the free traders as both countries appear to be closely integrated into 
the world grain markets. In addition, they were pursuing fairly liberal food 
price policies during the crisis (as detailed in Mueller and Mueller, Chapter 
18; and Kirsten, Chapter 19). This is also reflected in the relatively close co-
movement of local maize, rice, and wheat prices with their international 
equivalents as illustrated in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
In most markets, the prices move close together. There are, however, a few 











































International Brazil South Africa
Figure 2.1 Maize prices in Brazil and South Africa
Note:  International: US Gulf, no. 2’, yellow maize. Brazil: national average, yellow maize, wholesale. 
South Africa: Randfontain, white maize, wholesale. US Gulf, no. 2 refers to the specific maize vari-
ety used to designate the international maize price. This is the most commonly used benchmark 
for an international maize price.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database.
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than the international prices. There are relatively large gaps between the 
South African and the international maize price in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 
the second half of 2007, but the gaps seem to disappear briefly in 2003, 2005, 
and 2008. The South African maize market is characterized by substantial 
variation in production around what is needed to satisfy demand (FAOSTAT 
2013a). As a result, South Africa shifts continuously between being a net 
importer and a net exporter of maize. When South Africa is a net importer, 
as in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 (according to data from FAOSTAT 2013b), 
the domestic price approaches import parity, whereas periods of net exports 
(2003, 2005, and 2008)  drive prices towards export parity (NAMC 2007, 
2009). Kirsten (Chapter  19) finds that when such trade regime shifts are 
accounted for, the evidence suggests that South African grain markets are 
highly integrated into the world markets.
The only other market in this group which experienced regime shift dur-
ing the crisis period is the Brazilian market for rice. Brazil is traditionally a 
rice net importer, but at the peak of the crisis in 2008, the country exported 
around 81,000 tons more than it imported, compared to a net import of 

































International China India Vietnam
Figure 2.2 Rice prices in Brazil
Note: International: Bangkok, ‘Thai 100% B’. Brazil: national average, wholesale. Thai 100% B refers 
to the specific rice variety used to designate the international rice price. This is the most commonly 
used benchmark for an international rice price.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database. 
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for the relatively modest transmission of the international price peak as the 
domestic price declines (relative to international prices) from import parity 
towards export parity.
Both Brazil and South Africa are consistent net importers of wheat 
(FAOSTAT 2013b), so the domestic wheat prices tend to move closely with 
international prices (NAMC 2009). In Figure 2.3, discrepancies are evident 
during and after the global food crisis period, but the overall impression of 
substantial market integration remains.
2.4.2 Exporting Stabilizers
China and India successfully managed to stabilize local rice prices, primarily 
by banning exports. Vietnam also introduced export restrictions, but the sta-
bilization policies were less effective. Common features of these three coun-
tries are that they are all net exporters of rice (India and Vietnam being two 
of the largest rice exporters in the world), and that grain trade tends to be 


































Figure 2.3 Wheat prices in Brazil and South Africa
Note: International: US Gulf, no. 2, hard winter red. Brazil: national average, wholesale. South 
Africa: Randfontain, wholesale. US Gulf, no. 2, hard winter red refers to the specific wheat variety 
used to designate the international wheat price. This is the most commonly used benchmark for an 
international wheat price.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database. 
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countries to control domestic grain supply, and stabilize prices. Evidence of 
this is illustrated in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Whereas the rice prices in China and India as well as wheat prices in India 
were virtually flat during the food crisis period, the price of rice in Vietnam 
did show a partially muted response to the surging international prices. One 
explanation may be that the Vietnamese prices are retail prices (wholesale 
prices were not available) which include additional marketing and profit mar-
gins. Another possibility is provided by Nguyen and Talbot (Chapter 15): the 
Vietnamese government sets rice export limits (by advice of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)) based on projected rice surplus 
and not rice prices per se. In the spring of 2008, MARD forecast a lean rice 
crop which prompted the government to reduce the maximum export quota 
by one million tons to 3.5–4 million tons for 2008, and impose a temporary 
three-month moratorium on signing new export contracts. In any event, the 
projection turned out to be faulty and rice farmers produced a bumper crop. 
The Vietnamese policies took the tip off the price spike but were not suffi-





































Figure 2.4 Rice prices in China, India, and Vietnam
Note: International: Bangkok, Thai 100% B. China: Hunan province, first quality, wholesale. 
India: Delhi, wholesale. Vietnam: Hanoi, retail.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database. 
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The Indian wheat and rice prices show an upward trend in the second half 
of 2009 (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Ganguly and Gulati (Chapter 16) refer to this 
as a form of delayed price transmission. However, the increases in prices have 
less to do with (belated) transmission of price changes in the international 
market, but may be better explained by specific factors within India. India 
experienced relatively poor harvests in 2009, and following the food crisis of 
2007–8, the government started to buy larger quantities of grain in an effort 
to expand the strategic grain reserves. Also, the MSPs for grains were adjusted 
upwards in the wake of the crisis, and the resulting higher farm gate prices 
were transmitted down through the value chain.
2.4.3 Importers
Five countries in the sample, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, and 
Mozambique consistently depend on imports for the supply of their main 
staple, rice in Bangladesh and Senegal, wheat in Egypt, and maize in Kenya 
and Mozambique.
Figure 2.6 shows the rice prices in Bangladesh and Senegal plotted 
against the international prices. I have also included the Indian rice price 

































Figure 2.5 Wheat prices in India
Source:  FAO GIEWS food price database. International:  US Gulf, no.  2, hard winter red. 
India: Delhi, wholesale.
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Deb 2010). In fact, judging from Figure 2.6, the Bangladeshi rice price 
appears to be more closely related to the Indian price than the interna-
tional (Thai export) price. Although both Senegal and Bangladesh were 
exposed to the international price volatility, they experienced the global 
crisis rather differently. In Bangladesh, the price shock is visible but quite 
modest. In Senegal, the rice price rose sharply and has stayed at a rela-
tively high level ever since.
Rather than explaining why the rice prices increased in Bangladesh in the 
early 2008, a more interesting question is why they did not rise further. Raihan 
(Chapter 11) reports that the government in Bangladesh did seek to stabilize 
the rice prices but they had limited tools at their disposal. The most effective 
short-term policy response was the suspension of a 5 per cent import tariff 
on grains, which had at best a marginal effect. More importantly, Bangladesh 
managed to secure a supply of around half a million tons of rice from India 
in February 2008, just before the international price skyrocketed. However, it 
took a long time for the two governments to agree on a price and the first deliv-
ery arrived in April, just as the domestic rice harvest was about to hit the mar-



































Figure 2.6 Rice prices in Bangladesh and Senegal
Note: International: Bangkok, Thai 100% B. India: Delhi, wholesale. Bangladesh: Dhaka, whole-
sale. Senegal: Dakar, imported, retail.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database.
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harvest, partly due to a massive supply response. In fact, for the first time in 
almost a decade, Bangladesh produced more than it used (FAOSTAT 2013a).
However, the question remains why private traders did not utilize the arbi-
trage opportunities and export rice from Bangladesh. The government did 
impose a ban on exports, but Dawe (2010) suggests that it had little effect 
in practice. As a traditional rice importer, Bangladesh lacks the capacity (in 
terms of quality assurance mechanisms and reputation) to export large quan-
tities of rice in the short term.
Like Bangladesh, Senegal had few options available for reducing the impact 
of higher international rice prices. Import tariffs were already very low, and 
their suspension must have had little impact. To make matters worse, Senegal 
suffered two consecutive seasons of poor harvests in 2006–7 and 2007–8 due 
to shortages in agricultural inputs and irregular rainfall patterns (Resnick, 
Chapter 14). According to data from FAOSTAT (2013a), production in 2006 
and 2007 was down almost 19 per cent compared to the average of the preced-
ing three years. In response, the Senegalese government attempted to regu-
late rice prices directly. Senegal has had a long tradition of fixing bread prices, 
but as such price ceilings were extended to rice and other commodities, they 
could not be enforced and were therefore largely ignored. In response, the 
government struck an agreement with rice distributors by offering subsi-
dies in return for lower retail prices. However, the subsidies turned out to be 
unsustainable and might actually have exacerbated the crisis. As the govern-
ment was unable to pay out the subsidies on time, rice distributors started 
to stockpile rice in anticipation of future subsidy payments. As a result, rice 
prices continued to rise (Resnick, Chapter 14).
In the case of Egypt, it is difficult to assess the extent to which international 
prices were transmitted to domestic markets due to the lack of data: whole-
sale prices and retail prices are only available from January 2008 onwards. 
The evidence, shown in Figure 2.7, indicates a relatively stable retail price, 
but the apparent price stability was broken by short-lived spikes in late 2008, 
2010, and 2011. The 2008 spike may represent a delayed response to the 
global food crisis; international wheat prices were also climbing in 2010 and 
2011. Even so, any close relationship between international and Egyptian 
prices is not obvious. This rather mixed picture is consistent with the litera-
ture. Despite substantial wheat imports, Baffes and Gardner (2003) find that 
Egyptian wheat markets were very poorly integrated with global markets. 
However, Conforti (2004) and Rapsomanikis, Hallam, and Conforti (2006), 
show a long-term relationship between the Egyptian wholesale wheat prices 
and the international wheat prices after (but not before) 1989, despite strong 
regulation of Egyptian wheat markets.
An elaborate social protection infrastructure already existed in Egypt prior 
to the crisis. Large quantities of locally produced and imported wheat are 
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procured by the General Agency for the Supply of Commodities (GASC, a gov-
ernment agency), milled in public mills, and processed in public bakeries into 
baladi bread which is sold in public shops at subsidized prices. In addition, a 
range of subsidized basic commodities (such as sugar, oil, and rice) are distrib-
uted to a large part of the population on the basis of ration cards. Although 
the social safety net is hugely expensive, inefficient, and mired by corruption 
and massive leakage, it does appear to have shielded the poor beneficiaries 
from the worst impact of the global food crisis (Ghoneim, Chapter 12).
Figure 2.8 shows the wholesale price of maize in Kenya and Mozambique, 
together with the international price and the maize wholesale price in South 
Africa, the main supplier of the two countries. The maize prices in Kenya 
and Mozambique rose substantially during the food crisis period but as the 
international and South African prices collapsed in the second half of 2008, 
domestic prices stayed at a high level. In the case of Mozambique, maize 
prices peaked half a year after the global crisis.
Closer inspection of the two countries suggests that domestic factors 
played a major role in the domestic maize price formation. Although Kenya 
and Mozambique are both consistent maize importers, Minot (2011) cannot 










































Figure 2.7 Wheat prices in Egypt
Note: International: US Gulf, no. 2, hard winter red. Egypt: Lower Egypt, retail.
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database. 
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African) and domestic prices (however, he does find evidence of rice market 
integration in Mozambique).
In Kenya, several years of drought-induced poor harvests generated 
a need for large imports of maize in 2008 (Benson et al. 2008; Nzuma, 
Chapter 9). According to FAOSTAT (2013a), production in both 2008 and 
2009 was down by 20 per cent compared to the average of the previous 
three years. As the developing global food crisis prompted neighbours, 
such as Tanzania and Malawi, to restrict their exports, the Kenyan govern-
ment struggled to fill import orders throughout 2008. When the import 
needs were finally satisfied during 2009 (another drought-ridden year), 
imports of maize jumped from around 114,000 tons in 2007 and 244,000 
tons in 2008 to 1.5 million tons in 2009 (FAOSTAT 2013b). Insofar as the 
massive increase in imports represents a buildup of an acute supply short-
age, it is not surprising that the maize prices increased in 2008 and per-
sisted throughout the year. What is, perhaps, surprising is that Kenya was 
unable to satisfy its import needs for such a long time in the aftermath of 
the global food crisis. Although the regional export bans stayed in effect 
throughout 2008, Kenya’s main import supplier of maize was not Malawi 
or Tanzania but South Africa, which did not restrict maize exports. In fact, 









































International Brazil South Africa
Figure 2.8 Maize prices in Kenya and Mozambique
Source:  FAO GIEWS food price database. International:  US Gulf, no.  2, yellow maize. 
Kenya: Nairobi, wholesale. South Africa: Randfontain, white maize, wholesale.
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(COMTRADE), South Africa ended up supplying two-thirds of Kenya’s 
maize imports in 2009.
The picture is not quite as clear in the case of Mozambique. FEWS NET 
(2009) reports that the country was hit by floods, rainfall deficits, and wild-
fires in different areas which affected harvests adversely. It is, however, not 
clear if these events were particularly severe compared to the earlier years. 
Maize harvests in 2007 and 2008 were around the same size as the average 
of the previous three years (FAOSTAT 2013a). Arndt et al. (2008) suggest that 
part of the domestic price shock was due to the unusually high international 
prices as the government did little to prevent price transmission (see also 
Nhate, Massingarela, and Salvucci, Chapter 10). Also, part of the price vola-
tility in Figure 2.8 seems to be seasonal. Prices tend to increase towards the 
‘hunger season’ from October to January (FEWS NET 2009), as output from 
the second harvest is no longer available to cushion the prices (Arndt et al. 
2008). The large price spike following the global price peak coincides with 
this period.
2.4.4 The Isolated
Among the fourteen countries included in the sample, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Nigeria, and Zambia are relatively isolated from the international cereal mar-
kets. Ethiopia experiences substantial variations in maize production over 
time (FAOSTAT 2013a), but domestic storage serves to close the gaps between 
production and use with little reliance on international trade (Tadesse and 
Guttormsen 2011). Demand for maize in Nigeria tends to follow domestic 
supply quite closely (FAOSTAT 2013a), although Nigeria is dependent upon 
imports of rice (Olomola, Chapter 13). Malawi and Zambia have traditionally 
depended on maize imports from neighbouring countries, but both coun-
tries recently managed to become largely self-sufficient in maize and even 
produced a small surplus for exports (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter  7; 
Chapoto, Chapter 8; FAOSTAT 2013a, 2013b).
Figure 2.9 shows the maize prices in Ethiopia and Nigeria together with the 
international reference price. Both countries experience sharply increasing 
prices during the global food crisis period, but the domestic price spikes are 
substantially larger than the international price shock. It also takes longer for 
the domestic prices to come down again—especially in Nigeria.
There is some debate over the extent to which the Ethiopian food prices 
were driven by domestic factors or the international crisis. The isolated (and 
landlocked) nature of Ethiopia together with its very limited international 
food trade would suggest that the domestic market should be fairly unrelated 
to international markets. However, the evidence appears to be mixed. In 
their empirical studies, Ulimwengu, Workneh, and Paulos (2009) and Minot 
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(2011) find no long-run relationship between Ethiopian maize, sorghum, or 
wheat markets. In contrast, Conforti (2004) and Loening et al. (2009) do 
find long-run co-integration between the Ethiopian and international grain 
prices.
Admassie (Chapter 6) argues that the Ethiopian crisis was primarily caused 
by long-running domestic factors, such as increasing grain demand due to 
economic growth and more well-developed social safety nets, stagnating 
grain supply, and inflationary monetary policy. The trigger came in 2008, 
when the surging global energy prices led to a shortage of foreign exchange 
reserves which prompted the government to ration the foreign exchange 
available for other purposes such as imports of food.
The inflationary monetary policy explanation for the observed food price 
inflation has gained a lot of traction, particularly among economists at the 
World Bank and the IMF (Haji and Gelaw 2012). Foreign exchange controls 
prevented the currency from depreciating and rapidly rising prices denomi-
nated in domestic currency translated directly into high food inflation meas-
ured in US$ (Minot 2011).
There is little doubt that Ethiopia experienced high and growing general 
inflation in 2007 and 2008. It is less clear, however, that food inflation was 


































Figure 2.9 Maize prices in Ethiopia and Nigeria
Source:  FAO GIEWS food price database. International:  US Gulf, no.  2, yellow maize. 
Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, wholesale. Nigeria: Kano, wholesale.
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Food inflation, particularly in cereal prices, was substantially higher than 
non-food inflation during the food crisis period (FAO/WFP 2009). While 
demand-driven inflation does not necessarily entail that all prices grow by 
the same rate, it is still remarkable that Ethiopia had the largest food inflation 
rate relative to non-food inflation in the developing world (3.5 per cent per 
month) in 2008, and negative relative food inflation in both 2009 and 2010 
(Headey et al. 2012).
In the light of this discussion, it is unlikely that Ethiopian food prices 
were determined by solely domestic or international factors. In support of 
this assertion, Haji and Gelaw (2012) decompose food price inflation into 
different components and find that a number of factors affected domestic 
food prices, including domestic price level, world grain prices, domestic fuel 
prices, and non-food prices. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to assess 
the relative weight of the different factors in forming domestic prices.
Admassie (Chapter 6) presents another piece of interesting evidence, repro-
duced here using data from FAO. Figure 2.10 shows a relatively close rela-
tionship between different Ethiopian cereal prices—indeed the maize and 
wheat prices appear to be much more closely related to each other than their 
respective international counterparts. This is consistent with the explanation 












































Figure 2.10 Maize, wheat, and teff prices in Ethiopia
Source: FAO GIEWS food price database.
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indicate an additional (and sometimes forgotten) channel of price transmis-
sion. Price increases in one grain commodity are likely to spill-over to other 
related commodities as demand shifts from more expensive to cheaper staples.
In Ethiopia, this mechanism appears to be quite strong. Rashid (2011) finds 
a close relationship between the wheat and maize prices, but the correlation 
between these and the teff price is limited. Furthermore, his analysis suggests 
that transmission from maize to wheat is stronger than vice versa. It is pos-
sible that whatever influence the global cereal markets have on the Ethiopian 
prices, it works through a single commodity rather than through multiple 
commodities simultaneously.
Nigeria has not been studied as closely as Ethiopia and less data is avail-
able. However, there appear to be many similarities with the Ethiopian case. 
Nigeria is self-sufficient in maize, yet maize prices spiked along with (and 
greatly surpassing) the international price during the 2008 food price crisis 
(see Figure 2.9). However, unlike Ethiopia, Nigeria also experienced a surge 
in maize prices in 2005 that was almost as large in nominal terms as the 
one in 2008. This earlier price spike occurred at a time where international 
prices were relatively stable which suggests that the Nigerian maize prices are 
predominantly driven by domestic factors. There was no obvious shortfall in 
production in 2005, but there was a small surplus in 2006—equivalent to 10 
per cent of production (FAOSTAT 2013a). It is possible that a part of the price 
spikes in 2005 and 2008 reflects unusually low prices in 2006 and 2007, fol-
lowing an increase in production in 2006.
Nigeria imports a substantial part of its rice consumption, but unfortu-
nately no data on the Nigerian rice prices were available on a monthly basis. 
Yearly averages presented by Olomola (Chapter 13) show that rice prices also 
rose in 2008, but more detailed price transmission patterns cannot be estab-
lished for rice.
The maize prices in Malawi and Zambia are depicted in Figure  2.11 
along with the international price and the regional reference price in 
South Africa. Both the domestic price series show an upward trend dur-
ing the food crisis period, but generally the prices display a relatively 
high volatility and do not show any obvious relationship with any of the 
reference prices. Minot (2011) finds weak (insignificant) long-run links 
between the international prices and a few of the local Malawian mar-
kets close to the border, but no evidence of any long-run relationship 
between the Zambian and international prices. Both countries face very 
high international trade costs and international trade in maize is strictly 
under the control of the government (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7; 
Chapoto, Chapter 8). They both have a history of relatively frequent food 
crises during which local maize prices increase rapidly relative to inter-
national prices, latest in 2005–6. All this suggests that prices are mainly 
International to Domestic Price Transmission
45
determined by domestic factors and that international prices should play 
a very limited role.
Malawi experienced good weather and a bountiful harvest in 2007 (the sur-
plus was smaller, but still positive in 2008). Zambia faced flooding in parts of 
the country and output declined slightly in both 2007 and 2008, compared 
to 2006. However, 2006 was a good year, and harvests in 2007 and 2008 were 
still in line with a long-term upward trend (FAOSTAT 2013a). Chirwa and 
Chinsinga (Chapter 7) and Chapoto (Chapter 8) suggest that the local crisis 
was largely precipitated by government mismanagement combined with pri-
vate hoarding behaviour. In Malawi, very poor quality of information about 
the domestic maize supply led the private sector to believe that there was a 
shortage of maize, inducing speculative hoarding of maize in anticipation of 
higher prices in the future. In response to the initial price increases, the gov-
ernment banned exports (and cancelled a partially filled export agreement 
with Zimbabwe) and tried to restrict private domestic trading in an effort 
to control prices. These initiatives merely reinforced the signals of supply 
shortages and led to more intensive hoarding of maize. In Zambia, reports 





































Figure 2.11 Maize prices in Malawi and Zambia
Source:  FAO GIEWS food price database. International:  US Gulf, no.  2, yellow maize. 
Malawi: Lilongwe, retail. Zambia: national average, white maize, retail. South Africa: Randfontain, 
white maize, wholesale.
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responded by banning exports, speculative forces similar to those in Malawi 
added to the price pressure.
Although there appears to be little direct relationship between the global 
food crisis and the local crises experienced in Malawi and Zambia, it is possi-
ble that the high global prices acted as catalysts for the local market tensions. 
Chirwa and Chinsinga (Chapter 7) and Chapoto (Chapter 8) suggest that the 
local maize prices were largely driven by hoarding, driven by expectations 
of higher prices. It is possible that these expectations were also influenced 
by the global food outlook, just as the global food crisis could have inspired 
greater unease among the government officials and prompted them to mis-
judge the appropriate policy response.
2.5 Conclusion
Drawing a few general conclusions from fourteen very different stories on 
how the global food crisis was experienced and managed is not an easy 
task. Yet, it is possible to identify certain patterns shared by several of the 
countries. Here are the most important ones: the synthesis categorized the 
fourteen countries according to their trade status to generate predictions 
regarding the price transmission patterns. The four categories are:
1. Free traders: as well-integrated and open agricultural economies, Brazil 
and South Africa were expected to exhibit a relatively large degree of 
price transmission. The evidence presented here is consistent with this 
prediction, although the close relationship between the South African 
and international maize price is sometimes masked by changes in trade 
status (between exporter and importer), which cause the domestic price 
to shift between export and import parity.
2. Exporting stabilizers: China, India, and Vietnam are exporters of rice, 
and they all have effective state-control over exports. Although the 
countries’ strong exporter status should generate a close relationship 
between domestic and international prices, effective price stabilization 
policies (primarily in the form of export restrictions) were expected to 
reduce price transmission substantially in the time of crisis. This pre-
diction is strongly supported in the cases of China and India, but the 
Vietnamese retail rice prices showed a surprisingly strong pass-through 
of international prices, despite export restrictions.
3. Importers: of the fourteen countries in the sample, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal are consistently dependent upon 
imports of their main staple. Unlike exporters, the import-dependent 
countries have few stabilizing policies available, and price transmission 
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was therefore expected to be substantial. However, the evidence painted 
a rather mixed picture. While Bangladesh managed to contain domes-
tic rice prices at relatively low levels (indeed, price pass-through was 
smaller than in Vietnam), domestic prices in Kenya, Mozambique, and 
Senegal rose rapidly during the crisis and stayed high long after the 
international crisis had subsided. Egypt appears to have been greatly 
affected by the food crisis as well, but the evidence is more difficult to 
evaluate due to data limitations.
4. The isolated: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia are poorly integrated 
with the international cereal markets and are largely self-sufficient in 
their main staple. Due to these countries’ relatively isolated status, we 
should expect domestic prices to be independent from the interna-
tional prices. It is therefore striking to observe that they all faced rapidly 
increasing domestic prices during the food crisis period. In Ethiopia 
and Nigeria, the maize price spike surpassed the international prices 
by several orders of magnitude, and Malawi and Zambia experienced 
persistently high prices.
The synthesis discusses two overall reasons for why we observed unex-
pected price transmission patterns: issues related to the implementation of 
policies and various domestic factors. Although food price policies aimed 
at controlling local prices were implemented in most countries, they were 
not equally effective everywhere. Export bans were not always binding (e.g. 
Ethiopia and Kenya), and in Vietnam export restrictions were reportedly 
designed to counter a perceived domestic shortfall rather than the interna-
tional crisis. Suspended import tariffs were often already low, particularly 
in import-dependent countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Egypt, Mozambique, and 
Senegal). Many of the policies, particularly food subsidies and tax exemp-
tions, represented a heavy drain on government finances and were unsus-
tainable in the long term (as acutely felt in Egypt, Malawi, and Senegal). Also, 
many of the country studies suggest that government mismanagement ren-
dered policies less effective or even exacerbated the crisis (Nigeria, Malawi, 
Senegal, and Zambia).
It is difficult to evaluate to what extent the local price shocks reflected 
domestic factors or were driven by the global crisis. On the one hand, it 
is remarkable that almost all of the countries experienced domestic price 
shocks that coincided with the global price spike (sometimes with a short 
time lag), even those (such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Mozambique) 
that empirical research suggests are poorly integrated with the world mar-
kets. On the other hand, correlation is not the same as causation and certain 
signs indicate that domestic factors must have played a primary role in many 
countries. In Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Mozambique, local shocks were 
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much greater than the global shock, and it is hard to explain how price trans-
mission alone could have generated such a major local price response. In 
Egypt, Malawi, and Zambia, the domestic prices spiked during the food crisis 
period, but apart from that, local prices show very little obvious relationship 
to international prices. Also, several of these countries, including Nigeria, 
Mozambique, and Zambia have earlier experienced episodes of great price 
volatility that were clearly not related to international prices. It is also pos-
sible to identify local supply constraints that can explain a substantial part 
of the local price shocks: harvest failures in Kenya and Senegal, flooding in 
parts of Mozambique and Zambia, generally tight markets combined with 
inflationary policies in Ethiopia, and poorly designed and implemented food 
policies in Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia. On a more positive note, a domes-
tic supply response may also explain why the food crisis in Bangladesh was 
relatively benign: a bumper harvest was beginning to hit the markets just as 
international rice prices spiked.
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A Cacophony of Policy Responses




This study is a synthesis of all policy responses reported in fourteen country 
studies. Drawing from the rich accounts supplied by country-study authors, 
it provides an overview of each country’s crisis response including details as 
to the magnitude, timing, and other policy particulars. Although this study 
is primarily intended as a synthesis, it also examines differences in policy 
responses across countries and, where available in the country studies, pre-
sents evidence concerning the factors which mitigated or enhanced policy 
effectiveness.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the 
framework used to classify policies and countries. Section 3.3, which cov-
ers policy responses, is divided into three sub-sections according to policy 
type—price policies, output policies, and safety nets. Each sub-section in 
Section 3.3 is further divided according to country type. In this way the 
study reviews price policies for each of the three country types—interveners, 
* This study would not have been possible without the hard work of the country-study authors 
and the author extends his first thanks to them. Earlier versions of this study benefited from 
the constructive comments of a number of reviewers including Robert Paarlberg, Lynn Brown, 
Kenneth Baltzer, and Derrill Watson II to whom the author owes hearty thanks for their sharp 
insights and corrective guidance. Finally, the author would like to thank Per Pinstrup-Andersen 
for his comments and guidance during the entire process. The author takes sole responsibility 
for all remaining errors and omissions.
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observers, and dabblers—then output policies, and lastly safety nets. Finally, 
Section 3.4 provides concluding observations.
3.2 Analytical Framework
In order to facilitate comparison between different countries and the policies 
each pursued, this study has been structured around policy type—increasing 
production, reducing or stabilizing prices, or protecting vulnerable groups—
and country category. The three policy types loosely follow Wiggins et al. 
(2010), but with at least one notable exception. Wiggins et al. only consider 
short-term policy responses. To provide as much detail as possible regarding 
crisis responses, this study includes all policies. More than just comprehen-
siveness, this approach is justified in that policy is not made in a vacuum 
and implementing one policy may influence a government’s will or ability 
to implement others. A final point regarding short-term versus medium-term 
and long-term responses is that some policies defy such classification. 
Short-term production subsidies may have long-term impacts; furthermore, 
without the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to determine whether a policy 
intended to be temporary actually was.
Countries have been organized into three broad categories according to the 
degree to which they responded to the crisis. The first and largest category, 
consisting of Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Zambia, China, and 
India, will be referred to as the interveners. This designation represents the 
willingness of each of these eight countries to go to extraordinary lengths 
to manage food prices. The second category of countries, consisting of only 
South Africa and Brazil, will be referred to as the observers; authorities in 
both countries took note of developments in food markets, contemplated 
taking action, but, believing existing social safety nets sufficient, ultimately 
decided to do little more than continue monitoring developments. The third 
category of countries defies categorization as either interveners or observers 
and will be referred to as dabblers. Bangladesh,1 Mozambique, Nigeria, and 
Vietnam responded to the crisis, but are distinct from interveners in that 
these countries’ responses were more restrained. It is an open question why 
these countries demonstrated more restraint than their intervening counter-
parts, though it may be due to political economy concerns (Watson, Chapter 
5) or underlying structural factors (Baltzer, Chapter 2).
1 As will be demonstrated later in the study, Bangladesh is somewhat of a borderline case 
and responded in many ways more like an intervener. It was ultimately included among dab-
blers because it failed to implement broad untargeted subsidies or price controls and because 
its export ban was mostly symbolic. All other interveners put into place binding export restric-
tions, price controls, untargeted subsidies, or some combination of the three.
 




Following Wiggins et al. (2010) price policies refer to measures intended to 
reduce or stabilize food prices. Price policies can be implemented at the bor-
der (e.g., export bans and tariff adjustments) or within the domestic mar-
ket (e.g., price controls and untargeted subsidies). This is a departure from 
typical policy classifications and is intended to capture the economic ration-
ale behind these policies during the crisis period. To present all of the poli-
cies as concisely as possible, this study has divided price policies into four 
sub-categories:  supply management measures; export bans; tariff and VAT 
adjustments; and price controls, broad subsidies, and monetary policy (see 
Table 3.1).
INTERVENERS
Each of the eight countries in this category responded with price policies, 
and nearly all of them responded with at least one price policy from each 
of the four price policy categories making price policy the most common 
response among interveners. Despite these interventions, prices almost 
invariably spiralled out of control—China and India being the two excep-
tions. Underlying structural factors and domestic market conditions account 
for much of the price behaviour experienced in the present sample (Baltzer, 
Chapter 2). Lack of market integration, for example, mitigated transmission 
and poor harvests reduced the ability of many interveners to effectively 
manage prices. As discussed by Baltzer (Chapter 2), these factors were pos-
sibly compounded by grain substitution and the resulting spill-over of price 
hikes from one grain market to another. In addition, many of the intervener 
country studies implicate the strategic behaviour of market participants 
as exacerbating price movements and reducing policy effectiveness. This 
behaviour, especially hoarding, has also been recognized in the broader lit-
erature (Timmer 2009; Jayne and Tschirley 2010). A final factor discussed by 
country-study authors as to why policies succeeded or failed to control prices 
is the actual effectiveness of the policy itself. Many authors fault poorly for-
mulated policies, lack of funding, flawed implementation, or poor timing or 
coordination for the lack of anticipated results. Where evidence is available 
in the country studies that such factors were at play, it is woven into the dis-
cussion which follows.
All of the interveners in our sample engaged in activities to manage grain 
supply (see Table 3.1). Many authors report both release of reserves into 
the market and increased procurement. In most cases it is unclear if these 





Table 3.1 Intervener price policies
Country Supply Management Export Bans Import/Export Tariffs & VAT Price Controls, Broad Subsidies & 
Monetary Policy
Egypt Wheat procurement increased from 
1.8 million tons in 2006/7 to 
2.5 million tons in 2007/8
Export ban on rice (Apr. 2008) Export tariff on rice (late 
2006), increased in 2007 
and 2008; suspension of 
rice import tariffs (Apr. 
2008)
Food subsidies doubled between 
2006/7 and 2008/9, mostly for baladi 
bread; 15–22 million people added 
to ration card system (Jan. 2008)
Ethiopia Informal suspension of WFP local 
procurement; increased imports
Export ban on teff, wheat, 
maize, and sorghum (Dec. 
2006); later expanded to all 
cereals (Jun. 2008)
VAT and turnover tax 
suspended for all major 
food items and cereals 
(Mar. 2008)
Price ceiling on certain foods; enforced 
by task force with mandate to close 
shops and arrest non-compliant 
traders
Release of at least 5,000 Mt of 
emergency wheat reserves to mills; 
sales to urban mills at subsidized 
prices
Loose monetary policy leading up 
to crisis; tighter during crisis with 
reserve requirements increased 
from 5% to 10% in 2007 then 15% 
in 2008; liquidity requirements for 
commercial banks increased to 25% 
(Apr. 2008)
Kenya Increased efforts to build stocks 
through aggressive importation
Export ban on food crops 
(Oct. 2008)
Wheat import tariff reduced 
from 35% to 10% (Jun. 
2008); maize import tariff 
suspended
VAT on wheat and maize 
flour suspended
Maize sold to millers at Ksh 1,750 per 
90 kg bag, Ksh 200 below the gvt’s 
producer price
Malawi National Food Reserve 
Administration increased 
procurement efforts
Maize exports banned (Apr. 
2008) and no export licenses 
issued in 2007/8 season
  Maize ceiling increased (2007/8); to 
maintain the ceiling, large private 
traders temporarily banned from 
domestic market (Aug. 2008)
Macro policy dampened inflation, 
contributed to relatively stable 
exchange rates
Senegal Five-year contract with Indian gvt 
to procure 600,000 Mt. of rice 
annually (Mar. 2008)
  Import tariff on wheat (5%) 
and rice (10%) suspended 
(Jul./Aug. 2007)
18% VAT for all levels of 
bread production chain 
lifted Jul./Aug. 2007)
Price ceiling for wheat & baguettes 
(Nov. 2006); price ceiling for scented 
broken rice (Jul. 2007); rice subsidy 
given to distributors to maintain the 
ceiling (Apr.–Jul. 2008)
Zambia Gvt maize imports from South 
Africa
Maize exports banned (Jan. –
Aug. 2008–9); wheat exports 
banned (Jun. 2009)
  Large-scale maize millers subsidized at 
50% (Dec. 2008), later reduced to 
40% (Mar. 2009); total subsidized 
sales of app. 120,000 Mt
China Release of wheat, rice, and maize 
reserves (late 2007); increased 
foreign procurement through 
futures contracts (late 2007)
Food and feed exports banned 
(late 2007)
Suspension of maize export 
subsidies (Nov. 2008); 5% 
export levy raised on food 
grains
Suspension of VAT rebates 
for maize; VAT removed 
from rice & wheat
Loosening of monetary policy in late 
2008, more as a result of the financial 
crisis
India Wheat procurement doubled 
in 2008/9 to 22.7 million Mt. 
Large quantities of rice and 
wheat released from stocks
Wheat exports banned (Feb. 
2007); exports of common 
rice banned (Oct. 2007), 
but no effect on existing 
contracts
Zero import duty on 
selected food items
Reserve ratios lowered and money 
supply increased at a rate of about 
20% in 2006/7 and 2007/8
Source: country studies.
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neutralized the downward price pressure exerted by releasing additional 
grain, or if release and procurement were sequentially coordinated. In many 
cases it is also unclear that the supply increase was of sufficient quantity to 
have more than a marginal price effect. Finally, although each intervener 
responded with some form of supply management, there is great varia-
tion in the instrument used. In fact, considerable diversity in the details of 
policy responses is apparent within and between all policy categories and 
sub-categories and is an overriding characteristic of crisis responses in the 
present samples.
Interveners such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia report hav-
ing attempted to procure grains from abroad. Kenya and Zambia looked to 
South Africa and Senegal signed a five-year contract to import Indian rice. 
Ethiopia’s 2007 and 2008 wheat imports came from multiple sources, espe-
cially Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, the United States, and Italy (Admassie, 
Chapter 6). Nzuma (Chapter 9) reports that Kenya’s imports suffered major 
delays, perhaps because the government suspended plans to import maize 
then later reversed its decision. Senegal’s procurement appears to demon-
strate long-term thinking in an environment of rising and volatile food 
prices. However, the Senegalese government entered into the agreement with 
India in March 2008 when international prices were near their peak and 
may have paid a high price for the precaution. In contrast to many other 
interveners, Huang, Yang, and Rozelle (Chapter 17) report that China’s sup-
ply management response was well coordinated. The Chinese government 
first increased foreign procurement by entering into futures contracts in late 
2007, and soon after put into place an export ban. By buying on the futures 
market before banning exports, China may have protected itself from the 
rise in international prices many have attributed to such trade restrictions. 
Huang et al. also report China released a significant amount of grain from 
reserves, though release apparently did not keep pace with procurement 
as stocks increased substantially over the crisis period (Baltzer, Chapter 2). 
Similarly, although Ganguly and Gulati (Chapter 16) report India released 
large quantities of rice and wheat, procurement must have outstripped 
release as stocks increased for both grains, especially for wheat which rose by 
an extraordinary 8.9 per cent (Baltzer, Chapter 2).
Admassie (Chapter  6) reports that Ethiopia released emergency wheat 
reserves directly to consumers through consumers’ associations organized 
at local levels and to flour mills, although it is unlikely the quantity was 
sufficient to influence overall domestic price (though it is conceivable that 
such release significantly lowered local prices). Ethiopia also distributed 
significant quantities through other channels (Chapter 6). Egypt is some-
what of a special case in that the government is the largest buyer of domesti-
cally produced wheat during normal years and also a major distributor; still 
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Ghoneim (Chapter 12) reports that procurement rose significantly in 2007–8 
to 2.5 million tons, up from 1.8 million in 2006–7. Finally, Malawi increased 
domestic procurement efforts through its National Food Reserve Agency 
(NFRA). Chirwa and Chinsinga (Chapter 7) implicate procurement efforts as 
exacerbating rather than ameliorating Malawian maize price increases.
In an effort to manage prices, seven out of the eight interveners banned 
exports (see Table 3.1). Only Senegal, which is not usually a grain exporter, 
failed to put a ban in place. Among the earliest interveners to apply bans are 
Ethiopia, India, and China. Ethiopia’s ban came in late 2006, prior to the 
steep run-up in international prices. This is likely a reflection of domestic 
conditions, namely high general inflation rooted in loose monetary policy 
(Admassie, Chapter 6). The latest intervener to ban exports was Kenya which 
apparently did not ban exports until October of 2008, months after inter-
national prices had begun a precipitous decline. The timing of this response 
is perplexing, especially given Kenya’s extremely high domestic prices and 
trade position (Baltzer, Chapter 2). Perhaps then the Kenyan ban was mostly 
symbolic in nature. Nonetheless, Nzuma (Chapter 9) implicates the ban as 
reducing producer and consumer welfare, a possibility which is echoed by 
other country-study authors regarding their own countries’ bans.
Of the seven interveners which implemented bans, four (Egypt, Kenya, 
Malawi, and Zambia) note that such measures were problematic and suf-
fered reduced effectiveness, especially due to informal cross-border trade or 
strategic behaviour by the private sector (e.g., storing grain until the ban is 
removed). The India, China, and Ethiopia study authors reported no dif-
ficulties implementing export bans. In the cases of India and China, border 
measure effectiveness was facilitated by state-controlled grain sectors, while 
in the case of Ethiopia the absence of problems may be due to domestic grain 
prices which were in some cases triple the international price, thus removing 
export incentives (Baltzer, Chapter 2).
Tariff adjustments and modifications to value added tax (VAT) likely played 
a minor role in protecting consumers from food price increases during the 
global crisis (Demeke et al. 2009; Baltzer, Chapter 2). Still, three-fourths of 
interveners used such measures in an attempt to insulate consumers, Malawi 
and Zambia being the two exceptions. Egypt and China imposed export tar-
iffs on certain grains; in the case of Egyptian rice the tariff was put in place 
as early as late 2006. Ghoneim (Chapter 12) reports the tariff was increased 
in 2007 and 2008 before ultimately being abandoned in favour of a ban 
due to traders’ ability to circumvent the tariff. The ban apparently suffered 
similar challenges (Ghoneim, Chapter 12). Four of the interveners included 
in our sample also reduced or eliminated import tariffs, though as discussed 
by Baltzer (Chapter 2) and elsewhere in the literature, tariffs were generally 
very low to begin with and it may be that more interveners failed to lower 
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import tariffs because they were already at zero (Malawian maize) or because 
the country was self-sufficient (Zambian maize). Kenya is perhaps an excep-
tion, having considerably reduced wheat and suspended maize import tariffs 
from initially high levels. Kenya and Senegal combined import tariff adjust-
ments with elimination of VAT and China combined elimination of VAT 
with its export levy and suspension of export incentives. While VAT reduc-
tions only covered a few specific food items in every other country, Ethiopia, 
the sole intervener not to combine changes in VAT with tariff adjustments, 
suspended VAT across the board for all major food items and cereals.
Interveners were much more likely than any other group to respond to the 
crisis with sweeping subsidies or price edicts (see Table 3.1). The two excep-
tions to this are India and China which both preferred the use of stocks 
to manage prices, perhaps because more than any other interveners they 
had stocks at their disposal. Among the remaining six interveners, Malawi 
responded with price controls, Kenya and Zambia with general subsidies, and 
Egypt,2 Ethiopia, and Senegal with a combination of the two (although at 
least for Senegal the two approaches were sequential rather than combined—
when price controls failed, general subsidies were implemented). With the 
exception of Ethiopia, which accompanied price controls with stringent 
enforcement measures (Admassie, Chapter 6), country-study authors report 
major difficulties administering price controls. Egypt’s hybrid subsidy and 
rationing system reportedly suffers from massive leakage and poor targeting; 
Malawi’s price ceiling was put into place at an inopportune time for traders, 
moreover, the implementing agency lacked the funds necessary to defend 
the ceiling; and, among other obstacles, Senegal’s implementing agency was 
also underfunded (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7; Ghoneim, Chapter 12; 
Resnick, Chapter 14).
A total of five interveners are reported to have employed broad subsidies 
to mitigate price increases, and all but Egypt did so through subsidized sales 
to millers (see Table 3.1). Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia are each reported to 
have experienced difficulties with subsidized sales, especially the problem 
of millers receiving subsidies but failing to pass benefits through to consum-
ers. Ethiopia reports only minor difficulties administering miller subsidies, 
and these were largely overcome by the appointment of a monitoring task 
force and measures to ensure that wheat was milled and sent to bakeries, and 
that bakeries sold at prescribed prices (Admassie, Chapter 6). Beyond facing 
implementation difficulties, general subsidies raise concerns over fiscal sus-
tainability. Fiscal concerns are especially salient in the case of Egypt which 
2 Egypt did not implement price controls per se. However, certain food items are subject to 
price controls under the ration card system. In this sense, and because heavy subsidies and the 
ration system were in place before the crisis, Egypt is a special case.
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embarked on a massive increase in subsidies and added up to 22 million peo-
ple to its ration card system (Ghoneim, Chapter 12). As discussed below, fiscal 
concerns are not limited to price policies.
Monetary policy is a blunt instrument and only four interveners are 
reported to have used it during the crisis—albeit each for different reasons. 
China and India were both responding more to the international financial 
crisis than the food price crisis and thus loosened monetary policy. This 
response aimed to keep interest rates low, credit markets primed, and to 
maintain an acceptable rate of overall growth. Admassie (Chapter 6) reports 
the remarkably high food prices seen in Ethiopia were partially a result of 
loose monetary policy, and Ethiopia eventually took measures to reduce 
money supply and reign in overall inflation, though not until 2009. Chirwa 
and Chinsinga (Chapter 7) note that Malawi’s sound macroeconomic policy 
dampened inflation, maintained a high level of fiscal discipline and helped 
maintain relatively stable exchange rates.
OBSERVERS
The Brazilian and the South African government believed existing safety 
nets were adequate to mitigate the negative impacts of food price increases 
and that interventionist responses would result in more harm than good 
(see Table 3.2). In light of this, the Brazilian government’s decision to sus-
pend rice exports in early 2008 appears problematic. However, Mueller and 
Mueller (Chapter 18) report the ban only affected government stocks, which 
are equivalent to about 10 per cent of domestic consumption in recent years, 
and that a private sector ban was never considered. Given that the ban only 
affected a fraction of consumption needs, it seems likely the ban was at 
most precautionary and possibly only symbolic. The only other price policy 
reported for either country is a loosening of monetary policy in Brazil. Similar 
to India and China, this response had little to do with food prices and much 
to do with the international financial crisis. South Africa is not reported to 
Table 3.2 Observer price policies
Country Supply 
Mgt.
Export Bans Import/Export 
Tariffs & VAT
Price Controls, Broad 
Subsidies & Monetary 
Policy
Brazil   Suspension of gvt 
rice exports (did 
not affect private 
trade)
  Loose monetary policy 
with credit expansion 
and lowering of interest 
rates
South Africa        
Source: country studies.
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have implemented any price policies and the government appeared particu-
larly wary of such responses (Kristen, Chapter 19).
DABBLERS
All dabblers responded to the crisis with measures to reduce or stabilize 
prices, though to a much lesser extent than interveners (see Table 3.3). Only 
two dabblers banned exports, just one used broad subsidies, and not a single 
dabbler responded with price controls. In addition, relative to interveners, 
dabbler responses tended to come later, were of a reduced magnitude, and 
had limited impact.
Three of four dabblers used stocking policies to manage the crisis (see 
Table  3.3). Bangladesh and Nigeria are reported to have both released 
stocks and increased procurement efforts. Releases from Bangladesh were 
reportedly targeted and thus might be considered safety nets, however, the 
Table 3.3 Dabbler price policies
Country Supply Management Export Bans Import/Export 
Tariffs & VAT
Price Controls, 
Broad Subsidies & 
Monetary Policy











5% import duty on 












Mozambique   Import tariffs for 
wheat, rice & 
maize reduced 
from 25% to 2.5% 
(early 2008)




Nigeria Release of 65,000 
Mt of grain crops 
and garri; foreign 
and domestic rice 
procured (110,000 
Mt) and sold at 
subsidized prices 
(May–Oct. 2008)




Vietnam Businesses ordered 
to procure all 
paddy rice at 
above-market floor 
price set by gvt 
(2008 & 2009)
Lower rice export 
quota (Mar. 
2008) followed 
by a 3-month 
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quantity released was so massive that prices were probably affected (Raihan, 
Chapter 11). Although Nigeria’s release was relatively small and suffered from 
implementation challenges including leakage to prominent figures and pol-
iticians, Olomola (Chapter 13) suggests it still may have helped to reduce 
prices. Nigeria and Bangladesh reportedly experienced difficulties in their 
release and procurement efforts. Baltzer (Chapter 2) shows that, at least in the 
case of procurement, the obstacles must have been overcome as wheat stocks 
increased in both countries and rice stocks increased in Bangladesh. Vietnam 
can also be considered to have engaged in procurement, though the mecha-
nism differed from all other countries (Nguyen and Talbot, Chapter 15).
All dabblers with the exception of Vietnam, which is a net grain exporter, 
adjusted import tariffs in an attempt to mitigate price increases. Bangladesh 
had relatively low tariffs to begin with, but Nigeria suspended a considerable 
rice tariff and Mozambique reduced high tariffs for all of its major grains 
(Olomola, Chapter 13; Nhate, Massingarela, and Salvucci, Chapter 10). While 
the Vietnamese government did not adjust import tariffs, it did reduce and 
later ban rice exports and also suspended VAT for most agriculture-related 
activities (Nguyen and Talbot, Chapter 15). Bangladesh followed Vietnam 
in banning exports and suspending VAT; however, given that Bangladesh 
exports limited quantities of rice, Raihan (Chapter 11) reports the ban had no 
effect. Finally, although Vietnam banned exports, its ban was fundamentally 
different than intervener bans in that it only prohibited new contracts and 
was in place for a mere three months, after which the government actually 
encouraged exports (Nguyen and Talbot, Chapter 15).
In terms of price controls, monetary policy, and broad subsidies, there is lit-
tle to report since dabblers predominately avoided such responses (see Table 
3.3). Not a single dabbler implemented price controls, although Bangladesh is 
reported to have created committees to monitor prices (Raihan, Chapter 11), 
and only Bangladesh used monetary policy in an attempt to curb inflation. 
Mozambique is the sole dabbler which reported increased food subsidies. 
Unfortunately, it is only reported that food and fuel subsidies were increased 
and it is unclear whether these were targeted (and thus more of a safety net 
policy); it is also not clear how much of the subsidy increase was allocated to 
fuel and how much to food.
There is no single answer as to why dabbler price policy responses were 
more restrained than those of interveners. In terms of geography and 
crop importance, two of the dabblers in our sample are in Africa and two 
in Asia. Bangladesh and Vietnam are predominately rice economies while 
cassava dominates in both Nigeria and Mozambique (followed by maize in 
Mozambique and yam in Nigeria where maize, rice, and wheat play rela-
tively minor but still important roles). In Bangladesh, the more measured 
response may have something to do with the country’s history of recurring 
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food crises which have caused it to gradually refine its response over many 
decades (Raihan, Chapter 11). In Vietnam, it may be more the result of a 
bumper crop and an economy consisting of many small rice producers which 
stood to gain3 from price increases (Nguyen and Talbot, Chapter 15). Nigeria’s 
responses may have been tempered by the fact that it is a large producer and 
households are reliant on mostly non-traded foods such as yam and cassava. 
In the case of Mozambique it is difficult to point to a specific structural factor, 
though perhaps the importance of cassava played a role. Finally, although it 
is impossible to attribute moderate price policy responses to any single factor, 
it is noteworthy that all dabblers responded with major (and in some cases 
novel) initiatives to expand agricultural output, often with an eye to the long 
term (see Table 3.4).
3.3.2 Output Policies
Output policies consist of measures taken to augment production. These 
include input subsidies, tax incentives, price supports, and transportation 
and market infrastructure among others. As with price policies, output poli-
cies have been organized into sub-categories. The three sub-categories are 
input subsidies and tax incentives, price supports and farm credit, and other 
output policies (see Table 3.5).
INTERVENERS
At the core of interveners’ output responses were a combination of input 
subsidies and price supports. This is not surprising given that these pro-
grammes were mostly in place before the crisis and thus the main thrust of 
the response was consistent with historical precedent. Still, not all interven-
ers’ output responses were as readily predictable. In some instances the crisis 
engendered policies which are remarkable in that they represent disconti-
nuity with past policies or include novel features. In the case of Senegal, 
for example, the crisis created an opening for a momentum shift in which 
policies that were already formulated were abruptly displaced by new and 
reportedly inferior ones. China, in contrast with Senegal’s shift to inferior 
policies, achieved a retrenchment in expansionist biofuel policy. As is dis-
cussed in more detail toward the end of this section, Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
India are also among interveners which pursued policies with noteworthy 
features.
3 Vu and Glewwe (2011) find mixed evidence regarding welfare impacts of price increases. 
Small increases may lower poverty while larger increases may cause poverty to increase slightly. 
On the whole, welfare impacts from price increases are positive since gains outweigh losses, but 




Table 3.4 Dabbler output policies
Country Input Subsidies & Tax 
Incentives
Price Supports & 
Farm Credit
Other
Bangladesh Fertilizer subsidies 
increased by 









farmers wishing to 
import fertilizers
MSP increased for 
wheat by 44%, 
paddy rice by 60%, 
and aman rice by 
30%
Expansion of ag. 
credit
Endowment Fund for Ag. R&D 
created (2007/8)
Mozambique     Plan for Action for Food 
Production introduced (PAPA 
2008); aimed to increase 
production & promote 
commercialization & increased 
processing; doubling of the ag. 
budget as a share of GDP
Plan to increase storage to 
capture PAPA surpluses (Jul. 
2008)
Promotion of alternative 
transportation
Nigeria   Minimum Support 
Prices introduced 
in 2009




terms; farm credit 
expanded
UN helped develop a framework 
to deal with food prices; 
new National Food Security 
document (2008) went 
beyond expanding output; gvt 
created a special fund for ag. 
development
Funds earmarked to complete 
17 outstanding silo projects as 
well as 11 new silo projects
Vietnam Favourable tax 
changes intended 
to promote ag. 
investment (Dec. 
2010)
Expansion of ag. 
credit (Apr. 2010)
Investments to improve rural 
marketing (Jan. 2010); pilot ag. 
insurance projects (Mar. 2011); 
new storage & upgrades to 
existing (Sep. 2009)
3.8 million hectares set aside 
for rice, no urban or industrial 
encroachment through 2020 
(Dec. 2009)
New requirement to reimburse 
farmers for land taken for 
industry (Dec. 2009)
Source: country studies.
Table 3.5 Intervener output policies
Country Input Subsidies & Tax Incentives Price Supports & Farm Credit Other
Egypt 72% increase in wheat procurement 
price (2007/8); changed to setting 
maize procurement price before 
planting (2010)
Greater enforcement of limits on rice 
production area to try and boost wheat 
production in 2007/8; increase in storage 
capacity (2010)
Ethiopia   Establishment of the Ag. Transformation 
Agency to boost productivity; creation of a 
commodity exchange
Kenya Inputs procured by the gvt and sold at steep 
discounts (Mar. 2009); FAO and World Bank 
US$50 million input subsidy programme (May 
2008)
Increased maize procurement price to 
Ksh 1,750 per 90 kg bag (2008) and 
later to 1,950
US$5 million AGRA and IFAD supported 
expansion of ag. credit (2008)
Renewed efforts to improve irrigation
NAAIAP (see input subsidies and discussion 
below)
Malawi Fertilizer subsidy rate increased to 90% in 2007/8 
(from 67%), then decreased in 2008/9
125% increase in producer price 
(2007/8) to MK45 per Kg
 
Senegal FAO programme provided US$1.5 million to buy 
inputs for vulnerable small-holders
  Grand Offensive for Food & Abundance 
(GOANA) launched to move toward 
self-sufficiency & raise ag. investment (May 
2008)
Zambia Fertilizer subsidy rate increased from 50% to 
75%; subsidy programme expanded from 
120,000 to 200,000 farmers (Feb. 2008)
Ag. equipment VAT zero rated (2009); customs 
duty removed from commercial trucks; tariffs 
suspended for certain inputs & equipment
Maize MSP increased by 16% and then 
35% in 2008; further increases in 2009
25% gypsum import tariff suspended to 
promote domestic fertilizer production 
(2009)
China Input subsidy increase; levy on phosphate 
fertilizer exports (Feb. 2008); 100% levy on all 
fertilizer exports (May–Dec. 2008)
  Retrenchment of expansionist bio-fuel policies 
& new restrictions on land competition 
between food & fuel
India Fertilizer subsidies increased in 2007/8 and again 
in 2008/9
Wheat MSP increased 30% (2007/8); 
maize, rice, & pulses by 30–50% 
(2008/9)
Rs 600 billion debt waiver for 30 million 
farmers (Feb. 2008); expanded to 
43 million farmers in 2009
Nation Food Security Mission (NFSM) 
launched in 2007/8 to boost staple output
Increased spending under the National Ag. 
Devt. Program, a portion of which aims to 
extend Green Revolution to East India
Source: country studies.
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As evidence that interveners were keen to expand near-term grain supply, 
nearly all of those in our sample increased input subsidies; the two excep-
tions being Egypt and Ethiopia (see Table 3.5). In the case of Egypt, Ghoneim 
(Chapter 12) relays that the government is routinely involved in input mar-
kets, providing subsidies for fertilizers, irrigation, and fuel. However, there 
were no adjustments as a result of the crisis. The Ethiopian government pro-
posed a fertilizer subsidy, but it was never implemented. The remaining six 
interveners are all reported to have responded by increasing subsidies under 
existing programmes or by creating new programmes. This is in sharp con-
trast to output-enhancing tax and tariff incentives, which were only reported 
by two countries—Zambia and China. Finally, input subsidy increases for 
three interveners, Kenya, Senegal, and India, were implemented as part of a 
larger programme to boost agricultural productivity. This is discussed fur-
ther in the section on ‘other’ output policies.
Two additional approaches interveners used to boost output were increased 
price supports and expansion of farm credit (see Table 3.5). The latter was 
only implemented by two countries, India and Kenya, while five employed 
the former. Although India is not reported to have explicitly expanded credit, 
the government did waive a vast amount of outstanding agricultural loans 
and is thus still included in the credit category. Kenya’s credit expansion was 
implemented in collaboration with multi-lateral partners and is noteworthy 
in that it included agricultural and business training. In terms of farm sup-
ports, there was a great deal of variation in the proportion of the increase. 
Unfortunately, interpreting such variation in proportional increases is com-
plicated by differences in prevailing conditions across countries and grain 
markets, as well as by differences in initial support prices. In the end, what 
is clear is that price support increases were common among interveners and 
considerable in magnitude. On the one hand, Malawi more than doubled its 
(maize) producer price in the 2007–8 season and Egypt increased its wheat 
procurement price by approximately three-quarters. Zambia (maize) and 
India (wheat, maize, and rice), on the other hand, increased minimum sup-
port prices by only about a third. In the case of Zambia, Chapoto (Chapter 8) 
reports the initial increase in the 2008 season was only 16 per cent. However, 
due to competition from the private sector and the resulting inability of the 
government to meet its procurement targets, the price was later increased. 
Similar difficulties were experienced by other interveners including Malawi, 
Kenya, and Egypt.
As discussed above, many countries pursued policies which are difficult to 
classify. Although such policies were more common among dabblers than 
interveners, most interveners implemented at least one policy belonging 
to the category ‘other’ (see Table 3.5). These other policies can be further 
divided into two groups. On the one hand, many countries implemented 
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relatively isolated policies aimed at a particular aspect of production. 
Examples include: Egypt’s enforcement of rice area limits and increase in 
storage capacity, Kenya’s revived irrigation efforts, Zambia’s efforts to pro-
mote domestic fertilizer production, and perhaps China’s biofuel retrench-
ment. The remainder of this section will focus on the second type of other 
policies—overarching policies consisting of multiple programmes intended 
to expand agricultural output.
Ethiopia, Senegal, Kenya, and India are all numbered among interveners 
which introduced wide-ranging programmes to enhance agricultural pro-
ductivity (see Table 3.5). Ethiopia established the Agricultural Transformation 
Agency and Admassie (Chapter 6) reports this was accompanied by a whole 
host of initiatives intended to expand production—increased investment 
in research and development (R&D), extension services, and infrastructure 
development among others. Also among the country’s crisis responses was 
the government’s decision to provide incentives to foreign investors, par-
ticularly India and China. Admassie indicates this led to 3.5 million hectares 
changing hands with a similar amount planned to be exchanged in the near 
future. This is perhaps the most controversial response and a sizeable lit-
erature has developed debating the merits of so-called land grabs. Finally, 
Ethiopia’s 2008 introduction of a commodity exchange is also noteworthy, 
although at inception trading remained limited (Chapter 6).
In Kenya, several of the responses reported by Nzuma (Chapter  9) fell 
under the country’s larger National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Programme (NAAIAP). A few of the features under what Sheahan et al. (2012) 
refer to as ‘a comprehensive multi-million dollar fertilizer and improved seed 
subsidy and training programme’ include: input subsidies, agricultural credit 
offered on favourable terms, and training on improved farming methods 
and business management. As is the case with numerous policy responses, it 
is unclear how much the NAAIAP was initiated in response to the crisis and 
how much it was a result of existing political momentum (Sheahan et al. 
2012). This theme receives further attention in subsequent sections and is 
treated comprehensively by Watson (Chapter 5).
The Senegalese government responded to the crisis with the Grand 
Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA). In many ways GOANA repre-
sents continuity with past agricultural plans which also tend to emphasize 
output expansion and greater self-sufficiency (Resnick, Chapter 14). Although 
GOANA is included as a larger agricultural development strategy and report-
edly realized some short-term success, it should be emphasized that the 
initiative received a tepid response from stakeholders and was deemed unsus-
tainable by the national FAO director (Resnick, Chapter 14). Unfortunately, 
GOANA is also reported to have displaced what were considered by some as 
superior strategies which had been developed with stakeholder participation.
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India is reported to have implemented a number of initiatives intended 
to increase productivity, food security and sustainability. These initia-
tives include the National Food Security Mission (NFSM), the National 
Agricultural Development Programme (NADP) and, somewhat later, the 
National Food Security Act (NFSA)—though these policies probably repre-
sent pre-crisis momentum more than crisis responsiveness. As discussed by 
Watson (Chapter 5), the government’s response was in part conditioned by 
the right to food movement which preceded the onset of the crisis. This is 
particularly true of the NFSA. In the case of the NADP, Ganguly and Gulati 
(Chapter 16) applaud what appear to be novel efforts to expand the Green 
Revolution to East India and address sustainability issues. Nonetheless, the 
resources behind these efforts are apparently so inadequate that the whole 
affair is dubious (Ganguly and Gulati, Chapter 16).
OBSERVERS
As with price policy, observers’ production response was trivial (see Table 3.6). 
Brazil reports expanding access to agricultural credit and South Africa invest-
ing in productivity-enhancing infrastructure. In the case of Brazil, credit 
expansion simply continues a trend begun in about 2000; the measures in 
South Africa were reportedly limited to areas of deep poverty and strategic 
political importance (Kirsten, Chapter 19). Beyond pre-existing safety-nets 
mentioned earlier in the study and discussed in more detail below, the trivial 
output response may be because neither country experienced an acute short-
age and, as middle-income countries, both have populations which depend 
relatively less on unprocessed grain as a part of their food basket. Another 
possibility is that they were counting on a natural production response as 
farmers themselves reacted to price signals. Finally, it also may be because 
both countries were operating under more stringent fiscal constraints. No 
matter the cause, output policy responses among observers were at most 
negligible.
Table 3.6 Observer output policies
Country Input Subsidies & Tax 
Incentives
Price Supports & Farm 
Credit
Other
Brazil   Expansion of ag. credit
South Africa     Promotion of household & 
community production; 
investments in productivity 
enhancing infrastructure 
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DABBLERS
Dabbler output policy responses were varied and identifying an overall strat-
egy which defines the group is difficult (see Table 3.4). Bangladesh belongs 
more with interveners in that it too focused on expanding short-run pro-
duction through a combination of subsidies and price supports. Besides 
Bangladesh, no dabblers are reported to have increased price supports 
(although Nigeria introduced minimum support prices in 2009). In addi-
tion, apart from comprehensive programmes which are discussed later, 
Bangladesh is the only dabbler reported to have increased input subsidies. 
Despite wide variation in dabbler output responses, one pattern is clearly 
discernible: dabblers responded to the crisis with far-reaching policies which 
appear to address long-term concerns.
As noted above, only one dabbler increased input subsidies while two 
made tax or tariff adjustments to facilitate output expansion (see Table 3.4). 
Bangladesh increased fertilizer subsidies considerably and also targeted fuel 
and energy, the latter by instituting electricity rebates for agro-based indus-
tries. The other dabbler to promote agriculture through tax policy adjust-
ment was Vietnam which continued a legacy of favourable tax arrangements 
for farmers, agricultural investors, and agri-businesses by making fresh tax 
reductions during and in the aftermath of the crisis (Nguyen and Talbot, 
Chapter 15).
Price supports were used only by Bangladesh while various forms of credit 
expansion were reported by three of the four dabblers. Nigeria extended con-
cessionary credit to increase rice processing capacity and took measures to 
expand the pool of financing available to commercial farmers. Bangladesh 
shared Nigeria’s objective of expanding farm credit but took the additional 
step of easing restrictions and facilitating credit access for importers. The 
Vietnamese government made collateral-free loans available for agricultural 
activities.
All dabblers pursued policies categorized as ‘other’, and in most cases 
these policies appear to be significant in scope (see Table 3.4). The pos-
sible exception to this is Bangladesh’s Endowment Fund for agricultural 
research and development—Raihan (Chapter 11) notes that R&D spending 
actually decreased between 2007 and 2009 despite the fund. In contrast 
to Bangladesh, the Nigerian government requested technical assistance 
from the United Nations (UN) Country Team which, together with a 
number of other multi-lateral organizations, apparently played a signifi-
cant role in the country’s crisis response—at least on paper (Olomola, 
Chapter 13). Mozambique is similar to Nigeria in that it also developed 
a major strategy to address not only the crisis, but broader agricultural 
and food security objectives. A  key difference between the two is that 
the Mozambique government is reported to have developed the strategy 
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internally while Nigeria apparently received considerable outside input. 
Vietnam’s ‘other’ policies are distinct from those of the other dabblers in 
that they do not belong to one overarching programme, but are rather a 
collection of isolated policies which nonetheless demonstrate a certain 
degree of cohesion.
The crisis is reported to have led to a number of significant changes in 
Nigeria, not least of which is the 2008 National Food Security Programme 
(NFSP) document. Olomola (Chapter 13) deems this document ‘a major para-
digm shift’ in that it goes beyond output expansion, and it was reportedly 
accompanied by a host of policies aimed at modernizing the rural sector and 
promoting agricultural research and development. The government is also 
reported to have collaborated with multi-lateral partners to develop a sec-
ond major strategy document, the National Food Crisis Response Programme 
(NFCRP). Although this was also accompanied by a number of initiatives to 
promote food security, Olomola criticizes the document’s omission of the 
more innovative features of the NFSP and notes that its implementation was 
marred by difficulties.
In Mozambique, the crisis led to the 2008 Plan for Action for Food 
Production (PAPA). Broadly directed at expanding output and promoting 
commercialization and agro-processing, Chapoto (Chapter 8) terms PAPA the 
‘operational tool’ for the previously approved ‘Green Revolution Strategy’. 
With regards to novel features, PAPA appears to be more conservative than 
Nigeria’s approach, although it does include provisions to intervene in the 
value-chain, promote rural processing, and enhance the flow of goods. At 
the same time, Chapoto (Chapter 8) reports the adoption of PAPA entailed 
an ambitious doubling of the agricultural budget as a share of GDP (up to 
8 per cent). The immediate cause of this impressive funding growth may have 
been the food price crisis, however, even with this increase Mozambique’s 
agricultural budget remains below the 10 per cent commitment made under 
the Maputo Declaration.
Vietnam is not reported to have unveiled a grand agricultural strategy as 
a response to the crisis, but the country did enact a number of legislative 
measures which are of note. Among these measures were policies to promote 
rural marketing, enhance the efficiency of rice exports, assist farmers in 
mitigating risk through pilot insurance projects, and to reduce post-harvest 
losses through storage expansion and upgrades. In addition, the govern-
ment took measures to prevent industrial encroachment on agricultural 
land. These included a major set-aside programme of 3.8 million hectares 
dedicated solely to rice production until 2020, and a new requirement to 
reimburse farmers for land appropriated for industrial purposes. The major-
ity of these measures came during 2009 and 2010 in the aftermath of the 
initial crisis.
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3.3.3 Safety Nets
Safety nets consist of cash or in-kind transfers which are targeted at specific 
vulnerable groups. These transfers may be conditional, such as programmes 
which require labour or school attendance, or unconditional. Safety net 
tables in this study have been sub-divided according to the conditionality 
of the transfer. For the purpose of presentation, school feeding and public 
sector wage increases have been included with conditional transfers even 
though they are not true conditional programmes.
INTERVENERS
The crisis elicited a dizzying array of safety net policies and five of the eight 
interveners are reported to have made adjustments in an effort to mitigate 
the harmful effects of food price increases (see Table 3.7). Of those who did 
make use of safety nets, Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s were the most extensive fol-
lowed by China’s. In Senegal, safety nets were mostly donor-initiated and on 
a small scale, in China, Egypt, and Kenya they were mainly governmental, 
and in Ethiopia safety nets were a hybrid of the two. Lastly, three of the five 
safety net users reported experiencing factors which reduced policy effec-
tives (Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal), especially poor targeting.
Unconditional transfers were employed more widely than conditional 
transfers by all interveners, except perhaps Ethiopia which relied heavily on 
its Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (see Table 3.7). In terms of the 
form of such transfers, Egypt’s consisted of both cash transfers and subsi-
dized sales through its ration card system. Ethiopia also used a ration card 
system, and like Kenya, sold grain at subsidized prices to poor consumers. 
Resnick (Chapter 14) reports that Senegal released grain reserves to the poor, 
and although these were given freely, the magnitude of the transfer was 
rather small and only in place for three months (see Table 3.7). China is the 
only intervener to rely solely on cash transfers and is also unique in that the 
increase in transfers was automatic based on the consumer price index (CPI). 
All other interveners employed transfers in a more ad hoc fashion, retaining 
greater discretion as to the ultimate magnitude.
Two interveners (Ethiopia and Kenya) channelled resources to consumers 
through conditional transfer programmes, two increased public sector sala-
ries (Egypt and Ethiopia), and two made adjustments in school feeding pro-
grammes (Ethiopia and Senegal) (see Table 3.7). Unlike Kenya’s cash for work 
programme which was not implemented until 2009, Ethiopia’s PSNP existed 
before the crisis, during which it was expanded to support 8 million people 
from an initial plan of 5 million in 2008 (Admassie, Chapter 6). An addi-
tional difference between the two countries is that Ethiopia’s programme is 
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a relatively minor role in Senegal where a donor supported programme, 
established in 2008, covered about 80,000 children. Ethiopia’s much larger 
school feeding programme was expanded during the crisis and reportedly 
benefited 482,000 students in 2008 (Admassie, Chapter 6). It is also reported 
that the Ethiopian government made a modest increase in public sector sala-
ries, though this was probably not enough to offset the rising food prices and 
Table 3.7 Intervener safety net policies
Country Unconditional Transfers Conditional Transfers, School 
Feeding, Public Wage Increases
Egypt Certain vulnerable groups added to the ration 
card system: widows, divorced women, women 
heading households, and chronically sick 
persons; prices and quantities for ration card 
items adjusted
Social pension doubled from LE 80/mo. to LE 160/
mo. and coverage increased from 650,000 
persons to 1 million from 2005-7
Education grant increased from LE 20/mo. per 
child to LE 40 (2008)
30% increase in public sector 
salaries compared to the usual 
increase of 10% (May 2008)
Ethiopia Procured 520,000 Mt of wheat, 515,000 Mt of 
maize from intl. mkt and distributed through 
the Urban Food Rationing Programme and 
subsidized sales to flour mills (2008); release 
of wheat and maize reserves to the poor at 
subsidized prices (190,000 Mt of wheat in 2007)
WFP and other NGOs channelled about 200,000 
Mt of food into Ethiopia during the crisis; WFP 
provided food assistance to 11 million people in 
2008 rather than the 1 million it had planned
PNSP coverage in non-PNSP 
areas increased from 4.6 to 
6.4 million people (2008); 
PNSP daily wage increased 
from ETB 6 to ETB 10/day
Expansion of existing school 
feeding programmes
Public salaries increased
Kenya Subsidized maize meal distributed to poor districts 
(Dec. 2008); cost for 2 kg was Ksh 55 rather than 
the Ksh 72 market price
Ksh 15 billion Kazi Kwa Vijana 
cash for work programme 
launched to create 300,000 
jobs within 6 months (Mar. 
2009)
Malawi    
Senegal Food vouchers for 17,400 households amounting 
to CFS 1.9 billion (2008, donor supported); 
20,000 Mt. of rice distributed to vulnerable rural 
consumers through the AMR programme (May–
Aug. 2008)
Targeted cash transfers to mothers of children 
0–5 yrs. through NETS programme (donor 
supported)
School feeding for 80,000 
children in Dakar (2008, 
donor supported)
Zambia    
China Semi-targeted food subsidies to urban consumers 
and students, vary at provincial level but 
considerable in size; automatic based on CPI
 
India  No increases reported, though transfers are large 
and have increased over time
 
Source: country studies.
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may have increased inflationary pressure (Admassie, Chapter 6). In Egypt, on 
the other hand, the salary increase is reported to be substantial. None of the 
other four interveners, Malawi, Zambia, China, and India, is reported to have 
responded to the crisis with conditional transfers, school feeding or increases 
in public sector wages.
OBSERVERS
Both of the observers in our sample credit comprehensive and effective 
safety nets, which were in place before the crisis, as obviating the need for 
further responses (see Table 3.8). Brazil reportedly increased payments under 
Bolsa Familia in 2007 and 2008, though such increases were marginal. 
Mueller and Mueller (Chapter 18) argue that, due to other programmes and 
structural factors, marginal increases may have been all that were necessary. 
Bolsa Familia is also noteworthy in that it is reportedly well-designed, avoid-
ing the leakage so often associated with such welfare programmes. Besides 
Bolsa Familia, Mueller and Mueller report that the Programme for Food 
Acquisition was in place prior to and during the crisis. While it is unclear if 
the programme was ramped up to meet additional needs, an impressive 13 
million people reportedly received benefits in 2009. South Africa apparently 
considered its safety net programmes adequate and made no extraordinary 
adjustments as a result of the crisis besides limited distribution of food par-
cels (Kirsten, Chapter 19).
DABBLERS
The solitary dabbler to have responded to the crisis with significant changes 
to safety net programmes is Bangladesh, which used a combination of con-
ditional and unconditional transfers as well as scaling up of school feeding 
(see Table 3.9). In terms of conditional transfers, in 2008–9 the government 
scaled up the Test Relief programme which provides in-kind transfers in 
exchange for work. Raihan (Chapter 11) also reports scaling up of targeted 
food distribution (an unconditional transfer programme). The only other 
Table 3.8 Observer safety net policies
Country Unconditional Transfers Conditional Transfers, 
School Feeding, Public Wage 
Increases
Brazil Bolsa Familia increased transfers  
South Africa Comprehensive combination of safety net & 
welfare programmes in place before the crisis; 
no changes made as a response to the crisis
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dabbler reported to have used targeted safety nets during the crisis is Nigeria, 
though this programme was aimed at education and healthcare rather 
than food security and was not a direct response to the crisis (Olomola, 
Chapter 13).
3.4 Conclusions
In terms of the types of policies pursued and the specifics of formulation, 
timing, and implementation, the fourteen countries in our sample displayed 
remarkable diversity in their crisis responses. The eight interveners in our 
sample share in common a vigorous attempt to control prices, but the primary 
measures used range from price controls, to supply management, to broadly 
administered consumer subsidies, to trade policy, especially export bans. 
Dabblers’ efforts to control prices were more limited and the most common 
crisis response in this group of countries was output expansion. Even among 
dabblers the primary means used to expand output varied. Bangladesh used 
price supports and input subsidies, Mozambique and Nigeria developed new 
comprehensive plans, and Vietnam employed a suite of isolated but interre-
lated policies which share features with many crisis responses without resem-
bling that of any single country.
Despite such heterogeneous responses, some general observations can be 
made. First, with the exception of Brazil and South Africa, crisis responses in 
all countries exacted a high fiscal cost. Tariff reductions, VAT suspensions, 
and export bans all entail lost revenue. Even as revenues were declining, 
crisis responders were creating new programmes, expanding membership 
Table 3.9 Dabbler safety net policies
Country Unconditional Transfers Conditional Transfers, School 
Feeding, Public Wage Increases
Bangladesh Targeted food distribution more than doubled 
from 372,000 Mt in 2005/6 to 786,000 Mt 
by 2008/09
Significant scaling up in the 
2008/9 crop year of the 
Test Relief programme to 
360,000 Mt of wheat and 
rice
School feeding scaled up
Mozambique    
Nigeria Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) programme 
launched to provide N5,000/child to 
extremely poor households to send their 
children to school and participate in free gvt 
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in existing programmes and increasing benefit levels. Egypt, for example, 
planned to spend LE9.5 billion in 2007–8 on food subsidies but expanded 
programming for a final cost of LE16.4 billion. India’s crisis response is 
reported to have contributed to a more than doubling of the fiscal deficit 
between 2007–8 and 2008–9 and the cost to Senegal is estimated at around 
US$748 million. Soaring food, fuel, and fertilizer prices compounded these 
budgetary burdens even when governments took no additional actions. In 
Zambia, for example, Chapoto (Chapter 8) reports the 2008 fertilizer budget 
was initially approved for US$42 million but two months later price increases 
caused the cost to be inflated by an additional US$68 million. To make mat-
ters worse, many programmes are reported to have suffered reduced effective-
ness due to factors such as poor targeting and corruption. This was reported 
widely enough that is receives separate treatment below.
All dabblers and interveners in our sample, with the notable exception of 
China, reportedly experienced difficulties responding to the crisis. In the case 
of China, Huang, Yang, and Rozelle (Chapter 17) report that the crisis response 
was comprehensive, well coordinated, and the policies had the intended 
impact. Among countries which experienced difficulties, there were a range 
of reasons given for reduced policy effectiveness. Government procurement 
efforts met with difficulties given the scarcity of grain on the market in 
Bangladesh and Nigeria while Malawian and Zambian efforts reportedly con-
tributed to price increases. India had no trouble procuring grain, but reportedly 
had inadequate storage facilities leading to considerable waste. Kenyan ferti-
lizer subsidies may have ended up in the hands of Ugandan farmers due to 
smuggling while Zambian fertilizer subsidies are reported to suffer from poor 
targeting, corruption, leakage, poor delivery, and other factors which mitigate 
their effectiveness. The vast Indian debt waiver is reported to have dispropor-
tionately benefited wealthier farmers just as Egyptian subsidies and ration 
card benefits apparently accrue more to the wealthy than the poor. Ganguly 
and Gulati (Chapter 16) note that Indian safety nets have generally not been 
very effective; subsidized maize meal in Kenya was designed in such a way 
that the intended beneficiaries could not access it; and Senegal’s attempt to 
distribute rice was poorly targeted and experienced funding problems besides. 
Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia tried subsidizing millers and distributors but the 
benefits reportedly never made it to consumers. Nigeria released grain from 
stocks but it was captured by powerful intermediaries. Malawi and Senegal 
attempted administrative price controls—both failed. Export bans were prob-
lematic and some traders simply stored grain in anticipation of the lifting of 
the ban (Egypt and Vietnam) while others circumvented the ban by exploit-
ing porous borders (Zambia and Kenya).
In seeking an explanation for the myriad failings outlined above, it is 
appealing to blame ad hoc responses and to prescribe more preparedness. 
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Similarly, given that the only two countries in our sample (Brazil and South 
Africa) not to have intervened in food markets had well-functioning safety 
nets, it is tempting to conclude that if more countries had such measures 
in place the crisis would not have elicited such drastic responses. However, 
judging by the experiences of countries like China and Ethiopia, it would 
be a mistake to conclude that safety nets alone prevent more intervention-
ist responses. Furthermore, Brazil and South Africa are both middle-income 
countries with relatively lower poverty rates; for lower income countries 
with exceedingly high poverty rates safety nets present additional obsta-
cles. And while it is true that many countries’ ad hoc policies were problem-
atic, more preparedness may not prevent countries from abrupt reactions 
to crises. Political and structural factors influence the extent to which gov-
ernments are willing to be involved in food markets, as does historical prec-
edent. Another, less recognized reason why some governments may have 
intervened during the crisis is overestimation of the negative impacts. Initial 
food security impact assessments significantly overstated the problem and 
this sensationalism may have increased the pressure felt by governments to 
intervene. Further research is needed to parse out the relative weight of these 
various factors and to build a more complete understanding of why govern-
ments continue to meddle in food markets despite evidence that such inter-
ference is welfare-reducing. In that regard, the current political economy 
study makes a solid contribution.
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Policy Processes and Food Price Crises
A Framework for Analysis and Lessons from Country Studies
Suresh Chandra Babu*
4.1 Introduction
The recent food price crisis brought forward a discussion on how countries 
design and implement food policies (FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012; IFPRI 2012). 
Policy responses to the crises depended on several factors, including the rate 
and extent to which price fluctuations transfer from international markets 
to domestic markets; the vulnerability of the country to the vagaries of food 
prices; pressure to act from opposition parties, development partners, and 
producer and consumer groups; the capacity of the actors in the policy pro-
cess; and the evidence generated by the research community on the poten-
tial and real effects of increasing food prices. Identifying and understanding 
how these factors contribute to the policy process is critical for preparing 
policy makers to better face food price crises in the future.1
* The author thanks Per Pinstrup-Andersen for his encouragement in writing this chapter, 
sharing the country case studies and for providing valuable comments on the first draft of this 
chapter. Thanks to Danielle Resnick for discussions on various models of the policy process and 
for several valuable suggestions that shaped the contents of the chapter. The author alone is 
responsible for its contents.
1 In this chapter we use the theories of policy processes as an investigative tool to understand 
how various actors and players shape up and influence the policy decision-making (Sabatier 
2007). There is a large volume of literature on the political economy of policy-making that looks 
at how policy makers balance sound economic policy-making with political realities (Meier 
1991; also see Watson, Chapter 5). While studies of political economy of policy-making often 
use policy process theories (Birner et al. 2011), mainstream political economy analysis addresses 
issues such as the measures of protection, modelling political games among the actors, and 
the role of political institutions (Rausser and Swinnen 2011; Bates and Block 2010). This paper 
focuses on the factors contributing to the effectiveness of the policy process during the time of 
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The recent food price crisis and the responses of the policy makers in 
developing countries provide an unprecedented opportunity to analyse 
the policy processes in these countries, with particular regard to the indi-
vidual and organizational capacity in the policy process and the political 
and socioeconomic context in which the policies are developed. Studying 
the political realities policy makers face in policy design and programme 
interventions can help place the policy outcomes in proper perspective. 
Further, understanding the institutional and governing environment in 
which polices are made can help to identify opportunities that enhance 
roles and contributions of various actors and players to the policy-making 
process. In addition, given the limited research on the policy-making pro-
cess in developing countries in general, an analysis of the food policy-mak-
ing processes in countries in various stages of development and operating 
under diverse political environments can add to the broader literature on 
policy processes.
A comparative study of policy processes in developing countries in the 
context of the food price crisis is important for several reasons. First, under-
standing the nature of policy-making and the roles that various actors play 
in the policy process can help in designing interventions to address future 
food crises. Second, food policy-making in developing countries during a 
crisis period provides an opportunity to study the similarities and differ-
ences in policy processes with respect to their responsiveness. Third, study-
ing the food policy process aids in developing a framework to understand 
the policy process in developing countries in general. Fourth, insights from 
the knowledge gaps and the capacity gaps that developing countries face 
could help in designing interventions that strengthen the policy process 
to better respond to a food policy crisis. Finally, the lessons learned from 
the policy process in one country could be useful for another country with 
a similar political and socioeconomic environment to address food policy 
challenges.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section 
reviews the policy process literature and its relevancy to developing coun-
tries and Section 4.3 introduces a framework to analyse the policy process 
in developing countries in the context of the food price crisis. Using this 
framework, Section 4.4 provides an analysis of the policy process in coun-
try studies in the context of policy-making during the food price crisis. 
Lessons from the analysis of the policy processes are presented in Section 
4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
food price crisis and complements two other synthesis papers by Bryan (Chapter 3) on the typol-
ogy of policy responses and by Baltzer (Chapter 2) on the nature and magnitude of food price 
transmission from international to local markets.
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4.2 Policy Process in the Context of Food Crisis: A Review 
of Literature
How does policy-making in times of crisis differ from policy-making in 
times of relative calm? Who are the players and actors in the policy process? 
What triggers the policy process? How is the policy process conducted and 
what roles do different players play in the policy process? These questions 
have been of interest to policy scientists for a long time and have garnered 
increased interest in developed countries in the last 30 years.
We briefly review some of the archetypical models of policy processes 
in the context of food policy-making in developing countries. Appendix 
Table 4.A1 (at the end of the chapter) presents an overview of selected policy 
process models and their characteristics, used under normal circumstances 
and under crisis situations. A key tenet explored in this chapter is that given 
a certain degree of political openness, does the policy process differ accord-
ing to the context and time available for decision-making? For example, 
policy-making during a crisis may involve overnight decisions with little or 
no open consultation while the release of genetically modified crops may 
involve protracted debate and discussion over several years.2 We look first to 
the linear model for answers, then to the interactive model and the multiple 
stream model, followed by the institutional development and rational choice 
model, policy learning and diffusion model, advocacy coalition framework, 
and lastly, the policy entrepreneurship model.
At its simplest, the policy process can be thought of as six stages that occur 
in a sequential fashion (Figure 4.1). This linear model suggests that the policy 
process commences with problem identification or the setting of a policy 
agenda, moving from stage to stage until the policy is either abandoned, 
effectively ending the policy process, or there is recognition that the policy 
must be revised, and the process repeats.
The linear model suggests that the policy process is a simple, sequential 
process (Nakamura 1987), but this is seldom the case in reality. In most situ-
ations only a partial adoption of this model (involving the four stages begin-
ning with problem identification to policy implementation in Figure 4.1) 
is realized. Further due to lack of follow through in terms of monitoring, 
impact assessment, and policy learning renders the linear model invalid in 
reality. The linear model has also been criticized for its inability to trace cau-
sality, for being top-down, for the lack of attention to the iterative process of 
2 Political openness may vary within democracies and within authoritarian regimes. Broad 
grouping of the countries such as democracies and dictatorships will not be sufficient for a fuller 
understanding of the policy processes.
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policy-making, and for ignoring multiple levels of policy-making (Sabatier 
2007). It also fails to account for political economy factors.
Even so, a partial adoption of the linear model may be seen in developing 
countries’ policy-making when there is an urgent policy problem, for exam-
ple when responding to a food price crisis, or when there is a clear need for a 
policy solution and any quick help from the government would result in at 
least a marginal change over the current situation acceptable to a majority 
of the stakeholder groups. For example, the recent food policy-making pro-
cesses in countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria seem to have followed the 
selected stages of linear models at least partially.3
In most cases, however, policy processes are more complex and non-linear 
than as shown in Figure 4.1. According to Sabatier (2007), they involve a pleth-





















Figure 4.1 The stages of the policy process
Source: author’s compilation.
3 For example, recent efforts in establishing the Agricultural Transformation Agency in 
Ethiopia and the development of the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in Nigeria could be 
categorized only as a partial adoption of the linear model of policy process. They are partial in 
the sense that only the first four stages of the policy process are followed and that too with lim-
ited analysis and evidence. The later stages such as policy monitoring, impact assessment, and 
the policy learning and revisions are not taken seriously. For these reasons the linear model is 
not fully valid in reality.
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problem and alternative approaches to solving it. The interactive policy process 
model is an improvement over the linear model in that it recognizes that there 
are multiple policy choices and that several actors and stakeholders interact to 
shape the debates and dialogues that result in multiple policy outcomes (Stone 
2002; Omamo 2004). The advantage of this model is that it encourages broad 
participation and helps determine how policy debates affect the policy process.
The multiple stream approach to the policy process identifies three 
streams—problems, policies, and politics—which operate together (Kingdon 
1984). In the first stream, problems are recognized and defined depending 
on the way policies are formulated and as political events unfold. The sec-
ond stream identifies policy alternatives whether or not they are solutions 
to recognized problems or are affected by political considerations. In the 
third stream, political events move along their own trajectories, whether or 
not they are related to problems or policy proposals. In this model, entre-
preneurial policy makers influence policy by making connections across the 
three streams. If the entrepreneurs are successful, policy solutions emerge. 
Under the multiple streams model of policy process, policy-making entails 
collective decision-making under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, 
which makes it an appealing policy process model (Zahariadis 2003). 
However, an application of this model to the developing country context 
could be limited by the lack of policy entrepreneurs in the countries who 
have the ability to bring the three streams of the policy process together.
Court and Young (2003) developed a similar framework with multiple dimen-
sions, but looked at different aspects of the policy process: context (politics and 
institutions), evidence (credibility and communication), and links (influence 
and legitimacy). From a review of more than 50 case studies of research policy 
linkages, they found that context influenced the extent to which research results 
were used in policy-making, that generated evidence was used more frequently 
when it was accompanied with clearly communicated possible solutions, and 
that the links between researchers and policy makers were important, particu-
larly informal links, but the extent and ways in which trust, legitimacy, open-
ness, and formality affected the links remained unclear.
The institutional development and rational choice model expounded by 
Ostrom and her associates has an important place in the context of col-
lective action in policy and programme design related to natural resource 
management (Ostrom 2011). Using self-governing institutions as its focal 
points, this approach identifies policy-making venues according to the pol-
icy actors involved, the policy action needed, the policy context, and the 
policy arena in which the policy process evolves. The research community 
and other stakeholders can develop effective strategies and understand the 
policy institutional framework within which they are operating, using this 
institutional development framework (Ostrom 1986).
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Policy learning and diffusion models focus on how countries faced with 
similar policy challenges learn from each other. Volden et al. (2008) show 
how learning from the results of the political process in other countries can 
influence the beliefs of policy makers with regards to the implications of poli-
cies that are currently under discussion. The evidence generated by domestic 
think tanks and the results garnered from global, regional, and other national 
policy research organizations could play a key role in policy learning and the 
diffusion of specific lessons in their own countries. Such cross-country evi-
dence can support the policy makers and determine the policy agenda.
Policy processes in developing countries, as in many advanced coun-
tries, are gradual processes in which policy changes occur incrementally 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Slow policy processes are explored through 
the advocacy coalition framework (Birner et al. 2011), which recognizes the 
need for a timespan of at least a decade to see policy change occur. Developed 
initially by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) this framework explains policy 
change through the development of coalitions of different policy actors with 
shared beliefs that are homogenous and stable over time. These beliefs could 
be the result of policy shocks and policy learning that initially occurred from 
a policy change. Major policy changes (or policy reforms) occur when several 
coalitions find common ground. Non-political stakeholders can play effec-
tive roles in this process by generating evidence and advocating for their 
cause to sway public opinion and hence the beliefs of the policy players.
In summary, the above review of literature indicates that while there may be 
no one model that fits squarely with the policy process of a developing country, 
a combination of models can help describe the nature of the policy process and 
how various actors and players position themselves to play meaningful roles 
in the realm of policy-making. In the context of the food price crisis, as will be 
seen in the following sections, several elements of these models are useful to 
describe the nature of the policy process. In order to help the analysis of key 
characteristics of the policy process, we develop a conceptual framework that 
brings together various elements discussed in the above review of literature.
4.3 A Framework for Studying Food Policy Processes 
in Developing Countries
Applications of the policy process models to study the policy phenomenon 
are limited in developing countries. Studies that use well-established models 
tend to identify the most applicable model to study a policy process when, in 
reality, policy processes may follow combinations of elements of several pol-
icy processes. Figure 4.2 presents a stylized framework by combining elements 
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Figure 4.2 A stylized framework of policy process in developing countries
Source: author’s compilation.
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The process is initiated when policy issues are identified either from global, 
regional, or country-level food security goals (ellipse 1) or from research pro-
jects (square 2). Local problem identification and priority setting in terms of 
national agricultural and food security strategies and priorities based on the 
interplay of global agendas, national policy challenges, and country-level pri-
orities is given in ellipse 1, in the top left corner of Figure 4.2.
All developing countries use research and analysis to some degree to 
design their national and sectoral strategies. Depending on the country’s 
domestic capacity, external technical assistance may be used for research 
and analysis. In the last 20  years, however, the development of policy 
research organizations in several developing countries has resulted in local 
policy research capacity supporting the policy process.4 The policy research 
and analysis cycle, which contributes context, ideas, and evidence to the 
policy process, is given in Box 2 in Figure 4.2. The link between the research 
and policy processes again varies depending on the nature of the political 
and administrative processes, the socioeconomic context and the culture 
of decision-making. These cross-cutting factors also influence the political 
process itself, which also depends on the level of involvement of various 
internal and external influences on the policy process as seen in Box 2 in 
Figure 4.2.
Policy learning and the diffusion of policy lessons from geographical 
regions and from international policy networks play increasingly impor-
tant roles in the policy process. These lessons move through several path-
ways. Public servants and policy makers learn from the national and global 
debates in which they participate; researchers and analysts participate in 
their professional associations both locally and internationally; and civil 
society organizations (CSOs) are increasingly connected to international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies which com-
municate best practices and lessons learned on the issues and problems 
they deal with. The extent to which a policy problem is identified through 
global agenda setting or research depends on the political leadership at the 
country level. Policy issue identification also depends on the level of influ-
ence of donors on the country policy process and the amount of internal 
pressure from opposition parties. These internal and external pressures are 
crucial determinants of how the political and policy processes operate for 
a particular issue. These elements are depicted in ellipse 3 in Figure 4.2 
4 With the recognition that technical assistance by donors to policy development has not 
resulted in local capacity, the 1990s saw the establishment of policy think tanks in most of the 
African countries. Initiated with the support of UNDP and the World Bank, these policy think 
tanks became one of the sources of local capacity for policy analysis and research, although 
their capacity to produce high quality research going beyond consultancy reports still remains 
a challenge.
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and are arguably the most important from a political economy perspec-
tive. Recognizing the linkages between policy learning and diffusion, and 
research and evidence generation is important for understanding how new 
ideas are formed, tested, and evaluated. This aspect of the policy process is 
depicted in Box 4 in Figure 4.2.
Translating evidence of policy alternatives and strategies into implementa-
ble programmes requires institutional capacity to formulate and monitor 
the rules and regulations that govern the public sector, private sector, and 
CSOs in a country. Institutional analysis thus becomes critical to explain 
why different levels of institutional development result in policy outcomes 
of differing quality. Similar to the institutional development framework, the 
rational choice policy process model focuses on understanding the linkages 
and relationships between bureaucratic figures and the legislature. National 
assemblies are becoming increasingly responsive to emerging problems and, 
with the provision of relevant information on policy choices, could be effec-
tive in driving policy outcomes (Babu and Ergeneman 2005; Ostrom 2011). 
The institutional analysis and development aspects of the policy process are 
given in Box 5 in Figure 4.2.
The advocacy coalition model of the policy process assumes actors 
with similar objectives and similar stakes in the policy process collude to 
strengthen their position in the policy debate. Actors and players form 
advocacy groups and engage in the policy process to advance their goals 
and objectives. They may interact with local institutions, borrow ideas from 
research, and learn from their own policy and political processes, as shown 
by Box 6 in Figure 4.2.
Strengthening institutional capacity to develop and alter rules and their 
interpretation can help in modifying policy outcomes (see Boxes 1, 2, 5, and 
7 in Figure 4.2). Policy outcomes in developing countries are increasingly 
influenced by various internal players who collaborate with each other to 
promote specific policy pathways. A wide range of players, actors, and insti-
tutions with a common ideology and belief system can advocate for a specific 
set of policy options (Sabatier and Weibles 2007). However, sub-groups of 
these actors may compete for different policy outcomes and understanding 
their differences could explain the adoption of particular policies within a 
certain political environment (see Boxes 2, 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 4.2).
While the strength of advocacy coalitions depends on the policy problem 
at hand, complementing them, or at times replacing them, with policy entre-
preneurs who can better mobilize their cause and identify policy windows, 
can aid in advancing their policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs are also influ-
enced by local institutional arrangements and policy lessons learned from 
other sectors and countries that face similar policy challenges, as shown by 
Box 7 in Figure 4.2.
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The policy entrepreneurship model relies on the strengthening and mobi-
lization of key policy leaders and supplying them with adequate informa-
tion. Policy entrepreneurs often wait for policy windows to open (Maxwell 
2006). The food price crisis opened such windows in many developing coun-
tries, although due to a lack of collective policy leadership within the food 
system in general as well as among policy makers in government ministries 
responsible for food security, it is unclear how effectively these opportunities 
were used to achieve food security (see Boxes 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 4.2). 
Specific policy options are chosen by policy makers based on how success-
ful political leaders were previously. Learning from peers who operate under 
similar political systems characterizes the policy diffusion framework. In 
Figure 4.2, Boxes 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8 jointly illustrate the policy diffusion frame-
work. Lessons from policy adoption and implementation suggest solutions 
to the actors and players in various stages of the policy process. Finally, the 
policy or set of policies agreed upon and implemented are seen in Box 8.
In summary, the stylized framework presented above attempts to capture 
various aspects of the policy process in developing countries, since no one 
individual framework or model could fully explain policy-making given 
the wide range of policy-making processes. It should be noted that, while 
the application of these frameworks is still new, even in developed coun-
tries, very little effort has been made to understand their implications in 
the context of development policy-making in developing countries. The 
applicability of this framework, partially or fully, to food policy-making 
will differ depending on the nature and extent of the crisis and on the 
country context.
In the next section we apply the framework to analyse the policy processes 
and their outcomes in the case-study countries. One way to apply the frame-
work is to identify country archetypes and examine whether they followed 
similar policy process in responding to the food crisis. Alternatively, one can 
identify specific policy outcomes such as export bans vs. enhancing social 
safety nets and analyse whether they are generated by similar policy pro-
cesses. In what follows we combine these two approaches to identify the most 
important factors that contribute to variations in policy-making processes to 
derive lessons for future policy-making.
4.4 Synthesis of the Policy Processes in Country Studies
The policy process theories reviewed above identify different pathways that 
countries take to develop and implement policies. They help to locate various 
sub-systems of interest to study the policy process and can be useful to iden-
tify areas that could be improved to facilitate food policy decision-making 
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such as political openness, information access, and the negotiation skills of 
actors and players. How did the country studies fare with respect to these 
characteristics? To what extent was the policy process influenced by these 
characteristics? How can these characteristics be modified to improve the 
performance of the policy process to better respond to food crises in the 
future? Answers to these questions could be useful to enhance the efficiency 
of the policy process.
In order to understand the policy process during the food price crisis, 
we look at the triggers of policy responses, country responses, the key 
actors and players in the policy process, and their approaches toward 
policy-making.
4.4.1 Policy Triggers
Several domestic and external factors triggered policy responses to the 
food price crisis in the country studies. One of the major policy triggers 
was the widespread understanding that there was a rise of international 
food prices. Price transmission differed (Baltzer, Chapter 2). Food export-
ers such as India, China, and Vietnam with food security concerns reacted 
strongly and quickly to stop or slow their exports, mainly in response to 
actual or potential criticism they might have faced internally. Policy reac-
tions to the international food price increase were also significant in coun-
tries that were not seriously affected by it. This was the case for African 
countries including Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi mainly due to 
pressure from civil society and consumer groups to act. The fear of these 
groups taking to the streets, which has implications for the stability of the 
governments, moved governments towards quick responses to the food 
price crisis. In Nigeria’s National Assembly, food-related CSOs were more 
redoubtable than members of the opposition parties. Thus, at least in some 
of the countries, internal domestic factors influencing policy decision-
making seem to be more influential on policy outcomes than external 
factors. Finally, countries such as Brazil and South Africa that traded more 
freely made little effort on the domestic front to respond to increasing 
international prices.
4.4.2 Policy Responses
Policy responses varied depending on the type of policy process, existing 
policies, and available resources at their disposal. Developing country gov-
ernments chose responses that ranged from increasing incentives for pro-
duction to market interventions, such as export bans and import tariffs 
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(Bryan, Chapter 3). On the supply side, countries provided incentives, usu-
ally through subsidies for the adoption of modern technologies, such as 
fertilizer and seeds. This was the case in Malawi, which strengthened a 
pre-existing fertilizer subsidy programme. Countries such as China, India, 
Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia used input subsidy programmes to help farm-
ers increase their production levels. In order to maintain sufficient supply 
in domestic food markets, countries resorted to export bans, import tariffs, 
or both. To reduce the pressures of domestic price increases on consumers, 
some countries, including China, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, released stocks of 
food reserves in the market to stabilize prices. Countries that were chroni-
cally vulnerable to food deficits relied on food aid to meet the increased 
market demand for food. Policy learning and diffusion occurred among 
the countries. For example, Vietnam has been following and implementing 
similar policy measures as China; South Asian countries closely watched, 
and responded to policy actions of India; and South Africa’s policy moves 
on food trade affected policy discussions in several southern African 
countries.
Protecting vulnerable populations through safety nets was a key interven-
tion that was further strengthened during the food price crisis. Countries 
such as China, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Senegal, South Africa, and 
Zambia reinforced their public support for social programmes to pro-
tect their poor and food insecure populations. Targeted food distribution 
through food for work and cash transfer through guaranteed employment 
programmes helped to ease the burden of the high food prices on the poor 
in India and Bangladesh. Open market sales to poor consumers in selected 
localities seemed to be a quick response to reduce the pressure from opposi-
tion parties (for example, rice in Bangladesh and pulses in India).
Watson (Chapter 5) provides a complete treatment of policy responses 
announced by the governments and reported by the media. Each govern-
ment faced a different set of domestic pressures that pushed them to act in a 
timely manner. In democratic countries, such as India and Bangladesh, the 
rise in domestic food prices following the global food price increase forced 
governments to act or respond in ways to avoid criticism from the opposi-
tion or from the media. Authoritarian regimes such as China and Vietnam 
acted proactively to avoid any political instability and addressed the con-
cerns of various stakeholders even though they were not engaged in any 
formal consultations. In open democracies such as Nigeria and Zambia the 
food price increases were met by riots in the streets by consumers and other 
disenchanted groups. This resulted in further debate in some national assem-
blies on the food price increase and actions followed.
Policy processes differed depending on the nature and level of decen-
tralization. In large countries such as India and China, policies made at the 
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central level took time to permeate to decentralized levels, whereas in small 
countries such as Malawi and Senegal, policies were only made at one level. 
In India for example, the state governments allocated additional resources 
to protect their vulnerable population. Although politically motivated to a 
large extent states like Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu provided rice for 
Rs. 1 per kg (US$0.02/kg). Policy processes also differed depending on the 
trade orientation of the countries. Openly trading countries like Brazil and 
South Africa did not have much to decide as the private sector may already 
be functioning sufficiently well to import food to take advantage of domestic 
price increases or export surplus food. Closed economies such as Bangladesh 
and India on the other hand, often needed to change policies to meet their 
development goals (Balzter, Chapter  2). Institutional development and 
capacity for facilitating policy debate and dialogue could accelerate or delay 
the policy-making process. The latter mostly applied to long-term policies. 
However, some policy changes had to be made so quickly, that in many coun-
tries, there was not much debate. Export bans, for example, were quickly 
agreed upon due to their populist nature. Countries with well-established 
social safety nets needed to make small changes to their policy course to 
protect their citizens. The cases of Brazil and South Africa in this volume 
illustrate this well.
4.4.3 Key Actors and Players in the Policy Process
Policy processes were influenced by the types of participants and their ability 
to raise issues openly. In countries like China, Vietnam, and Ethiopia, ruling 
parties, their committees, state councils, and government ministries were key 
players in designing intervention policies. In countries where political insti-
tutions permitted open discussion, such as Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, 
India, and Bangladesh key actors and players in the policy process included 
members of national assemblies, policy advisors, the private sector, consumer 
groups, national and international NGOs, farmer associations, and develop-
ment partners. In Bangladesh, opposition parties and their policy advisors 
were quick to point out weaknesses in the proposed food security and safety 
net programmes (Watson, Chapter 5).
The roles of the stakeholders in the policy process were influenced, for 
the most part, by the severity of the problem, the willingness of the govern-
ment to listen to them, and their perceived influence on policy outcomes. 
Some actors in the policy process, particularly the media, private sector, 
and CSOs tended to raise their voices early on, depending on how they or 
their constituencies were affected by the price increases. How policy makers 
responded to these voices depended to a greater extent on the power and 
influence of these entities in the policy process. In Senegal, for example, the 
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vocal complaints from the consumer and producer groups forced President 
Wade to act (Resnick, Chapter 14). Public data availability of international 
food prices and the corresponding local trends helped some country govern-
ments determine if the concerns raised by these entities were true. As a result, 
policy debates in countries like India and Bangladesh focused on the causes 
of the price increases.
4.4.4 Political Institutions
Political institutions provide a broad structural framework for understanding 
how countries respond to a food price crisis. Institutional arrangements and 
the functioning of political institutions may offer explanations of the struc-
ture of policy processes in some countries (Bates and Block 2010). The extent 
of a society’s involvement in policy debates and the use of evidence in such 
debates may also explain the nature of the policy process. The media also 
helps to gauge the level of tolerance of government functionaries for open 
debate and dialogue on policy problems.
At the policy-making level, the nature of the political system has a pro-
found influence on the choice of policy instruments and the speed of the 
policy process in responding to a food crisis. Democratic governments with 
strong opposition parties in their national assemblies tend to act on the food 
price crisis with a sense of accountability, even if they may not choose the 
first best policy that satisfies all the stakeholder groups (Watson, Chapter 5). 
For example, India reacted with an export ban mainly due to pressure from 
opposition parties who blamed the government for allowing cereal exports 
while the country’s population faced higher food prices. The Vietnamese 
government, on the other hand, responded with a similar intervention, but 
it turned out not to be necessary. Vietnamese policy makers later apologized 
to the cabinet committee explaining that the decision for the export ban on 
rice was based on incorrect calculations (Ngan 2011). Due to the absence of 
a functional opposition, the government was not held accountable for its 
error.
4.4.5 Formal Organizational Units with a Food Security Mandate
The existence of formal institutional structures with food security mandates, 
such as food security units or food policy units within the government, 
helped to speed up the policy process because of their linkages to policy 
makers at different levels. For example, the food security units in the Office 
of the President in Kenya and in the Ministry of Economic Development 
took leadership to convene policy dialogues and brought information for 
policy-making. The quality of their human resources and the organizational 
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effectiveness to contribute to information generation and to monitoring and 
evaluation, as well as their ties with the policy leaders, helped to hasten the 
debate and decision-making in the policy process.
In implementing policy responses, governance arrangements and admin-
istrative structures and procedures played crucial roles. Supervisory and reg-
ulatory mechanisms were important for providing feedback to the policy 
process on interventions. Without such feedback, policy implementation 
tends to operate in a veil of ignorance. For example, although the Malawi 
government imposed an export ban on maize following the food price 
increase, it had no way of knowing how much maize remained in the coun-
try due to this ban because of the weak administrative capacity to monitor 
the informal trade between traders in Malawi and neighbouring countries 
such as Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. In contrast, when 
India imposed an export ban on rice, due to strict border control, the policy 
affected the flow of rice into Bangladesh’s markets, which had significant 
implications on the deliberations and intervention strategies contemplated 
by policy makers in Bangladesh.
4.4.6 The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society Organizations
An active presence of the private sector in the policy process makes a differ-
ence in a country’s response to a food crisis. The confidence that the private 
sector has in government policy is critical for its effective involvement in 
the food and input markets. Further, in countries where the private sector 
is asked about its potential challenges and is supported by the government 
through short-term credit, the implementation of market interventions 
becomes more effective. In Bangladesh, for example, the private sector has 
become an effective partner of the government to import the food needed 
to supply the domestic market. In China, the private sector that exported 
fertilizer was affected by the restriction of fertilizer export. However, domes-
tic support to farmers helped the private sector to gain from such interven-
tions. Thus irrespective of whether a country is market economy or centrally 
planned, successful policy-making in the food sector needs to involve regular 
consultation with the private sector to enable them to function effectively 
and profitably.
In response to the food crisis, Nigeria implemented a massive support pro-
gramme to increase fertilizer use. The implementation of this programme 
largely involved the private sector for the importation and transportation 
of the fertilizer. Regular consultations with the private sector has helped 
the government policy makers to gain a better understanding of the chal-
lenges the private sector faces and to address them through interventions as 
necessary, such as improving customs processes (personal communication 
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with officials of the Fertilizer Department, Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, Nigeria). CSOs also play a vital role in food policy 
debates when they are allowed to participate. For example, in Malawi, the 
federation of NGOs with a food security mandate raised common voice 
towards the food security of people in vulnerable areas. In Nigeria the net-
work of food security NGOs meets with the Minister of Agriculture and 
Rural Development on a regular basis. In many developing countries, the 
emergence of food security CSOs during the development of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers has helped to cement their participation in food 
and agriculture policy processes.
In countries with strong CSOs, the CSO-contributed information on the 
causes and consequences of a food crisis has shaped the policy debates. For 
example, in India the CSOs engaged in the ‘right to food’ movement were 
highly critical of the government during the food price crisis and this further 
strengthened their position in the policy process. However, the capacity of 
CSOs to meaningfully contribute to the policy development process is still 
limited in many countries.
4.4.7 Food Security Committees and Taskforces
In addition to the food security units that operate within government min-
istries, governments in several countries such as Kenya and Malawi relied 
on the recommendations of special task forces or committees to guide their 
policy decisions. These taskforces are normally convened by the govern-
ment food security units described above, but not always. For example, 
in Kenya, the National Food Security Committee in the President’s Office 
played a key role in working with the Kenya Food Security Steering Group 
in the provision of information to the policy process. In addition, Kenya’s 
Inter-ministerial Committee on Drought and Food Security convened regu-
larly to discuss the food security situation in the country. A similar commit-
tee, the Vulnerability Assessment Committee, exists in Malawi within the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. This committee regu-
larly monitors the country’s food security situation. The commitment of 
the country’s government to its food security goals and the existence of 
food security strategies and policy statements provide a good point of depar-
ture for discussions during the policy process. The political commitment of 
leaders to address food security problems also contributed to focused delib-
erations in the policy process. The formation of special committees and 
taskforces also helped to quiet the opposition and to buy time, particularly 
when the committee was composed of respected food policy researchers and 
advisors.
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4.4.8 The Role of Academic Researchers and Think Tanks
Academic researchers in universities and think tanks were a key source of 
evidence on policy alternatives in countries such as India, China, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia. However, some 
countries used these research groups more effectively than others. Policy 
makers in some countries relied mostly on confidential discussions with 
researchers from think tanks to generate information that supported their 
policy options. For example, Indian policy makers regularly consulted the 
National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP) 
for their inputs on policy issues. These reports, however, are not published 
but shared as policy notes to policy makers (personal communication with 
researchers of NCAP). Similarly, the Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies (BIDS) was often called upon by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Commerce 
to guide its policy-making process (personal communication with research-
ers of BIDS).
In Vietnam, however, the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (IPSARD) was heavily relied upon to support the 
policy direction preferred by the Ministry of Agriculture but the advice given 
by IPSARD was not fully based on independent analysis (personal commu-
nication with researchers of IPSARD). This experience generated serious dis-
cussion among IPSARD’s researchers on how to make IPSARD independent 
of the Ministry of Agriculture in order to play a more effective role in pro-
viding evidence on policy alternatives, in the way that the Chinese Center 
for Agricultural Policy does in China. Think tanks in African countries 
seemed to have played limited roles in the policy process compared to their 
Asian counterparts. The Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), 
the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), the 
Agricultural Policy Research Unit (APRU) in Malawi, the Nigerian Institute 
of Social and Economic Research (NISER), and the Indaba Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (IAPRI) in Zambia played some role in contributing to the 
policy process, directly or indirectly. However, gross capacity limitations, 
lack of funding, and a low level of trust of the government continues to limit 
the role of think tanks in food policy processes in much of Africa.
4.4.9 Presence of Food Security Monitoring Systems
Countries that have active food security and nutrition monitoring systems 
seem to have responded to food crisis more quickly than others. For exam-
ple, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) in many south-
ern African counties made food price data continuously available to policy 
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makers through monthly newsletters. However, two major challenges in 
such externally-driven monitoring systems are the sharing of data with gov-
ernment institutions and departments and the low level of trust that policy 
makers have in the information generated by these monitoring systems. In 
cases where the vulnerability assessments are conducted jointly with gov-
ernment departments, as was the case in Kenya, the reports were more read-
ily accepted in the policy process and were useful in identifying targeted 
areas for intervention. One major insight from this experience is that unless 
local systems for food security and nutrition monitoring are strengthened, 
information for designing interventions to protect the poor and the vulner-
able may not be effectively used in the policy-making process.
4.5 Lessons from the Country Studies
Twelve lessons can be drawn from the analysis of the policy processes 
discussed above.
1. Crisis vs. non-crisis policy process: policy processes are, in general, differ-
ent during a crisis period compared to a period of relative calm. Due to 
time limitations and pressure to act, policy makers tend to make deci-
sions with minimal consultation during a crisis period relying mostly 
on policy advice from a close circle of advisors. In the long run, how-
ever, there is evidence of more inclusive decision-making, particularly 
in more open democracies.
2. Political institutions and policy consultations: the nature of the political 
institutions in a country determines the extent of consultation and 
stakeholder participation. Short-run policy outcomes could be simi-
lar even if the nature of the political system and the source of pres-
sure to act vary. This is true even among some authoritarian regimes. 
Country-specific analysis is needed to explore the differences between 
the policy processes under similar political regimes.
3. Gaining recognition and access to the policy process:  the advocacy coali-
tion model was visible in some countries during the food price crisis. 
The crisis presented an opportunity for several organizations to become 
more active and vocal by working together to achieve food security 
goals. In some countries, food security-oriented CSOs gained impor-
tance and acceptance by policy makers when it was realized that their 
input was particularly constructive.
4. The policy process as collective action: policy processes can be seen as pro-
cesses of collective action when actors and players take proactive roles 
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to find their niche within the system. Yet collective action does not nec-
essarily improve the effectives of the policy process.5 Participants who 
oppose policy solutions proposed by policy makers may make the pro-
cess less effective. Thus, political incentives can encourage policy mak-
ers to actively engage specific policy actors in the policy process. This 
also reflects on the choice of members to the task forces and committees 
organized to address food price crises. Capacity for collective action is a 
challenge in countries when access to information and evidence varies 
among entities.
5. Crisis as an opportunity for long-term strategy development:  the 
multiple-streams framework of the policy process was seen in several 
countries where the food price crisis brought a window of opportu-
nity for various food and agricultural problems to be brought forward 
by different groups including adaptation to climate change, natural 
resource degradation, and opening up local food market chains for for-
eign investment. The crisis also pulled together various groups of policy 
proponents and raised differing views on potential solutions. However, 
it is not clear if countries used this opportunity effectively to develop 
long-term strategies to achieve food security.
6. Formation of stronger coalitions: in some countries the food price crisis 
provided an opportunity for the formation of advocacy coalitions. In 
Nigeria, for example, the agro-processors and millers came together to 
seek concessions for their operations even though they were competi-
tors. Similarly, NGOs working toward food security came together to 
form a united network.
7. Involvement in long-term policy dialogues with increased legitimacy: contin-
uous engagement of key actors that were involved in the policy process 
during the crisis period could aid in designing long-term interventions. 
In Nigeria, for example, a recent consultation with the food security 
CSOs showed that the CSOs that brought the increasing food prices 
to the attention of the government formed a coalition of food security 
NGOs and consulted at both the state and federal level (FMARD 2010). 
Thus the food crisis provided an opportunity for the CSOs to become 
5 Effectiveness of the policy process may be an important goal in itself for policy makers who 
seek to engage a wide range of actors and players to develop policy alternatives. It measures if 
the actual policy outcomes are in line with the desired or optimal policy outcome (from the 
perspective of the benevolent social planner). Better and more informed collective action by 
stakeholders by no means guarantees the desired outcome for all, as their expectations will 
differ. Nevertheless, coming together and working together on a policy problem makes future 
inclusiveness in policy-making more likely and enhances the quality of debate and dialogue in 
the present.
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more prominent and reinforce their legitimacy and participation in 
future policy dialogues.
8. Improved communication among stakeholders: the interactive model of the 
policy process was observed in countries where policy consultations 
brought various stakeholder groups together. This was more evident in 
open and democratic countries than in authoritarian regimes where 
interactive processes of policy-making remain limited to the ruling par-
ties and the councils appointed by them. The food price crisis mobi-
lized key players to work together by increasing their communication 
and interactions. At the same time, the challenges that CSOs and pri-
vate sector organizations faced in addressing the food crisis emerged 
during these discussions and, through increased interaction, they were 
forced to improved their communication skills, especially with other 
players in the policy process.
9. Implementation challenges:  many of the discussions, policy dialogues, 
and consultations that took place during the food crisis period focused 
not only on the policy options that the government was considering, 
but also on the challenges that it will face in implementing the policies. 
These interactions highlighted capacity challenges at all levels—the 
system level, organizational level, and individual level.
10. Role and independence of research organizations in the policy process: while 
research and academic organizations were consulted in countries such 
as India, China, and Vietnam, these organizations belonged to, and 
were funded by, their respective governments. The level of independ-
ence in evidence generation differed between countries. In some more 
democratic countries, policy makers, researchers, and bureaucrats 
worked well together to achieve their goals and objectives; however, 
these discussions were mostly internal and resembled the institutional 
rational choice model in that the relationships between the govern-
ment, think tanks, and political leaders were driven by a specific set of 
institutional rules.
11. Strengthening the capacity of actors and players in the policy process: in 
some of the countries, CSOs are allowed to play meaningful roles in 
the policy process, but are grossly constrained by a lack of capacity 
to do so. Strengthening the capacity of CSOs to identify the problem 
and to develop local solutions by analysing their data is a first step 
to increasing their effectiveness in the policy process. The media has 
played a significant role in several countries to highlight the problem of 
increasing food prices and their effects on poor households. However, 
the quality of reporting and information sources could be improved 
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by strengthening the capacity of the journalists and increasing their 
access to research-based evidence.
12. Role of monitoring systems:  regular information on the status of food 
insecurity and the vulnerability of households in different geographi-
cal areas of a country is a crucial ingredient in policy-making. Yet even 
where there are functioning data collection systems, much of the col-
lected data is not processed in time, only a portion of what is processed 
is analysed, and only a portion of what is analysed is used in the policy 
process. Improving the capacity of the taskforces and parliamentary 
committees to effectively demand information will improve the qual-
ity of the policy debate. Finally, enhancing implementation capacity to 
translate policy and programme interventions and to receive feedback 
on the impact of the implemented interventions is crucial for the policy 
process.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter an attempt is made to understand the policy-making processes 
that were followed when developing responses to the recent food price cri-
sis to draw lessons for improving and strengthening these processes to better 
face such crises in the future. After reviewing the broader literature on the 
frameworks, theories, and models of policy processes, we developed a com-
bined framework that could be applied to food policy-making in developing 
countries. Following several rounds of cross-country discussions and analyses 
of country-level policy-making, we identified the nature of policy processes 
in selected countries. A key lesson learned is that by strengthening the role of 
various players and actors, and empowering them by increasing their capacity 
for research, analysis, communication, and advocacy, their participation in 
food policy-making processes can be enhanced. However, their participation is 
conditional on the nature of the political institutions in the country. A broader 
insight from the review of the policy processes is that not one theory alone can 
fully explain the food policy-making process. A combination of theories is at 
work in any particular country. Identifying the most important actors as well 
as their roles is crucial to improve policy-making processes. Policy processes 
are affected by various factors depending on the political, socioeconomic, and 
cultural contexts of the countries. Understanding the nature and magnitude 
of these factors will help in devising strategies that could help development 
partners and policy makers to guide the development of open, transparent, 
and effective policy processes that can result in better policy outcomes.
 






Description of policy 
process
Major assumptions of 
the model
Use of models for food policy-making






Decision makers seek 




Demand for evidence 
exists; information 
supplied is based on 
analysis; information is 
used in policy-making
To defend and support 
government’s stand on 
various policy issues, 
particularly when existing 
policies are challenged by 
actors of the policy process
Quick policy decisions 
are made in close 
consultation with 
groups and institutions 
funded by or 
supported by the 
government
Interactive model 







Several actors and 
stakeholders interact 
and debate policy 
options that could 
result in variety of 
policy outcomes
Government is open to 
debate and dialogue; 
actors and players are 
well informed about 
policy problems; 
allows better 
ownership by the 
stakeholders
Long-term and medium-term 
strategies such as poverty 
reduction strategies and 
agricultural development 
strategies often involve 
multiple stakeholders and 
organized interaction
Not preferred in 
situations requiring 
quick policy decisions; 
prolonged debates 
can increase cost and 





Political science Three streams of 
problem, policies, 
and politics operate 
together to produce 
policy outcomes
Policy solution depends 
on presence of all 
three streams; policy 
entrepreneurs are 
assumed to play key 
role in connecting 
the problems to 
policies bringing 
political realities into 
consideration
Specific food policy 
interventions such as 
food subsidies and social 
safety nets/often depend 
on a group or groups of 
individuals bringing problem 
and policies together in the 
context of specific political 
conditions
Food price crisis provided 
opportunity to NGOs 
in some countries to 
highlight the problems 
of food security and 
enter policy arena. 
For example, ‘Right 
to Food’ advocacies 
used food price crisis 
to strengthen their 











Policy and intervention 
programmes can be 
developed in response 
to a crisis situation at 




and the players are 
capacitated to identify 
solutions after analysis 
of the problem
Food-based interventions in 
drought prone communities; 
management of irrigation 
systems, community forest 
resources, and land and 
water resources
During crisis period 
policy solutions often 
emerge at the macro 
level; village-level food 
reserves to protect 
the vulnerable group 
during lean seasons; 
local price volatility will 
involve policy responses 





and Berry 1992);  
(Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993)
Political science Policy makers learn 




regions, or countries 
and adapt them to 
their situations
Policy makers have 
access to knowledge 
base on what worked 
in similar policy 
situations in other 
settings
Long-term policy development 
such as national agricultural 
investment plans and 
opposition to GMOs in 
selected African countries 
are some examples of use of 
policy learning and diffusion 
model
During the food crisis 
period, politically 
motivated decision by 
some countries to ban 
export of food grains 
gathered momentum 
with other countries 







Policy science People/groups of people 
with similar ideology 
could form coalitions 
to promote specific 
policy agenda




allows for coalition 
formation
Role of CSOs and NGOs that 
work towards poverty 
alleviation come together 
with one voice to develop 
poverty reduction strategies; 
federations of farmers’ 
organizations have been 
effective in forming 
advocacy coalitions
Network of NGOs 
working food security 
areas come together 
to advocate for policies 
to reduce food prices. 
Some of them jointly 
took to streets to get 
the attention of policy 
makers
Source: Author’s compilation.
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The Food Policy Crisis
Derrill D. Watson II*
5.1 Introduction
Food policy papers have generally sought to explain levels of chosen poli-
cies (e.g., size of a tariff or a fertilizer subsidy). Once the policy has been 
determined, the studies critique how well they are implemented and meas-
ure which policies are the most effective at accomplishing different goals 
in a given context. Some of the studies are summarized by De Gorter and 
Swinnen (2002) and Karp and Perloff (2002). Fewer papers attempt to under-
stand why and when governments choose different types of policies, which 
would improve policy analysts’ ability to encourage pro-poor policies which 
are more likely to be enacted, or to adapt policies which are more palatable 
to policy elites.
This chapter is a synthesis of political economic insights which can be 
gleaned from the fourteen country studies reported in Chapters 6–19. While 
Bryan (Chapter 3) describes which policies were chosen and Babu (Chapter 4) 
the processes by they were chosen, this chapter’s main duty is to bring the 
diverse policy processes into a common framework in order to identify why 
different policy responses were chosen. The narratives provided in the coun-
try studies are combined with political economic theories, primarily to dem-
onstrate how the studies fit into the political economic literature.
* This chapter has markedly benefited from comments by Rob Paarlberg, Phil Abbott, and 
participants at the Food Policy Network Workshop at Cornell University. I also appreciate the 
research assistance of Ochuware Imodagbe.
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For many governments, the rapid rise in food prices represented not only 
a food price crisis, but a food policy crisis. Policy processes are described 
as being ad hoc, unprepared, confused, and contradictory. In some cases, 
the governments themselves are described as being in panic. Government 
actions and inactions sparked fierce debate and riots across the globe.
There are several reasons to study food price movements through a politi-
cal economy lens. First, international price changes and the degree of price 
transmission from international to domestic prices are likely to be influenced 
by government policies as discussed by Baltzer (Chapter 2). Second, govern-
ment policies determine how the effects of food price changes are distributed 
among the population, partly through policy impacts on price transmis-
sion. The World Bank (2010) further contends that the ad hoc, sudden 
changes in trade policy constitute policy failures, as did the well-intended 
but ill-conceived attempts to prevent hoarding and block futures markets. 
These policy failures added to speculative behaviour and excessive, panicked 
importing.
This chapter emphasizes three models of government behaviour that 
implicitly underlie the political economy discussions in the country studies. 
In the section on internal factors, governments are considered in isolation 
from their citizens and initially assumed to have pursued exogenous social 
welfare goals as efficiently as possible. Though I refer to this as the ‘naive’ 
model because it abstracts from political realities, a microfoundation jus-
tification is given. The assumptions in the naive model are relaxed in the 
following sub-sections to allow for fragmented government, self-interested 
government actors, and path dependence. In the following section on exter-
nal factors, governments maximize a weighted social welfare function in 
which different stakeholders or lobby groups receive different weights. I refer 
to this as the rent-seeking model. Sub-sections discuss the private sector and 
protests.
5.2 Internal Political Economic Factors
5.2.1 Government Goals: Unitary, Benevolent Government
Claim 1: much of the common policy response can be explained by a social wel-
fare function maximizing government.
To understand why the governments chose the policies they did, we need to 
ask what the governments’ primary goals were, temporarily abstracting from 
the politics which inform those goals. In the naive model, governments have 
exogenously given goals which they pursue in the most efficient manner 
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There are two reasons for starting from there. The first is that this is the 
benchmark from which most other economic models of governmental deci-
sion-making depart. We can then ask how governments’ behaviour deviates 
from that of a first-best or second-best optimization of those goals, to iden-
tify what is missing from this description of government behaviour. Second, 
five of the country-study authors indicate that their governments try to 
maximize a social welfare function that weights different interest groups 
approximately equally, with Brazil and India being the strongest supporters 
of the model. The naive model is not only interesting as a benchmark, but it 
provides useful predictions in its own right.
The casestudy authors were asked to rank order which of eight possible 
goals were the most important for their government as it responded to ris-
ing food prices (Table 5.1). The second column shows the average rank given 
by the study authors with a lower number representing a higher priority. 
For most governments, the stated first priority of their food policies was to 
reduce hunger and food insecurity. As Bryan (Chapter 3) observes, more than 
three-fourths of the countries intervened in multiple ways to reduce prices. 
As a practical matter, very little policy attention was given to the nutritional 
aspects of food security; ensuring access to available supplies of grains and 
staples was the primary target for most governments. Reducing poverty and 
increasing national food self-sufficiency were among the three most impor-
tant goals in the majority of the governments. A significant number of cases 
Table 5.1 Policy priorities of the country-study governments (n=13)
Goal Average Response
(Rank from 1 to 8)
Number Responding 
that the Goal was 
among the Top 3 
Priorities
Number Responding 





Reduce poverty 3.8 8 3






Secure the government’s 
power . . . or political or 
economic rents
5.1 5 4
Stabilize macroeconomy 5.8 4 7






Source: survey of the country study authors.
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further indicate the importance of stability: achieving stable macroeconomic 
conditions, reducing social and political unrest, and keeping the current gov-
ernment in power.
Ensuring minimum farmer incomes and maintaining international rela-
tionships were primarily important to the developed countries’ governments 
and ignored by the developing countries’ governments. However, notice in 
the final column that roughly half of the governments made ensuring a min-
imal farming income at least somewhat of a priority while none considered 
their policies’ impacts on other countries. In light of the potential for policy 
spill-overs seen in the food price crisis, this willful ignorance is alarming and 
should be addressed by the involved international organizations (Pinstrup-
Andersen and Watson 2011; Baltzer, Chapter 2).
This section focuses on the first goal; reducing food insecurity. One rea-
son for this is the complementarity between reducing poverty, increasing 
national food self-sufficiency, and reducing food insecurity. While these 
goals are not equivalent, it is difficult to identify a policy measure undertaken 
to increase self-sufficiency which at the same time might not reflect a desire 
to reduce food insecurity. However, it should be noted that any complaints 
that the policies selected were not very efficient at addressing hunger apply 
doubly for addressing the problems of poverty and national self-sufficiency. 
Another reason is that very few of the governments invested in long-term 
national self-sufficiency: the vast majority of policies intended to increase 
food production did so by introducing economically unsustainable fertilizer 
subsidies or by increasing grain stocks. Mozambique provides one important 
exception to this rule, where spending on agriculture nearly doubled. Their 
Food Production Action Plan invested in multiple agricultural sectors and 
at all parts of the production-processing chain. The political stability goals 
receive separate treatment below in the self-interest, the rent-seeking, and 
the protest sections. Last, the topic of macroeconomic stability showed up 
primarily as monetary policies, discussed in Baltzer (Chapter 2) and Bryan 
(Chapter 3), or in the quantitative levels of policy choice rather than the 
qualitative choice of which policies to choose.
The desire to reduce hunger implies that in most cases lower food prices are 
preferred to higher. Barrett (1999) provides a justification for equating gov-
ernments’ target to reduce food prices with maximizing social welfare. He 
constructs a structural model of coalition formation over food price policies. 
Small- to medium-scale farmers, landless rural labourers, and the urban pop-
ulation poor prefer low prices. Commercial farmers and agro-industrialists 
prefer high food prices.
Barrett (1999) is quick to point out that this is only a description of coa-
lition formation, not of the complex policy processes that determine final 
policy outcomes. Barrett uses the model primarily to explain why countries 
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with larger farms and more net food sellers prefer higher prices than coun-
tries with primarily small, subsistence farms. This is one reason why the USA, 
Brazil, South Africa, and Vietnam enacted fewer price decreasing policies. His 
paper also suggests that in studying food price crises, the important factor is 
that prices are high rather than that they are variable. Price stability is a less 
important target to achieving lower food insecurity than ensuring afford-
able prices, favouring the groups that prefer lower prices. However, as prices 
increase, variability raises costs and may become a more important part of 
policy processes going forward.
Empirically, most researchers find that lower food prices also help the 
poorest in rural areas because they tend to consume more food than they 
produce (e.g., Deaton 1989, for Thailand; Barrett and Dorosh 1996, for 
Madagascar; Klytchnikova, and Diop 2006, for Bangladesh; Mghenyi and 
Jayne 2006, for Kenya; De Janvry and Sadoulet 2010, for Guatemala). On 
the one hand, nearly all the rice Zambian farmers produce is for household 
consumption, so any increase in the price of imported rice is harmful in the 
short run (Chapoto, Chapter 8). On the other hand, most wheat in Zambia is 
produced by large-scale commercial farmers who benefit from higher wheat 
prices. Nearly two-thirds of the Kenyan crop and livestock producers are net 
food buyers (Nzuma, Chapter 9). According to Bangladesh’s 2005 Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey, marginal farmers in Bangladesh must pur-
chase 83 per cent of their rice from markets and even large farms acquire 
20 per cent of their rice from markets (Raihan, Chapter 11). At the same time, 
however, these marginal farmers are selling 20 per cent of what they pro-
duce. This shows that price increases during harvest time will be welcomed 
by even the poorest, while price increases before it will harm even large, 
commercial farmers.
However, low food prices are not always preferred by poor farmers. In 
Cambodia, China, Madagascar, and Vietnam, the average farmer is a net 
food seller (World Bank 2007). Chinese academics argue that food inflation 
should be allowed in order to benefit the poorest Chinese (Huang, Yang, and 
Rozelle, Chapter 17). Even when farmers are net buyers, low food prices may 
not be in their best interests in the long run. Harriss (1979: 377) observes that, 
because most producers are net food consumers, they have favoured ‘the 
very same cheap food policy that is causing their poverty in the first place 
since it is not in their interests to pay out higher prices for food’. However, 
low food prices discourage further investment in agriculture, keeping small-
holders’ production low. Numerous researchers argued before the food price 
crisis that small increases in food prices would help the same farmers in the 
long run. Similarly, Barrett (1999) shows that both higher and lower food 
prices create political coalitions to support the continuance of either one. 
Ravallion (2000) argues that higher food prices eventually generate increased 
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agricultural wages which may offset the decrease in consumer welfare from 
higher prices. The Brazilian case makes use of this notion, showing that if 
food prices are fully passed through to increase wages—a big if—the poor 
in Brazil would be better off with higher food prices (Mueller and Mueller, 
Chapter 18). If there is only a 50 per cent pass-through, the poorest 10 per 
cent of the population is no worse off.
POLICY FAILURES
There are several significant factors which argue against taking the naive 
model of government action. For instance, economists typically assume gov-
ernments identify and address specific market failures so that government 
intervention in pursuit of their goals can be efficiency enhancing. While 
roughly half the studies briefly mention speculative behaviour, hoarding, 
anti-competitive practices, or abuse of market power, very few of the gov-
ernments took action to address the issues. In Ethiopia, the government 
merely warned firms not to hoard grain stocks (Admassie, Chapter 6). Egypt 
passed a law forbidding anti-competitive practices, but following the crisis it 
was deemed to be largely ineffective in addressing the problem (Ghoneim, 
Chapter 12). The three exceptions are: Bangladesh, where the government 
sealed warehouses to prevent hoarding (Raihan, Chapter 11); Malawi, whose 
government justified its trade restrictions and price bands on addressing 
hoarding problems (Chirwa and Chinsinga, Chapter 7); and South Africa, 
where a Competition Commission was established before the food crisis 
which increased prosecutions and fines for food companies engaging in 
anti-competitive behaviour (Kirsten, Chapter 19). Governments’ relation-
ship with the private sector will be discussed below.
No attempt was made to address other classic market failures, such as pro-
viding public goods, which would improve market integration or reduce spa-
tial price variability (e.g., Vietnam). Instead, governments intervened when 
desirable outcomes were not being achieved by market forces in the short 
run, typically without regard for the long-run considerations.
More damaging to the naive model are the inefficiencies in the policy 
choices. Most of the governments did not target their food price policies 
to those facing hunger and food insecurity. The selected policies tended to 
be easier and quicker to operate and were either not targeted well or they 
targeted urban and middle-class citizens whose need was less. Kenya, for 
example, subsidized bags of processed maize meal which were too large for 
poor households to afford. India and Zambia, despite identifying reducing 
poverty as one of their top priorities, took no new actions to improve social 
safety nets or otherwise support the incomes of the poor. Despite the claim 
that the majority of the countries wanted to increase food self-sufficiency, 
most agricultural interventions were short-term only. While Mozambique 
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has claimed to invest heavily in agricultural production and processing bot-
tlenecks, food production has not increased since the crisis. Ganguly and 
Gulati (Chapter 16) complain that even though India is one of the few coun-
tries to increase investment in achieving a second green revolution, the 
budget allocations are so small that they are likely to have only symbolic 
impacts. Most of the important interventions are also quite expensive, work-
ing against the goal of macroeconomic stability.
In addition to the failures from inefficient policy choices, implementation 
failures may be found throughout the case studies. Policies are announced 
and then retracted within three to six months, usually for being ineffective, 
corrupt, or both. Subsidized foods did not get to the hungriest or poorest. 
Many policies were introduced too late to stop the rapidly rising prices. Most 
countries took many actions but had very little to show for it.
The success of the Chinese implementation stands in stark contrast to 
what happened in most countries (Huang, Yuang, and Rozelle, Chapter 
17). China’s primary goals were to increase national food self-sufficiency 
and provide macroeconomic stability. They certainly succeeded in creating 
food price stability. Regular government and public research centre reports 
were fed into a policy apparatus where trigger conditions for specific policies 
were already put in place. The bureaucratic system was ready to put those 
policies into operation quickly and efficiently. As a result, though rice and 
wheat prices did rise from 2005 to 2010, they did so at a steady rate that 
completely denied all international variation. The government credits the 
success to the combination of stock releases with gradually changing export 
subsidies into restrictions. If stocks were released without export restrictions, 
the subsidized grains would have easily made their way to other countries, 
as happened in the other countries. Since China imports all its soybeans, 
however, the domestic price fully realized all changes in the global prices. 
In the immediate aftermath, the majority of China’s policies focused on the 
short-run impacts. Since then, new policies focusing on long-term agricul-
tural development have been introduced.
There are multiple explanations for most countries’ divergence from effi-
cient policies, including fragmented government decision-making, path 
dependence, and self-interested decision makers. So far governments have 
been modelled as unitary decision makers with a single objective function. 
Relaxing this assumption, we can see that different factions, ministries, or 
individuals within government may have competing goals. The evidence on 
how fragmented government decision-making processes and uncertainty 
alter the policy mix and introduce delays and inefficiencies and the extent 
to which policy makers are constrained by past policy choices is discussed 
below. The ‘public choice’ model is then considered, which assumes that 
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some or all of those factions may act in their own self-interest and not just 
for the national interest.
5.2.2 Fragmented Government and Uncertainty
Claim 2:  one primary cause of policy failure was fragmented government 
decision-making.
Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the government can be treated as 
one entity, capable of rational decision-making based on a known set of goals 
and constraints. In general, this will only be the case when most policy deci-
sions are made by only one person or by a small group of like-minded people. 
China forms a distinct counter-example of a large government with many 
ministries involved in decision-making, yet unified around common goals 
directed from above (Huang, Yang, and Rozelle, Chapter 17).
Many of the studies, however, demonstrate that the simplifying assump-
tion of unitary government decision-making masks essential dynamics. 
They reveal a pattern of poor coordination and tensions between differ-
ent ministries—each with its own goals and maximands, special interest 
groups, targets, resources and constraints, biases, and influence—which 
slow policy formation, introduce inefficiencies, and result in sub-optimal 
outcomes. Roubini and Sachs (1989) are generally credited with introducing 
the study of fragmented government decision making to fiscal policy, exam-
ining whether single-party control of government changed budget deficits. 
Others have expanded the concept to include the number of decision makers 
(Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999) and their ideological cohesion (Volkerink 
and de Haan 2001). These authors also note that fragmentation will matter 
more during periods of crisis as the one currently being considered.
Fractures exist over who is in charge of decision-making. In Egypt, there 
was a great unity of purpose surrounding the bread subsidy, but outside of 
that one policy there was very little coordination or data sharing. The result 
was that each ministry used its own tools to accomplish its own goals, lead-
ing to both duplicated efforts and conflicting policies. In Bangladesh, by 
contrast, the ministry of commerce was nominally responsible for food mar-
ket policies. However, it was unable to act without the consent and support 
of other ministries. Lack of coordination led to a widespread criticism of 
the ministry for failing its job in a time of crisis. One of the responsibili-
ties of Bangladesh’s ministry of commerce might have been to specifically 
take the blame for general government failures. Nhate, Massingarela, and 
Salvucci (Chapter 10) particularly mention the contention between govern-
ment sectors over how much money to allocate to agricultural priorities in 
Mozambique.
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In addition, fractures develop over what role different institutions are sup-
posed to play. In South Africa, the finance ministry offered the ministry 
of agriculture 400  million Rands to improve food security. Agriculture’s 
response, in one of the oddest inter-ministerial conflicts, was that their man-
date covered increasing production and funding research, not food policy. 
The funding therefore went towards social development through another 
ministry. In India, the federal government structure complicated and slowed 
the decision-making process as the federal and state governments debated 
which was responsible for responding to the crisis.
Malawi seems at first an ideal counter-example: the president had a high 
level of control over government policies and—as a former minister of agri-
culture who installed a close friend as his successor in the ministry—he was 
deeply involved in creating and overseeing the primary agricultural policies. 
Public agencies that tried to act independently tended to be underfunded, 
encouraging all government bodies to act in concert with the president’s 
wishes. However, when investigating why the price band failed, Chirwa and 
Chinsinga (Chapter 7) point, among other problems, to perennial institu-
tional rivalry between the parastatal marketing board and the parastatal 
grain reserve board. Uncertainty about whether there was a crisis or not, with 
prices rising despite a record harvest, also slowed policy action. In Zambia, 
the late timing of government responses were due to conflicts between the 
ministry of agriculture and other ministries similarly reduced the country’s 
ability to import enough grains to deal with the crisis.
The validity of the unitary government assumption depends on the policy 
being discussed. Significant government policies are largely determined by 
only one person or an elite group of like-minded individuals while other 
policies are left to large groups of diverse stakeholders inside and outside 
of government. Brazil’s programmes to help smallholders are decided by a 
small group, while income and pricing policies are decided by large groups. 
In several countries, such as Egypt and Zambia, specific directives come from 
the highest level around which all policy makers must unify, but then minis-
tries are left to follow other guidelines as they deem best. The survey results 
identify a slight tendency for the executive head to personally oversee poli-
cies relating to social or political unrest while agricultural policies tend to be 
made by larger groups of decision makers.
Claim 3: Uncertainty and incorrect forecasts significantly influenced govern-
ment actions.
Analysts now have the convenience of being able to look back and see long 
time series of price data behind them. During the food price crisis, how-
ever, there was no telling how high prices might go, when they might come 
down again, or what was causing prices to rise so rapidly (Croushore 2011). 
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Uncertainty in Ethiopia over whether price increases were domestic or inter-
national delayed its monetary policy response.
The effects of a fragmented government could be magnified by uncertainty 
and incorrect forecasts. In Zambia the Disaster Management Consultative 
Forum watches for production shocks while the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock focuses more on national food balance sheets. Thus, if there is no 
change in production, the committee trained to deal with disasters will not 
react to changes in the international market. Further, the disaster commit-
tee focuses on rural, smallholder, and poverty issues while the agriculture 
ministry responds more to the commercial farmers’ needs. Private unions 
convinced the Minister of Agriculture in July 2008 that demand would be 
larger than the government estimated, and so it began importing earlier.
The interplay between uncertainty and fragmented government is best 
seen in the study on Vietnam. Vietnam’s policy decisions were sparked by a 
March 2008 report from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) that claimed harvests would be lower than usual. The government 
felt it would be wisest to restrict exports. However, this decision was based on 
faulty predictions because Vietnamese farmers had a bumper crop. The min-
ister apologized before the National Assembly for the wrong estimates that 
led to an export ban. This one bit of uncertainty in the report could therefore 
well be blamed for part of the crisis itself, to the extent that Vietnam’s meas-
ures to restricting exports led to increasing global grain prices.
One hypothesis is that policy actions in India spilled over into Vietnam. 
The argument relies on imperfect information and uncertainty, with govern-
ments getting a signal about conditions in other countries based on their 
policies. When India restricted its exports, the Vietnamese government 
received a signal about the likely production of India and of the direction of 
future rice prices. Fearing that increasing prices would reduce consumer wel-
fare, Vietnam began reducing its exports. As each government saw the other 
restricting exports, more restrictions were put in place.
The problem with the logic of this hypothesis is that the Vietnamese 
government viewed India as a competitor in the rice market (Nguyen and 
Talbot, Chapter  15). When India announced export restrictions, this sig-
nalled higher profits and foreign exchange to be earned by keeping markets 
open. Without the internal MARD report, the government would likely have 
not intervened in the export market. Rather than signalling a need to close 
borders, the Indian governments’ actions gave the Vietnamese government 
a reason to keep them open. This is one reason Vietnam merely ‘dabbled’ in 
intervention, to use Bryan’s (Chapter 3) classification.
While MARD was reducing export profits to protect consumers, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade was tasked with protecting farmers and there-
fore introduced a price floor above the market clearing price. Put together, 
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these conflicting policies meant that large amounts of rice were not sold 
domestically or abroad, prices rose despite the existence of surplus rice, and 
some households had less food access despite high food availability. Publicly 
held stocks increased rapidly. These examples highlight the importance of 
modelling governments as fragmented between different policy makers with 
different goals and constraints. Because of complex interactions, final out-
comes may resemble the goals of none of these parts.
5.2.3 Public Choice
Claim 4: policy makers’ private interests drove policy choice in select examples.
Unlike the naive model above, public choice theory assumes that policy 
makers also have self-interested motivations for what they do. In this chap-
ter, I differentiate between two branches of public choice theory: the first 
I call the rent-seeking model and the other the ‘self-interest’ model. In the 
rent-seeking model used when we consider external factors, policy makers 
put more weight on the welfare of some stakeholder groups than others (e.g., 
urban versus rural consumers). In the self-interest model considered here, 
however, policy makers explicitly ask how they can personally benefit.
While there is some overlap between these branches, the fundamental 
question is why policy makers support a particular group: if it is for private 
gain, it falls under the self-interest model. In the self-interest model, policy 
makers do not attempt to reduce hunger and poverty purely out of altruism 
but because doing so also satisfies other, private interests. These private inter-
ests may include ensuring their continuance in power, personal financial 
rewards, increased power and influence, or achieving a place in history.
Consider first the desire to remain in power. Ganguly and Gulati 
(Chapter 16) report on the widely held belief in Indian political circles that 
elections have been lost on the basis of onion prices that skyrocketed the year 
before the election, and that the government’s decision to forgive the debts 
of smallholder farmers was a populist sop before the 2009 elections. This 
supports the electoral business cycle theory, first put forward by Nordhaus 
(1975), in which politicians enact different policies near elections to secure 
their re-election (see also Vadlamannati 2008, for another application to 
India). Politicians have clearly learned to respond quickly to both preventing 
onion price increases and providing support when they do rise, lest they lose 
an upcoming election.
Nhate, Massingarela, and Salvucci (Chapter 10) and Resnick (Chapter 14) 
similarly argue that Mozambique and Senegal typically only begin imple-
menting promised programmes just before elections. Efforts to prevent food 
price increases were therefore widely perceived as attempts to improve the 
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government’s re-election chances. Kirsten (Chapter 19: 422) indicates the 
few innovations South Africa enacted were based on ‘the seriousness of the 
crisis in terms of political repercussions’.
Policies were not only chosen to secure electoral victory but to generate pri-
vate wealth as well. For instance, the Grossman-Helpman (1994) ‘pay to play’ 
model assumes that governments maximize a weighted sum of social welfare 
and campaign contributions which can be thought of either as being used to 
stay in power or as private spending money. Practitioners then use data on 
trade barriers to measure government benevolence, with more open govern-
ments putting more weight on social welfare (e.g., Gawande, Krishna, and 
Olarreaga 2009). This explicitly assumes that some governments respond 
more to private incentives than others, and so we should expect the same in 
these studies.
Malawi and Zambia most closely exemplify the influence private incentives 
have on policy selection. The Malawian political system functions through 
a system of patronage, with votes and support bought using public resources 
doled out to favoured constituents. In part because of its importance to the diet 
and even more because of the food crises in 2001–2 and 2005, maize policies 
became the lifeblood of the political parties. The most important campaign 
element in the 2009 election for all parties was what to do with the extremely 
popular fertilizer subsidy which directly transferred resources to politically 
important farmers. Government officials admit that ‘the government is only 
interested in controlling the price of maize because . . . there can be political 
backlashes’ and is ‘motivated largely by electoral considerations (Chirwa and 
Chinsinga, Chapter 7). Because of the importance of maize policies to govern-
ment legitimacy, the president announced price policies and maize export bans 
at political rallies and functions.
The Malawian government granted one particular firm a monopoly in dis-
tributing and overseeing the fertilizer subsidy. That company was owned 
by the president. It was therefore very much in his private interest that the 
subsidy be expanded. Furthermore, Chirwa and Chinsinga (Chapter 7) argue 
that the reason the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) did not release 
grain stocks was that the major grain exporters to Zimbabwe were politi-
cians who profited from the high international prices. This directly led to 
the implementation failure of the price band enacted through Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the agricultural 
parastatal.
Political economists have posed two competing models for how a 
self-interested government should distribute scarce resources, such as ferti-
lizer and seed subsidies, to their citizens and supporters. The ‘swing voter’ 
model says that governments should transfer resources to marginal constitu-
encies to strengthen their loyalty (e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull 1993; Bates 
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2008). The ‘core support’ model, however, believes that governments should 
reward strong loyalty rather than tepid support, distributing resources to 
their strongest supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986).
Empirical studies have found support for each model. Banful (2010) for 
instance finds that Ghana distributed more vouchers for subsidized fertilizer 
to districts where they lost the last election, evidence in favour of the swing 
model. The studies presented in this volume come down heavily in favour 
of the core support model. In both Malawi and Zambia, subsidized ferti-
lizer vouchers are distributed as a reward for support in the previous elec-
tion (Chapoto, Chapter 8). According to Mason and Ricker-Gilbert (2012), the 
average household receives 11 kg more fertilizer if it lives in a constituency 
that voted for the government party and that amount increases by 0.5 kg 
for every additional 1 per cent of the vote. Chapoto (Chapter 8) adds that 
stakeholder contributions were deliberately ignored to support policies with 
a higher political payoff.
In addition to winning elections and personal enrichment, decision 
makers’ goals include seeking a place in history (Galeotti and Breton 1986). 
The Senegalese case study provides an interesting portrait of a leader com-
pelled to make a name for himself in history. President Wade focused on 
very large projects, nearly all of them with his name emblazoned on top. 
Yet at the same time, these projects could be abandoned rapidly as minis-
terial responsibilities were shuffled to prevent anyone else from rising to 
the top.
Four of the study authors believe food policy goals were not pursued for 
their own sake but primarily in order to secure government power or legiti-
macy. Two further authors explicitly listed maintaining power as one of 
their governments’ goals. They additionally confirm that this is standard 
operating procedure rather than a new factor. Where elections exist, they 
are universally ranked as one of the most important factors in determin-
ing when and how to respond to a food crisis. These answers and studies 
suggest that, while personal benefits accruing to policy makers influence 
governance and policy choice more in some governments than others, 
emergency situations do not alter governments’ degree of self-interest or 
benevolence.
5.2.4 Status Quo Bias and Path Dependence
There are three possible ways that the food price crisis could change food 
policies: change governments’ goals; introduce new policies used to achieve 
pre-existing goals; or adjust pre-existing policies (e.g., lower import tariffs). 
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Most of the changes witnessed were in the last category, evidence of status 
quo bias and path dependence.
Claim 5:  the responses to past crises are the best guides to predicting future 
actions.
Governments may suffer from a status quo bias for a number of reasons. One pos-
sible form of status quo bias would be if there are costs to enacting new policies. 
Governments would then maintain current policies until the forgone benefits 
are greater than the costs to change. Alternatively from accumulating evidence 
from behavioural economics posits that endowment effects and loss aversion 
mean that most individuals prefer the status quo to any change—effects which 
would afflict political decision makers as well (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). 
In particular, if it is unknown who will gain and lose from a particular policy, 
governments may hesitate to break from the status quo (Fernandez and Rodrik 
1991). Tetlock and Boettger (2006) argue that if it is known who will lose from 
a particular policy, transparency will increase policy makers’ status quo bias. 
These effects generate two possible hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is that governments should prefer policy changes with 
lower costs, such as changing the level of a currently existing policy rather 
than introducing a new policy.
Second, there should be relatively little government activity normally, but 
crises should impel government action in ways that would not be seen nor-
mally. Thus, we would expect to see larger and bolder policy experiments as 
a result of the food price shocks.
Claim 6: the studies support the first hypothesis, but not the second.
The food price crisis did not change most countries’ goals. Only two of the study 
authors believe that government goals and priorities shifted during the crisis: in 
Nigeria, where continued media pressure redirected at least some government 
attention to the neglected agriculture sector and in Egypt, where the 2005 
change in election laws created new pressure on the government to address food 
policy issues. There has been some change in Ethiopia’s goals after the crisis as 
well, as the prime minister indicated an increasing policy emphasis on food 
self-sufficiency and a reduced reliance on foreign food aid (Malone 2010).
Most governments seem to have felt that the policies they had in place 
or typically implemented were sufficient. The governments that typically 
intervene little did not change their history of non-involvement. The gov-
ernments that typically have a single powerful decision maker let the person 
decide the food policy responses in ways that were largely predictable. Even 
though China changed direction from subsidizing exports to restricting 
them, it followed traditional policy processes in order to maintain impres-
sive price stability, even without announcing a set price for rice or wheat. The 
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global food price crisis only temporarily sped up India’s right to food delib-
erations rather than changing their nature. Brazil and South Africa reacted 
in the most passive manner; their safety nets and policies were already in 
place for dealing with the crisis when it came. As a regional food exporter 
with significant safety nets in place, it is even questionable whether there was 
a food crisis in South Africa. Kirsten (Chapter 19: 424) adds the realities of 
fragmented government and considers
The fact that the ANC in itself is not monolith and is intensely divided along 
many divisions it is no wonder that most spheres of government policy making—
especially in agriculture, food, land and rural development matters are experi-
encing ‘policy paralysis’ or the inability to make important decisions. . . . This 
‘policy paralysis’ can be ascribed to the fact that government (and the party) 
has succumbed to deep ideological divisions within the ruling alliance, which 
prevent any agreement on the way forward.
Even where new policies were introduced (roughly half the cases), they were 
most often a re-introduction, following historical precedent. Export-oriented 
countries that give significant support to agriculture were more likely to leave 
export borders open than the countries where consumer interests have typi-
cally received greater weight. Historically favoured farmers were more likely 
to receive farmer-friendly policies than farmers of less politically influential 
crops. Countries that have long been concerned about food self-sufficiency 
enacted policies to encourage that goal. These path-dependent policy choices 
may represent interest-group interactions (see next section), ideology, or a 
kind of myopia wherein the psychological costs of introducing new policies 
are higher than the costs of expanding current policies.
The most prevalent and first used policy changes were to adjust tariff and 
tax rates, add people to income or in-kind benefits and increase their value, 
or release stocks gathered in previous years. As Mueller and Mueller (Chapter 
18: 399) point out for Brazil, ‘the fact that these cash transfer programmes 
were already set up and running when the food price crisis hit in 2007 made 
it very easy for the government to use these channels to provide some com-
pensating income to the poor’.
Citizens’ willingness to protest the removal or reduction of a benefit acts 
as a significant constraint to the scope of policy choice. Ghoneim (Chapter 
12: 256, 255) reports that ‘removing one element of [Egypt’s bread subsidy] 
can create a very dangerous domino effect’ because it represents ‘a powerful 
symbol for the social contract between the population and any governing 
regime’. Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy and Brazil’s Bolsa Família are showing a 
similar propensity.
There were relatively very few policy surprises: Brazil demonstrated that its 
relatively new institutional checks on executive power were more effective 
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than would have been supposed. Egypt took advantage of the crisis to stream-
line many aspects of the ration card and bread subsidy system, reduce leakage 
to the black market, and speed the adoption of electronic ration cards to pre-
vent fraud—though there was a desire to effect these changes already. Egypt 
also established an advisory board on food security to improve coordination 
of the various food and agricultural policies that straddle ministry divisions. 
The most common new policy was to introduce fertilizer subsidies which 
had been having a very good run in Malawi, both politically and in terms of 
agricultural production.
One of the best guides for identifying how governments would respond to 
the food price shock was how they responded to previous food crises or other 
disasters. Devaluation led to a food price shock in Egypt during 2001–3, 
which prompted the government to nearly double the size of the bread sub-
sidy. The subsidy was again nearly doubled during the 2007–8 food price cri-
sis. Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy programme was developed in response to the 
two droughts and the food crises in 2001–5. Those food crises put the sub-
sidy at the forefront of Malawi’s political environment. Zambia established 
a system of national food balance sheets which would trigger an export ban 
in response to the 2001–3 and 2005–6 crises. South Africa similarly estab-
lished a Food Price Monitoring Committee in response to the 2001 food price 
shock to improve the government’s information set during crisis periods. 
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy came about in part because of the 
food crisis of 1985–8, and the loss of food aid from once-communist coun-
tries starting in 1989.
Bangladesh is an interesting case in this regard. It had not suffered from 
food price crises, but had instead experienced several natural disasters dur-
ing the 2000s. The government had established a network to deal with dis-
asters, supplying food and other basic necessities wherever they were needed 
quickly. The food price crisis was therefore treated as if it was a natural dis-
aster; as in the past, they went to buy rice from India. Given that there were 
also floods and a cyclone in 2007 on top of spiralling food prices, this seems 
a very reasonable interpretation. This also explains why Bangladesh was 
among Bryan’s (Chapter 3) policy dabblers: it was another natural disaster 
and did not require a major policy shift to address. However, the caretaker 
government had a short time horizon for which it was planning and it failed 
to address long-term issues. When there was a delay before an agreement 
could be reached with the government of India to send rice to Bangladesh, it 
taught the government that stocks are needed to deal with natural disasters 
as well, leading to a renewed interest in national food self-sufficiency and 
stock building following the crisis (Raihan, Chapter 11).
Status quo bias may also exist because of the institutional backdrop within 
which policy elites work (e.g., Hager and Sullivan 1994). Brazil’s institutional 
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framework ensures that ‘strong incentives’ constrain the president ‘irre-
spective of party or ideology. . . to pursue fiscally sound social inclusion’ 
policies (Mueller and Mueller, Chapter 18: 385). Only 10 per cent of the 
budget is within the president’s direct control, while at the same time 
the president must prevent inflation or be removed from the office. These 
institutional trappings of the presidency convinced even a left-leaning 
candidate like Lula da Silva—who advocated defaulting on Brazil’s debt—
to act like a fiscal conservative in office. The institutions, informed by 
electorate beliefs created during previous inflation crises, constrained 
the president’s choice set. Mueller and Mueller (Chapter 18) also contrast 
Brazil’s government’s infrastructure with Argentina’s where these checks 
and balances are not present, and attribute their varying policy choices 
(e.g., export ban in Argentina, none in Brazil) to that fundamental insti-
tutional difference.
India’s goals did not shift during the crisis, but there was an institutional 
shift that began in 2001. Its Supreme Court ruled that the government’s 
food-related programmes were legal entitlements (Srinivasan and Narayanan 
2007). This shifted the government’s policy priorities from poverty allevia-
tion to fulfilling their people’s right to food. Most of the long-term policies 
they enacted were already being discussed or in process of implementation 
before the crisis because of this institutional imperative. While Brazil’s insti-
tutions shrank the scope of action, India’s mandated increased action and 
attention to this area.
5.3 External Political Economy Factors
The first half of the chapter considered government largely in isolation from 
outside influences. To unify our discussion of policy makers’ interactions 
with the rest of their countries, consider the Stigler–Peltzman rent-seeking 
model as generalized by Hillman (1982). The key insight it offers is that gov-
ernments value the rents or the political support they receive from industry 
and consumers, as well as income from tariffs. The political support given is 
assumed to be closely related to group welfare, so we can say that governments 
have an incentive to increase the key groups’ welfare. Producers’ ideal price 
is that which maximizes industry profits: the monopoly price. Consumers’ 
ideal price is that which would prevail under competitive conditions or the 
world price if the country imports. Depending on the weights governments 
place on these groups and tariff revenue, the government chooses tariffs and 
other policies to set industry prices. For instance, Senegal’s Wade prominently 
introduced new policies immediately after meeting with different constitu-
ency groups in order to ensure their political support (Resnick, Chapter 14). 
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This half of the chapter considers the roles of various, overlapping special 
interest groups: urban citizens, donors, the private sector, and protestors.
Claim 7: Policies tended to favour urban consumer groups over other stakehold-
ers, but it is not clear that this represents a change in policy priorities.
Half of the country-study authors indicate that their governments’ primary 
motivation was to maximize the welfare of particular, politically important 
groups of people. Chief among these politically important groups are urban 
consumers: only three authors say urban consumers’ welfare was not consid-
ered by the government in making policy decisions. In Zambia it was mealie 
maize—consumed in cities and not in rural areas—that was subsidized rather 
than maize itself, so the benefits went to urban consumers rather than rural. 
Bangladesh similarly focused on subsidizing urban consumers’ food through 
the rationing system rather than urban consumers.
Political economists and scientists have generally hypothesized that 
food price crises increase governments’ urban bias. In terms of Hillman 
(1982), the additional weight governments place on urbanites’ welfare is 
the underlying urban bias. Hillman (1982) demonstrates that if the world 
prices decrease, the governments would prefer to exactly offset the price 
decrease with an increase in tariffs to maintain the same domestic price. 
The same is true in reverse during a food price spike. This provides one 
partial explanation for the decrease in anti-agriculture policies docu-
mented by Anderson (2010) since the seminal Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 
(1988) study: food prices had decreased and so anti-agriculture policies 
were reduced. Thus, policies designed to lower food prices may not be the 
result of a change in governments’ preferences (i.e., the additional weight 
placed on urban consumers relative to agriculture) but merely attempts to 
preserve the existing balance. Future research will want to examine this 
possibility.
Claim 8: foreign actors had no practical influence in most governments’ deci-
sion-making processes.
With several of the sub-Saharan African countries relying heavily on interna-
tional aid for budget support and food, given donors’ historic interventions, 
it might have been expected that the international financial institutions and 
bilateral donors would have a significant influence on policies. This makes 
it surprising that donors took on a much more supportive role than the one 
with which they are usually credited. The authors regularly state that donor 
organizations helped fund government initiatives, but there is no evidence 
that they pressed for those initiatives to take particular directions. In Senegal 
and Malawi, multiple donor organizations did press for improved policy 
actions, but these calls went unheeded. The World Bank even helped to fund 
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fertilizer subsidies in many countries which as recently as 2005 were against 
best practices.
For the most part, donor organizations and non-governmental organiza-
tions concentrated on expanding their own in-country programmes and 
alleviating the immediate hunger and poverty. It has been suggested this 
was due partly to a lack of experienced staff dealing with food and agricul-
tural issues: no one was prepared for a sudden return to real prices not seen 
in twenty-five years. Since the crisis began, donor organizations increased 
their own capacity to deal with these issues, so they may be expected to play 
a more active policy role in future food price crisis (assuming different crises 
do not transfer the funding elsewhere).
There are several exceptions to the non-influence of foreign actors. In 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia, the International Monetary Fund claimed that the 
inflation they were experiencing was caused by domestic factors and that they 
therefore needed to employ tighter monetary policy. Raihan (Chapter 11) 
notes that the World Bank and other donors can have significant influence 
since they provide 55–60 per cent of the government budget, but no details 
are given for how or which policies they influenced. Egypt made use of donor 
admonition and help to introduce smart cards to their bread subsidy, improv-
ing efficiency and reducing corruption. The US indication that they would 
allow Japan to sell its rice stocks on the open market sent a powerful signal 
which is credited with reversing the price crisis, even though those stocks 
were never actually released.
5.3.1 The Private Sector
Claim 9: insider business lobbyist groups played a pivotal role in policy forma-
tion, primarily in lower-level committees.
Claim 10: lack of transparency fuels mistrust between the government and the 
private sector, leading to policy and implementation failures.
The relationships between governments and the private sector during the 
food price crisis are complex and fascinating in their contradictions. There 
are at least two types of stories repeated in the country studies: business lobby 
groups have significant access to government committees which grant them 
influence on policy decisions, but that influence is constrained by mistrust 
on both sides. Governments call firms saboteurs, accuse them of speculative 
hoarding designed to destabilize the country, and threaten them with fines 
and jail for performing temporal and spatial arbitrage. Firms are concerned 
about the uncertainty generated by policy reversals and lack of transparency. 
This combination makes policy making—not to mention efficient food mar-
kets and business development—a difficult process.
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Lobbies’ influence on politics can be readily seen. As only one example, 
Zambia’s three main agricultural lobby groups represent large farmers, 
maize millers, and grain traders. While farmers’ unions prefer to block grain 
imports, the largest millers prefer open imports and receive subsidized grain 
from the government. In January 2008 when these lobbies were in agree-
ment over the direction policy should take, the stocks monitoring committee 
was happy to follow their suggestions. After that, however, the lobbies disa-
greed and because of their lack of unity the committee did nothing else until 
riots broke out, as discussed below.
This influence is heavily constrained by mistrust. Ethiopia’s and Malawi’s 
governments enacted specific policies to deal with distrusted private traders 
by restricting domestic grain trade. In Malawi’s case, this was the only new 
policy crafted specifically for the price increase. In Ethiopia’s case, the gov-
ernment largely relied on verbal censure, claiming businesses were deliber-
ately trying to create unrest and instability. Admassie (Chapter 6) also refers 
to harassment and intimidation, but details are not known. In addition, 
the combination of fertilizer subsidies and closed borders led to smuggling 
in some cases, such as trading Kenyan subsidized fertilizers for Tanzanian 
maize.
In Bangladesh, the caretaker government’s fight against corruption dis-
rupted supply chains and decimated informal markets many people relied 
on for food access. This reduced supply and likely increased food prices in 
more remote areas. Even though Mozambique has created a forum for busi-
ness concerns to be heard, their input was largely ignored in formulating 
the government’s response to the food price crisis. India, the world’s larg-
est democracy with an impressive historical concern for human rights, can 
force private traders to liquidate their grain stocks within fifteen days or face 
jail time. Oddly enough, however, Vietnam has such a reverence for private 
property that the idea of seizing private stocks was not even debated.
The distrust the government has for the private sector also leads to a lack 
of policy transparency. Why tell people you mistrust what you are going to 
do? This creates uncertainty for market participants encompassing the prices 
at which the government will buy grains, the market price that will trigger 
government sales, the length of export or import bans, and the size and 
scope of subsidies. Farmers must make planting decisions without knowing 
government pricing plans and traders must import without knowing when 
governments will intervene. Each could potentially lose their entire invest-
ment. There is a persistent irony that smallholder farmers are verbally praised 
and largely forgotten during policy making while large commercial farms 
and processors are quietly subsidized and publically demonized.
For instance, when farmers begged the Kenyan government to reveal the 
price it would set for maize in the 2010–11 season, the government responded 
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that that was not how markets worked—as if governments’ price-setting poli-
cies were driven by market forces (Mugambi 2010). Egypt’s export ban was 
announced for only six months, but then extended for six more. This gener-
ated uncertainty and increased price instability compared to a transparent 
system. India’s agricultural trade regularly suffers from drastic policy changes 
and piecemeal policy making. Malawi follows the same pattern (Babu and 
Sanyal 2007).
The kind of policy gyrations witnessed in Nigeria, Kenya, Vietnam, and 
elsewhere impede the effectiveness of other policies because people cannot 
trust that other policies will remain in effect any longer than these. If a pol-
icy can change so rapidly, how can firms or consumers make informed deci-
sions on investments?
Food price uncertainty contributed to the lack of transparency. 
Governments could not predict how long bans would need to be in place 
because they did not know what was going on in their own markets at the 
moment, let alone predict what would happen in the future. Ideally then, 
governments should establish clear guidelines about the conditions under 
which certain policies would be enacted—at what price thresholds bans 
would be put into place or taken down, how subsidies would vary with price, 
and so forth. This would promote both market and policy efficiency by ena-
bling farmers and traders to make informed decisions.
In some cases, the problems stem from only partial market liberalization. 
The threat of government intervention through still-extant parastatal cor-
porations keeps private firms from making the investments needed to create 
properly functioning, thick markets. The lack of well-established markets 
simultaneously tells the government they should not fully dismantle the 
parastatals. The end result preserves all the negatives of both market and 
control system while denying the benefits of both. Countries might be better 
off with either a more market-friendly system or a more controlled top-down 
system, rather than trying both and neither.
Resolving these concerns will require much greater transparency 
from government and trust between government and the private sec-
tor (Pinstrup-Andersen and Watson 2011). Unfortunately, as previ-
ously discussed, path dependence matters. Previous crises have built 
the distrust over decades and it requires a significant amount of time 
to change the culture of mistrust that exists. Jayne, Zulu, and Nijhoff 
(2006: 338) declare that:
The phenomenon of subsidized government intervention in the market, or 
the threat of it, leading to private sector inaction, is one of the greatest prob-
lems plaguing the food marketing systems in the region. Effective coordina-
tion between the private and public sector would require greater consultation 
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and transparency with regard to changes in parastatal purchase and sale prices, 
import and export decisions, tariff rate changes and stock release triggers.
5.3.2 Protests
Claim 11: protests and the threat of protests over food prices most often elevate 
food policy decision-making to a higher government level. Political protests 
have quite different impacts.
Bellemare (2012) convincingly demonstrates that food price shocks are sig-
nificantly correlated with the risk of protests, but what leads some stakehold-
ers to protest and others to work within the government processes? Insider/
outsider models postulate that interest groups have different levels of access 
and influence over policy makers. The difference between the groups is vari-
ously identified as being one of access or of strategies, with insiders being 
able to and choosing to consult with the government while outsiders rely on 
other means, such as media or social protest to influence government deci-
sions (e.g., Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994). There is a hefty debate 
whether they are outsiders because they choose such tactics or whether they 
protest because they are denied inside access.
Protestors tended to be not the poorest, but middle-poor to 
lower-middle-income urbanites, often encouraged by opposition parties. 
Protestors hoped to sway policy toward their favour while opposition parties 
hoped to gain additional power in decision-making both at the time of the 
protests and at the next election (Vadlamannati 2008). These methods are 
significantly different from those of the insider business lobbies who try to 
become part of the decision-making process, providing the information and 
feedback on which governments rely.
Prior to the Zambian riots, which targeted retail shops rather than the gov-
ernment, the government had only acted when the major business lobbies 
acted in concert. After the riots, high-level officials took notice and the food 
policies ‘became political’ (Chapoto, Chapter 8). Huang, Yang, and Rozelle 
(Chapter 17) recall the Chinese proverb that when peasants are hungry, they 
rebel. In particular, the urban poor and university students were identified 
as the most politically sensitive group. Though there was an attempt to tar-
get subsidies to the poorest students, ‘the students were included, of course, 
not fully because of poverty consideration, but the political power and their 
influences through demonstration’ (Huang et al. 2013). Thus, even though 
the Chinese government’s primary goals were related to its ongoing efforts to 
reduce poverty, desires for political stability played their role as well.
Ensuring political stability was one of Ethiopia’s primary goals. Therefore 
reducing political instability was an essential element of Ethiopia’s 
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policy-making, despite the fact that there were no reported protests. Protests 
followed the 2005 elections that brought a large contingent of opposition 
candidates into the legislature. This accomplished several things. The insta-
bility that followed encouraged farmers to hold onto more of their produce, 
not bringing as much to the market. This decrease in marketed supply 
increased food prices before the international price spikes. At the same time, 
the government took several strategic actions—in addition to food policies—
to reduce the possibility of further protests. Opposition leaders were accused 
of inciting the protests and were jailed. Freedom of assembly was curtailed in 
a number of instances in order to reduce the risk of protests. Food price poli-
cies were part of the policy response specifically to reduce the likelihood of 
protest: bringing down food prices and increasing food supply would reduce 
the pressures.
Admassie (Chapter 6) provides some confirmation for this version of 
events by noting that while the government’s priority was reducing food 
prices, the reason for doing so was to ensure political and macroeconomic 
stability. He notes that ‘the Ethiopian government took various measures 
to control rising food inflation since it did not want to take risks which 
might lead to another political instability’ (Chapter 6: __). He further con-
firms that non-food policies were an important part of the government’s 
food policy when he concludes that ‘avoiding social unrest’ was the first of 
the ‘main factors that motivated the government to take these measures’ 
(Chapter 6: 150).
In addition to being more frequent, protests seem to have been more 
effective in Senegal than in most other countries. With five major protests 
supported by opposition parties in 2007–8 alone, the government was pres-
sured to improve vendor working conditions, agree to a new five year con-
tract to import rice, introduce new rice subsidies, and to establish a new 
inter-ministerial task force to meet weekly with the head of the consumers 
union.
Political protests are different from food protests. The 2007–8 Egyptian 
riots were significantly smaller and more geographically constrained than 
the later 2010–11 protests. The primary complaint in the first riots dealt spe-
cifically with increasing food and fuel prices while any anti-government 
sentiment was largely a symptom of concerns about prices; the latter riots 
focused on poor government performance, low wage increases, and unem-
ployment. When the government reaffirmed and increased the bread sub-
sidy in 2008—a programmatic response to previous protests—the protestors 
largely dispersed. In that sense, these were similar to the 1977 riots which 
prevented a decrease in the size of the subsidy. In 2010, however, the riots 
and protests remained despite subsidy increases.
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In Kenya, violence lowered the level of government addressing food policies 
instead of raising it. Kenya’s chief executive was primarily concerned with the 
constitutional transformation following the election violence at the end of 2007; 
most food policy decisions were therefore made by the minister of agriculture. 
It is also interesting to note the similarity between South Africa in 1994 and 
Kenya in 2007–8. In both cases, the populace and government were intensely 
interested in political transitions that trumped attention to rising food prices. In 
South Africa’s case this included the end of apartheid, the induction of Nelson 
Mandela as the first black president, and the 1995 Rugby World Cup win that 
overshadowed a 22 per cent food price spike. In Kenya, election violence and 
the changing constitution were more immediate concerns, leaving individual 
ministers free to set their own policies without much coordination.
5.4 Conclusions
This synthesis has made eleven claims about the political economy of food 
policies from the 2006–8 food price crisis:
1. Much of the common policy response can be explained by a social wel-
fare function maximizing government.
2. One primary cause of policy failure was fragmented government 
decision-making.
3. Uncertainty and incorrect forecasts significantly influenced govern-
ment actions.
4. Policy makers’ private interests drove policy choice in select examples.
5. The responses to past crises are the best guides to predicting future 
actions.
6. Governments preferred policy changes with lower costs, such as chang-
ing the level of a currently existing policy rather than introducing a 
new policy.
7. Policies tended to favour urban consumer groups over other stakehold-
ers, but it is not clear that this represents a change in policy priorities.
8. Foreign actors had no practical influence in most governments’ deci-
sion-making processes.
9. Insider business lobbyist groups played a pivotal role in policy forma-
tion, primarily in lower-level committees.
10. Lack of transparency fuels mistrust between the government and the 
private sector, leading to implementation failure.
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11. Protests and the threat of protests over food prices most often elevate 
food policy decision-making to a higher government level. Political 
protests have quite different impacts.
Remarkably, many of these factors can be seen in play in Nigeria. Data uncer-
tainty led to significant government delays that were exacerbated by a lack 
of protests (Claims 3 and 11), which the government would have taken as 
a signal that the food price spikes were a cause for concern. Very few of the 
policy plans drafted were actually put into place, increasing business uncer-
tainty about government actions and likely increasing rice hoarding (Claim 
10). One reason cited for passing on a policy that would improve Nigeria’s 
rice processing ability was the cost and the fact that its impacts would not 
have been seen for some months (Claims 4 and 6). When the federal govern-
ment did release rice stocks to state government representatives (Claim 2), 
there were significant corruption charges against state representatives who 
used released stocks for political and personal gain (Claim 4 and self-interest 
model). Even though Olomola (Chapter 13) contends that the federal govern-
ment’s primary goal was reducing hunger, and was itself free of corruption 
in this episode (Claim 1), stocks were released to states not by population size 
but by political interest in particular regions’ welfare (rent-seeking model). 
Agricultural credits were extended for political reasons (self-interest model). 
One reason for the ad hoc policy reactions, described by Olomola (Chapter 
13) as panicked, was a lack of past experience with food crises; yet it is most 
likely we would see such ad hoc, stop and go actions again in another crisis 
because no long-term plan has been put into play to deal with the next crisis 
(Claim 5).
This synthesis has found three models of government behaviour to be 
particularly relevant to governments’ decision-making during the global 
food price crisis of 2007–8. The broad commonalities between very differ-
ent countries can be understood by appealing to a relatively naive model 
of political economy. Most governments interested in the short-run welfare 
of their people tend to favour policies that lower prices when international 
prices spike upwards:  lowering import barriers while export barriers rise, 
and lowering taxes on food consumption while subsidies increase. Concerns 
about the food security of the poor will lead governments to increase the size 
and scope of social safety nets. Concerns about macroeconomic stability may 
moderate these policies but most governments demonstrated a willingness to 
forgo significant revenue in order to deal with the near-term crisis.
While the naive model is sufficient to uncover the broad similarities 
between policy packages, it is also apparent that this simple model is insuf-
ficient to explain much of the variance or the ways in which governments 
deviate from these simple predictions. Without strong leadership and clear 
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direction from the executive, different ministries with different goals and 
instruments available not only act slowly, but enact directly contradictory 
policies (e.g., Vietnam). Even where governments have had a very clear, uni-
fied set of food and agriculture policies, severe swings in international prices 
may create or bring to the fore schisms that had not been politically rel-
evant before (e.g., Egypt). Uncertainty led to significant policy delays and 
reversals (e.g., Vietnam, Nigeria). These factors combine to cause much of 
the policy implementation failure documented here and in Bryan (Chapter 
3). Institutions, both formal and informal, constrain political choice and 
resources (e.g., Brazil, India).
Rent-seeking models that assume the governments care more about the 
welfare of particular groups implicitly underlie most of the cases and find 
significant support from them. Social safety net expansions were more likely 
to benefit urban consumers than rural (e.g., Bangladesh); governments did 
less to reduce price increases where farmers had large farms, were organized, 
and were politically connected (e.g., the USA, South Africa); and subsidies 
favoured groups more likely to protest and disrupt government legitimacy 
(e.g., Ethiopia, China). In some special cases, governments deviate even fur-
ther, enacting policies in ways that are privately beneficial to the detriment 
of publically stated goals and targets (e.g., Malawi, Zambia, and Senegal). 
Politics matter.
Government relations with the private sector have also been shown to be 
of critical importance in some cases (e.g., Kenya). Mutual distrust between 
them has been paralysing for both investment and policy. Lack of govern-
ment transparency and sudden policy shifts have led firms and traders to 
hoard and speculate, and farmers to invest more conservatively; those same 
responses support governments’ beliefs that businesses will hoard and spec-
ulate, thereby promoting a lack of transparency and sudden policy shifts. 
This coordination failure is an essential component of policy failures in these 
countries and must be remedied to prepare for future crises.
The global food crisis also appears to have affected underlying policy pro-
cesses much less than would have been hypothesized. Government/stake-
holder relationships did not change, government goals did not change, and 
most countries responded not by introducing completely new policies but by 
either tweaking existing policies or responding to food price volatility with 
instruments they had used before. Most relevant institutional change hap-
pened in the five years prior to the food crisis, suggesting that it is the period 
between crises when governments are most susceptible to new policies and 
processes.
This suggests that now is the time to prepare for the next crisis rather than 
waiting for the next emergency to create an impetus for change. It is also 
likely that their responses to future global food crises will be similar to those 
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followed during 2007–12. Among changes that would help resolve some of 
the challenges mentioned above is to establish automatic policy responses 
following important trigger variables. This would improve policy trans-
parency and reduce the problems from policy delays and fragmented 
government.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 










The world market prices of major staples such as wheat, maize, and rice dou-
bled or tripled between 2007 and 2008 (UNCTAD 2008; FAO 2009). A com-
bination of factors including export bans, structural and cyclical factors, and 
developments in international markets have been cited as the main causes of 
the price increase (Dewbre et al. 2008; Headey and Fan 2008).
There had also been a steady increase in the price of food staples in Ethiopia 
starting around 2004. For instance, the price of maize in 2008 was 130 per 
cent higher than the 2004–8 average (FEWS NET 2009). Several policy meas-
ures have been initiated by the Ethiopian government starting around 2006 
in response to rising food prices. The policy measures include production 
subsidies, social safety nets for food insecure households, price controls, fis-
cal measures such as adjustments in tariffs, the release of grains from the 
strategic reserve, media campaign, and export bans on food products.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the rational for adopting different 
policy measures and the role of different social groups as well as the likely 
impact of the policy measures. The chapter primarily relies on a synthesis 
of the available policy documents, research reports, newspapers, etc. Some 
consultations with experts were also organized to understand the policy pro-
cesses and the role played by the various stakeholders during the design of 
the policy measures. Quantitative information on prices, production import 
and export, etc. was collected from the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), the National 





6.2 Recent Staple Food Price Trends and Policy Responses
In Ethiopia, food production trends greatly affect staple food prices, which 
tend to rise during drought years and during the lean seasons (June–October) 
when most households run out of their own produced food stocks. What 
happed during the droughts in 1974/5 and 1984/5 are illustrations. The 
recent developments in food prices are briefly discussed next.
6.2.1 Food Price Developments between 1998 and 2004
Traditionally, Ethiopia has generally been a country with low inflation rates, 
and food inflation has not been a major challenge. For instance, the aver-
age month-to-month annualized cereal inflation before 1998 was hover-
ing around 1 per cent. Several factors, such as prudent monetary and fiscal 
policies, general price controls, as well as the implementation of economic 
reform and stabilization programmes, have contributed to this.
In terms of food price developments, the last decade can be broadly cat-
egorized into five major episodes. Episode I represents the period from July 
1998 to July 2000 that was characatrized by the Ethio-Eritrean war and 
localized drought in some parts of Ethiopia (see Figure 6.1). Episode II cov-
ers the period from July 2000 to July 2002, where the Ethio-Ertrian war was 
over. Deflationary situations were observed during this period partly due 
to the bumper harvest and partly due to the slow demand recovery from 
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Figure 6.1 Inflation and time line of incidences






urban centres due to slow business activities in the aftermath of the Ethio-
Eritrean war.
Episode III captures price developments between August 2002 and July 
2004 when drought forced about 14 million people to depend on food aid 
and led to a 3.3 per cent decline in GDP in 2003 (EEA 2004). Weak and 
poorly functioning marketing and distribution systems and poor policy 
coordination were additional challenges. The Ethiopian government estab-
lished a Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission and formulated 
a National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, as well as a Food 
Security Strategy. In addition, the Emergency Food Security Reserve and the 
New Coalition for Food Security Programme were established towards the 
end of 2003 in collaboration with the donors.
6.2.2 Food Price Developments between 2004 and 2008
The period from August 2004 to July 2009 is captured by Episode IV, which 
was characterized by the 2007–8 global food price crises and the world finan-
cial and economic crisis. As pointed out earlier, Ethiopia was one of the coun-
tries with modest inflation rates except during drought and war periods. But, 
the story started to change around 2004 when Ethiopia started to experience 
high rates of inflation. Towards the end of 2004 and well before the rise 
in international food prices, nominal prices of grains started to rise in the 
Ethiopian markets as a result of strong demand- and supply-side factors.
Increased private consumption and increased investment in poverty- 
oriented sectors and improved purchasing power of farmers due to the 
injections of cash into the local economy through the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) and microcredit services may explain the growth 
in aggregate demand. Supported by improved market information systems, 
road infrastructures, and storage facilities, farmers have gradually changed 
their trade practices, being able to hold some stocks in anticipation of bet-
ter market opportunities. Increased remittances could be another important 
factor on the demand-side. On the supply-side, despite the good harvests 
obtained in the last several years, the amount of food marketed has not 
increased as expected. Household surveys complemented with market and 
cross-border trade surveys as well as analysis of large amounts of time series 
data have shown that the production estimates of cereals was roughly 30 per 
cent lower than the official estimates (Minot 2008).
Expansionary monetary policy, driven by a significant growth in money sup-
ply needed to meet the surge in credit demand for investment financing and 
the rising cost of imported intermediate inputs contributed to the increase in 
food prices. A World Bank (2007) study argued that during 2004–6, the money 




addition, the unit price of imports of petroleum soared by 145 per cent while 
the unit price of fertilizer increased by 254 per cent. The prices of imported food 
items including grains increased by 55 per cent.
Ethiopia had a national election in 2005 which was followed by serious 
controversies. Reduced budget supports by donors to the government due to 
disagreements on the handling of the post-election events and some social 
unrest following the election have contributed to the market instability. The 
government increased money supply to fill the gap created by the withdrawal 
of the donor support and to make credit available for investment in particu-
lar credit to the public enterprises.
The general inflation rate reached 12 per cent in 2006 resulting from a 
strong upward pressure on food (14 per cent), and non-food prices (7 per cent) 
(CSA 2010). The average month-to-month annual inflation for food and cere-
als during 2007 and 2008 was 41 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively. The 
overall annual inflation rate accelerated reaching an average rate of 46.1 per 
cent (based on 12-month moving average), while the national food inflation 
reached a record rate of 61.1 per cent in mid-2008. The food inflation rate in 
November 2008 stood at a record 58.7 per cent, with an increase of 37.4 per 
cent if compared to the same month in 2007.
The nominal prices of grains show a dramatic increase between June 
2007 and June 2008. Similarly, between April and August 2008, nominal 
retail prices of wheat, teff and sorghum, and maize increased by 60 per 
cent, 80 per cent, and 90 per cent, respectively. The real maize price rose 
by about 80 per cent, real teff prices by about 40 per cent, and real wheat 
prices by about 20 per cent.
6.2.3 Food Price Developments after 2008
The last period representing the period starting around July 2009 and extend-
ing to the present is represented by Episode V in Figure 6.1. Several food price 
stabilization measures and strict monetary and fiscal measures were put in 
place to lower the rampant inflation. The National Bank imposed a credit 
ceiling on private bank lending in early 2009 with the intention of curbing 
food and general inflation. In May 2009 food inflation stood at 52.6 per cent, 
a decline of 8.5 percentage points since climbing to the record rate in 2008. 
Cereal prices started to decrease marginally also due to the arrival of the har-
vested crop on markets. In December 2009, the food inflation rate declined 
to about 6.1 per cent. However, while the food component of consumer price 
index (CPI) inflation has been declining fast, the non-food component of 
CPI inflation declined from 21.9 per cent by the end of December 2008 to 




The declining trend in inflation was again reversed due to other policy 
interventions like the 20 per cent devaluation of the Birr against the US$ in 
September 2010 (see Figure 6.2). The government established price caps on 
essential food items which significantly destabilized the market and prices 
started again to rise. Accordingly, the month-to-month annualized general 
food and non-food inflation for May 2011 stood at 34.7 per cent, 40.7 per cent, 
and 26.2 per cent, respectively (EEA 2011). The government borrowing from 
the central bank as well as the significant increase in foreign exchange earn-
ings contributed to the rise.
6.2.4 Regional Price Trends for Major Food Staples
A steady increase in food prices has been observed in all regions of Ethiopia. 
Some of the regions experienced much higher food inflation rates than the 
national average. The region of Harari (71 per cent), Dire Dawa (60 per cent), 
Gambella and Tigray (58 per cent) experienced the highest food inflation 
rates in 2008. After declining fast in 2009 and 2010, food inflation again 
picked up significantly in all regions and actually reached the 2008 levels; 
Benishangul Gumuz region recording the highest inflation in 2011. Often 
the different regions exhibit different food price trends. Usually Addis 
Ababa, Amhara, and Oromia markets share similar food price trends suggest-
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The heterogeneity of regional food prices is partly explained by the limited 
regional market integration due to inadequate infrastructure and undevel-
oped food markets, restricting trade between food surplus and food deficit 
regions (World Bank 2007). In addition, weather conditions leading to differ-
ences in the performance of the agricultural sector across regions may explain 
some of the price heterogeneity across regions (Ulimwengu, Workneh, and 
Paulos 2009).
6.2.5 Price Transmission from International Market 
to the Domestic Markets
The price developments in the international market could have significant 
impact on local food prices if a country is highly integrated to the interna-
tional market. However, according to Minot (2010) there could be a short-
term transmission of only 8 to 9 per cent of the changes in international 
prices to local markets in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of Ethiopia, the 
rising world food prices do not appear to have major implications for the 
domestic prices. Ethiopia is a relatively closed economy where imports are 
not more than 25 per cent of the GDP (Access Capital 2012). Moreover, about 
75 per cent of food consumption in Ethiopia is comprised of local staples 
(such as sorghum and teff) that are not traded much internationally (World 
Bank 2007). Given the small share of imports in GDP and in the Ethiopian 
consumer basket, the inflation of imported items may have only marginal 
effects on domestic prices.
Commercial imports of food staples in Ethiopia are about 8 per cent of 
total consumption although this accounts for roughly 16 per cent of its for-
eign exchange earnings (World Bank 2007). Commercial import of maize 
was negligible. The commercial import of wheat was insignificant until 
2008, but increased during the crisis. The largest amount of wheat import 
was in 2008, when the government imported 545,325 mt to stabilize the 
grain market. The impact of international food price increases can also filter 
through to domestic inflation if that domestically produced good is exported 
in large quantities since high prices in external markets become more attrac-
tive options for local producers and exporters pushing up domestic prices. 
And indeed, unit prices for some of Ethiopia’s export commodities such 
as coffee and oil seeds have been increasing during the period. However, 
given the small weights of these commodities in the CPI, the net impact of 
such external price effects would not be expected to be significant on the 
overall domestic price index. In addition, the rise in world food prices was 
accompanied by a similar increase in oil price that led to higher costs for 
fertilizer, sea freight, and overland transportation, which could raise the cost 




unit price of imports for petroleum soared by 145 per cent and that of ferti-
lizer increased by more than 254 per cent in 2008. Minot (2010) argues that 
landlocked countries face both higher costs, insurance, and freight prices of 
imported food and higher costs of overland transport. Thus, higher fuel costs 
may be an important contributing factor, but they are not enough to explain 
the full increase in staple food prices in Ethiopia.
Domestic prices in Ethiopia started increasing before the global food 
crisis and started increasing sharply long after world prices stabilized (see 
Figure 6.3). Ethiopian food prices also increased more rapidly than world 
food prices over the reference period. Moreover, local prices did not follow 
the downward trend in international prices after 2008, but continued to 
steadily rise.
A study by Ulimwengi, Workneh, and Paulos (2009) found that although 
all regions in Ethiopia have experienced drastic rise in food inflation since 
2004, none of the Ethiopian regional maize markets had a long-term con-
nection to the world market. The study found that the Ethiopian local maize 
markets do not share a common long-run trend in their respective price with 
the world maize market. The short-term impacts of a change in the world 
maize price on regional maize prices in Ethiopia are also limited and insig-
nificant in most of the regions. Only border regions experienced higher and 
significant influence from the world maize price on local markets. Minot 
(2010) found that although the international price has a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the domestic price of wheat, the coefficients suggest that the 
relationship is fairly weak.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that domestic rather than for-
eign factors were the most important determinants of Ethiopia’s food price 
inflation during the crisis. As noted by Minot (2010), the domestic policy 
and production shocks such as the government’s restrictions on imports and 
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factors. As indicated by the World Bank (2007) study and also emphasized 
by the study by Loening, Durevall, and Birru (2008) a supply shock may 
have contributed to higher real staple food prices in Ethiopia. In addition, 
although the rising inflation ought to be accompanied by a depreciation 
of the currency, the government imposed restrictions on imports and on 
the purchase of foreign exchange. While domestic prices rose about 70 per 
cent between June 2007 and June 2008, the exchange rate remained essen-
tially unchanged. In early 2008, the national bank started rationing foreign 
exchange. So, as noted by Minot (2010) because of the fuel subsidies and 
restrictions on the foreign exchange market a shortage of foreign currency 
was created, preventing private traders from importing grain.
6.2.6 Impact of the Food Crisis
The price increases led to a reduction in the consumption of preferred foods 
and switching to cheaper foods. Reducing food and non-food consumption 
is a significant coping strategy by the most vulnerable households in Ethiopia 
(Bene, Devereux, and Sabates-Wheeler 2012). Teff is the most common sta-
ple grain consumed by most people, particularly in urban areas in Ethiopia. 
However, during the crisis many people resorted to relatively cheaper foods 
such as maize and sorghum. Anecdotal observation showed that people 
switched to eating twice a day instead of the usual three meals. According to 
the World Bank (2007), most poor people are net consumers implying that 
higher food prices could lead to increased poverty. Moreover, small farmers 
in Ethiopia both sell and buy food (it is estimated that more than 80 per cent 
of cereal producers purchase some cereals).
The result from a study on fifteen Ethiopian rural villages shows that 
the poverty level fell substantially (from 48 to 35 per cent) between 1994 
and 2004 but increased to 52 per cent in 2009 and consumption per capita 
declined significantly (Dercon et al. 2011). Another study by Action against 
Hunger (2009) indicated that high prices were closely followed by an increase 
in malnutrition and under-five mortality rates. Ulimwengi et al. (2009) argues 
that a 50 per cent increase in grain prices would reduce urban caloric intake 
by 16 per cent and rural caloric intake by 24 per cent. Recently, Kumar and 
Quisumbing (2011) suggested that female-headed households in Ethiopia 
have experienced a higher food price shock in 2007/8. These studies suggest 
that the food price crisis indeed had significantly affected particularly the 
socially disadvantaged and poor people.
In addition to the significant effect on household welfare, the food crisis 
created serious balance of payment problems in Ethiopia. The worsening cur-




IMF (2008), the impact of the 2008 food and fuel price increases has con-
sumed more than 50 per cent of the international reserve for Ethiopia.
6.3 Policy Responses to the 2007–8 Food Crisis
The Ethiopian policy makers strongly felt that staple foods cannot be left to 
market forces alone and took several measures to stabilize food prices and to 
improve the purchasing power of the most affected segments of the popula-
tion, mostly the urban poor. Like in many other countries, Ethiopia also took 
measures ranging from fiscal, trade, and monetary policy to social protection 
and safety net measures. Since the price transmission from the international 
market was limited, the policy responses were instigated by domestic price 
increases caused primarily by domestic factors.
6.3.1 Export Bans on Cereals
One of the first measures taken by the Ethiopian government was to restrict 
grain trade. The government banned the export of major food grains through 
several government circulars and directives based on the assumption that 
prices have increased because of the exports of tradable grains. Accordingly, 
the export of teff, wheat, maize, and sorghum was totally banned through a 
directive issued by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in December 2006. In 
June 2008 the ban was extended to all cereals.
6.3.2 Fiscal and Monetary Measures
Ethiopia removed value added tax and turnover taxes on food grains and flour 
through a directive issued in March 2008. The elimination was intended to 
help to control food prices particularly in urban markets. The government 
attempted to restrict the supply of monetary aggregates in the economy since 
increased money supply was suspected to have contributed to the crisis. The 
National Bank of Ethiopia raised the minimum reserve requirement from 
10 to 15 per cent of net deposits in 2007 (National Bank 2007). In addition, 
the Bank issued another directive on 7 April 2008 in which it raised the mini-
mum liquidity requirement to 25 per cent of the bank’s total current liabili-
ties (National Bank 2008). These directives are believed to have significantly 
reduced the lending capacity of commercial banks and thereby reduced the 
money supply in the economy. However, public spending has not been as 
such affected by the various national bank directives. The minimum interest 







6.3.3 Administrative and Price Control Measures
In addition to the above measures, the Ethiopian government suspended 
local procurement by the World Food Programme (WFP) and others and 
took several administrative measures on the domestic market. The most 
direct intervention was the price control, where the government prescribed 
the maximum prices to be charged for selling grains and placed directives 
on private traders to use price tags on their goods and to post the list of 
their goods for sale with the corresponding prices. Traders were warned not 
to hoard any grain. A task force was established with the mandate to take 
immediate action including the closing of illegal shops and stores without 
prior warning. Accordingly many traders were arrested for not respecting 
the directive (Ethiopian Herald 2008). The strategy seems not to have been 
effective.
6.3.4 Releasing Reserve Grain Stocks and Grain 
Procurement Measures
Ethiopia had maintained a strategic grain reserve for a long time although 
substantial market liberalization was implemented. The Emergency Food 
Security Reserve Administration was restructured and re-established in 
2000 as a government organization to manage emergency food reserve as 
part of the preparedness strategy in the country’s disaster management 
efforts. The government released food grain reserve stocks starting in late 
2007. About 190,000 tons of wheat was released from the grain reserve 
stock. More than 5,000 tons of wheat was also distributed to flour mills 
(FAO 2011). In addition, the WFP and other non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) on their part channelled about 200,000 tons of food aid dur-
ing the crisis (FAO 2011).
The Ethiopian government also started to procure wheat from the interna-
tional market and distribute to poor consumers at subsidized prices through 
consumers’ associations and cooperatives. Thus, in 2008 Ethiopian Grain 
Trade Enterprise (EGTE) and WFP imported 520,000 and 515,000 tons of 
wheat and maize, respectively. The EGTE imports were distributed through 
the urban food rationing programme and through sales to flour mills at sub-
sidized prices. This measure indeed helped to reduce the price of wheat in 
the domestic market. In order to finance the importation and sale of wheat 
at subsidized prices the government imposed a 10 per cent surtax on selected 
imported goods such as ready-made clothes, packed foods, electronics, bever-
ages, perfumes, etc., which according to the government were luxury prod-






6.3.5 Productive Safety Net Programme
Ethiopia, which had a long history of emergency food assistance in the form 
of relief aid, intensified its social protection interventions. It shifted its strat-
egy of distributing food aid to a productive and development-oriented pro-
gramme starting in 2005 by introducing the PSNP. The overarching principle 
of the PSNP was to facilitate ‘a gradual shift away from a system dominated 
by emergency humanitarian aid to productive safety net system resources. 
The focus of this programme was to provide more reliable and timely support 
to chronically food insecure households by helping them to earn income 
(in kind or cash) through cash or food for work labour-intensive public pro-
grammes (MoFED 2007). Those households who have no labour or no other 
means of support, and who are chronically food insecure receive direct sup-
port. About 20 per cent of the beneficiary households in PSNP receive direct 
support (Kie-Song 2011).
The programme targeted about five million people when it started in 
2005. However, the number of food insecure people increased to about 
eight million in 2008 and the government requested donors to increase 
their contribution in order for it to assist people in non-PNSP rural areas 
affected by the 2007/8 food price crisis. The number of people from 
non-PSNP areas that depended on the food assistance of various NGOs 
increased from 4.6 to 6.4  million people in 2008. Although WFP had 
planned in 2008 to provide food assistance to about one million people, it 
delivered assistance to more than eleven million people during the year. In 
addition, the government increased the daily wage rate (cash transfer for 
public works in the framework of the programme) from 6 ETB to 10 ETB per 
day. In many instances, households preferred to receive food assistance as 
opposed to cash during the food price crisis.
6.3.6 Increased Investment in Agriculture
Ethiopia took several measures to support domestic food production. 
Long-term investment in agriculture has been adopted as one of the viable 
options by the Ethiopian government starting in 2008 by offering attractive 
incentives for investors particularly from China and India. The Ministry of 
Agriculture transferred more than 3.5 million hectares (ha) of land to these 
investors and is in the process of transferring a similar amount in the next 
five years. However, there is much debate regarding these land investments 
and their food security implications (Desalegn 2011). It is argued that the 
acquisition of land that may be claimed by indigenous societies may lead 
to food shortage. Some also argue that foreign investors are acquiring land 





without land or jobs. Nevertheless, the number of foreign investments that 
have started operation is still limited.
The Agricultural Transformation Agency was established to improve agri-
cultural productivity and bring agricultural transformation by supporting 
existing structures of the government, the private sector and non-state actors. 
The agency is playing a coordinating role and aims to address the systematic 
bottlenecks in seeds, soil health, and fertility management, input and output 
markets, extensions and research, and cooperatives. The government is also 
committed to invest more in agricultural research, extension, irrigation and 
new technology development (Wodon and Zaman 2010). Improving farm-
ing practices, advising farmers to use water pumps, overcoming soil acidity, 
empowering farmers to get access to finance through microfinance insti-
tutions are examples. Investment in agriculture was also strengthened by 
improving infrastructure such as roads to make less densely populated areas 
more accessible to investors and investment.
Other measures to improve productivity through enhanced input delivery 
have been considered. For instance, donor assistance to cover around 50 per 
cent of the cost of fertilizer was requested in 2008 in response to the food 
price rises. The government has proposed to subsidize the cost of fertilizers 
by about 25 per cent. Schemes to improve and narrow the gap between the 
demand for improved seeds and actual supply and distribution through gov-
ernment-imported certified improved seeds have been designed. Increased 
resettlement programmes to reduce the pressure on overpopulated areas as 
well as increased family planning services with the view of reducing pressure 
on fragmented land holdings were additional measures taken. Introduction 
and support of agricultural insurance systems and microcredit services have 
been intensified. Measures were taken to support pastoralists by providing 
direct supply of feed and establishment of water points.
6.3.7 Establishing a Commodity Exchange
The Ethiopian government established the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange 
(ECX) in March 2008 to enhance market transparency and facilitate the use 
of long-term legally binding contracts between the agricultural commodities 
suppliers and traders and thereby reduce or manage risk. The intention is to 
create a new market place where all market actors (from farmers to traders 
to processors to exporters to consumers) can take advantage of more trans-
parent market information and hedge against price risks through stand-
ardized contracts for immediate or future delivery. Although ECX trading 
started with four commodities, namely, maize, wheat, haricot beans, and 
sesame seeds, only some maize and wheat were traded initially through an 




universities. Currently, coffee and sesame are the main crops that are traded 
on the exchange. So, its contribution in stabilizing the prices of food staples 
is quite limited.
6.3.8 Other Policy Measures
The Ethiopian government has also attempted to create economic oppor-
tunities for the most vulnerable groups especially in urban areas by provid-
ing finance and working space. Several urban work programmes have been 
launched to engage the youth. The school feeding programme which started 
earlier was also expanded and strengthened to retain students in school 
(WFP 2008). The government, as well as non-state operators, also increased 
the salary of public employees.
6.4 The Rationale for Policy Interventions and the Role 
of Stakeholders
6.4.1 The Rationale for Policy Interventions
THE NEED FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
The government has always claimed that achieving sustained economic 
growth by maintaining macroeconomic stability is one of its central objec-
tives. Accordingly, the effort to lower the growth of money supply towards 
the end of 2008 was basically derived from the intention to maintain a level 
of inflation that is not detrimental to growth. For instance, the increased 
reserve requirements for private banks as well as the credit cap on lending 
by private commercial banks were direct responses to limit the growth of 
money supply. But, this action has seriously undermined the lending ability 
of private banks and had constrained import trade in particular as most of 
the short-term loans from the private banks were used to finance imports.
THE NEED TO AVOID SOCIAL UNREST
The 2007–8 food price crises occurred just two years after the national elec-
tion in 2005. There have been some controversies about the result of the 
election and several protest actions were organized by the opposition politi-
cal parties after the elections. The aftermath of the election created serious 
uncertainties and partly contributed to the upward pressure on prices. Some 
farmers were reluctant to sell their produce after the 2005 elections, due to 
these uncertainties. Members of the opposition political parties also often 
used the high food price inflation to show the weakness of the government. 








inflation since it did not want to take risks which might lead to further politi-
cal and social instability.
PROTECTING THE POOR (WELFARE CONCERNS)
The Ethiopian government has been extremely concerned about the implica-
tions of the food price rise on the food security status of the most vulnerable 
urban households and producers (Ethiopian Herald 2008). The importation 
and distribution of food grains at subsidized prices to poor people was a 
direct response to such concerns. The introduction of the food rationing 
programme suggests that the economic, human, and political costs that may 
be caused by price instability are a predominant government consideration 
in food policy in Ethiopia (Rashid 2010).
6.4.2 The Role of Stakeholders
THE CONFIGURATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING ORGAN
The Ethiopian system of governance recognizes three branches: the legis-
lative, the executive, and the judicial branches and the system of political 
governance is based on a multi-party political configuration. Several politi-
cal parties have been formed mostly organized along ethnic lines. However, 
most have been unable to win seats in the federal or regional parliaments 
during the successive elections in the country. In the entire history of the 
Ethiopian parliament only the 2005 election saw a sizable number of opposi-
tion political parties’ representation, although several members of the oppo-
sition political parties refused to take their seats in parliament. However, in 
the most recent election in 2010 only one member of the opposition and 
one independent candidate were able to win seats in the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives. The rest of the parliament belongs to the ruling party. So, the 
configuration of the political landscape is highly skewed towards the ruling 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) political party 
led by a powerful prime minister. The House of Peoples’ Representatives, 
which is the legislative organ, is dominated by members of the ruling party 
which has easily reinforced the legacy of a one-party policy-making process. 
The power of the government is huge. It has several state-owned corporations 
involved in many critical economic sectors.
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE 
ORGANS IN THE FOOD PRICE POLICY DECISIONS
Several key actors are created within the Ethiopian political landscape under 
the auspices of the space guaranteed by the constitution. The legislative, the 
judicial, and the executive branches of the government, the public and pri-







In addition, bilateral and multi-lateral international organizations such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have a stake in the 
social and economic developments in Ethiopia.
The 2007–8 food price crisis was discussed by the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (lower chamber). The few members of the opposition polit-
ical parties who took their seats after the 2005 elections were constantly 
requesting the government to provide explanations for the high food price 
increase, but consensus has not been reached on the causes of the rising food 
price and the policy responses. On the one hand, the government was argu-
ing that the food price increase was the result of the growth process itself 
and, therefore, the solution is to intensify growth. According to the govern-
ment, increasing supply will be the mechanism for meeting the imbalance 
between the demand for food and the supply as demand has grown faster 
than supply. On the other hand, the members of the opposition political par-
ties were blaming the monetary and fiscal policies. It was only in 2009 that 
the government accepted the argument that its monetary policy is one of the 
sources of the problem and started to take measures to reduce the money sup-
ply in the economy. The imposition of credit ceilings on private commercial 
banks was an example of the measures.
While the persistent appeal by the opposition members of parliament at 
the time is believed to have marginally contributed to the adoption of various 
policy measures, the main initiator and driver of the policy measures with 
respect to the food price rise was the executive branch of the government. 
Most of the policy measures were drafted by the MoFED and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, discussed within the Council of Ministers, approved by 
the House of People’s Representatives, issued as directives by the respective 
ministry and made public through the mass media. As the House of People’s 
Representatives was dominated by the members of the ruling political party 
at the time, whatever was drafted by the executive branch often easily got 
endorsed by the House. The National Bank was mainly responsible for the 
monetary directives.
6.4.3 The Contribution of Other National Stakeholders
As discussed earlier the Ethiopian political landscape is dominated by a cen-
tralized and authoritarian executive branch which does not often respond to 
public pressure. Nevertheless, it is believed that some groups indeed had lim-
ited influence on the policy decisions. For instance, there have been several 
media reports regarding the high food prices; though it is not clear to what 
extent they have influenced the policy decisions. While the relatively strong 
public media invariably propagated only the government view and accused 




price rise, the relatively weak and less effective private media which is sti-
fled by a restrictive press law was very emotional. Some of their arguments 
were not supported with evidence and focused mostly on condemning the 
government. So the views of the media in particular on the price crisis were 
often divided.
The private sector including the chamber of commerce had little influence 
on the food price policy decisions. The government has actually accused 
private traders of hoarding grains and causing the price escalation during 
the food price crises. As a result the private sector has often been harassed 
and intimidated by the government as the various statements issued by the 
government clearly show. Similarly, the role of civil society organizations in 
the food price policy decisions has been limited. The Ethiopian government 
has often stated that the attempt to influence policy by civil society organ-
izations is not welcomed. There are not many consumers’ and producers’ 
associations in the country that can put meaningful pressure on the policy 
makers. There were some cooperatives and unions engaged in trading activi-
ties, which, according to some people, were contributing to the inflationary 
situation in urban areas as they bought grains from farmers and sold them at 
high prices. Apart from individual discontents and complaints, there has not 
been any major organized public riot or protest by the civil society groups.
There are a few national research institutions including the Ethiopian 
Economics Association, the Ethiopian Development Research Institute, 
and some university-based research units which were expected to provide 
evidence-based policy suggestions, but their contribution has been mar-
ginal as the culture of evidence-based policy decision is not strong within 
the Ethiopian system of governance. There are no references in the policy 
documents which show that the policy measures regarding the food price 
challenges were informed by the results of research undertaken by these 
institutions.
6.4.4 The Role of External Development Partners
It can be hypothesized that the multi-lateral institutions such as the World 
Bank, IMF, European Union (EU), Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), WFP as well as the bilateral donors such as the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) or United States Agency for Interntional 
Development (USAID) might have some influence on the policy framework 
since Ethiopia is heavily dependent on these donors. However, the Ethiopian 
policy makers have often claimed that they have not been influenced and 
dictated by external partners. Nevertheless, some discussion forums focus-
ing on the food prices have been organized and the government has accepted 




in public. Some people say that the government was forced to cut back on 
some investment projects, or at least forced to delay them around 2008 as 
a result of the advice of the international bodies. In addition, some of the 
recommendations by international research organizations might have been 
considered by the policy makers, although there has not been any explicit 
reference to the studies.
6.5 Major Outcomes of the Policy Interventions
6.5.1 Socioeconomic Impacts
While studies have not yet established a clear link between changes in wel-
fare and the policy measures in Ethiopia, it can be argued on the basis of 
limited anecdotal evidence that the measures have helped to reduce the 
potential negative impacts of the crisis on consumers. For instance, the FAO 
(2011) study showed that the number of undernourished people in Ethiopia 
in 2002 which was about 33 million remained the same in 2006–8. The same 
report actually stated that the proportion of undernourished people went 
down from 48 per cent in 2002 to 41 per cent in 2006–8. Another FAO (2009) 
study confirmed that malnutrition had continued to decline in 2008.
Similarly, official data from MoFED show that the food price rise does not 
seem to have reversed the decline in poverty. The proportion of the popula-
tion below the poverty line which was estimated to be around 37 per cent in 
2005/6 declined to 29.6 per cent in 2010 (MoFED 2012). It seems that the pol-
icy interventions have counter-balanced the potential negative effects of the 
food price rises and actually contributed to the poverty reduction. The release 
of emergency food stocks and the distribution of subsidized imported wheat 
to low-income urban families must have helped. The government sales of its 
wheat imports from July to October 2008 successfully reduced domestic mar-
ket prices (Rashid 2010). Similarly the introduction of the productive safety 
net programme must have also helped to contain the impact. Although the 
PSNP was initially planned to benefit around 5.14 million people per year, 
MARD (2009) and Amdissa (2010), however, indicated that around seven 
million people have been able to meet consumption needs through food for 
work programmes and around one million as direct beneficiaries.
6.6 Conclusions
Inflation in general and food price inflation in particular was not a serious 






food price inflation rates portrayed a general upward trend starting around 
2004. Though developments in the international markets indeed have some 
minor impact, the high food inflation was caused mostly by domestic fac-
tors including the increased monetization of the economy, the inefficient and 
poorly integrated market structure, as well as the speculative behaviour of mar-
ket participants. Developments in the international market had little impact.
Recognizing the challenges brought about by the rising food prices, the 
Ethiopian government took several policy measures including the banning 
of cereal exports, reduction of import tariffs, raising the reserve requirement 
of commercial banks, administrative measures and releasing of grain stocks 
and most of all, distributing grains at subsidized prices to the urban poor 
starting in 2006. Although there has been some limited pressure by some 
interest groups, both domestic and external, most of the policy measures 
were initiated and implemented by the executive branch of the government. 
The main factors that motivated the government to take these measures 
include the desire to avoid social unrest, protect the urban poor, and main-
tain a stable macroeconomy.
These measures have indeed helped to control and reduce the potential 
negative impact of the food price increase particularly on the poorest seg-
ment of the population. The interventions helped to bring some level of mac-
roeconomic stability, maintain the trend in poverty reduction, and improve 
the balance of payment position from a situation of one month’s import to 
about 2.5 months import in 2009.
This chapter has clearly underscored the need for appropriate and well-
targeted social protection programmes to reduce the impact during such cri-
ses. Buffer stocks and emergency reserves are also important instruments. In 
addition, the food price increases have also underscored the need for consid-
ering agricultural development as a priority for food security. Establishing 
monitoring mechanisms to reduce the negative consequence of food price 
volatility in the future could be useful.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Malawi
Ephraim W. Chirwa and Blessings Chinsinga 
7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the underlying political economy motivations of 
the government’s policy responses to food price increases in 2007/8 focus-
ing particularly on maize as the main staple crop. The main government 
policy responses to the food price spikes in 2007/8 were price control, 
and bans on domestic and international trade. We argue that although 
there has been increased openness in policy debates and dialogue relat-
ing to the question of food security since the transition to democracy in 
May 1994, the process continues to be unclear, dominated by presiden-
tial interventions, and tends to be highly motivated by electoral politics 
and considerations. Periodic food spikes are not a new phenomenon in 
Malawi, but the uniqueness of the 2007/8 experiences is that the coun-
try experienced sustained price increases when it had registered a record 
surplus of its maize harvest. The country reportedly recorded 1.3 million 
metric tonnes (MT) of maize over and above annual food requirements 
estimated at 2.8 MT (Dorward and Chirwa 2009). This has mainly been 
attributed to the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) which provides 
smallholder farmers with highly subsidized fertilizer and seed using a 
voucher system. Although the FISP was launched against fierce resistance 
among development partners, it turned out to be a huge success which, 
for several years, put Malawi at the centre of the global debates about the 
desirability of subsidies in reviving the fledging agricultural sector across 
the African continent (Chinsinga 2010).
Malawi has several food crops such as rice, cassava, and beans, the gov-





focused exclusively on maize. In addition to existing price support mecha-
nisms such as input subsidies, safety nets, and strategic grain reserves, the 
government responded by introducing price control, domestic trade restric-
tions, and an export ban policy on maize. The government responded as 
such because maize is a very important political crop due to the fact that 
the legitimacy of politicians in government is closely linked to the avail-
ability and accessibility of maize to the people at the grassroots at prices they 
can afford, either through their own production or buying from the market 
(Harrigan 2003). According to one of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (MoAFS) officials interviewed ‘ . . . the government is only interested 
in controlling the price of maize because if it gets out of hand, there can be 
political backlashes since almost everyone depends on maize for subsistence’. 
He argued that both rice and beans are not grown by many farmers to the 
extent that ‘apart from announcing the expected minimum prices for the 
farmers at the beginning of a growing season, the government does essen-
tially nothing to intervene in the markets of these crops ‘because even if their 
prices rise sharply, nobody will complain to the extent that it would become 
a public policy issue’.1
Food security in Malawi is defined primarily in terms of the availabil-
ity and accessibility of maize. Maize is consumed by almost all Malawians 
on a daily basis and accounts for about 97 per cent of the total land area 
planted with crops. Consequently, food policy debates focus almost exclu-
sively on policies relating to maize production, marketing, trade, and con-
sumption (Chirwa 2009). The government’s policy responses to the 2007/8 
global food price crisis reveals that the president’s direct involvement in 
food policy-making, national food security considerations as a key elec-
toral issue, and vibrant private media were very important in influencing 
the shape, form, and nature of the government’s reactions, actions, and 
strategies.
The key question is who are the key actors in the policy-making pro-
cesses in Malawi? The identification of these actors is imperative because 
it would illuminate on their narratives, linkages, authority structures, 
and their political power and influence. However, this cannot be done 
effectively without understanding Malawi’s political system and its recent 
political history. The point is that the political economy context of a 
country matters a great deal since policies’ chance of success cannot be 
judged abstractly in their theoretical or technical attributes without con-
sidering the institutional, political, and cultural context in which they 
are applied.
1 Interview with MoAFS official, 23 May 2012.
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7.2 The Political System
Malawi returned to multi-party democracy in May 1994 after three decades 
of autocratic rule led by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) under the leader-
ship of the late Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Banda 1998; Chirwa 1998). As 
a one-party state, power was centralized in the presidency which was but-
tressed by the 1966 republican constitution. This constitution abrogated the 
provision of the Bill of Rights and formally proclaimed Malawi a de jure 
one-party regime. This meant that the MCP regime systematically and stra-
tegically curtailed fundamental freedoms and human rights, cultivated a 
political culture of fear, docility, suspicion, and total loyalty and obedience 
to authority (Kaunda 1992 and Chinsinga 2003).
The centralized nature of the one-party state was further reflected in the 
nature of policy-making processes. The president almost entirely dominated 
the policy-making processes since the Office of the President and Cabinet 
(OPC) was effectively the centre for all public policies, planning, and imple-
mentation (Fozzard and Simwaka 2002). The main purpose of the parliamen-
tary process in policy-making processes was largely to establish the legitimacy 
and the legal standards required for policy implementation (Chinsinga 2006). 
This amounted to a technocratic style of policy-making which is a huge 
impediment to democracy because the public cannot scrutinize decisions, 
yet scrutiny of this nature lies at the heart of democratic politics.
The transition to democracy in May 1994 fundamentally altered the 
nature of political and policy processes at least on paper. Malawi retuned to 
democracy with a liberal democratic constitutional order which opened up 
the political and policy processes and dispersed power to various public and 
private institutions including the citizens. The 1994 constitution explicitly 
states that legitimacy to govern derives directly from the people of Malawi 
and those privileged to govern continue to do so upon sustained trust of the 
people (Kanyongolo 2010). This implies that the transition to democracy rep-
resented opportunities for the renewal of the policy-making process.
Although the policy-making process is procedurally open and subjected 
to the influence of a diverse range of stakeholders, the presidency remains 
a dominant force (Banda 1998; Chinsinga 2010). For instance, following 
the fourth democratic elections, the policy space under President Bingu 
wa Mutharika was severely eroded and the presidency dictated most policy 
decisions. The dominance of the presidency is inevitable because it remains 
extremely powerful since the incumbent presides over an expansive patron-
age network. The incumbent has enormous powers of appointment to a wide 





The relative autonomy of the incumbent president is further reinforced 
by the existence of the weak civil society and private sector. According to 
Harrigan (2001), the private sector exists in Malawi, but it is also owned by 
the state. This means that the survival of private sector enterprises is threat-
ened as soon as they fall out of favour with the government. This is because 
the state is the major dispenser of lucrative contracts. Most of the civil society 
organizations are weak and have been captured by their founders mainly as 
instruments for livelihoods and they are mostly reactive instead of being 
proactive in their engagement with the state. Furthermore, most of the civil 
society organizations are urban-based without networks extending beyond 
the confines of the capital, yet they claim to speak authoritatively on behalf 
of the people (Chirwa 2000; Chinsinga 2006).
The main challenge for Malawi is that the one-party political culture has per-
sisted without major modifications. The multi-party democratic dispensation 
is to a great extent shaped by the one-party political culture which has simply 
adjusted to the pressures of a multi-party political dispensation while remaining 
almost the same. The policy-making processes are essentially driven and under-
pinned by a neo-patrimonial logic (Cammack et al. 2007) where the government 
essentially functions as a transfer pump of resources by political leaders to their 
respective clients in return for their support. Thus, leaders and their opponents 
use both formal and informal rules, norms, and practices to gain legitimacy and 
advantage in a winner takes all competition for the control of the state.
7.3 Key Actors in the Policy-making Process
There are several key actors in Malawi’s policy-making processes. Unlike in 
the one-party era, in principle, policy-making is no longer an exclusive pre-
serve of the president; it is at least subject to the influence of a diverse range of 
stakeholders as shown in Table 7.1. These stakeholders include the following: 
political parties; civil society (the church, citizen groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and professional associations); the media (print and 
electronic); international organizations (international financial institutions, 
and donor agencies); the three branches of government (legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary); and the public at large.
The exact impact of these stakeholders in the policy processes varies from 
issue to issue. However, it is important to note that generally the enduring 
legacy of the strong presidency remains a huge impediment to subjecting the 
policy-making processes to the influence of a diverse range of stakeholders 
so that they become as participatory, transparent, and accountable as pos-
sible (Chinsinga 2006). With specific reference to food policy-making pro-




presidency, media, civil society organizations, international development 
agencies, parastatal organizations, particularly the Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the National Food Reserve Agency 
(NFRA), ordinary citizens, research institutions, and private traders.
The civil service, particularly the Ministries of Agriculture and Trade and 
Industry, plays key roles with reference to production, pricing, and trade con-
trol of agricultural produce. Besides being the head of the civil service, the 
president has an abiding interest in food policy processes due to the role they 
play in the country’s electoral politics. The media reports on food policy pro-
cesses, particularly in relation to food shortages and price trends. The man-
ner in which the media reports on these policy issues depends very much on 
its perceived or actual political alignment. Private media tends to highlight 
challenges, whereas public media almost always attempt to paint a glittering 
picture of the food security situation in the country.
There are several civil society organizations that are prominent in the area 
of food policy processes. These include the Centre for Social Concern (CSC), 
Consumers Association of Malawi (CAMA), Farmers Union of Malawi (FUM), 
and National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM). Both 
the CSC and CAMA keep track of the costs of the monthly food basket for the 
major cities across the country while FUM and NASFAM are farmers’ organiza-
tions whose main interest is to promote and safeguard the welfare of farmers 
Table 7.1 The roles of stakeholders in policy-making processes in Malawi
Stakeholder Role in the Policy-Making Process
Media Act as a sounding board in their interactive relationship with the public 
opinion. The media often call attention to issues on which political action 
and policy-making are required.
Political parties Put forward interests, aspirations, and beliefs of their membership into 
coherent ideological platforms, policy initiatives, and programmes. They 
therefore provide a forum through which the grassroots can offer inputs and 
exert influence over the policy-making process.
Civil society Offers the grassroots alternative channels of participation and influence in the 
policy-making process in their respective spheres of influence.
Judiciary Determines and specifies not only what the government cannot do but also 
what it must do in order to meet legal and constitutional requirements for 
policy decisions.
Executive Initiates and implements policies to be legislated on by the parliament.
Parliament Legislates policies and provides oversight in the implementation of those 
policies.
Citizens Exert influence over the policy-making process through various channels at 
their disposal, for example, through representation in the legislature, media, 
civil society, political parties, mass mobilization, demonstrations, etc.
International 
organizations
Influence the realm of economic policies by playing a key role since the 
country’s economy is heavily donor-dependent. The national budget 




by lobbying for better returns on their produce and propagation of favourable 
policies for the agricultural sector more generally. The citizens are engaged in 
the food policy processes by articulating the impacts of deficient food policies 
on their livelihoods. The international development agencies play a particular 
role in influencing the nature of policies in the agricultural sector that have 
significant implications for food and price policy processes. There are often 
contestations between and among different international development agen-
cies depending on their ideological orientations (Harrigan 2003). The major dif-
ference between and among the international development agencies relates to 
whether or not the market can be relied upon to guarantee food security at all 
times.2
The parastatals are used mainly for a price stabilization function in the food 
policy processes.3 ADMARC serves as a marketing outlet for maize especially 
during periods of chronic food shortage and sudden price shocks. However, 
ADAMRC’s roles have changed quite considerably over the years particularly 
following the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
(Mvula, Chirwa, and Kadzandira 2003; Chinsinga 2011). The NFRA runs 
the country’s strategic grain reserves, a function that was initially run by 
ADMARC. The main goal of the NFRA is to have adequate maize stocks in 
order to prevent the country from experiencing serious food shortages espe-
cially in the event of unforeseen disasters. Private sector players emerged fol-
lowing the liberalization of the agricultural sector. ADMARC is no longer the 
sole buyer of farm produce. It has to compete with private traders, both small 
and large. While ADMARC buys produce from farmers primarily as a social 
function, private traders are engaged in the exercise for profit.
7.4 Food Price Trends and Shocks
7.4.1 Maize Price Trends
Figure 7.1 shows the nominal and real prices for maize 2001−11, with price 
peaks in 2001, 2005, and 2008, with the 2001 and 2005 shocks attributed 
mainly to poor weather conditions. An interesting question is: why did the 
2 In this debate, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) best repre-
sents the group of international development agencies that strongly believe that the market can 
guarantee food security in Malawi while FAO represents the group of international development 
agencies that believe in strong investment in domestic food production. There are some inter-
national development agencies that lie in between who basically argue for a strategic balance 
between these two polar extremes. The Department for International Development (DFID) is a 
very good example of such international development agencies.
3 It is important to note that the managements of both ADMARC and NFRA are appointed on 






country experience high maize prices when it reported record maize surplus? 
Chirwa (2009) attributes the high maize prices to poor quality information 
about domestic supply from the government both in terms of domestic pro-
duction and stocks in reserves. Why should the government be motivated to 
project a misleading picture? In the interviews, some stakeholders pointed 
out that ‘the government was motivated to cook up impressive production 
figures because it wanted to maintain the grand success narrative of the 
FISP’.4 The FISP had been endorsed as a success story even by ‘the once pes-
simistic donors and nothing short of continued success would be welcome’.5
This claim of impressive productivity was invariably undermined by the 
apparent rise in prices of maize which in turn fuelled speculative behaviour 
among key players in the industry. This was further reinforced by the govern-
ment’s failure to export 400,000 MT of maize to Zimbabwe through NFRA. 
By the time about 300,000 MT were exported, the private sector was finding it 
difficult to source maize for export which sent signals that there were supply 
shortages and the prices began to rise substantially. Moreover, the behaviour 
of state agencies, ADMARC and the NFRA, by offering higher purchase prices 
4 Interview with the President of FUM, 28 May 2012.
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National Nominal Prices in Malawi Kwacha 
National - Nominal Prices
National - Real Prices
Figure 7.1 Trends in nominal maize prices, 2001–11
Source: based on Chirwa (2009) updated, using monthly retail prices published be the MoAFS 
between 2008 and 2011.
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to farmers than the private sector, and through the government’s action of 
imposing a ban on private traders and other desperate measures signalled 
that there were domestic supply shortages. Finally, the high international 
maize prices, amid continued surplus maize production, created speculation 
that the export market for maize would be lucrative, leading to stockpiling 
and purchasing maize from farmers at higher prices by the private sector.
The constant threat of inadequate domestic food supplies makes food price 
policies a priority issue for the government. This means that any slight indi-
cation of impending food shortages and increases in food prices are likely to 
trigger the government’s intervention ‘for it to be at least seen leading the 
efforts to guarantee food security otherwise it risks backlash from rural com-
munities who constitute the bulk of voters and depend exclusively on maize 
for subsistence’.6 He emphasized that the government does not worry much 
about urban consumers because they make up just 10 per cent of the total 
population. The urban constituents are mainly concerned with governance 
issues broadly defined. He argued that the protests in urban areas since the 
transition to democracy in May 1994 have focused on governance issues and 
not necessarily on food price policies per se.
7.4.2 International Price Transmission
The extent to which high food prices at international markets can have 
effects on domestic prices depends on the integration of markets through 
the price transmission mechanism. There is evidence that most of the 
maize markets in eastern and southern Africa are integrated with inter-
national markets as revealed by the co-movement of international and 
domestic maize prices in the long run (Rapsomanikis 2009). In the context 
of Malawi, earlier studies established a weak link between international 
and domestic maize and rice prices between 1980 and 2000 (Chirwa and 
Zakeyo 2006). Actually, Rapsomanikis (2009) notes that short-run effects 
of maize prices in Malawi and the international (and South Africa) prices 
are insignificant. The adjustment of domestic prices to international prices 
is also slow ranging from 4.7 months for the Karonga to 7.7 months for the 
Liwonde market.
7.4.3 Policies for Management of Food Price Swings
The government’s policies to the 2007/8 price spikes were driven by the 
government’s desire to project itself as playing a leading role in protecting 
citizens from the detrimental effects of price swings on their livelihoods. In 





invoking these policies, the main government narrative advanced mainly 
by the late President Mutharika was that the government ‘ . . . as a caring 
government was protecting the people of Malawi from ill-will forces that 
were driven by selfishness to profit from the high maize prices they were 
artificially creating by hoarding maize stocks when the country had regis-
tered record surplus maize’.7 This narrative was clearly motivated by electoral 
considerations because food security is perhaps the only issue that features 
in Malawi’s elections. The price spikes occurred a year before the general 
elections. Nevertheless, the policy responses to the 2007/8 global food price 
crises must be placed into a proper historical context in order to be fully 
understood.
7.4.4 Price Controls
In the wake of the 2007/8 global food price crisis, the government attempted 
to reinforce the price control policy for maize. The underlying motivation 
of this policy is to protect producers and consumers by making sure that 
producers and consumers generate adequate income from maize produc-
tion and access maize at affordable market prices, respectively. This policy 
intervention is administered in the form of a price band which was first 
introduced in 1996. As the price of maize continued to soar, the government 
revised the price band upwards to MWK45 per kg as the producer price and 
MWK52 per kg as the consumer price from MWK20 and MWK30 per kg, 
respectively.
MoAFS officials described price controls as ‘an automatic instrument we 
resort to or activate in the wake of price spikes either on our own or in con-
sultation with the State House or upon a directive from the State House’.8 
The implementation of the price controls in 2007/8 followed a directive from 
the State House which MoAFS officials felt was triggered by ‘persistent media 
reports that highlighted the escalating maize prices in local markets yet we 
had just recorded the historic maize surplus during that year’. According 
to these officials, the failure of the NFRA to satisfy the 400,000 MT maize 
export contract to Zimbabwe created panic at the State House. This forced 
the president to direct the revision of the price band upward for ADMARC to 
7 This narrative became a mantra that was recited at a very political rally at the peak of the 
global food price crisis. The main targets in this narrative were opposition politicians. The presi-
dent argued that the opposition politicians were deliberately withholding maize to create arti-
ficial scarcity of maize in order to project him as a failure in managing food security with the 
idea of deceiving voters to vote for them in the May 2009 elections. The opposition politicians 
seized it accordingly, arguing that high maize prices amidst claims of the historic record maize 
surplus was a clear manifestation that the FISP’s success had been exaggerated. They are the ones 
who are better placed to take it forward so that it guarantees food security on a sustainable basis.




compete with the private sector in buying maize from farmers. This maize 
was meant to stock the Strategic Grain Reserves (SGR) to avert a possible 
food disaster in case failure by the government to satisfy the maize export 
contract indeed indicated shortage of maize supply in the country to meet its 
subsistence requirements.
According to the president of the FUM, price controls do not attract any 
serious reaction from stakeholders because ‘we know from experience they 
do not work in practice; prices continue to be dictated by the forces of 
demand and supply’. He argued that the government turns to price controls 
‘simply to be seen to be doing something about the escalating prices for 
political posturing and they know it’. The evidence indeed suggests that 
price controls have not worked effectively as depicted in Figure 7.2 which 
shows the nature of the maize pricing system’s relative prices under private 
marketing. From 2008 through to March 2009 maize was trading at prices 
above the price band; this is also the period of high food prices. Maize pro-
duction during this period was more than adequate but prices remained 
high and the price controls were ineffective in stabilizing maize prices dur-
ing this crisis.
Chirwa (2009) attributes the ineffectiveness of the price band to several 
reasons which include: (1) the inability of the government to enforce the 
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Figure 7.2 Price band and average maize prices, 2000–10
Source: authors’ calculations based on MoAFS monthly retail prices between 2001 and 2010.
Malawi
163
when maize prices are above the maximum price; (3) ADMARC lacks ade-
quate financial resources to defend the price band effectively; (4) the price 
band is often too narrow offering very little margins to traders; and (5) there 
is no statutory provision for the strategic grain reserves for purposes of stabi-
lization of prices. The conclusion of many officials interviewed particularly 
those from the Grain Traders Association of Malawi (GTAM) is that price con-
trols do not often succeed because of limited management capacity worsened 
by institutional rivalry between ADMARC and NFRA. According to Chirwa 
(2009), NFRA had enough maize grain stocks estimated at 160,000 MT dur-
ing the 2007/8 global food price spikes that could have been used to stabilize 
prices but did not release it into the market. Instead just like ADMARC, it 
proceeded to buy maize from farmers which increased the pressure on high 
maize prices as they both attempted to outbid the private sector in terms of 
the price offered to farmers which clearly signalled to the stakeholders short-
ages in domestic supply.
The institutional rivalry between NFRA and ADMARC is partly rooted 
in the history of the creation of the latter. NFRA’s functions were before 
its formation performed by ADMARC but shed off to NFRA as an integral 
part of structural adjustment reforms (Mvula, Chirwa, and Kadzandira 
2003). The purpose of the reforms was to make ADMARC more efficient 
by streamlining its functions to focus largely on buying and selling farm 
produce. However, in practice the roles of these two parastatal agencies 
have not been clearly spelt out and there are considerable overlaps which 
‘make effective and efficient coordination and implementation of mecha-
nisms that would contribute to the stabilization of prices almost impos-
sible’.9 The paradox is that while politicians preach about food security, 
they are the very same people who undermine it. Most policy makers 
argued that while 
NFRA had enough maize stocks its management could not be allowed to release 
some of it to ADMARC markets to stabilize the prices because the majority of 
maize exporters to Zimbabwe were politicians with close links to the presi-
dent . . . depleting the reserves would have jeopardized their deals once the situa-
tion somehow stabilized.10
The decision to let both ADMARC and NFRA buy maize from farmers at 
higher prices was not necessarily to ensure that ‘the reserves were well 
stocked in order to avert possibilities of chronic food shortages but to fill 
the grain reserves so as to fulfil the export contract to Zimbabwe that was 
monopolized by politicians or their close associates’.11
9 Interview with an NFRA official, 27 May 2012.
10 Interview with a Ministry of Trade and Industry official, 26 May 2012.
11 Interview with a Ministry of Trade and Industry official, 27 May 2012.
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7.4.5 Domestic Trade Restrictions
The government imposed restrictions on the domestic maize trade as the 
prices of maize continued to soar. The domestic trade restrictions for maize 
were introduced in August 2008 but by mid-September 2008 they had been 
somewhat modified. In introducing the reforms, the MoAFS exempted 
small-scale traders operating in rural markets. The restrictions targeted 
mainly large companies that trade in maize or use maize as a raw material 
for manufacturing. According to Jayne, Mangisoni, and Sitko (2008) the jus-
tification for the trade restriction was that the private sector was deliberately 
hoarding maize, thereby creating shortages that fuelled price increases.
As a way to enforce the trade restrictions, ADMARC was designated as a 
sole buyer of maize from farmers and it was also given the exclusive mandate 
to sell maize to consumers at the prescribed government price. The political 
nature of the decision was evident from its justification. In reinforcing the 
ban, the deputy minister of MoAFS argued that ‘maize is a protected crop and 
anybody buying it will be arrested’.12 In this regard, ADMARC was instructed 
to purchase at least up to 50,000 MT of maize per year which it has not been 
able to do due to its perennial serious financial constraints.13
According to officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the ban was 
relaxed as early as mid-September 2008 because of the fierce lobby of GTAM. 
They argued that ‘most members of GTAM have close political connections 
and some politicians have stakes in companies that buy maize directly from 
farmers’. While politically plausible, it was quickly realized that ‘an exclu-
sive ban on large private sector companies would backfire because it would 
have led to the scarcity of manufactured maize products which can easily 
upset the rather docile urban consumers’.14 Similar concerns were echoed 
by the FUM. Its main argument was that the policy did not make practical 
sense since ‘it did not clearly define who a large trader was, it would not be 
enforced objectively’.15 FUM further faulted the ban as ‘infringing upon the 
rights of farmers by forcing them to sell their produce to ADMARC which 
does no longer have marketing outlets across the country and is often cash 
strapped’.16
These criticisms coupled with the stakes that some key politicians have in 
maize trade forced the government to somewhat modify the blanket ban on 
large-scale private sector involvement in maize trade in less than a month. 
12 See, ‘Maize Prices Soar Again’, The Daily Times, 24 April 2009.
13 See, ‘ADMARC Misses its Maize Target: Buys only 22,000 out of expected 50,000 tonnes’, 
The Nation, 4 September 2009.
14 Interview with CAMA’s executive director, 17 May 2012.
15 Interview with the president of FUM, 28 May 2012.




While GTAM and FUM pushed for a total lift of the ban, the government 
opted for a modified version of the ban which allowed private sector traders 
to participate in maize trade as long as they were duly licensed to do so. This 
was highly strategic on the part of the government because it ensured that 
‘those who were licensed were either politicians or those with close connec-
tions to politicians . . . this cannot be hidden . . . some of us were licensed just 
to silence us’.17 The decision to introduce an exclusive ban on private maize 
traders was justified as offering the government an opportunity to get an 
exact idea of the maize harvest so that ‘we can keep enough for our consump-
tion and how much to export’.18
The ban was not successful because ADMARC which was supposed to 
defend the price band could not purchase maize from smallholder farmers 
and was unable to sell maize to consumers at official prices due to its weak 
financial position. Jayne, Mangisoni, and Sitko (2008) note that the rapid rise 
in prices affected ADMARC’s ability to buy maize from smallholder farmers 
as it initially offered to buy maize from smallholders at as low as MWK30 
per kg when private traders were already buying maize at MWK60 per kg. As 
already noted, the financial stature of ADMARC has greatly diminished but 
the government continues to use ADMARC in this way ‘merely as a desperate 
attempt to project an image of a caring government during times of hardship 
largely for electioneering purposes’.19
7.4.6 International Trade Restrictions
In reaction to the soaring maize prices, the government also imposed export 
bans on maize during the 2007/8 global food price spikes. It is, however, 
important to put into proper perspective the context in which the export 
ban on maize was instituted. Following the implementation of SAPs, Malawi 
phased out quantitative restrictions on international trade except for a few 
products whose restrictions are largely based on health, safety, and national 
security reasons (Chirwa and Ngalawa 2006). Although maize is not on the 
list of restricted products requiring import license, its import is subjected to 
heavy regulation which further underlies its sensitivity in the country’s food 
security equation.
With respect to the 2007/8 food price crisis, the maize export ban was 
instituted in April by President Bingu wa Mutharika at a political rally. 
This ban was imposed when the export contract to Zimbabwe amounting 
to 400,000 MT had not yet been fully met. As already indicated above, the 
17 Interview with a chairperson of GTAM, 1 June 2012.
18 See ‘Maize Prices Soar Again’, The Daily Times, 24 April 2009.




government issued maize export permits to Zimbabwe ‘on the account that 
Malawi had registered a historic record maize surplus estimated at 1.3 mil-
lion MT’.20 However, most senior policy makers interviewed argued that the 
government was rather reluctant to impose the ban because ‘it would under-
mine the grand success narrative of the FISP particularly during a season it 
had reportedly registered a historic maize surplus over and above the annual 
food requirements’.21 The president was reportedly forced to impose the ban 
following media reports that indicated that maize prices had soared to as 
much as MWK90 per kg. In these stories, the media began to question the 
credibility of the claims that the country had enough maize ‘yet the prices 
are soaring far much more than it is the case when the country is hit by 
drought’.22 The media further highlighted the hardships that households 
were experiencing due to high maize prices.23 This was seized by opposition 
political parties which argued that the price crisis amidst plenty ‘simply sug-
gested that Mutharika’s government had failed to manage its own success to 
guarantee food security and as such it needs to be replaced at the next polls’.24
When he announced the maize export ban at a political rally, President 
Mutharika justified it as a means ‘to stop unscrupulous traders, most of them 
allies of the opposition political parties, from depleting the country’s grain 
reserves’. He argued that the ban would be lifted only when the government 
would be satisfied with the food security situation in the country. This was 
further justified as a way of dealing with speculation. He argued that busi-
ness people were hoarding maize in their warehouses to create an artificial 
shortage in order to make supernormal profits out of maize either through 
exports or selling it locally at inflated prices.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry proceeded to gazette the maize export 
ban. This was fiercely protested by GTAM. According to GTAM’s chairperson 
they protested ‘because we knew that some politically connected traders or 
even politicians themselves would continue to export maize regardless of the 
export ban’. They further protested because most of the GTAM members had 
already invested considerable resources in arranging for their maize exports 
to Zimbabwe. The export ban was condemned by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the IMF. They characterized the 
20 Interview with a MoAFS official, 22 May 2012.
21 Interview with a MoAFS official, 22 May 2012.
22 See, ‘Disaster Looms as Maize Prices are about to Hit MK100 per kilogramme’, The Nation, 
22 March 2008.
23 It is important to note that it was only the private print and electronic media which ped-
dled these stories. The public media is heavily controlled by the state and carried stories that 
attempted to underplay the seriousness of the maize price crisis. It was essentially a mouth for 
the government to advance its narrative of sabotage as explaining the soaring of maize prices 
and that it was doing everything possible to deal with the culprits.
24 Interview with an opposition member of parliament who at the time was sitting on the 
Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources, 24 May 2012.
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ban as retrogressive since it undermined Malawi’s commitment to economic 
liberalization (Jayne, Mangisoni, and Sitko 2008). The argument is that 
donors were reluctant to engage forcefully with the government on these 
policy responses because at that time Malawi was widely seen as a success 
story in as far as the question of food security was concerned through the 
implementation of the FISP which they had fiercely opposed. They were thus 
afraid of making yet another ‘mistake’.
However, regardless of the protest against the ban by GTAM and donors it 
remained in force until August 2010. Although the arguments presented by 
those who protested against it were generally sound, ‘the government would 
not retreat for it was important for it to project itself as leading the efforts to 
protect the people especially since elections were just around the corner’.25 
He argued that in private, even the president recognized the negative conse-
quences of these policy responses that entailed reversals without debate and 
discussion but ‘considered them to be politically correct in terms of project-
ing his government as a caring government motivated largely by electoral 
considerations’.26
7.4.7 Impact of the Policy Responses to Price Swings
This section examines the impact of the policy responses implemented by 
the government to respond to the 2007/8 global food price crisis. The main 
question is: who were the winners and losers following the implementation 
of these policies? None of the policies that the government implemented 
were designed with a long-term orientation. They were driven by the desire 
to stabilize maize prices in order to make it affordable by vulnerable house-
holds while at the same time protecting them from food insecurity. The price 
band was invoked to prevent the prices of maize rising further; the restric-
tion of domestic maize trade was implemented to boost the maize supply by 
making sure that private sector traders did not hoard maize to further fuel 
speculation; and the export ban was meant to ensure adequate supplies of 
maize were available in the domestic economy.
The main argument is that although the policy responses were justified 
as an attempt to protect both farmers and consumers, the main beneficiar-
ies were maize traders with close political connections. For instance, when 
the large-scale private traders were banned from domestic maize trade, the 
politically connected traders managed to lobby for the implementation of 
a modified version of the ban in less than a month. This version allowed 
25 Interview with a chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, 2 June 2012.




large-scale traders to be involved in maize trade on condition that they 
were duly licensed and traded within the stipulated maize ban. According 
to some interviewees, the licensing requirement was exploited to exclude 
those traders that were not politically connected. The fact that ADMARC 
failed to enforce the price band meant that the privileged traders ben-
efited from high maize which shot up to as high as MWK90 per kg. The 
very same people benefited when the export ban on maize was introduced 
in April 2008. According to key stakeholders interviewed, although the 
export ban was introduced, some privileged traders, mostly politicians 
and their associates, continued to export maize to Zimbabwe. Thus, trad-
ers without political connections lost out. They did not benefit from the 
soaring domestic maize prices since they could not be licensed and they 
incurred losses when the export ban was introduced quite abruptly. They 
had already invested considerable resources in the logistics related to the 
delivery of their export quotas to Zimbabwe.
The smallholder farmers who are mostly net buyers of maize and the poor 
urban consumers were the main losers as they disproportionately bore the 
brunt of the policy responses that the government implemented in the wake 
of the 2007/8 global food crisis. They suffered most because of the instabil-
ity in maize prices fostered by the policies implemented by the government 
in order to address maize price spikes. While the government intervened in 
the maize markets by prescribing the floor and ceiling prices, it was unable 
to defend these prices for two main reasons. The government did not accu-
rately estimate the actual production levels of maize which made it set the 
prices either too low or too high. This made it difficult for ADMARC to effec-
tively defend them. The situation was often compounded by the failure of 
ADMARC to effectively defend the price band due to its weak financial posi-
tion. It was neither able to buy maize from farmers nor sell it to consumers at 
the prescribed official price.
Consumers have also suffered from the effects of stockpiling maize sup-
plies through ADMARC and NFRA. They did not release maize stocks into 
the market at all during the 2007/8 global food price crisis. They have often 
done so as part of their recycling strategy at times when there is too much 
maize in circulation. This has tended to depress maize prices quite substan-
tially.27 And in a drive to be competitive, ADMARC and NFRA have often 
slashed their prices. This means that farmers make severe losses which make 
further investment in maize less attractive. The overall net effect of maize 
27 See ‘Malawi Maize Selling Low . . . NFRA is Offloading Maize as Part of the Agency’s Grain 
Recycling Strategy’, Malawi News, 2–8 April 2011; ‘NFRA Maize Sale Oversubscribed’, The Daily 
Times, 4 April 2011; and ‘ADMARC Shocks ECAMA, Farmers:  It is a Marketing, not Stocking 
Corporation’, The Nation, 22 July 2009.
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price instability is that it prevents smallholder farmers from graduating out 
of poverty and inhibits surplus production and investment in marketing 
infrastructure. The main drawback is that high price instability is detrimen-
tal to the poor constructing their own routes out of poverty since it increases 
the risk of failure to secure food from the market and reinforces a pattern of 
subsistence reliance on one or a few main food crops for household-level food 
security.
The government incurred substantial costs and losses resulting from the 
stockpiles of maize to which they added during the peak of the 2007/8 global 
food price crisis. Both ADMARC and NFRA incurred heavy costs of main-
taining the stockpiles of maize that in some cases were almost five years old 
during this period. The enormous costs were inevitable because it is costly to 
maintain high-level quality maize for a longer period of time. As part of the 
recycling strategy, the NFRA incurred a loss of MWK390 million in dispos-
ing of the maize reserves that were procured at MWK1.05 billion way after 
the food price spikes were over. When the maize was offloaded, it fetched 
only MWK660 million. A similar story can be told about ADMARC. Having 
accumulated huge volumes of maize, ADMARC decided to dispose of the 
maize to create space for fresh reserves. As stated above, ADMARC had to 
slash down its prices in order to compete with private traders. Consequently 
ADMARC posted a MWK551 million loss against a projected net profit of 
MWK181 million.28
7.5 Concluding Reflections
The main purpose of this study was to assess how the government responded 
to the 2007/8 global food price spikes from a political economy perspec-
tive. The analysis demonstrates that the policy responses to the rising prices 
implemented by the Malawi government underpin the underlying political 
objectives and interests of the key stakeholders in the policy processes. As the 
single most important electoral battleground, the question of food security 
is central in determining whether those out of power can wrestle it from the 
incumbent or whether the governing party or coalition can maintain itself 
in power.
All the three major policy responses, namely: price control, domestic 
trade restrictions, and export trade ban were motivated by the desire for the 
government to maintain a semblance of food availability at all times. The 
main preoccupation is to fend off any perception of food scarcity as well as 
28 ‘ADMARC Shocks ECAMA, Farmers:  It is a Marketing, not Stocking Corporation’, The 




unaffordability to the majority of smallholder farmers and consumers. The 
policy interventions to ensure that ADMARC and NFRA hold enough maize 
stocks were meant to ensure that maize would be readily available even when 
there is some slack in production in a growing season. It is for this reason 
that ADMARC was mandated to act as a primary buyer of farmers’ produce 
often at higher prices than those offered by private traders in order to outbid 
them. Both the NFRA and ADMARC have since the 2005/6 growing season 
accumulated maize reserves which are supposed to be released into the mar-
ket when there are indications of scarcity, but the evidence suggests that they 
were not able to do this effectively during the 2007/8 global food price spikes.
The maize export ban and the regulation of who is involved or not in the 
maize trade were implemented in the same spirit. When there are apparent 
signs of scarcity the government has moved in to effect an export ban of 
maize. An export ban on maize trade was introduced in April 2008 when it 
became apparent that the country was short of maize. The ban remained in 
force until August 2010 when the government authorized that up to 300,000 
MT of maize be exported to Zimbabwe. The maize export ban was further 
complemented by the ban on private traders’ involvement in maize trading 
activities leaving ADMARC as the only legitimate buyer and seller of maize.29 
In a modified version of this policy intervention, only those who were duly 
licensed were allowed to get involved in maize trade. The justification for the 
drastic policy interventions was to protect farmers as well as consumers from 
unscrupulous traders who are primarily obsessed with making supernormal 
profits.
A critical assessment of the underlying dynamics of the policy responses 
show that there is no real commitment to ensure that the policies actually 
succeed. The real beneficiaries of these policies were not necessarily small-
holder farmers and consumers but rather maize traders who are politically 
connected. This was mainly the case because the low transparency in the 
policy-making process related to food policies created a certain level of uncer-
tainty in the food markets which further led to speculation pushing food 
prices even higher to the advantage of those who were still able to engage in 
maize trade under these circumstances.
The traders who were licensed following the implementation of a modi-
fied version of the domestic trade restriction in maize benefited from high 
maize prices as a result of the failure of ADMARC to defend the price band. 
Some of the traders continued to export maize to Zimbabwe even when the 
29 See, ‘Cost of not Exporting Surplus Maize: Reflecting on Forex Shortage, High Storage Costs’, 
The Nation, 12 August 2010; ‘Malawi Strategizes on Excess Maize . . . ADMARC to be Sole Buyer’, 
The Daily Times, 15 April 2009; ‘ADMARC Misses its Target: Buys only 22,000 out of Expected 
50,000 Tonnes’, The Nation, 4 September 2009.
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export ban was in force. There is thus absolutely no political will to ratchet 
technical competence relating to the estimation of food needs, food sup-
ply, national food reserves, and impact evaluation of policy change(s) vital 
to managing the food economy effectively and to increase the benefits of 
polices and reduce their cost. These weaknesses are further reinforced by the 
inherent institutional rivalry between NFRA and ADMARC. The capacities 
of the relevant stakeholders entrusted with the implementation of the poli-
cies are so weak that the policies themselves are not fully implemented or 
monitored at all.
Why then are these policies implemented when there is clearly no political 
will to ensure that they deliver? The policy makers interviewed acknowledged 
as much about the inevitable failure of the policies but they are nonetheless 
implemented for sheer political expediency. This underlies the centrality of 
maize in the politics of Malawi. Although both policy makers and politicians 
know that the policies are not effective at all they still proceed to implement 
them because they project a government’s commitment to the citizens’ wel-
fare by attempting to ensure the availability of adequate food supplies at all 
times and its affordability since it forms part of the social contract between 
the state and its citizens.
Although the food policy-making processes are theoretically subjected 
to the influence of a diverse range of stakeholders, few are dominant. The 
president was clearly dominant in initiating policy processes although this 
was not necessarily followed up with firm political commitment to ensure 
that the policies succeeded. The history of Malawi generally shows that the 
presidency dominates policy processes relating to matters of food policy and 
pricing. This is attributed to its uniqueness due to having a single dominant 
staple, maize, which suggests that Malawi is relatively homogenous ecologi-
cally (Poulton 2011). This, combined with a history of chronic food shortages 
and insecurity, has transformed maize into a political crop whose influence 
in electoral politics and in the social contract between Malawians and their 
government has become extremely important.
The government’s responses to the global food price spikes further dem-
onstrate that while moments of opportunities often triggered by crises exist 
when other actors as identified above could have the potential to influ-
ence the shape and form of policy processes, their effect is rather limited. 
The resultant policies often reflect the government’s interests which are to 
a great extent motivated by desire to maintain a tight grip on the ruling 
coalition. The ordinary people are essentially on the receiving end of the 
policy processes. Except through the ballot box once every five years oppor-
tunities, moments, and channels for the ordinary citizens to influence the 
nature, form, and shape of policy processes hardly exist (Cammack 2010). 
Thus, although there has been increased openness in the policy debate and 
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dialogue relating to food security, the process continues to be unclear, domi-
nated by presidential interventions and tends to be highly motivated by elec-
toral politics and considerations.
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Like many countries in the world, ensuring food security is at the centre of 
Zambia’s agriculture policy. Unstable and high prices for food staples such 
as maize, wheat, and rice have severe economic, social, and political conse-
quences.1 The global food price crisis of 2007 and 2008 raised fears about the 
impacts of higher and more volatile food prices for the urban and rural poor 
in Zambia.
Recent large price swings for the major staple food, maize, reinforced the 
general perception that food prices are far too strategically and politically 
important to be left to the market. They may expose poor farmers and con-
sumers to unacceptable price spikes and collapses (Chapoto and Jayne 2009). 
Rapidly increasing retail prices for maize meal triggered food riots in Kitwe, a 
mining town in the Copperbelt province, which pushed the government to 
take action and attempt to respond to the global food crisis of 2007 and 2008.
The policy response strategies were similar to those used in past drought-
induced food crises including an immediate maize export ban/restriction 
without looking at implications on regional trade; agreement on the quan-
tity of maize to be imported, and how much each of the different stake-
holders should import; request for import duty waivers from the Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP), and the provision of subsidized 
maize grain to millers for onward transmission to consumers. The outcome of 
using this package was not effective in solving the crises because the agreed 
1 See Newberry and Stiglitz (1981); Timmer (2000); Dehn, Gilbert, and Varangis (2005); 





implementation plan was fraught with problems. With the existing high lev-
els of mistrust between government and the private sector, opposing self-
interests among the key interest groups and some vested interest amongst 
certain individuals in both the public and private sector led to inertia in 
dealing with the problem.
While the causes of past global food crises have been studied, there is little 
knowledge of the policy processes and the related political economy issues. 
A few studies have helped to catalogue events and responses in the country, 
for example, Govereh (2009), Chapoto and Jayne (2009), and Jayne et al. 
(2009). These studies outlined in detail the timeline of events and responses 
although political economy issues were not at the centre of the analyses. 
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Zambia also 
helped to raise awareness of the likely impact of the global food price crisis 
on the poor and vulnerable households by outlining how they were posi-
tioning themselves to respond to the impending crisis. Unfortunately, most 
of their reports or analyses were done at the height of the global food crisis 
and tended to overstate the crisis and its impact since their main focus was 
to attract funding to support their humanitarian efforts in the country. On 
the other hand, press reports covering the local food price crisis tended to be 
driven mostly by what was going on outside of Zambia. This failed to take 
into account local conditions and political economy issues pertaining to the 
government responses to the impending crisis. The local media started to pay 
more attention to the domestic situation only after the crises had deepened.
This country study uses political economy analysis framework to better 
understand how the Zambian government responded to past food price esca-
lations with special emphasis on the most recent global food crisis. Indeed, 
Zambia saw price escalations of wheat, rice, and soybeans in 2007 and 2008, 
whilst maize prices rose in 2008 and 2009. Maize, as the main staple crop, 
continued to attract the most attention from the government, hence the 
response strategies focused on maize grain and maize meal.
8.2 Country Context
Despite the rapid growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past dec-
ade, poverty rates in Zambia remain very high at about 60 per cent of the 
population. General economic growth has not reduced poverty (Tembo et al. 
2010; Chapoto et al. 2011). Addressing high rural poverty rates remains a 
government priority in the national development programmes, but solutions 
have proven elusive. The main impediment is not simply a lack of techni-
cal knowledge concerning what needs to be implemented, but realizing that 





capable of allocating scarce public resources in ways that reflect this knowl-
edge. Chapoto et al. (2011) argue that political economy and associated gov-
ernance problems are increasingly recognized as crucial.
Like most countries in Africa, white maize in Zambia is a strategic politi-
cal crop. After independence, maize became the cornerstone of an implicit 
and sometimes explicit ‘social contract’ between the government and the 
Zambian people (Jayne and Jones 1997). The social contract meant that the 
government had to ensure that smallholder farmers received higher pro-
ducer prices whilst consumers accessed cheaper food. To achieve these two 
opposing objectives, the Zambian government adopted a controlled market-
ing system, run by the government’s National Agricultural and Marketing 
Board (NAMBOARD) and later through the Zambia Co-operative Federation 
until the system became financially unattainable (Govereh 2009; Tembo 
et al. 2010).
With market liberalization in 1991, the government of Zambia stopped 
subsidizing production and consumption of maize, immediately causing 
the prices of basic food commodities including maize to sharply increase. 
Consumers resorted to rioting, so food pricing policy became highly politi-
cized under the new multi-party democratic system. Due to this pressure, 
the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), the political party that 
was in government, decided to revert back to some government controls 
on the food market. This resulted in the establishment of the Food Reserve 
Agency (FRA) in 1996. Unlike its predecessor, NAMBOARD, which was the 
sole buyer and seller of grain in the country, FRA was originally conceived to 
hold buffer stocks to dampen price variability and, when necessary, provide 
liquidity in the maize market during the initial years of market liberalization 
while the private sector was establishing itself (Jayne and Jones 1997). Due 
to the recurring drought induced food crises, the government through the 
FRA decided to increase its participation in the maize market via state restric-
tions on the private export of maize, and unpredictable changes in trade 
tariff rates, quantities traded, and prices offered and paid by FRA. Ostensibly, 
these state activities have been in response to perceived failings of the private 
sector to provide reliable markets and stable prices for smallholder farmers’ 
surplus maize production (see Nijhoff et al. 2002; Chapoto and Jayne 2009; 
Tembo et al. 2010).
8.2.1 Key Decision Actors in Food Policy Issues
Food policy in Zambia is formulated at both the technical and political level. 
During the food crisis, the policy-making process was overwhelmingly dom-





decision-making process. The major stakeholders, farmers, and millers had 
direct access to policy makers at very high levels.
The executive branch of government comprises cabinet ministers and 
is chaired by the president of the Republic of Zambia. The secretary to the 
cabinet is the head of the civil service and ultimately all policy positions 
that originate from ministries pass through his/her office. Each ministry 
is responsible for generating its own policy positions which are submitted 
to the permanent secretary, and finally to the minister for approval. Once 
approved, the documents are sent to the policy analysis and coordination 
section in the secretary to the cabinet’s office. After approval, the cabinet 
memorandum is finally sent to the cabinet for debate and approval.
Ultimately, all power in the cabinet is vested in the head of State. Although 
a minister can lobby for policy change, his/her limits are set by policy state-
ments made by the political party in power. For example, during the food cri-
sis of 2008 and 2009, the executive branch did not openly veto any policies 
but in most cases the aspirations of the political party in power and recom-
mendations of lobby groups with access to the cabinet were prioritized. Also, 
the fact that the minister of agriculture is a member of the cabinet meant the 
executive branch was briefed about the situation and considered recommen-
dations coming from various stakeholders. The policy responses that were 
chosen tended to ignore the technical input from the relevant ministry or 
research organizations in favour of input from very powerful interest groups.
Zambia’s parliament has an oversight role on government policy imple-
mentation, although some of the issues not requiring changes or enactment 
of new laws are dealt with at cabinet level and not taken to parliament for 
ratification. However, from time to time, the parliamentary committee on 
agriculture, for instance, makes requests for briefings and updates on various 
policy implementation issues. One of the major weaknesses of this system is 
that a policy can be radically changed by the cabinet disregarding technical 
input. This is especially crucial given that powerful interest groups often 
directly lobby cabinet members.
The main policy tools that are at the disposal of Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock (MAL) include: issuance of import and export permits based 
on the crop forecast results; stock monitoring through the stocks commit-
tee; recommendations to the cabinet on the level of market participation 
by FRA; and dealing with plant and phyto-sanitary matters and the issu-
ance of appropriate importation and exportation clearance for agricultural 
commodities. Cross-border trade policy is administered through the Zambia 
Revenue Authority, which has the mandate to manage all customs functions 
with MAL’s phyto-sanitary officers stationed at most of the major borders. 
Internal marketing policy is generally implemented through FRA.
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Recently, the maize monitoring committee chaired by MAL permanent 
secretary was transformed into the stocks committee, an inter-ministerial 
and private sector technical body that routinely meets to discuss the national 
food security status (stocks), specifically focusing on the major cereals, maize, 
wheat, and rice.2 Although transparency is often emphasized in dealing 
with food crises, the decision-making is characterized by high information 
asymmetry amongst major stakeholders. For instance, Millers Association of 
Zambia (MAZ) does provide consolidated information on stocks held by its 
members. However, competition amongst the individual milling companies 
means that they are often very hesitant to share accurate stocks informa-
tion even to the association. This makes policy-making very difficult. For 
instance, in December 2009, millers reported lower than expected stocks. 
But, when the government offered a price subsidy to millers, the reported 
quantity of available stocks increased significantly. The lack of transparency 
among the players in the milling industry is partly due to the way the indus-
try is organized. Due to the high cost of credit in Zambia most mills are not 
able to keep significant inventory of grain for processing. The implication of 
this has been that mills with the highest inventory are able to influence the 
market prices more than mills with lower inventory. Consequently, inven-
tory information is a very closely guarded secret. This has proven to be one of 
the biggest challenges in the grain market decision-making process. In years 
of cereal deficits, inventory information is also used by the milling industry 
to lobby government for intervention; this introduces considerable issues of 
information asymmetry.
INTEREST GROUPS
The two biggest interest/lobby groups in Zambia are the Zambia National 
Farmers Union (ZNFU) and Millers Association of Zambia (MAZ). The Grain 
Traders Association of Zambia (GTAZ) has increasingly gained some promi-
nence over the last five years or so. However, the organization has very limited 
membership and the wide scope of consumer issues has made the associa-
tion relatively less effective when dealing with specific food policy issues. 
Other lobby groups include the Zambia Consumer Association (ZACA) and 
the Jesuits Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR). ZACA has been in exist-
ence since 2000 and is supposed to be the major advocacy group represent-
ing consumers instead of MAZ when it comes to maize meal prices. JCTR has 
2 The stocks committee comprises: MAL, MoFNP, Central Statistical Office (CSO), Zambia 
National Farmers Union (ZNFU), MAZ, Zambia Farm Growers Association, Zambia Peasant 
Small-scale Farmers Association, FRA, Grain Traders Association of Zambia (GTAZ), National 
Food and Nutrition Commission, Bank of Zambia, Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(IAPRI) (formerly Food Security Research Project), Agricultural Consultative Forum FEWS NET 




been instrumental in highlighting issues affecting the poor in the country 
via their monthly consumer bulletin. However, they do not carry the same 
influence as the ZNFU and MAZ.
The ZNFU represents the interest of farmers with members drawn mostly 
from the commercial farming sector. Although the membership of the 
union is not publicly announced, the total number of large-scale agriculture 
holdings in Zambia numbers no more than 2000 (MAL 2011). On the other 
hand, the country has over 1.5 million small- and medium-scale agricultural 
households who can become members of the ZNFU through any small-scale 
farmers’ associations.
Generally, ZNFU is very vocal on pricing and trade issues for the staple 
grains (maize, wheat, and soybeans) and inputs (fertilizer, fuel, and electric-
ity). With the exception of maize, which is mostly grown by the smallholder 
farmers, the union is very active on issues that address the commercial farm-
ing sector in the country. Some critics from the peasant farmers association 
think that ZNFU does not fully represent the interests of the small-scale farm-
ers because it was formed initially to represent commercial farmers. Their 
argument is that issues of the small farming sector are more complex and 
require different lobby mechanisms. ZNFU’s agenda for the small-scale farm-
ers has been to fight for higher maize producer prices and more fertilizer sub-
sidies under FISP. Unfortunately, the union chooses to ignore the empirical 
evidence regarding maize production and marketing characteristics of small-
holder farmers and facts about the effectiveness of the government entitle-
ment programmes in terms of resource use and effect on overall agriculture 
development, especially when these subsidy/entitlement programmes result 
in under-funding of the key agriculture drivers, such as irrigation, roads, and 
research and development.
The second most influential lobby group is the MAZ, a self-financing asso-
ciation formed to represent millers in Zambia with a production capacity of 
1.5 metric tons per hour or more.3 Since 2001, MAZ has increased its influ-
ence on maize issues in Zambia through its ability to influence government’s 
policy on maize and maize meal prices during food crises. The association 
has long been plagued by allegations of collusion in price setting. These alle-
gations have always been denied by the association. During the past food 
price crisis, MAZ was able to convince government to intervene by allowing 
FRA to sell subsidized grain to them in order to reduce the consumer prices.
3 MAZ’s objectives are: (i) to promote the interests of the milling industry in Zambia; (ii) to 
assist the Zambian government with the country’s food security; (iii) to foster international and 
regional trade for the industry; (iv) to create dialogue with the government on behalf of the 




Donors and cooperating partners in Zambia are important in providing 
assistance to the Zambian government whenever there is a food crisis espe-
cially by helping to finance food aid importation for vulnerable groups. 
However, in most cases, the donors’ role in the agricultural sector has 
mainly been limited to an advisory one through the Troika (World Bank, 
Netherlands, and United States). During the food crisis, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the UN (FAO) funded a number of meetings to encourage 
stakeholders to discuss how to deal with the global food prices.
8.2.2 Past Food Crises, Price Trends, and Price Transmission
In the past decade, Zambia has experienced four episodes of food crises, in 
2001–2, 2002–3, 2005–6, and 2008–9 marketing seasons. The first three epi-
sodes were caused by severe drought conditions in the country. Zambia’s 
agriculture is mainly rain-fed, so crop production in the country is vulner-
able to weather shocks.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST FOOD CRISES
Zambia has not learned from past experiences how to plan and quickly 
respond to food crises. With similar and less successful response strategies 
in the past, one wonders why the government in collaboration with the rel-
evant stakeholders does not put together a standard operation strategy on 
how to deal with future food crises. The answer lies in the political economy 
surrounding food issues in the country, a subject that is central to this study.
The common characteristics of the past food price crises that hinder the 
successful implementation of the agreed upon plan are as follows:
1. The government through MAL has always been open to the stakehold-
ers’ input before the onset of a food crisis. However, the execution of the 
agreed plan is fraught with problems resulting in the crisis worsening 
before serious action is taken.
2. A high level of mistrust exists between the government and the pri-
vate sector. The private sector seems to be always uncertain about 
government actions especially regarding imports. This is because the 
government has in the past sanctioned the FRA to release its stocks at 
subsidized prices to a few selected millers hurting traders and/or millers 
who would have imported maize.
3. Once the alarm bell is sound through the crop forecast and national 
food balance sheet about an impending crisis, the government always 
imposes ad hoc export restrictions/ban. The effectiveness of such a 






to flow out of Zambia illegally. Also, ad hoc export bans have made the 
country become an unreliable regional grain supplier thereby curtail-
ing the growth of the private sector participation in regional trade.
4. The refusal and delays to grant duty waiver requests by the MoNFP 
shows lack of inter-ministerial dialogue with the MAL and other related 
government agencies, especially when the country requires them to 
respond quickly to a food crisis.
8.2.3 Policy Responses to the 2007–9 Global Food Crisis
Policies in response to the rising food prices in 2008 and 2009 fall into three 
categories: trade-oriented, consumer-oriented, and producer-oriented policy 
responses.
TRADE-ORIENTED POLICIES
Export restrictions/ban: The food security update by FEWS NET at the end of 
December 2007 reported localized maize and maize meal price escalation 
in some parts of the country especially the flood ridden southern province. 
In January 2008, Zambia like Malawi and Tanzania imposed export bans as 
a safeguard from likely shortfalls and to curb further food price increases. 
There is no evidence that this was done in a coordinated way. Each country 
was trying to protect itself from the looming food crisis triggered by the 
global events. This response was a result of the continued pressure from 
politicians, consumer groups, and press reports warning the government 
to respond to the impending food crisis due to floods and the global food 
crisis.
Maize export restrictions are a common feature in Zambia and date back 
to the 1960s. Whenever the country experiences a maize production defi-
cit, export ban/restrictions through the non-issuance of export permits is 
invoked. Since the region has the same growing season, a drought in Zambia 
usually means a drought in most of the neighbouring countries. Therefore, 
the decision to restrict exports is made out of fear that the millers and trad-
ers in search of higher prices will export most of the local stocks thereby 
exacerbating the food problem. Unfortunately, such restrictions have not 
worked well in the past because any ban requires strict policing, something 
that is not possible in Zambia, a country sharing borders with eight coun-
tries. Illegal exports tend to increase during this time and are hard to detect 
and the treasury forgoes revenues from export taxes. When the situation 







MAIZE IMPORTS AND IMPORT DUTY WAIVER
At a meeting held on 25 July 2008 between the government and the agricul-
ture stakeholders and chaired by the Minister of Agriculture, MAZ, GTAZ, 
and ZNFU disputed the national balance sheet for maize grain announced 
in May 2008 indicating a surplus of 200,000 MT for the 2007/8 agricultural 
season. They argued that the annual maize consumption of 50,000 MT was 
understated given the growth of the breweries and the stock feed sector. At 
this meeting, the FRA declared having maize stocks amounting to 150,000 
MT, MAZ, 55,000 MT, and GTAZ, 25,000 MT. From these stocks, it was ascer-
tained that precautionary measures needed to be taken by the private sector 
through buying futures on South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX).
However, given past experiences when government through FRA released 
stocks on the market to selected millers at a time when private sector imports 
were just hitting the market, traders wanted guarantees from government 
that this was not going to happen. On the other hand, the farmers wanted to 
make sure that maize imports by traders did not disadvantage local farmers 
who were still selling their maize. All parties agreed to have a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) drawn up and signed by all parties.
As a requirement, the MAL had to send the draft MOU for vetting by the 
Ministry of Justice. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice indicated that two 
clauses included in the MOU were not favourable to the government. In par-
ticular, the clause that would allow the private sector to re-export the maize 
if at the time of importation there was enough maize in the country. In addi-
tion, traders wanted an import duty waiver. Unfortunately, the latter was 
outside the jurisdiction of the MAL but required the MoFNP to make a ruling. 
The idea of the private sector locking into contracts on SAFEX was aban-
doned. In the meantime, as these discussions were progressing, maize prices 
were increasing and the ZMK had lost ground to the US$—from 3,500 ZMK 
to 5,000 ZMK (Figure 8.1). This meant maize imports were going to be more 
expensive, irrespective of who the importer was going to be—government or 
private sector. The private sector requested the MoNFP to peg the exchange 
rate at July rates of US$1 to 3,500 ZMK to facilitate their maize imports. 
However, this request was also not granted.
In October 2008, there were reports of a food riot in the Copperbelt prov-
ince targeting retail shops because of the high prices of maize meal. This 
was a wakeup call for the government to effectively deal with the rising food 
prices. With maize meal outlets targeted, the government’s concern was to 
find immediate solutions to quickly reduce maize meal prices and re-engage 
stakeholders on the issue of maize imports.
As of November 2008, neither the government nor the private sector had 
arranged to import maize and maize stocks held by FRA, MAZ, and GTAZ 




from 250,000 MT in July. The retail maize prices were now in the range 
of US$350 to US$400 per MT compared to US$176 per ton on the SAFEX 
exchange. Maize prices had risen above the import parity price from South 
Africa.4 On 24 November, 2008 a select committee of cabinet ministers man-
dated the FRA to urgently import 100,000 MT of maize wherever it could be 
found. This was an indication that the decisions about the food crisis were 
now being made by the president’s office.
As the FRA arranged to import this maize, there were reports of increased 
local maize stocks and the traders were calling for the government to stop 
purchasing more expensive stocks from outside since they had enough stocks 
locally. According to the grain traders, maize stocks that were pre-contracted 
to millers and not included in the uncommitted stocks was now available 
on the market since millers were now getting subsidized maize from FRA. 
Also, millers who were not members of MAZ challenged the stocks that MAZ 
reported to the stocks monitoring committee in July as they were never con-
sulted. After further consultation the government revised its import require-
ments to 35,000 MT.
On 5 December 2008, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting 
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Figure 8.1 Zambia’s exchange rates and inflation rate, 2001–11
Source: based on Central Statistical Office (various years).
4 Import parity prices are calculated as the sum of the FOB price, transport charges from 




announced at a press briefing that the government had set up a high-level 
task force to deal with the rising food crisis. This committee was different 
from the technical committee that was set up at the onset of the crisis. The 
task force was to be chaired by the Minister of Agriculture with a mandate 
to urgently come up with a national action plan to deal with the situation. 
This marked a turning point in how the country was going to deal with the 
escalating food prices, in particular maize meal.
CONSUMER SUBSIDIES
To cushion consumers from the rising maize meal prices, the government 
after meeting with stakeholders decided in December 2008 to subsidize 
maize grain to millers, requiring them to pass along lower maize meal prices 
to consumers. FRA was to release 30,000 MT of maize per month for four 
months to selected millers at US$275 per MT, and millers would then blend 
an equivalent amount of commercial stocks at market prices that ranged 
between US$410–420 per MT. The millers would then guarantee a low retail 
price of 53,000 ZMK per 25 kg bag instead of the market price of 65,000 ZMK 
per 25 kg. Unfortunately, retail maize prices remained above the 53,000 ZMK 
mark, so the government reconsidered its position and unilaterally decided 
to release 100 per cent subsidized stocks at US$220 per MT to be processed 
into maize meal without blending with commercial stocks. This meant FRA 
had to double its supply per month to 60,000 MT. Since FRA stock releases 
were inadequate to cater for millers’ requirements, the government was com-
pelled to sign a legal instrument to procure the maize stocks held by the 
millers at a price of US$385 per MT and releasing the maize at a price of 
US$220 per MT in December 2008. This innovation also failed to influence 
countrywide maize meal price reductions. Worse still, not all millers were 
able to access the cheaper maize provided by FRA and thus could not reduce 
their prices (Tembo et al. 2010). At the same time, there was a big outcry from 
grain traders who were now failing to sell their more expensive stocks. After 
protracted negotiations, FRA agreed to purchase 70,000 MT of maize from 
the traders in two parts, 40,000 MT at the time of signing the agreement and 
30,000 MT in March 2009 at a price of US$405.95.
The release of subsidized maize grain to selected large-scale millers with a 
guarantee that they would in turn reduce maize meal prices by 23 per cent 
from 65,000 ZMK to 53,000 ZMK, did not work well. With the continued 
price escalation, the press and other stakeholders began to blame the millers. 
The Minister of Agriculture threatened to push for the removal of the subsidy 
to millers as the programme was not benefiting the consumers. On the other 
hand, millers were threatening to increase maize meal prices if this hap-
pened. Eventually in March 2009, the government reduced the subsidy rate 




The upshot of these results is that the government of Zambia needs to 
seriously review its policy of providing consumers with price relief through 
subsidizing maize grain to a few large-scale millers. As in the past, this policy 
has failed the country, although general subsidies are easier to implement, 
but they fail to meet their goal of reducing prices; instead they distort the 
market and the big winners will be those millers who are able to access the 
subsidized grain. The government should have offloaded maize to the open 
market so that the poor consumers had access to low cost maize that could 
have been milled cheaply at local hammer mills as well as other small-scale 
mills (Chapoto and Jayne 2009).
PRODUCER-ORIENTED POLICIES
Input subsidy: The main government response to the food crisis of 2008 
involved mostly supply-side policies. These included ramping up FISP, tar-
geting more smallholder farmers. A major reason for focusing on supply-
side interventions is that the support base for the then ruling MMD party 
overwhelmingly comprised rural farming households. After the death of 
President Levy Mwanawasa in August 2008, fertilizer subsidies and higher 
maize producer prices became a campaign issue during the elections to 
replace him. Results from a study by Mason, Jayne, and Myers (2012) shows 
that the amount of fertilizer distributed was highly correlated to the election 
outcomes.
Since 2001, Zambia has provided smallholder farmers with subsidized 
fertilizers. With the rising food and fertilizer prices in 2007, the govern-
ment increased those subsidies. Initially, farmers eligible for subsidized 
fertilizers were required to pay only 50 per cent of the fertilizer market 
price but were now required to pay only 25 per cent. In February 2008, the 
Zambian parliament approved the 2008 budget with a planned spending 
of 187 billion ZMK for fertilizer subsidies (approximately US$42 million). 
Two months after the budget was approved, fertilizer prices further 
increased by more than 60 per cent compelling the government to seek 
an additional 305 billion ZMK (US$68 million) to cover the increased pro-
curement costs. The total expenditure on fertilizer subsidies released from 
the 2008 budget amounted about 33 per cent of the total amount spent 
by the whole Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, the number of benefi-
ciary farmers increased from 120,000 to 200,000. However, the implemen-
tation of the FISP programme continued to suffer from corruption, poor 
delivery, poor targeting, leakages, lack of training, and absence of moni-
toring and evaluation. The elite argue for the continuation of the ferti-
lizer programme through government procurement and distribution via 
a handful of preferred companies that have a track record working with 




by the vested interest of people who derive personal benefits from the pro-
gramme. Research has recommended the use of an e-voucher to deliver the 
subsidy, thereby eliminating the need for government to tender and distrib-
ute inputs while including the private sector and encouraging competition.
Producer price support through FRA: With the continuing desire to promote 
smallholder maize production, the government through FRA buys all its 
stocks from the smallholder farmers at prices above the market price. This 
is mainly due to pressure exerted by ZNFU and members of parliament. 
Unfortunately, this policy only benefits about 35 per cent of small-scale 
farmers with the top 2–5 per cent of the well-endowed farmers benefiting 
the most because they are able to sell 50 per cent of all the marketed maize. In 
2008 and 2009, there was extensive political pressure for FRA to announce its 
floor price even before the crop forecast and the national food balance sheet 
were announced by the Ministry of Agriculture. This was due to the allega-
tions that millers and traders were ripping off farmers by buying maize early 
at below market prices.
In June 2008, the FRA announced a buying price of ZMK 45,000 per 50 kg 
bag (about US$260/ton), an increase of 16 per cent from the previous sea-
son. On the other hand, anticipating higher returns later in the year due to 
the global food crisis, millers, and other private players started the 2008–9 
marketing season by aggressively buying maize at a price higher than FRA 
floor price, something that was uncommon at that time of the year. FRA 
tried to counter this by raising its price to ZMK 55,000 per 50 kg bag (about 
US$304/ton) but due to the tight maize supply in the market, they failed 
to reach their target of 88,000 MT. Instead FRA managed to procure only 
72,000 MT at the end of an extended buying season in October 2008. The 
argument for raising the FRA purchase price above market price in a defi-
cit period was that smallholder farmers needed this incentive to keep pro-
ducing maize for the country to remain food secure. Figure 8.2 shows an 
increase in maize and maize meal prices attributed to the stiff competition 
between the private sector and FRA as well as from some smallholder farm-
ers holding grain off the market in anticipation of higher prices later in the 
season (FEWS NET 2008).
Tax changes: Some of the tax proposals made by the high-level task force 
were adopted in the 2009 budget. In order to promote agriculture produc-
tion through mechanization, the government, through the national budget 
of 2009, announced that all agricultural equipment including small tractors, 
ploughs, pumps, and sprayers would be free of VAT. The tax policy changes 
were intended to reach the small- and medium-scale farmers. Also, the 25 per 
cent duty on gypsum imports was scrapped in order to promote local ferti-
lizer production. With the rising transportation costs due to the rising fuel 
costs, the government also removed customs duty on commercial trucks. 
Zambia
187
The impacts of these measures have not been subject to any scrutiny but it is 
reasonable to assume that they would support the agriculture sector to better 
withstand production shocks.
8.2.4 Relationship between World Food Prices and Zambia 
Food Prices
Results from price transmission models showed that that there was no sta-
tistically significant long-run relationship between local maize prices and 
the US Gulf freight on board (FOB) maize prices and South Africa, SAFEX 
maize prices. This may not be very surprising because Zambia is a landlocked 
country that has in the recent past been able to produce maize surpluses and 
only imported maize from South Africa in drought years. The caveat to this 
finding is that domestic policies and trader actions in Zambia were largely 
trigged by what was happening on the international market despite the fact 
that the country was not in an import position.
During the global food crisis, maize prices in Zambia started to escalate 
in July 2008, a time when global maize prices were trending downwards 
(Figure 8.1). This was mainly due to speculative maize purchases by the trad-
ers and millers and general bidding up of prices by both government and pri-
vate sector over the limited maize surplus at the beginning of the marketing 
season. Prices continued to rise until March 2009 when the new harvest had 
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Figure 8.2 Nominal price trends 2001–11: Lusaka maize grain, breakfast meal, roller 
meal, and FOB US maize gulf prices, in ZMK




On the other hand, global maize prizes started to increase again in 
November 2008 and continued to increase beyond March 2009 when maize 
prices in Zambia had started to decline. The price trends showed in Figure 8.2 
support the results from the transmission model that no long-run relation-
ship existed between local maize prices and the US Gulf FOB maize prices 
and South Africa. Instead, the rising maize prices in Zambia were driven 
primarily by what was happening domestically than driven by global maize 
prices. However, the general inflation in the country was rising due to the 
increase in prices of inputs such as fertilizer, diesel, labour, and transport. 
The rising inflation was also accompanied by the depreciation of the ZMK 
against the US$, from 3,186 ZMK per 1 US$ to 5,500 ZMK between June 2008 
to July 2009 making imports more expensive (Figure 8.3). Figure 8.3 shows 
the US$ denominated prices and it is apparent from this graph that Zambia 
grain prices did not skyrocket.
8.3 Impacts on the Poor
The increase in food prices is a big threat to the welfare of the poor, both 
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Figure 8.3 Lusaka nominal retail maize grain prices, US Gulf FOB white maize grain 
prices and Zambia general inflation rate





However, the impacts will vary depending on the characteristics of different 
households (Govereh 2009; Jayne et al. 2009).
Amongst the rural households, net sellers (28 per cent) are likely to have 
gained from the surge in food prices especially for maize whilst net buyers 
(49 per cent) were disadvantaged. The urban consumers and 49 per cent of 
the rural population, who are net buyers of maize, were negatively affected 
by the escalating maize and maize meal prices. The greatest impact was felt 
in the hungry season when prices rose above import parity.
Unfortunately, government marketing activities and policy decisions dur-
ing normal and abnormal years have thus far been largely unresponsive to 
these statistics. For example, the FRA and the private sector usually attempt 
to purchase the entire marketed maize surplus, leaving virtually nothing for 
purchase by rural farmers during the lean season. The grain is instead bought 
and hauled to urban centres, where it is sold to millers thereby disadvantag-
ing the majority of the poor rural households, who are net buyers of grain.
Furthermore, FRA’s sale of subsidized grain to large millers, who sell rela-
tively expensive maize meal, further disadvantages the poor in urban areas 
who would prefer to purchase grain from the market and send it to small 
and cheaper grinding mills. Evidence indicates that many of the urban and 
rural poor rely on these less expensive ways of procuring their maize meal as 
long as grain is available in local markets for purchase (Mwiinga et al. 2002; 
Mason et al. 2011). However, when the supply of grain in local markets dries 
up, consumers are forced to switch to more expensive packaged maize meal, 
or cut the number of meals they eat per day. Mwiinga et al. (2002) estimated 
that low-income urban households could save roughly 7–20 per cent of their 
monthly income if they were able to purchase grain and mill it into roller 
meal (mugaiwa) at a local grinding mill, rather than relying on more expen-
sive commercial alternatives. Mason and Jayne (2009) showed that a lot of 
poor households are not able to buy a 25 kg bag of maize meal, hence resort 
to buying small repacks pamelas at a price per kg that is about 30 per cent 
higher.
Government policies and strong lobby groups continue to ignore empirical 
evidence regarding the impacts of various past policy choices, not because 
they are insensitive to the plight of the poor, but because of other goals. 
Lobby groups, whose desire is to serve their own constituency, tend to pres-
sure the government to implement policies that may not be beneficial to the 
poor. For example, the ZNFU has continued to lobby for higher subsidies to 
farmers, higher FRA buying prices and a ban on wheat imports. Whilst, on 
the other hand, the MAZ has in the past used their access to high government 
officials to influence FRA to offload maize to its members at subsidized rates 
with the promise of reducing maize meal prices to consumers, asking for the 
removal of export bans whilst pushing for open borders for wheat flour. Such 
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a tug of war that exists amongst the key lobby groups tends to force the gov-
ernment to choose policies that are politically popular ignoring their costs to 
the country and the impact on the poor. Political expediency in dealing with 
past food crises has always resulted in unintended consequences to the poor.
8.3.1 Impact to the Treasury
The level of government intervention was costly and exacerbated the degree of 
uncertainty in the market, something that could have been avoided with good 
planning. With the adequate warning provided to government as early as July 
2008 regarding the impending maize shortages, early planning for imports 
could have saved the government 230 billion ZMK (approximately US$50 mil-
lion). In addition, the sale of maize by the FRA should have started much ear-
lier and would have prevented the prices from climbing to above import parity 
prices. The timely planning for imports would have ensured that moderate 
imports were purchased with the help of the private sector at a cheaper price 
and arriving before the start of the lean season in November 2008.
8.3.2 Mistrust between Government and Private Sector
The attempt to deal with the rising food prices reinforced the mistrust 
between government and the private sector. The government accused pri-
vate traders of acting as saboteurs who only cared about their interests and 
profits whilst poor people suffered. On the other hand, the traders accused 
the government of favouring the interests of a few stakeholders.
8.4 Conclusion and Recommendations
In Zambia, the effect of the rising global food prices was not felt until late 
2008 and early 2009. This study argues that failure by the government and 
other stakeholders to quickly respond to the global food crisis was the lead-
ing cause of the escalation of maize prices in the country rather than being 
driven by what was happening on the international scene. Like in the past, 
the implementation of government policy responses to deal with the rising 
food prices, especially for the major staple crop maize, were delayed due to 
ineffective response policies, protracted discussions, and inaction amongst 
key agriculture stakeholders.
This study exposes a number of key areas that need to be addressed if the 
government is to be successful in dealing with future food crises. First, the 
high level of mistrust between government and private sector, especially for 






Second, strong lobby groups with access to high political officials should 
be discouraged from overriding recommendations by the main techni-
cal committee tasked to deal with food policy issues. Procedures need to 
be established beforehand and all parties should be compelled to stick to 
them. Third, the government needs to review its policy of providing con-
sumers with price relief through a few large-scale millers. The policy is easy 
to implement in the short run but past attempts to use this strategy failed to 
have a meaningful effect on retail maize meal prices. Instead, the govern-
ment should consider off-loading maize to the open market so that the poor 
consumers have access to low cost maize. Local hammer mills and other 
small-scale mills can be utilized rather than forcing consumers to buy more 
expensive super refined maize meal from the commercial mills.
Since the government co-exists with the private sector, a rules-based mar-
ket system will benefit the country because the market will become more 
predictable. It is not realistic to assume that the Zambian government will let 
market forces deal with food crises. However, as this study has shown, past 
unpredictable behaviour by the government tends to make the private sector 
seek guarantees before making any investments. If the government insists 
on participating directly in agricultural markets, predictable and transparent 
rules governing state involvement should be established to reduce market 
risks.
As in the case of rice, avoiding government intervention in exports and 
imports for maize may be an important part of an overall maize long-term 
policy because it would reduce the impact of droughts on domestic prices. 
However, there is fear that allowing external market shocks to be transmit-
ted into local markets will cause unbearable pain to the poor in the coun-
try. This could be true in a static environment, but regional trade may be 
able to encourage private investment into technologies and institutions that 
broaden the scope of the market to better absorb price shocks. Policies that 
fail to include empirical evidence about the characteristics of the people they 
are trying to serve usually fail to achieve their intended results. The country 
should move towards a situation where politicians or policy makers should 
embrace empirical evidence rather than shy away from research results that 
deviate from the conventional wisdom. Depoliticizing government subsidy 
programmes is a good place to start. This may be one of the toughest rec-
ommendations to be adopted because of the power of some civil servants 
and politically linked private companies with vested interests who tend to 
resist recommendations to reform politically popular, but less effective pro-
grammes in favour of short-term personal gains. Good examples include 
the two most popular programmes in the country, the maize producer price 
support via FRA and fertilizer subsidy under FISP. Despite study results that 
have revealed the shortcomings of these two programmes and their negative 
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impact on long-term government investments on key agricultural drivers, 
the programmes have remained a top priority for most politicians. It may 
be true that elections can be won through these programmes but it is very 
irresponsible for public officers and interest groups to push for programmes 
that only benefit a few. With similar and less successful response strategies in 
the past, the government in collaboration with other relevant stakeholders 
should put together a standard operation strategy on how to deal with future 
food crises rather than waiting for a crisis to happen. An effective early warn-
ing system is required to trigger the response strategy with all players playing 
their part as per the operational strategy. This may be one of the ways to start 
dealing with the mistrust that exists between government and private sector 
thereby helping to quicken the policy responses to future food crises.
Last, the MAL should make every effort to have the Agricultural Marketing 
Act enacted. The draft Agricultural Marketing Bill agreed upon by the stake-
holders in 2010 and revised in 2011 provided guidance on the involvement 
of the government in the fertilizer, seed, crops, and livestock markets. In par-
ticular, it proposed: the formation of an independent marketing council to 
help the country deal with food crises; limiting the role of FRA to only han-
dling strategic grain reserves as well as requiring FISP to be reformed, par-
ticularly with regards to not limiting the coverage of the subsidy to mostly 
fertilizer but requiring the use of an electronic voucher to include the private 
sector dealers in the procurement and distribution of inputs. Implementing 
that proposal would be a step in the right direction.
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Part IV
The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Low-income Countries with 









This chapter evaluates Kenya’s food price crisis over 2002–11 using a political 
economy approach. Kenya’s food prices have been high and volatile rela-
tive to world food prices. Moreover, domestic food markets are highly inte-
grated while about 30 per cent of the changes in world market prices are 
transmitted to domestic markets in Kenya. The study finds a relatively slow 
speed of adjustment of domestic food prices in Kenya of between three to 
five months. In response, the government implemented both supply-side and 
demand-side policies. However, the implementation of these policies has not 
been fully institutionalized and relies on the most part on the executive. 
These findings lend credence to calls to institutionalize the policy-making 
process in Kenya.
Domestic food prices within Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) countries 
show a different pattern from world food prices (Meijerink, Roza, and van 
Berkum 2009). While global food prices rose sharply and peaked in the first 
half of 2008, food prices within the ESA region increased too, but at lower 
rates (Karugia et al. 2009). Although global commodity prices slumped in the 
second half of 2008 and stabilized throughout 2009, food prices within the 
ESA region defied the international food price trends. In 2010 and 2011, food 
prices within the ESA region have continued to rise in tandem with world 
food price trends. While high food prices may no longer be making headlines 
in rich economies, the food price crisis has remained a topical issue in the 
policy arena of ESA countries, in particular Kenya. The food crisis has wors-
ened the food security situation of most Kenyan households since a majority 
of these households are net food buyers. Estimates from the recent Kenya 
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Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS 2006)  indicate that about 63 
per cent of crop and livestock producers are net buyers. In addition, food pur-
chases constitute about 60 per cent of total expenditures of farming house-
holds. For these households, any food price increases negatively affect their 
food security status. Moreover, high and volatile food prices are not a new 
phenomenon to such households (Chambers, Longhurst, and Pacey 1981).
Commercial farmers, who can respond to the increase in prices by increas-
ing production, can potentially benefit from the price boom, provided that 
changes in the prices are transmitted to them through the value chain 
(Okello 2009). The rising food prices put the country at risk of a reversal in 
gains made towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) especially MDG 1 on reducing hunger and poverty. The impacts of 
the high food prices in the country are complicated by unstable macroeco-
nomic conditions and other regional factors such as persistent droughts and 
political conflicts that keep food prices high.
In response to the food price crisis, Kenyan policy makers adopted a broad 
spectrum of policy responses broadly classified into demand-side (food 
safety nets and tax reductions) and supply-side policies (subsidies and price 
support). The most common responses aimed at ensuring an adequate and 
affordable food supply for the majority of consumers. Safety nets are pro-
vided for the most food insecure and the vulnerable. They also aim at foster-
ing a positive agricultural supply response. The food price crisis re-affirms 
the need for adequate investments in the agricultural sector, with a focus on 
the increasing productivity through improved access to inputs and markets 
so that farmers are less vulnerable and capable of responding to production 
incentives.
9.2 Study Approach
The conflicting interests of producers and consumers of a commodity in 
an economy are fundamental problems for government policy decisions 
(Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson 1983). The behaviour and dynamics of visible 
and invisible actors within the food sector therefore can only be understood 
in terms of their power and class position in the larger social system. In prac-
tice, however, economists rely on two frameworks, namely: public choice and 
the traditional political economy approach (De Gorter and Swinnen 2002).
This study employs the political economy framework in seeking to under-
stand why governments choose a certain policy option over others in 
attempting to respond to food crisis. The study focuses on the price trends 
and policies of three major staple food crops in Kenya, maize, wheat, and rice. 





context within the food sector. The price data used in this study are compiled 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(KNBS), and the East Africa Grain Council.
9.2.1 Recent Political History
The key salient features of Kenya’s recent political history are the reintro-
duction of multi-party democracy in 1992 and the recent enactment of a 
new constitution in 2010. The first two administrations under Jomo Kenyatta 
(1963–78) and Daniel Arap Moi (1978–2002) exercised control over both the 
state and markets. Policy decisions were basically made by the executive even 
though multi-party democracy was allowed under President Kenyatta. After 
an attempted coup in 1982, President Moi concentrated state authority by 
making Kenya a single party state. The state pursued inward looking policies 
mainly meant to protect food producers but at the same time subsidize urban 
consumers.
The state controlled food production and marketing by subsidizing pro-
duction and administering controlled product prices. Official crop prices 
were gazetted and announced by the Agriculture Minister before the crop 
was planted each year. Decisions to import or export food were made by 
the cabinet and enforced through a monopoly state enterprise, the National 
Cereals Produce Board (NCPB). The price controls tended to benefit large-
scale food producers, processors, and urban consumers who had the power 
to lobby the state.
After a decade of single party rule, multi-party elections were held in 1992, 
creating an opportunity for the opposition to check on the executive in pol-
icy decision-making. The advent of multi-party politics coincided with the 
era of market reforms where state control on marketing and trade of food 
commodities was reduced, while the private sector was allowed a greater say 
in markets and trade.
The key policy-making institutions in the multi-party era have contin-
ued to be the finance and agriculture ministries, wherein the ministers 
and permanent secretaries are key policy actors. A new constitution was 
enacted in Kenya on 27 August 2010. The new constitution devolves deci-
sion-making to county governments rather than concentrating it on the 
central government. This would encourage wider participation of stake-
holders. In the recent past, producer associations under the umbrella of 
the Kenya National Producers Federation have been lobbying government 
before the national budget is read in parliament. Similarly, the parliamen-
tary budget committee has been allocated wider powers in budget-making. 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE
The first independent government weathered a period of protectionism 
that saw a lot of external pressure yield to structural reforms in the second 
administration that were enhanced by trade liberalization and the current 
multi-lateral trading systems. Thus, agricultural policies in independent 
Kenya can be grouped into two distinct categories. (1) Policies whereby direct 
government controls and participation dominated agricultural production 
and marketing—the era of government controls from 1963 to 1980. (2) Those 
whereby government participation was reduced and market forces and pri-
vate individuals or organizations have played major roles in agricultural pro-
duction, marketing, and investment—liberalized period.
ERA OF CONTROLS
After independence, agricultural policies were underpinned on Sessional 
Paper No. 10 on ‘African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya’ 
that focused on problems of transition (Kenya 1964). The immediate concern 
was Africanization of land ownership with financial support sought from 
various sources, resettlement of the landless and selection of suitable forms of 
organization. This typified the Kenyatta regime and saw the resettlement on 
one million acre schemes probably the greatest policy success this far. Farm 
organizations adopted the existing forms of national farms, cooperatives, 
companies, partnerships, and individual farms. Land use was to be closely 
monitored to prevent mismanagement and idle farms. Appropriate legisla-
tion and land use policy was proposed under the 1970–4 planning period. In 
addition, a policy of placing statutory management orders on mismanaged 
farms was reinforced and the reform of customary land tenure systems into 
a modern legal system was started.
Kenya inherited several statutory marketing institutions from the colo-
nial regime. Virtually all important commodities had state boards, which 
regulated their production and marketing. These included The Sisal Board 
of Kenya, Kenya Sugar Authority, Coffee Board of Kenya, Tea Board of 
Kenya, Pyrethrum Board of Kenya, Kenya Dairy Board, the Cotton Board 
of Kenya, the Dairy Board, and the Kenya Meat Commission. Smallholder 
production and marketing was organized under cooperatives to assist in 
the procurement of production inputs and in the marketing of produce. 
A  majority of these cooperatives were affiliated to the Kenya National 
Farmers Union. A  number of state-run farmer organizations were also 
set up to support the production and marketing of most commodities. 
These included Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) for tea, Kenya 
Co-operative Creameries for milk, NCPB for cereals, National Irrigation 






Similarly, price controls that predated the Second World War and covered 
virtually all sectors drawing legal basis from the Price Control Ordinance of 
1956 that was later renamed Price Control Act of 1972 were applied. Price 
controls operated at both the production and retail levels depending on the 
commodity, mainly maize, wheat, and milk, which were considered essential 
foodstuffs. In the 1970s producer prices were set based on parity prices to dis-
courage export surpluses during this period when Kenya was a net exporter 
of wheat and maize. Subsidized agricultural credit was availed through the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), Land Agricultural Bank (LAB), and 
cooperatives. Later on LAB was absorbed by AFC once most transfer of land 
had been finalized.
The policy on research inherited at independence over-emphasized cash 
crops and a few food crops. After independence research efforts were geared 
towards both small and large African farmers. The government increased 
expenditure on agricultural research and extension. The policy on exten-
sion was to retain existing staff and expand their numbers and as such 
Egerton College was expanded to train increased staff. However, most of the 
extension agents were primary school graduates with little or no technical 
training. These problems were recognized in 1970 and a new policy was for-
mulated to recruit school certificate graduates and train them for two years 
at agricultural training institutes.
The 1980s to early 1990s were a period of policy reforms in Kenya. The 
policy reforms were aimed at reducing the involvement of government in 
economic activities and therefore letting the country move towards a free 
market economy. Market liberalization policies started from the 1980s under 
the structural adjustment programmes of World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. The impetus of the reforms, however, gained momentum 
in 1982 with the requirements of the World Bank for removal of distortions 
in the economy as a conditionality for the disbursement of the World Bank’s 
loans. However, it was not until 1986 that the government officially spelt out 
the wide range of policy reforms for the whole economy in Sessional Paper 
No. 1 on ‘Economic Management for Renewed Growth’.
The liberalization period also coincided with multi-party politics in Kenya 
and a period after an attempted coup in 1982 that shook the administration 
under President Moi. There was a complete failure in policy formulation and 
such efforts were disjointed and uninformed by local conditions. After the 
second multi-party elections, donor support was withdrawn on governance 
grounds and the government lost interest in agriculture. There was insuffi-
cient money voted to agriculture. Moi’s interest in agriculture was exercised 
through patronage on maize, milk, and tea with negative effects on coffee. 
In the last days of the Moi regime, an attempt was made to save the regime’s 
image by composing a team of technocrats popularly known as the ‘dream 
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team’ to tame corruption and spearhead policy formulation. However, they 
happened to arrive at the scene a bit too late after the horse had bolted and as 
expected they did not get the necessary political good will to formulate and 
implement policies.
The third political administration rode to power on promises of ridding the 
country of corruption and has made an attempt to institutionalize policy for-
mulations by appointing qualified technocrats to positions of policy-making 
and giving them autonomy to do so. The new administration under President 
Kibaki that came to power at the end of 2002 wanted something to be identi-
fied within the agricultural sector. The ministers for agriculture and livestock 
therefore asked their respective permanent secretaries to prepare a strategy 
document (political expediency) towards this goal. Tegemeo Institute was 
asked to assist in the crafting of the document while United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) was also willing to assist. The team 
borrowed heavily from the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) to 
develop the Strategy for Revitalization of Agriculture (SRA).
KRDS had been prepared earlier in year 2000 with efforts spearheaded by 
Professor Shem Migot-Adholla, a member of the so called ‘dream team’ in 
President Moi’s era. KRDS was broad in coverage and extensively participa-
tory unlike SRA that was not fully accepted by stakeholders. The SRA mainly 
related to the organizational/institutional reform of ministries (downsizing) 
rather than agricultural sector policies. Nonetheless, the SRA has now been 
developed as a strategy for the next ten years as a sectoral implementation of 
the ERS. The focus is on raising productivity of agriculture mainly through 
providing support (public goods), private sector development, and democ-
ratization of policy-making. There is renewed emphasis on improving the 
institutional governance of stakeholder organizations and groupings.
However, the culture of ministries is still very much personality-driven by 
the permanent secretary. Moreover, the design of much of the legislation has 
vested too much power in the directors of agriculture and livestock, hence 
making other decision makers irrelevant or having to accept the director’s 
decision (even the PS in this position on some issues). Each line ministry 
now has a Central Planning Unit (CPU). Heads of planning departments who 
head the CPU’s are seconded from the Ministry of Planning as are many staff 
under the Economics Scheme of Service. However, there are insufficient staff 
and capacity from this source so the planning departments have staff with 
agricultural economics training seconded from the ‘technical’ departments 
to assist in the work and provide technical expertise, which provides new 
synergies.
At the CPUs, a new policy preparation process has been devised where 
documents are passed from the ministry to a cabinet committee after which 
they may or may not be sent to the attorney general for legal interpretation 
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depending on the seriousness of the issue at hand. After this stage the policy 
is then sent to parliament for debate. Again there is a high staff turnover in 
the Economics Scheme of Service with a lot of staff joining policy research 
institutes. The ten-year government embargo on employment led to a decline 
in this scheme’s staffing levels and permission was given to recruit a hundred 
graduate economists. It is hard to retain officers within government terms, 
which has led to the 9 am to 5 pm mentality that has demoralized the service. 
Clearly there is a need to retain and strengthen CPU for institutional mem-
ory. There is also need to build capacity among officers on negotiating skills 
with regard to international trade issues such as World Trade Organization. 
Moreover, the civil service within ministries in the Kibaki administration 
has been weakened and demoralized by the retention of retired officers as key 
decision makers. There is also a return of ethnicity and corruption in public 
sector recruitments.
9.3 Food Price Trends and Shocks
This section analyses the food price trends in Kenya using wholesale market 
prices relative to the international prices for the period 2007–11. The whole-
sale price data used in this study are collected from the agriculture ministry 
and KNBS.
9.3.1 Food Price Trends
Food prices in Kenya rose gradually when global food prices surged in 2007, 
but defied the global food price trends to continue rising throughout 2009–
11 and remained high relative to the world food prices (Figure 9.1). The 
Kenyan food price movements are heavily dependent on rainfall patterns 
since Kenyan agriculture is largely rain-fed.
Underlying the domestic food price volatility are price increases in key sta-
ple crops such as maize, wheat, and rice. Maize is a major staple crop in Kenya 
and food security in Kenya is equated to the availability and lack of maize. 
It carries a weight of about 13 per cent in computation of food inflation and 
is the highest proportion attributable to a single food commodity. Unlike 
the international maize prices which fell in the second half of 2008 and 
stabilized throughout 2009 and the first half of 2010, maize prices in Kenya 
rose throughout much of 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Figure 9.2). The stable global 
maize prices persisted up to July 2010 when prices began to climb and have 
been on an upward trend up to the fourth quarter of 2011. In contrast, maize 
prices in Kenya have remained relatively high but fell in the last quarter of 
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The rise in maize price can be attributed to a less than optimal maize har-
vest for three consecutive long rains harvests during 2007–9.
The food price pressures in Kenya could also stem from price-induced 
consumption shifts from traditional food staples, such as maize, to other 



































































Figure 9.1 Monthly trends in food prices, 2007–11 (January 2007=100)





























































































Maize Price Trends, January 2007–October 2011
Kenya Fao global
Figure 9.2 Maize price trends, Kenya
Source: FAOSTAT (2000–9) and KNBS (2007–11).
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on the international market. Between January and May 2008, international 
rice prices rose to unprecedented levels. Over the same period, rice prices in 
Kenya were lower than the global prices but also rose to reach their peaks 
three months later in September 2008. In the second half of 2008, inter-
national rice prices fell to stabilize in early 2009, a trend that has persisted 
throughout 2010 and well into 2011. In tandem with the global trends, rice 
prices in Kenya remain stable over the 2008–11 period.
On the other hand, wheat prices in Kenya rose sharply relative to the inter-
national wheat prices throughout 2009 and 2010. In the second half of 2010, 
international wheat prices began to climb and have been on an upward trend 
up to March 2011. However, domestic wheat prices within Kenya have exhib-
ited mixed trends over the same period. Between 2009 and 2011, wheat prices 
in Kenya have been on a downward trend but have been characterized by 
high volatility as indicated by the frequent price swings. A key observation 
with regard to the domestic wheat prices within Kenya is that they increased 
at a higher rate than the international wheat prices, suggesting the existence 
of protectionist domestic policies.
During the period February 2007 to February 2008, the volatility of 
domestic food prices in Kenya, as measured by month on month percent-
age changes in the price indices, was lower than the volatility of interna-
tional food prices (Figure 9.3). However, the food price volatility in Kenya 
over 2009–11 was higher than the volatility experienced in world market 
prices. The most volatile food prices in Kenya were those for wheat and maize 















Maize Fao global Rice Wheat
Figure 9.3 Percentage changes in food price indices, Kenya
Source: author’s computations.
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destabilizing food price scenario in Kenya, which could adversely affect the 
food security status of the country.
Of particular concern from a food security perspective are indications 
that prices in Kenya remain persistently high in 2009 despite the precipitous 
decline in international prices. These persistently high food prices indicate 
a poor degree of price transmission from international markets to domestic 
markets in Kenya. Price transmission effects provide insights into the nexus 
between domestic and international food prices (Karugia et al. 2009). They 
indicate the extent to which domestic markets are integrated into global mar-
kets and therefore the degree to which changes in global prices might influ-
ence domestic prices.
The links between international prices and local prices are complicated; 
the first determinants of how international prices translate into site-specific 
prices relate to exchange rate movements and a country’s net trade position. 
Furthermore, the existing domestic trade policies, and the manner of their 
implementation, often determine the extent to which individual producers 
are able to respond to market signals. Local price movements, meanwhile, 
reflect a multitude of factors, ranging from weather conditions, shifts in local 
production, disease and consumption shocks, inflation, changing infor-
mal trading patterns among others. However, that said, a cursory review of 
monthly price movements in Kenya reveals a trend of puzzling persistently 
high and increasingly variable food prices, which have a negative effect on 
the country’s food security.
9.3.2 International Price Transmission
An enterprise content management of price transmission was estimated 
using monthly domestic wholesale maize prices for five markets (Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kisumu) and the South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) white maize price for the period January 2002 to December 
2011 (Table 9.1).
The results show that out of the five markets, only two (Nairobi and 
Mombasa) have a significant long-run relationship with SAFEX maize prices. 
This is expected given that Kenya is a net maize importer that regularly 
imports maize through the port of Mombasa that is well-connected to Nairobi 
by both road and rail. However, the transmission of international prices to 
other domestic markets might be hampered by infrastructural constraints. 
The elasticities of price transmission in these two markets were about 0.3 
(Table 9.2). Although no significant long-run relationships existed between 
SAFEX prices and other market prices in Kenya, the elasticities of price trans-
missions were in the range of 0.2 to 0.3 implying that between 20 and 30 per 
cent of the changes in SAFEX maize prices are transmitted to Kenyan markets.
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Table 9.1 Transmission of SAFEX maize prices to domestic prices in Kenya








Nairobi No Yes Yes −0.305*** 0.103 0.304***
Mombasa No No Yes −0.287*** 0.114 0.287***
Nakuru Yes Yes No −0.428*** 0.047 0.212***
Eldoret Yes Yes No −0.350*** 0.253*** 0.259***
Kisumu Yes Yes No −0.191*** 0.024 0.368***
Note: ***significant at the 1% level.
Source: author’s computation from KNBS data (2006–11).
Table 9.2 Timeline of government responses to the food price crisis
Year Policy Action Remarks
2002–5 NCPB intervention in the operation of a 
strategic grain reserve
Stabilized market prices
2002–5 Import tariffs Tariff reduction to increase 
import access
2002–5 Zero rating of imports from East African 
Community and Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa
Deepening of regional 
integration
2008 Export ban on maize Retaliation from neighbouring 
countries





Partners, Equity Bank, AGRA, FAO, IFAD
Fertilizer and seed subsidy
2008 Irrigation subsidy Economic stimulus package
March 2008 NCPB procures 30% of national fertilizer 
requirement
Fertilizer subsidy
June 2008 Reduction of wheat import tariff from 35 
to 10%
Prices rose owing to a surge in 
world prices
June 2008 Zero rating of maize, wheat, and milk Prices rose owing to a surge in 
world prices
December 2008 Urban consumer price subsidy on maize 
meal (prime minister)
Poor targeting, inaccessible to 
the poor, food riots, flawed 
distribution
December 2008 NCPB producer price subsidy of KES 
200/90 kg bag
Farmers decline to release 
stocks
February 2009 Consumer subsidy policy reversal Maize meal subsidy withdrawn
February 2009 Food price taskforce formed Multi-sector task force on food 
prices formed
March 2009 Cash for work programme launched by the 
prime minister
Poor targeting
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Similarly, the speed of adjustment of domestic prices to the long-run rela-
tionship across the five markets was in the range of 0.2 to 0.3 (Table 9.1). 
The implication that can be drawn is that domestic maize prices take about 
3 to 5 months to fully adjust to changes in world prices. The findings of this 
study are comparable to earlier transmission studies undertaken in the coun-
try. Rapsomanikis (2009) finds a relatively slow adjustment of domestic food 
prices in Kenya to international prices with domestic prices taking 11 to 7.7 
months for the SAFEX white maize price. While reliance on rain-fed agri-
culture and therefore, weather shocks, is one cause of price volatility, poor 
infrastructure is another contributing factor.
Poor roads especially, in isolated producing and consuming regions 
within a country lead to increases in price variability. It has also been 
argued that poor infrastructure may, however, insulate domestic mar-
kets from international shocks. Rapsomanikis (2009) shows evidence of 
a strong long-run co-movement between prices in major Kenyan markets 
with the international price. Maize price in Eldoret (the main producing 
market) and Kisumu at the western part of the country, strongly directly 
co-move with both the international yellow maize price and the SAFEX 
white maize price. Strong co-movement suggests that international 
maize upturns would, in the long run, likely affect white maize in these 
markets.
Apart from poor infrastructure, rapid international price transmission may 
be hindered by state involvement in the procurement of both domestically 
produced and imported maize, and the subsequent release of the same at 
predetermined price. This may partly be responsible for the weak relation-
ship (moderate co-movement) between the SAFEX white maize price and the 
Nairobi and Mombasa maize prices.
9.4 Policy Responses
The government of Kenya has used a combination of policies to respond to 
the food price crisis. The policies pursued have included both supply- and 
demand-side policies. Table 9.2 provides a timeline of these policy inter-
ventions while the discussion that follows categorizes these actions into 
market-oriented interventions, safety nets, and supply response stimulation 
policies.
9.4.1 Market-based Interventions
Market-based policies attempt to reduce the cost of food, and increase its 






potentially affect all households. Prior to the 2007/8 food price crisis, the 
government of Kenya intervened in markets through the operation of the 
NCPB and the imposition of import tariffs on food imports. Though charged 
with the responsibility of maintaining a strategic grain reserve, its food pro-
curement activities have the effect of stabilizing market prices. On the other 
hand, the imposition of food import tariffs that were in the range of 25 to 50 
per cent over the 2000 to 2005 period has the effect of limiting imports and 
increasing domestic prices.
After the 2007/8 food price crisis, the Kenyan government implemented 
export restrictions on maize in 2008 while at the same time embarking on 
an aggressive importation of maize through the NCPB to build up stocks for 
the national strategic grain reserve. At the start of 2008, the government had 
licenced large-scale traders to export maize to neighbouring countries such as 
South Sudan. Much of these maize exports were procured from trader stocks 
and the NCPB strategic grain reserve. On realizing that the national strate-
gic reserve was depleted while supply was constrained by the impacts of the 
post-election crisis and a drought, the government imposed an export ban 
on maize. In response to the drought experienced throughout most of east 
and southern Africa, Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania imposed maize export 
bans. The maize export bans in countries such as Tanzania and Malawi lim-
ited the country’s ability to increase supply and curb the price surge through 
quick imports.
As the crisis worsened, and the imports failed to arrive on time, the govern-
ment turned to domestic procurement through the NCPB largely as a result 
of pressure being exerted by consumers following high maize meal prices. 
Although the government set a high price of KES 1,750 per 90 kg bag, farm-
ers held on to their stocks in anticipation of higher market prices later in the 
season. They demanded a 20 per cent increase to KES 2,200 per 90 kg bag. 
The government over the same period increased the producer price from 
KES 1,750 per 90 kg bag to KES 1,950, but directed the NCPB to sell the same 
to millers at KES 1,750. This translated to a producer subsidy of KES 200 per 
90 kg bag.
The government maize imports did not arrive until March 2009. Moreover, 
there were flaws in the distribution of the subsidized maize to millers. The 
NCPB imports were sold to briefcase traders posing as maize millers who 
were licensed to procure grain from NCPB in an effort to support a maize 
meal subsidy programme pioneered by the prime minister (see discussion 
under consumption subsidies). This undermined the effect of the subsidy 
programme. In addition, NCPB sold the subsidized maize only in bundles of 
50 kilogrammes making it unaffordable to the poor.
The export restriction may have been ineffective given the existence of sub-
stantial informal cross-border trade with its neighbours. Despite the export 
Countries with Limited Dependence on Food Imports
210
ban on agricultural commodities in Tanzania, substantial volumes of maize 
were exported into Kenya in 2009 (LEI 2008). Although export restrictions 
are aimed at protecting consumers by keeping the price low, they potentially 
increase transaction costs through the informal trade routes, effectively hurt-
ing the consumers. Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro (2005) observe that export bans 
increase smuggling costs, depress producer prices, and raise consumer prices.
Other trade policies that were adopted included the reduction of import 
tariffs and taxes on maize and wheat. In June 2008, import duty on wheat 
was reduced by 25 per cent (from 35 to 10 per cent) while that of maize was 
zero-rated following the intervention of the Ministry of Agriculture. Other 
fiscal measures included zero-rating value added tax on wheat and maize 
flour, and milk. Despite these efforts, the price of maize continued to rise and 
by October/November 2008, the government shifted its strategy to a direct 
protection of consumers through food subsides. This decision followed near 
food riots in Nairobi owing to pressure from urban populations.
9.4.2 Consumption Subsidies and Safety Nets
While universal food subsidies are ideal as a quick response in improving 
access to food and in mitigating the initial impacts of a price surge, they are 
costly and often fail to target those most in need. In December 2008, the 
Kenyan government adopted a direct consumer price subsidy by introduc-
ing a dual pricing system for maize meal. This urban maize meal subsidy 
programme was the brain child of the prime minister, whose urban constitu-
ency covers Kibera, the largest slum in Nairobi. The Ministry of Finance and 
Planning initially opposed the maize meal subsidy programme, but later on 
grudgingly accepted. A 2 kg packet of maize meal was supposed to sell at a 
commercial rate of KES 72 and a subsidized rate of KES 55. The latter was sup-
posed to benefit the poor. The subsidy programme was largely supported by 
the milling industry that was licenced to procure maize from NCPB, mill it, 
and sell it at subsidized prices but later on apply for rebates from the Ministry 
of Finance and Planning.
Other than transporting the subsidized meal to the informal settlements 
and other low-income neighbourhoods, there were no other targeting crite-
ria. Furthermore, the subsidized pack was retailed in 5 kg bags which made it 
inaccessible to the poor. Within a short period, the urban maize meal subsidy 
programme became untenable owing to financing and distribution bottle-
necks and was eventually discontinued. The subsidy programme raised some 
political overtones given the composition of the grand coalition government 
where the prime minister, who supported the programme came from one 
wing of the coalition while the minister for finance, who came from another 




The cost of the scheme was estimated at KES 23.4 billion (US$334 million) 
in subsidy and tax foregone in the fiscal year (FY) 2008/9. After a critical anal-
ysis, the cabinet withdrew the scheme in February 2009 and a commitment 
was made to develop an alternative, more effective scheme. In the meantime, 
the price was left to market fundamentals. In addition, the cabinet directed 
the relevant ministries to work with interested donor agencies to develop a 
comprehensive food subsidy programme.
Consequently, a multi-sectoral taskforce was formed in February 2009 
to facilitate this process. The membership of the task force covered the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Ministry of 
Livestock Development, Ministry of Special Programmes, Kenya Federation 
of Agricultural Producers, Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, and 
various lobby groups on maize, wheat, and livestock. The taskforce designed 
a cash transfer programme initially targeting the poor informal settlements 
in Nairobi on a pilot basis. Where improved access to food is the objective, 
cash transfers would work efficiently where food markets function well. The 
implementation of this initiative was, however, shelved by the cabinet due 
to design flaws.
Another initiative implemented by the government was a cash-for-work 
programme named Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) that was mooted by the prime 
minister. In an environment of increasing food prices, such public work pro-
grammes increase the income of the poor and improve their access to food. 
The large number of unemployed youths made such an intervention very 
attractive. The KES 15 billion (US$214 million) KKV programme was launched 
in March 2009 and aimed at creating 300,000 jobs within six months of its 
launch. The programme engaged the unemployed youth in infrastructure 
works (mainly roads) and environmental conservation exercises such as tree 
planting and river cleaning efforts. The programme, although bedevilled by 
payment problems, was successful in building some assets, notable being the 
clean-up of the Nairobi river.
9.4.3 Stimulating Food Supply Response
During the post-liberalization period, the government through NCPB, 
entered into farm inputs (fertilizer, maize seeds) markets in the year 2000 
with an aim of boosting the board’s revenue and stabilizing the fertilizer 
prices in the local market. However, following the surge in fertilizer prices 
in 2008, the government undertook to procure 163,000 MT or 40 per cent 
of the national fertilizer requirement at a cost of KES 6.2 billion (US$89 mil-
lion). This excluded the tea fertilizer bought by KTDA worth KES 1.6 billion.
In March 2009, the president announced that diammonium phosphate fer-
tilizer would be sold at a reduced price of KES 2,500 while calcium ammonium 
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nitrate fertilizer would retail at KES 1,650 per 50 kg bag from a high of KES 
6,000. The price of seed was also reduced by KES 50 and KES 10 per 10 kg packet 
and 2 kg packet, respectively. Just like the interventions in the maize market, 
the implementation of the input subsidy also encountered governance chal-
lenges. Once again, some unscrupulous traders procured the fertilizer from 
NCPB, repackaged it and sold it to unsuspecting farmers at higher prices than 
those recommended by the government. This was in addition to the potential 
disruptions of the fertilizer business. Smuggling was rife at the Kenya–Uganda 
border as fertilizer prices were higher in Uganda than in Kenya.
In realization that resource poor farmers, especially those in the lowlands 
may not have the know-how or cannot afford purchased inputs, the Kenyan 
government embarked upon a National Accelerated Agricultural Input 
Programme. The programme was aimed at promoting food security and pov-
erty reduction. Initially planned to subsidize fertilizers and maize seed for a 
limited number of districts, it was subsequently expanded to national cover-
age with plans to provide 2.5 million farmers with maize seed and fertilizers 
for one acre each, with vouchers issued to targeted farmers (with less than 2.5 
acres) and subsequent redemption through private input sellers who would 
also be eligible for trade credit guarantees. Farmers under this input grants 
popularly known as Kilimo Plus.
Starter kits are supposed to be linked to extension, cereal banks, warehouse 
receipts, and participation in farmer groups. These farmers are supposed to 
graduate after two years into another programme: Kilimo Biashara (farming as 
a business). The expected graduation is yet to successfully materialize due to 
the poor harvest in late 2007 and 2008. The programme received a financial 
boost from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank in 
2008 in response to the high food prices. Kilimo Biashara was launched in May 
2008 as a US$50 million (KES 3 billion) loan project. Probably encouraged 
by the Malawi successful experience with fertilizer and seed subsidies, the 
Kenyan government in partnership with the Alliance for Green Revolution, 
International Fund for Agricultural Development and Equity Bank launched 
the project with the aim of targeting small-scale farmers and enterprises in 
the agricultural value chain.
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) catalysed the project 
by setting up a US$5 million (KES 400 million) ‘cash guarantee fund’. The 
fund buffers the Equity Bank’s risk of lending money to farmers and small 
agricultural businesses with little or no collateral. The loans carry a 12 per 
cent interest rate applied when the loans fall due, a rate well below the bank’s 
standard lending rate of 18 per cent (as per 2008). Under the programme, 
farmers also receive training on improved farming techniques and business 
management in addition to government vouchers that enable them to pur-
chase new farming inputs. Another government response came in the form 
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of an economic stimulus to agriculture through revival of the stalled Hola 
irrigation scheme in the lower Tana Delta. In September 2008 the president 
and the prime minister launched a KES 2 billion National Economic Stimulus 
Programme on food production in the irrigation scheme. However, there 
seems to have been no plans to market the output as extensive post-harvest 
losses were recorded in February 2010.
9.5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Over the last four years, international food prices have witnessed unprec-
edented increases. FAO’s FPI rose by 57 per cent between March 2007 and 
March 2008 as compared to an increase of 9 per cent in 2006 (FAO 2008). 
However, food prices began to fall in July 2008 and trended downwards until 
the start of 2009 when food prices began to rise again albeit marginally but 
surged throughout 2010 to reach an unprecedented peak in January 2011. In 
contrast, food prices in Kenya rose gradually when global food prices surged 
in 2007, but defied the global food price trends to continue rising in the sec-
ond half of 2008 and throughout 2009 to 2011.
Of particular concern from a food security perspective are indications 
that prices in Kenya remain persistently high despite the precipitous decline 
in international prices. These persistently high food prices might be indica-
tive of a poor degree of price transmission from international markets to 
domestic markets in Kenya. The findings of a market integration analysis 
seem to suggest that domestic food markets in Kenya are highly integrated. 
Markets close to each other, such as Eldoret and Kisumu, show higher cor-
relation coefficients, as do markets that are connected by better transport 
infrastructure, such as between Nairobi and most of the other markets. The 
results seem to support the generally accepted notion that shorter distances 
and improved infrastructure among markets lead to lower transaction costs, 
making arbitrage profitable and thus enhancing integration of such markets.
Moreover, price transmission analysis finds that about 30 per cent of the 
changes in world market prices are transmitted to domestic markets in Kenya. 
However, the study finds a relatively slow speed of adjustment of domestic 
food prices in Kenya of between three to five months to their long-run rela-
tionship with international prices. The results of the econometric analysis do 
not give a clear picture to explain why market prices in Kenya remain high, 
the evidence of highly integrated markets and a slow speed of adjustment to 
the world prices notwithstanding. The political economy approach adopted 
offers better insights.
In response to the food price crisis, the government of Kenya imple-
mented both supply-side and demand-side policies. However, the design and 
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implementation of these policies has not been fully institutionalized and 
relies mostly on the executive. This is best illustrated by the 2009 reversal of 
the 2008 urban maize meal subsidy programme and the challenges facing 
other subsidy programmes. These political economy findings lend credence 
to the calls to institutionalize and strengthen the policy-making process in 
Kenya while the slow adjustment of domestic markets to international mar-
kets could best be addressed through infrastructure developments.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Mozambique
Virgulino Nhate, Claudio Massingarela, and Vincenzo Salvucci  
10.1 Introduction
Mozambique heavily relies on imported food and fuel, which makes it vul-
nerable to international price shocks. As a consequence, Mozambique expe-
rienced reduced exports, more expensive imports, and increased food and oil 
prices.1 This may have contributed to the stagnant poverty rates registered by 
the 2008/9 Mozambican Household Budget Survey (GoM 2010b).
This chapter attempts to analyse the relation between international and 
domestic food prices, and the policy responses adopted by the Mozambican 
government to stabilize the impact of price shocks in the domestic market.
10.2 Background
Despite the high gross domestic product (GDP) growth experienced by 
Mozambique in the past, poverty has not declined. According to official 
statistics, the Mozambican economy continued to grow at a 6 per cent rate 
even after the crisis had reached its peak in 2008 (GoM 2008a). GDP per 
capita increased from US$236 to US$453 from 1997 to 2009 (GoM 2008a, 
2008b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). But poverty rates, after a steep decline from 
about 69 per cent in 1996/7 (GoM 2010b), have remained steady at about 55 
1 The export value of cashew nuts declined from MZN 20.5 million to MZN 10.8 million; 
sugar from MZN 71.4 million to MZN 49.4 million (GoM 2007); tobacco from MZN 109 million 
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per cent between 2002/3 and 2008/9. A possible explanation for the stagna-
tion of poverty is that food price shocks have severely affected the poorer 
socioeconomic groups.
As a response to these shocks, the government implemented a mixture 
of policies aimed at containing the influence of international food prices 
and avoiding chaos on the domestic markets. The main government goals 
included increasing local food production and reducing dependence on 
imports, while enhancing productivity to improve competitiveness with 
imported foods. Measures for fuel subsidies and the construction of grana-
ries for the storage of agricultural surplus were also implemented. It is likely 
that the government’s desire to be re-elected in the upcoming 2010 elections 
was one of the motivations for implementing these policies. Nevertheless, 
the subsidies and other measures helped to maintain the retail price of com-
modities such as rice and bread stable, thus avoiding greater social struggle.2 
However, the effect of these (costly) policies on the macroeconomic frame-
work is less clear. In what follows, we try to understand, first, whether inter-
national price shocks were transmitted to the Mozambican economy; and, 
second, whether governmental policies succeeded in reducing the negative 
consequences of the price shocks on the economy.
10.3 Main Facts of the Mozambican Economy 
and Agricultural Sector
Mozambique has slightly more than 20  million inhabitants. Agriculture 
is the most important sector, with about 80 per cent of the population 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods (Cunguara and Hanlon 2010). 
However, its contribution to GDP is stagnant, approximately 25 per cent 
(Magaua, Hong, and Massingarela 2011). Subsistence agriculture is predomi-
nant despite the availability of fertile and irrigable land, and smallholders 
account for 99 per cent of total farms (Cunguara and Hanlon 2010). The 
agriculture budget share has always ranged between 3–4 per cent of total 
GDP, even though there is an ongoing pressure to increase it. Donavan and 
Tostão (2010) find that the average cultivated land for smallholders, who con-
stitute 99 per cent of total rural households, is less than one hectare (ha) (0.9 
ha), and most rural households are net buyers of food staples. This is also 
due to a paucity of granaries for the storage of staple crops, which prevents 
the build-up of domestic production surpluses, reduces food security, and 
increases vulnerability to international food price crises.
2 The increased price of food and fuel did lead, however, to violent riots and demonstrations 





Furthermore, almost 70 per cent of total household expenditures in 
Mozambique are devoted to food. Thus, a major upsurge in food prices such 
as the one experienced in 2008/9 can potentially affect large sectors of the 
population, especially lower income and urban households (GoM 2010b). 
Arndt et al. (2008) estimate that as a consequence of price increases in 2008, 
poverty increased by 0.5 per cent. At the same time, the 2008/9 agricul-
tural season was not successful due to poor weather conditions that caused 
droughts in some parts of the country and heavy storms and floods in oth-
ers (GoM 2010b). This resulted in either reduced or null food surpluses for 
most farmers, who thus were unable to benefit from higher domestic prices. 
Food access and food security are recognized as the country’s major unsolved 
issues.
10.3.1 Staple Food Consumption and Production
Thirty-six per cent of all calories consumed in the country come from cassava 
and another 22 per cent from maize. Wheat and rice account for 7 per cent 
each. Wheat and rice are mainly imported, but are increasingly preferred by 
both urban and rural households (Donovan and Tostão 2010). Figure 10.1 
presents wheat imports and consumption for the years 1996–2006.
Thus, in order to study the transmission mechanism between interna-
tional food prices and domestic prices, we focus in the following on wheat 
and rice. The analysis is based on three markets (Maputo in the south; Beira 
in the centre; Nampula in the north). Most imported food products are 
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Figure 10.1 Wheat imports and consumption, 1996–2006
Source: based on Cachomba (2010).
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prices recorded in Maputo, Beira, and Nampula are also used by the National 
Institute of Statistics to compute the official Mozambican consumer price 
index.
RICE PRICES
Figure 10.2 shows rice price trends both domestically and at its origin (the 
price of rice in Thailand is taken as a reference) for the years 2000–9. The 
price of rice has been following a slightly increasing trend both domestically 
and at the origin from 2002 until mid-2007 (Figure 10.2). In October 2007, it 
started to increase, reaching its peak in mid-2008. Thereafter, it went down 
again in the world market but remained high in Mozambique until the end of 
2009. In January 2009 the price declined slightly only in Beira, but in general 
it never returned to its pre-crisis levels. Despite the international price exhib-
iting a few extraordinary peaks, these were not reflected in the domestic 
price. This may be the result of different forms of subsidies introduced by the 
government, and of a substitution effect in consumption shifting towards 
locally produced staple crops.
WHEAT PRICES
With regard to wheat, the reference international price (Gulf of Mexico) 
started to rise in the second half of 2007, reaching its peak in the first quarter 
of 2008 (Figure 10.3). As observed for rice, the international price upsurge 
directly affected the domestic price for wheat. However, domestic price did 
not revert to the pre-crisis levels even though the international price did. On 
the contrary, it slightly increased, especially in Maputo and Nampula. This 
un-arrested increase in the domestic price of wheat —and hence of bread—


















































































at the end of 2010. To contain these occurrences, the government decided to 
implement additional price control measures.
10.4 The Degree of Price Transmission
In this section we perform a co-integration analysis to assess the degree of 
transmission between international and domestic prices for wheat and rice. 
The degree of transmission between prices in Maputo and prices in Beira and 
Nampula is subsequently also studied. As is standard in this kind of analy-
sis, we (i) test for the presence of a unit root; (ii) check for the existence of a 
long-run relation; and (iii) assess the speed of adjustment, and the long- and 
short-run adjustment (Minot 2010; Traub et al. 2010).
The results are presented in Table 10.1. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and Phillips-Perron unit root tests almost always agree on the non-stationar-
ity of the series analysed. A co-integrating relation exists only between the 
international rice price and its price in Nampula. This might be due to the 
fact that the northern region of Nampula is where most cassava is produced 
and consumed. This would imply that a cheaper alternative to rice exists 
locally and high mark-ups on the import price of rice do not last long. The 
test performed finds no co-integration between international and domestic 
prices of wheat. As displayed in Figure 10.3, the gap between international 
and domestic prices of wheat is wide. In particular, domestic prices followed 
the rise of international prices but did not follow their subsequent decline. 
This may be due to the lack of competitiveness in the local markets, but 
also to the population’s increasing preference and demand for wheat deriva-
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Mozambique are only weakly linked to international prices, especially when 
these decline. This would confirm that Mozambique is still a fairly small 
economy weakly integrated with international markets (Simeone 2010).
10.4.1 The Degree of Price Transmission among Domestic Markets
Maputo, the capital, is the most important economic centre of the coun-
try and the most populous city. Thus, most of the imports pass through its 
port, for delivery to the rest of the country. Therefore, here we investigate 
whether a co-integration relation exists between Maputo and the other two 
main markets (Beira and Nampula), concerning food price transmission. The 
results presented in Table 10.2 show that the price of rice and the price of 
wheat in Maputo and Nampula are co-integrated. This might seem puzzling, 
given that Nampula is about 2,000 km away from Maputo. However, it needs 
to be noted that Nampula is still a developing market, and that it serves the 
country’s most populated province of about four million inhabitants. Hence, 
part of the food sold in Nampula is imported from Maputo and then trans-
ported to this local market.
Also in this case, the ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests agree on the 
non-stationarity of the series analysed. Moreover, the Johansen procedure 
found that the prices in Maputo and Nampula exhibit long-run relations for 
both rice and wheat despite the existence of imbalances in the short run. The 
degree of rice price transmission between Maputo and Nampula was estimated 
at 0.03, i.e., only 3 per cent of the change in price in Maputo is transmitted to 
Table 10.1 Transmission of international rice and wheat prices to domestic markets in 
Mozambique
Unit root in 
domestic price?
Long-run   
relationship
Error correction model (if long-run 
relationship confirmed)
Location Commodity ADF 
test












Maputo Rice Yes Yes No – – –
Beira Rice Yes Yes No – – –
Nampula Rice Yes No Yes 0.112* 0.18* 0.13
Maputo Wheat Yes Yes No – – –
Beira Wheat Yes No No – – –






Nampula. The disequilibrium in the prices that is observed in the short run is 
corrected in about one month and the series revert back to the long-run relation-
ship in about nine months. For wheat, the elasticity of transmission is about 7 
per cent. The short-run disequilibrium is corrected in eleven months, while the 
long-run relationship is re-established in about two years (twenty-four months).
10.5 The Political Economy of Food Prices
The direct and indirect policy responses to the food price crisis in Mozambique 
are analysed and discussed in this section. The direct responses included 
various measures to smooth the impact of food price increases on domestic 
prices, while the indirect ones were aimed at reducing the impact of higher 
fuel prices on other sectors, including food production and distribution. 
Mozambique has a long history of price control and direct public partici-
pation in the markets as buyer and seller of key agricultural commodities. 
Alfieri, Arndt, and Cirera (2007) describe how during the 1980s and early 
1990s the government frequently bought and sold key staples in the mar-
kets—especially maize—through Agriculture Competences (AGRICOM) and 
later through the Institute of Cereals of Mozambique (ICM). In this man-
ner, the government sought to maintain food prices low for the consumers. 
However, the ICM was restructured in 1996 and is no longer active in any sta-
ple crop sales or purchases; currently it owns just granaries which are rented 
out to the private sector. Thus, the private sector has been largely free to 
set prices since 1997, although the government continues to issue indicative 
(non-binding) prices. In 2008/9, government policies were adopted mainly 
in the agricultural and trade sectors.
Table 10.2 Transmission of food prices in Maputo to other markets in Mozambique




Error correction model (if long-run 
relationship confirmed)











Beira Rice Yes Yes No – – –
Nampula Rice Yes Yes Yes 0.03 0.01 0.09*
Beira Wheat Yes Yes No – – –
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10.5.1 Promotion of Increased Agricultural Production 
and Productivity
In the aftermath of the 2008 price shocks, the government introduced the 
Plan for Action for Food Production (PAPA 2008–11), which was meant to 
secure food to the entire population. The PAPA operational plan was mainly 
targeted to the production of rice, wheat, and poultry, but also aimed to 
reduce the dependence on the imports of similar products. In addition, it 
proposed the application of different mechanisms to enhance food storage 
and distribution, and setting up basic conditions in rural areas to develop 
food processing using local inputs. Furthermore, in July 2008 the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry promoted the construction of granaries for the storage 
of cereals. As mentioned earlier, the storage of agricultural surpluses is one 
of the main problems for the Mozambican agricultural value chain. Given 
the high transportation costs, producers frequently sell their surplus locally 
and immediately after the harvest, missing the opportunity of higher profits. 
The granary initiative was intended to create a domestic production surplus 
that would improve food security and reduce the impact of international 
food price crises. Notwithstanding these policies, agricultural productivity 
did not exhibit any considerable improvement. Cunguara and Hanlon (2010) 
show that maize productivity was lower in 2008 than it was in 2002 and 
2003, while Mosca (2011) compares agricultural productivity in the 1950s 
with recent figures and concludes that the production structure and agricul-
tural productivity show no significant improvement over time. Figure 10.4 
displays the growth rate for agricultural production and all sector production 
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Figure 10.4 Trend of growth of the economy in Mozambique




10.5.2 Trade Policy Measures
To mitigate the short-term effects of increasing global food prices, the gov-
ernment reduced import tariffs in early 2008, cutting the tariffs of maize, 
wheat, and rice from 25 to 2.5 per cent. Moreover, after the 2008 increase in 
food and fuel prices, a specific committee was activated to search for possible 
strategic responses. The committee interacted with different stakeholders, 
such as companies that had intended to increase certain domestic prices. The 
increase of domestic fuel prices in response to the increase of international 
prices was also discussed first within a specific inter-ministerial committee. 
The government also adopted policies to maintain an overvalued exchange 
rate, while subsidizing fuel prices and freezing any increase in tariffs for pub-
lic utilities. Whereas the policies adopted for the agricultural sector did not 
have the expected results, it seems that such trade policy measures were gen-
erally effective in reducing the international price shock impact.
10.5.3 The Rationale for Policy Interventions
As introduced in previous sections, there are several reasons why the 
Mozambican government decided to step in during the 2008/9 fuel and food 
price crisis, and implement a series of measures to mitigate the most negative 
effects of the crisis.
PROTECTING THE POOR
First of all, the need to protect the poor was at the centre of the governmen-
tal agenda, as it appears from the main strategic documents in the country 
(GoM 2005, 2010b). Since most of the poor depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood, then part of the implemented policies obviously concerned the 
agricultural sector. However, the 2008/9 poverty assessment shows that 
the headcount ratio did not decrease from its 2002/3 levels (55 per cent). 
Cunguara and Hanlon (2010) also find that the median income was 10 per 
cent lower in 2008 than it was in 2002, and was lower for most income 
groups, concluding that poverty has been increasing rather than decreas-
ing. Nonetheless, increased food prices and declining terms of trade can-
not entirely explain the stagnation of consumption levels over time. The 
2008/9 poverty assessment stresses that at least two other factors contrib-
uted to that outcome: (i) very slow growth rates in agricultural productiv-
ity, especially with respect to food crops; (ii) weather shocks that impacted 
the harvest of 2008, particularly in the central provinces (GoM 2010b). 
As previously discussed, notwithstanding the agricultural strategies to 
increase the levels of agricultural production and productivity, there is not 
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the country’s poor. The country is still a net importer of agricultural com-
modities and the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to shocks does not 
seem to have been reduced (GoM 2011).
THE GOVERNMENT DESIRE TO BE RE-ELECTED AND AVOID 
SOCIAL UNREST
The 2008/9 food and fuel price shocks occurred immediately before the 
Mozambican presidential elections, and this certainly influenced the govern-
ment decision to stabilize the impact of price shocks in the domestic market, 
especially in order to avoid a generalized social unrest. The revenue losses 
and huge increase in public debt that the government incurred in 2008/9 
can also be explained in the light of its desire to be re-elected. However, 
such costly measures left no room for adopting additional policies after 2009. 
By then the government had used almost all available resources to avoid a 
general price upsurge, and had the international fuel prices continued to 
increase, there would have been very limited capacity to keep smoothing 
the impact on the domestic market. The government desire to be re-elected 
in the upcoming 2010 elections was then among the main motivations for 
implementing subsidies and other greatly incisive but costly trade policy 
measures.3 Indeed, such interventions were gradually abandoned in 2010.
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
Another goal of the government for intervening during the crisis was to main-
tain a low inflation rate and the stability in the exchange market. This was 
accompanied by a reduction in tariffs, which resulted in an increased import 
capacity and helped to avoid the increase of domestic food prices. However, 
the annual growth rate of tax revenue as a share of GDP from 2007 to 2008 
was below the 1.4 per cent target, and the decrease was mainly driven by the 
reduction of taxes on goods and services. Moreover, public debt increased 42 
per cent after the crisis, and external debt increased 17 per cent. According 
to GoM (2010c), subsidies increased so that the primary fiscal deficit passed 
from 2 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 5 per cent of GDP in 2009. This huge 
increase was largely due to the payments to fuel retailers and to millers and 
bakers.
Given the quantity and complexity of the different responses imple-
mented by the government during and after the food and fuel price crisis, it 
is difficult to accurately assess the impact of the adopted policies. While the 
adopted policy responses broadly fulfilled the goal of ultimately preserving 
the consumers from a massive price increase, their effect on macroeconomic 






stability is less clear. Some of these policy adjustments came at a very high 
cost, especially those that deprived the government of important sources of 
revenue, thereby preventing future investments.
Some sectors were more adversely affected by the price shocks: namely, 
transport and communications, tourism, and manufacturing. Other sectors, 
like agriculture, financial services, water and electricity, and construction 
seemed to be more immune to the crisis shocks (Castel-Branco and Ossemane 
2010). The limited impact of the price shocks on consumers can then be 
explained largely by both the country’s weak integration with international 
markets (Simeone 2010) and by the interventions of the central government 
in the economy.
10.6 Conclusion
The food and fuel price shocks occurred in 2008/9, immediately before 
the general elections which led the central government of Mozambique to 
intervene in order to stabilize the impact of price shocks in the domestic 
market. A mixture of subsidies and other measures helped to keep the retail 
price of food commodities stable, and thus to avoid greater social struggle. 
Nonetheless, such policies turned out to be extremely costly in terms of 
lost revenue and increased debt, so that their effect on the macroeconomic 
framework and on poverty reduction is less clear.
Using a standard co-integration procedure, we find that domestic prices 
for rice and wheat followed the international trends only partially, and that 
they remained high even after international prices had declined. This chap-
ter concludes that a significant price transmission mechanism existed only 
between the international price of rice and the price of rice in Nampula, and 
between wheat and rice prices in Maputo and Nampula. Such a transmission 
mechanism did not seem to be in place for the market of Beira in the central 
region.
Mozambique is a fairly small economy, with weak linkages to international 
markets and prices, but it increasingly depends on imported food commodi-
ties and fuel. This makes Mozambique vulnerable to international price 
shocks, also because the economy in the past had been unable to create the 
conditions needed for increasing agricultural productivity and food produc-
tion, and for storing post-harvest agricultural surplus efficiently. Price shocks 
affected some sectors as well as some socioeconomic groups more than oth-
ers, but the overall effects of these seemed to have been limited. This can be 
explained largely by both Mozambique’s weak integration with international 
markets and by central government’s deep interventions in the economy, 
which could have been more severe had the government not intervened.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Low- and Middle-income 










The Bangladeshi government moved beyond the public sector-led develop-
ment strategy to a private sector and market-oriented development strategy 
through the implementation of different structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) during the 1980s and 1990s. In response to donor suggestions the 
government adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in 2005. It 
emphasized a greater role of private sector investment and providing appro-
priate fiscal and other incentives to achieve that. The strategy highlighted 
the importance of agricultural and rural development and focused on the 
intensification of major crops (i.e., cereals), the diversification to high-value 
non-cereal crops (i.e., vegetables and fruits), the development of non-crop 
agriculture (i.e., fishery, poultry, livestock), and the promotion of rural non-
farm activities (i.e., rural construction, transport, and services). The strat-
egy also put emphasis on the expansion of micro-credit and importance of 
the safety net programmes. A national food policy was formulated in 2006, 
which called for several agricultural development and extension services. The 
second PRSP was formulated in 2009, which emphasized enabling the mac-
roeconomic environment for pro-poor economic growth. The Awami League 
(AL) government in 2010 abandoned the PRSP and reintroduced the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan for the period 2011–15 which identified a number of core tar-
gets in line with the vision and objectives of the Perspective Plan as well 
as the Millennium Development Goals. These targets are related to a con-
siderable rise in economic growth, significant reduction in poverty, signifi-
cant improvement in human resource development, water and sanitation, 
energy and infrastructure, gender equality and empowerment, environment 
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sustainability, the widespread use of information, and communications 
technology.
11.2 Food Price Trends and Shocks
11.2.1 Previous Crisis Episodes and Policy Responses
Over the last forty years after independence in 1971, Bangladesh faced a 
number of man-made and natural calamities which threatened food security 
of the poor and marginalized population. These calamities include a famine 
in 1974, floods in 1987 and 1988, a cyclone in 1991, and a flood in 1998.
During the 1974 famine the food price rose sharply when rising inflationary 
expectations raised the demand for food while the supply of food decreased 
as farmers and traders released less food in the market. According to Drèze 
and Sen (1989) the famine was due to entitlement failure, rather than the per 
capita availability of food. The government tried to ensure subsidized food 
to all the urban people on a priority basis through the rationing system. The 
government’s famine relief efforts were limited and disorganized and the gov-
ernment was inadequately prepared to face the challenge.
In 1987 and 1988 the country experienced disastrous floods. The govern-
ment undertook various disaster management programmes. Food aid and 
increased imports of rice and wheat were the major steps. All the international 
development partners supported a project entitled Flood Action Plan from 
1990 to 1996 to formulate a national flood and water management strategy.
The 1991 Bangladesh cyclone was among the deadliest tropical cyclones 
on record. The government and the international community launched a 
major response to the cyclone disaster which included food aid and large 
scale reconstruction.
In 1998, over 75 per cent of the total area of the country was flooded. It was 
similar to the catastrophic flood of 1988 in terms of the extent of the flood-
ing. The government responded to the crisis by supplying food for immediate 
relief efforts during the floods and by helping to coordinate food aid commit-
ments and deliveries. At the same time, as part of its price stabilization strat-
egy, the government encouraged private sector imports, a policy that helped 
avoid a food supply shortage following the floods (del Ninno et al. 2001).
11.2.2 Price Trends for Key Food Crops and Price Transmission
As shown in Figure 11.1, the domestic retail price of rice had been higher 
than the import cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) price of rice until 2003–4. 






rice began to rise considerably, the domestic retail price had been much lower 
than the import CIF price until 2008–9. This is a reflection of the fact that in 
recent years, Bangladesh has become less dependent on import of rice and 
therefore, the world price had little effect in determining the domestic price.
Bangladesh is heavily dependent on the import of wheat and therefore, the 
domestic retail price of wheat had always been higher than the import CIF 
price. The gap between these two prices widened during 2003–4 and 2007–8, 
suggesting that the domestic retail price of wheat increased more than the 
rise in world price of wheat. In 2008–9, the gap between these two prices nar-
rowed (Figure 11.2).
11.2.3 Causes of the Price Hike
There are several explanations for the food price hike during 2007–8. Some 
of them were domestic and some were related to the effects generated at the 
global level. Raihan and Fatema (2007) identified eight reasons.
1. Bangladesh had been one of the high growth performing economies 
over the last ten years. The high growth rate of per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) contributed to a demand-pull inflation.
2. Bangladesh had been a net food importing country. As a result, any rise 
in food prices in the world market pushed the domestic prices of those 
commodities to increase.
3. The Bangladesh government increased fuel prices in April 2007 in order 






















































Figure 11.1 World price and domestic retail price of rice during 2001–9
Source:  Department of Agricultural Marketing (<http://www.dam.gov.bd/jsp/index.jsp>) and 
Indexmundi (<http://www.indexmundi.com>).
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Though fuel constituted a very small share in the basket of commodities 
used for the calculation of the consumer price indexes, the rise in fuel 
prices had some indirect impacts on the prices of commodities by rising 
cost through two major channels:  the high prices of fuels led to high 
costs for irrigation, which raised the costs of agricultural production, and 
high fuel prices increased the cost of transportation, which also raised the 
prices of essential items transported from remote villages to urban areas.
4. Since 2002 the Bangladeshi taka had depreciated much against the US$ 
while the Indian rupee has been appreciating. This resulted in a major 
depreciation of the Bangladeshi taka against the Indian rupee. India had 
been one of the major sources of Bangladesh’s imports, as imports from 
India constituted more than 20 per cent of Bangladesh’s total imports 
comprising many essential food items.
5. Though there was no concrete evidence of established syndicates in the 
markets of essential commodities taking advantage of the weak con-
sumer protection laws, there were some short-term alliances among the 
suppliers of these goods to influence supply and prices. This might have 
some impact on the rising prices of essential items.
6. Due to the anti-corruption drive by the military backed caretaker gov-
ernment many businessmen contracted their usual business activities 
with the fear of legal actions. Furthermore, many informal market-
places, both in rural and urban areas, were wiped out by law enforcing 
agencies on legal grounds. Such actions resulted in a disruption in the 




















































Figure 11.2 Wholesale and retail prices of wheat flour during 2001–9




7. There was a declining trend of growth in agriculture over time, especially 
of the crop sector in Bangladesh. This resulted in less domestic produc-
tion relative to the domestic demand. Slower growth in agriculture, and 
especially of the crop sector, was due to failures in the timely supply of 
fertilizer, seed, and pesticide to the farmers, increased cost of irrigation 
because of a rise in diesel price, and the decline in the availability of 
cultivable land because of population growth and rehabilitation. Severe 
floods during July–August 2007 also exacerbated the situation.
8. Bangladesh was experiencing a steady rise in remittance inflow until 
the mid-2000s. In 2006–7, the growth of remittances was 24.49 per 
cent. Such inflow also contributed to some demand-pull inflation in 
Bangladesh.
11.3 Broad Impact on Stakeholders as a Result of Price 
Shifts Associated with the Crisis Period
The impacts of food price shocks on different categories of households would 
depend on the extent by which the households are integrated to the market. 
In the case of rice and wheat it appears that while farmers source around 80 per 
cent of their consumption needs from own production and the remaining 20 
per cent from the market, marginal farmers procure more than 80 per cent of 
their consumption needs from the market and the remaining 20 per cent from 
own production. The small farmers can source around 56 per cent of their 
consumption need from own production and the remaining 44 per cent from 
the market. This suggests that large farmers may gain from rice price increases 
while small and marginal farmers would lose. Non-producing households 
such as rural landless households, rural non-farm low-income households, 
and urban low-income households are extremely vulnerable to price shocks.
Several studies assessed the impact of food price increase on the level of 
poverty in Bangladesh. According to the World Bank (2008), a reduction in 
poverty by 5 per cent, between 2005 and 2008, was expected in Bangladesh 
resulting from the strong GDP growth during that period. However, the study 
instead projected around a 3 per cent increase in the incidence of poverty 
from the baseline rate of 40 per cent in 2005 as a result of the increase in food 
prices. Therefore, the net impact on poverty, from the combined effects of 
economic growth and the inflation of food prices, was to result in a decline 
of about 2 per cent; from 40 per cent in 2005 to 38 per cent in 2008. Rahman 
et al. (2008) showed that in the fifteen-month period from January 2007 to 
March 2008 the gross income of poor people plummeted by 36.7 per cent. 
The income erosion of up to 30.5 per cent alone resulted from paying for the 
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high food bill, the predominant item in the rather bare purchase list of the 
poor. In consequence, 8.5 per cent of people comprising 2.5 million house-
holds fell below the poverty line.
Raihan (2009) explored the impact of the rise in food prices on the food 
consumption and education of children in the poor and vulnerable house-
holds in Bangladesh. The study showed that during early 2008 the prices of 
rice, pulses, and edible oil increased exceedingly which threatened the sta-
tus of food security of these poor and vulnerable households in Bangladesh. 
As a result of the price hike, a significant percentage of households were 
forced to cut their consumption of rice, pulses, and edible oil.1 The house-
holds who could maintain the same level of consumption of rice could do 
so at the cost of reduced consumption of other non-rice food items and/
or by reducing the non-food expenditure, i.e., expenses on their children’s 
education.2
11.4 Policy Responses
11.4.1 Increased Agricultural Production through Input Subsidies, 
Investment, and Enhanced Extension
The government took a number of initiatives for the development of the 
agriculture sector in the light of the PRSP, National Agriculture Policy, and 
Millenium Development Goals. Discussions with the policy makers suggest 
that many of these initiatives were reinforced in the context of rising food 
prices in the global market. These included subsidy on fertilizer, a rehabilita-
tion programme for flood and cyclone, endowment funds for agricultural 
research and development, diesel subsidy to the small and marginal farm-
ers, cash incentives for exporting agricultural products, rebate on electricity 
bills to the entrepreneurs of agro-based industries, reduction of the rate of 
interest for disbursement of loan for the production of pulse, oil-seed, and 
spices, and pursuing distribution programmes of agriculture and rural credit 
1 Raihan (2009) reported that more than 25 per cent of sample households in the rural areas 
were forced to reduce their consumption of rice while the corresponding figure was about 
19 per cent in the urban areas. However, the extent of fall in the consumption of rice was relatively 
higher in the urban areas compared to that in the rural areas, since for the urban households, who 
experienced a fall in consumption of rice, on average, decreased by around 22.8 per cent, while the 
corresponding figure was 21.6 per cent for the households in the rural areas.
2 Raihan (2009) also reported that high dropout rates among the children of these vulnerable 
households were observed because of the price hike of food items as most of the households 
could not continue to bear the expenses of their children’s education. On average, 58 per cent 
and 56 per cent of households in the rural and urban areas, respectively, experienced a dropout of 
their children from school. A significant proportion of these dropped out children were engaged 





through state-owned commercial banks. The allocation for these programmes 
increased during 2007 and 2008 (Economic Review 2008).
The Bangladesh Bank (BB) undertook several initiatives to streamline 
higher and balanced flow of agricultural credit as well as the distribution of 
subsidies on agricultural inputs. It was made compulsory for all local and 
foreign banks to disburse agricultural credits to facilitate agricultural produc-
tion. The BB introduced a ‘revolving crop credit limit system’ for a three-year 
period to ensure access of farm loan to farmers continuously engaged in agri-
cultural production.
11.4.2 Domestic Price and Trade Policies
Tariff rates on essential imported food commodities, such as rice and wheat, 
were brought down to zero in 2007–8. Also, operative tariff rates on other 
food items were reduced drastically during 2007–8. There was the withdrawal 
of the provision of an annual renewal fee of value added tax (VAT) registra-
tion by commercial importers.
The government also directed the BB to encourage the banks to provide 
credit facilities on softer terms to new importers, to ease the letter of credit 
(L/C) margin for food items, and to extend the time for customer facility. In 
order to curb inflation, the BB stated that it would continue following an 
accommodative monetary policy.
11.4.3 Social Safety Nets
In the face of escalated food prices in the domestic market, the national 
budget of 2007–8 expanded the existing food grains distribution through 
various social safety net programmes. There was also increased coverage 
and amount of individual grants under those programmes. Some additional 
programmes, such as Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) ‘Dal-Bhat’ (Pulses-Rice) pro-
gramme, were undertaken. The national budget of 2008–9 continued these 
measures and expanded the open market sale (OMS) of food grains at subsi-
dized price.
11.4.4 Procurement and Stocking Policies
In 2007–8, though the government decided to intensify internal procure-
ment of food grains, in reality, total procurement was much lower than the 
targeted procurement. This was due to loss in production caused by nat-
ural disasters and higher prices prevailing in the market compared to the 
procurement prices set by the government. The government could also not 
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the international market due to the fact that in October 2007 India imposed 
a ban on rice exports, and the international market price of rice was much 
higher than the domestic price during that period, which discouraged pri-
vate importers from importing.
One important observation made by Dorosh (2009) was that though the 
government in Bangladesh mostly relied on private sector imports to supple-
ment any shortfalls in domestic production, it also traditionally held public 
stocks of cereals. The public stock of rice began to decline in 2004–5 reaching 
a low level in 2006–7 after which it doubled by 2008–9. The public stock of 
wheat in 2006–7 became almost one-third of its level in 2001–2 and dropped 
further by 2007–8. It almost doubled between 2007–8 and 2008–9. Dorosh 
(2009) suggested that the export bans that many traditional grain export-
ing countries imposed in reaction to the 2007–8 food crisis created concerns 
among Bangladesh’s senior policy makers that international trade might be 
disrupted at times when the country needed to import. As a result, the gov-
ernment set a high public stock target of rice and wheat for 2008–9. The 
increased stock was attributed to lesser off-take and increased domestic pro-
curement and import (FPMU 2008).
11.4.5 Other Policies and Interventions
The national budget of 2007–8 announced the establishment of a task force 
at the national and district levels to review prices of essential commodities 
regularly. The country at that time was run by a ‘civil’ caretaker government 
backed by the military. The activities of the political parties were very lim-
ited. The demand for establishing task forces to review prices didn’t come 
from the political parties; rather the civil society organizations, non-govern-
ment organizations, and consumer groups were the pioneers in raising that 
demand. However, discussions with the stakeholders indicate that very little 
achievements were made in terms of establishment of task forces, and their 
operations were limited and were mostly ineffective. The inter-ministerial 
monitoring committee was formed to analyse the price situation of essential 
commodities. A legal framework was proposed to protect consumer rights 
which later in 2009 took the shape of a Consumer Protection Act. The civil 
society organizations, including the Consumers’ Association of Bangladesh, 
were very active in pursuing the Consumer Protection Act. Also, in the 
Ministry of Commerce (MoC), there was support for this act, especially due to 
the fact that the MoC was usually criticized for its ‘failure’ in monitoring and 
curbing prices and there was a general perception among the high officials in 
the MoC that the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act would provide 
them with the necessary instruments to take measures against any anti-com-




The national budget of 2008–9 announced medium-term measures such as 
an increase of production and distribution of food grains through creation 
of wholesale markets in various places including Dhaka and taking initia-
tives for introducing a Consumers’ Rights Protection Ordinance. The meas-
ures related to boosting agricultural production had some positive effects 
as reflected in an increased production of agricultural commodities in the 
subsequent years. However, the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act 
had little effect in containing the prices of essential food items since the gov-
ernment lacked required machineries, personnel, and capacity to effectively 
implement this act.
11.4.6 A Timeline of the Events and Responses
Table 11.1 provides a brief summary of the timeline of the major events and 
responses during 2007 and 2008. The timeline suggests that the govern-
ment’s major success was raising the boro rice production and on targeted 
safety net programmes. A significant rise in rice production during April/June 
2008 helped the government to increase the public stock of rice.
11.5 Political Economy Context
11.5.1 The Role of Ministries
The MoC and the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) were 
at the centre of discussion related to government’s actions against the food 
price hike during 2007–8.
On 18 March 2007 the MoC, as part of its action to keep the prices of 
essential commodities within the purchasing power of the common people, 
announced it would set up a Price Monitoring Cell (PMC) in line with the 
proposed Consumer Protection Act to monitor the prices of essentials on 
a day-to-day basis. This PMC was successful in collecting data on prices of 
essential food items on a daily basis. However, because of the lack of required 
machineries, personnel, and capacity, PMC also failed to exert any influ-
ence over the market prices. The MoC urged the Federation of Bangladesh 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) to set up a monitoring cell and 
display price lists at the wholesale and retail outlets. FBCCI’s monitoring cell 
was ineffective, and the MoC’s instruction to display price lists at the whole-
sale and retail outlets was largely disobeyed by the traders because of lack of 
monitoring capacity of the MoC.
The MoC was instrumental in pursuing the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to 




Table 11.1 A timeline of the events and responses
Year 2007 2008
Quarter Jan/Mar Apr/Jun Jul/Sep Oct/Dec Jan/Mar Apr/Jun Jul/Sep Oct/Dec
Events Two rounds of 
severe floods
Spike in global 
fuel prices
Super cyclone Sidr 
(mid-Nov).
India bans rice 
exports
Uncertainties about 
rice import from 





17% up on 
previous year





Bank credit for 
private food 
import eased






- Second round of 
major safety net 
operations
- Intensifications of 
OMS operation
- Massive support for 
boro rice harvest
- Continuation of OMS 
operation
- Announcement of 
highest ever farm 
price support
- India agrees special 
dispensation 













Source: Wiggins et al. (2010). Reproduced under ODI Creative Commons Licence (CC BY-NC 3.0).
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the newspaper on 19 March 2007,3 businessmen welcomed the government 
initiative of exempting taxes on wheat and rice imports. They also suggested 
going for the same step regarding import of other food items like soybean 
oil, milk, lentils, etc. The same report mentioned that some high officials of 
the Commerce Ministry and the National Board of Revenue (NBR) held the 
view that the reduction of L/C margin would not play any role in reducing 
the prices of commodities and only businessmen would benefit from such 
provision.
Price hikes of essential food items during the month of Ramadan had been 
a regular phenomenon in Bangladesh. In the months of Ramadan during 
2007 and 2008, the MoC had been consistently maintaining that the stocks 
of essentials were sufficient and thus there was no cause for a price hike. Also, 
in 2009, when the food prices in the international market were decling, the 
MoC had been calling the businessmen to reduce food prices in the domes-
tic market. However, the businessmen were arguing that because of the the 
rise in international commodity prices local prices were getting pushed up. 
An article published in a British daily newspaper did not find valid reasons 
for the soaring local prices as the current stocks had been procured when 
the international market prices were lower.4 The same article also mentioned 
that despite calls from the commerce minister to the business community to 
avoid stockpiling and hoarding, especially during Ramadan, as this would 
create artificial scarcities and thus manipulate prices upward, such practices 
were still observed in the retail community.5
There were also some debates within the MoC with regard to involving the 
Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB), an organization under the MoC, 
as a market player during the times of price hike. TCB is a public organiza-
tion and it used to have some roles in the past when after the independence 
the government could intervene in the market through imports of essential 
commodities using the TCB. However, with the growing dominance of the 
free market philosophy, the importance of the TCB gradually declined and 
currently it has become an organization with insufficient funds and man-
power. There are some interesting political economic issues related to the 
debate whether to make TCB effective or not. There was a ‘public’ demand 
for making TCB effective in the sense that TCB with some sizeable volume 
of imports of essential food items could put some downward pressure on the 
prices of essential food items in the domestic market. However, there was 
resistance from the business community and their lobbys in the government 
not to extend the operation of TCB. During the episodes of price hike in 2007, 
3 The Daily Star, 19 March 2007.   4 The Daily Star, 9 August 2009.
5 The Daily Star, 9 August 2009.
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2008, and 2009, there were regular features in the national dailies related to 
this debate.6
During 2007 and 2008, the MoFDM set high targets of public food distribu-
tion and building up of the government’s food reserve. However, there were 
concerns in the media with regard to the failure of the MoFDM in achieving 
those targets. Quoting a food ministry official, The Daily Star reported that the 
stocking and distribution of food grains through government programmes 
had not been satisfactory. That the newspaper also mentioned that the gov-
ernment invited tenders for importing rice 36 times during 2007 and 2008 
but the response to the tenders was not good as the import cost of rice became 
higher than what had been quoted in the tender bids.7
It should, however, be mentioned that the MoC and MoFDM didn’t 
have any direct power to influence the prices in the domestic market. For 
example, the MoC didn’t have any direct authority to lower the duties on 
import of food items. They had to request the MoF to undertake such a 
decision. Also, to expand the operation of the TCB in terms of increased 
manpower and increased fund for a larger volume of imports of food items 
could only be possible through the endorsement of the MoF, which was not 
straightforward. A number of studies (such as Raihan, Khondker, and Uddin 
2010) identified some important non-economic reasons for a food price 
hike in the domestic market, such as extortion and unofficial payments 
in the transportation, distribution, and marketing conduits of food. This 
required actions from the Ministry of Home. The caretaker government, 
through the Ministry of Home, took a number of measures to combat the 
non-economic factors and also drove actions against ‘illegal’ or ‘informal’ 
supply chains. Though some of the measures against extortions were effec-
tive, many of those actions against ‘illegal’ or ‘informal’ supply chains were 
6 An article in The Financial Express, 3 October 2012, mentioned that the commodity markets 
in Bangladesh were characterized by monopolies, duopolies, oligopolies, etc., and frequent price 
manipulations. Though a significant volume of food requirements is met by import from the 
international market, the prices of imported food had been much higher in the domestic markets 
than in the international markets. The report thus highlighted the importance of reactivating 
TCB. In the early years after its establishment, TCB was used to establish competitive prices in 
the domestic market as it had a large share in total imports. For example, in 1972−3, it imported 
63 commodities and its share of total import was 24.84 per cent. Also, during the period between 
1972 and 1977, TCB imported as many as 70 commodities. However, from late 1970s the role 
of TCB has been curtailed, and in recent years the organization has hardly managed the import 
of three products (sugar, edible oil, lentils) from the international market. Also its share in total 
imports has been even less than 1 per cent. The organization has been inactive since the early 
1980s, with the beginning of privatization and liberalization of the economy following prescrip-
tions by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The number of TCB employees 
has been reduced quite drastically over the years—in 1996 the number was reduced from 1,390 to 
714, and again in 2002 the number was further reduced to 225. The article highlighted that the 
TCB has been currently suffering from a shortage of efficient manpower, legislative inflexibility, 
resource mismanagement, difficulties in its decision-making process, and lack of leadership.
7 The Daily Star, 6 April 2008.
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counter-productive. CPD (2008) mentioned that strict law enforcements 
by the joint forces and the eviction of many roadside markets adversely 
affected the food inflation situation in Bangladesh. Demolition of local hat 
and bazars did not help either.
11.5.2 Role of Business Associations
The Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI), Dhaka urged 
the central bank to consult the leaders of private sector businesses and indus-
tries and collectively evolve a strategy for controlling inflation. In a statement, 
published in a newspaper,8 on the fourth mid-year Monetary Policy Statement 
(MPS) of the BB announced on 12 July 2007, the leading chamber body of the 
country said the MPS which hinted at a tighter monetary policy in the near 
and the medium term should not aim at increasing interest rates and effecting 
a hike of statutory liquidity ratio and cash reserve requirement (CRR) of banks. 
The MCCI also urged the BB to ensure that the administrative prices of fuels, 
utilities, and fertilizers not to be increased and ensure that the borrowings of 
the government be reduced. MCCI opposed BB’s tight monetary policy as it 
might raise the cost of borrowing for the entrepreneurs, curb the enthusiasm 
of genuine businessmen to invest in the formal economy, and subdue eco-
nomic growth. However, such call from the business community didn’t have 
any impact on the BB to reverse its stance on monetary policy.
The MCCI also urged the government to strengthen the price-monitoring 
cell. Since the MCCI was the country’s prestigious and elite trade body, they 
wanted to uphold the clear image of the business people through such actions. 
They also suggested that the hoarders or syndicates should be given exem-
plary punishment. Furthermore, they asked for a clear definition of ‘hoard-
ing’ and ‘artificial crisis’ so businessmen could distinguish between what was 
allowable and what was not. The MCCI also suggested the government turn 
the TCB into a public limited company and give it enough autonomy to func-
tion independently.9 Such a call from the MCCI could appear to contradict its 
self-interest, since TCB would presumably compete with the private traders. 
However, as mentioned before, TCB had always been neglected by the gov-
ernment, and it was a common perception among the business people that 
TCB would never be operationalized effectively. And in fact, despite such a 
call from the MCCI, TCB was not made functional.
The FBCCI in May 2008 commissioned a task force comprising top trad-
ers, ministry officials concerned, and members of the joint forces to monitor 
the price situation.10 The task force was supposed to collect information on 
8 The Financial Express, 19 July 2007. 9 The Daily Star, 6 January 2010.
10 The Daily Star, 8 May 2008.
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the prices, demand and supply, stock and market trends of essentials, and to 
come up with a set of recommendations to contain the prices. The task force 
was supposed to meet once every fifteen days and three major chambers—
Chittagong, Khulna, and Jessore—would provide daily information for its 
cell. A website on the task force was also supposed to be lauched. Complaining 
against the government’s anti-hoarding drive, the FBBCI also demanded a 
food and hoarding policy, changes to the present food procurement policy, 
and immediate measures to create a better business climate.
A newspaper report in July 2008, however, mentioned that the FBCCI price 
monitoring task force was yet to gather pace two months after its launch in 
May.11 It thus appears that, though a few top leaders of FBCCI were eager to 
set up the price monitoring task force, they didn’t receive any support from 
the larger business community.
In September 2008, the FBCCI president urged business people to keep 
prices of basic commodities within people’s reach by not making unreason-
able profits during the month of Ramadan.12 He urged the wholesalers to 
give vouchers to the retailers for transparency in pricing of the commodities. 
However, in reality, there was no authority to monitor whether this was prac-
tised by the traders.
FBCCI formed a ten-member committee to investigate the sugar scam in 
October 2009 and recommended possible ways to control the prices of sugar and 
other essentials.13 Meanwhile, backtracking from its earlier stand to arrest the 
unscrupulous sugar traders, who manipulated the sugar price during the month 
of Ramadan, the government in September 2009 decided to form two separate 
committees to conduct an ‘extensive investigation’ into the sugar price spiral.14 
The committees submitted the reports, though the reports were never made pub-
lic and there were no effective actions against those unscrupulous sugar traders.
In August 2010, the FBCCI urged the government to make a commodity price 
control policy to tackle irrational price spirals in the market.15 The policy should 
deal with the issues that affect prices and should define clear strategies and 
11 The Daily Star, 7 July 2008.
12 The Daily Star, 11 September 2008. 13 The Daily Star, 1 October 2009.
14 An article in The Daily Star on 30 September 2009 mentioned that those committees were set up 
at a time when eight sugar traders had been trying to escape from being arrested as they were alleged 
to have manipulated sugar prices in the local market. Though the commerce minister persistently 
stated that legal actions would be taken against those responsible for destabilizing the sugar market, 
the business leaders were denying the allegations and held the soaring international price respon-
sible for the local price hike. The government’s attempt to arrest the alleged sugar traders created 
fear among many traders in the large wholesale markets, and some even kept their businesses shut. 
The article also mentioned that the Consumers’ Association of Bangladesh (CAB) was alarmed that 
some dishonest members of the business community were trying to create a new sugar crisis to put 
pressure on the government, and that some business leaders were trying to save business syndicate 
members. The CAB reminded the government that the commerce minister’s declaration to arrest 
these syndicate members had not yet been implemented and asked for immediate action.
15 The Daily Star, 23 August 2010.
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guidelines on the pricing of commodities at various levels of commodity supply 
chains. FBCCI called for continued action from the government in its drive to 
check food adulteration, deploring the misdeeds of an unscrupulous section of 
the business people, who tarnish the image of the whole business community. 
The FBCCI president suggested that the inconsistencies in supply chain could 
be removed by adopting appropriate measures, including guidelines for tackling 
the issues affecting commodity pricing, not only during Ramadan but all the 
year round. The FBCCI chief also called for the abandonment of the demand 
order (DO) system for sugar and edible oils and replacing it with appointment 
of dealers, claiming that the latter would better address the price spirals evident 
in the market. Underpinning the need for using the latest information technol-
ogy systems to track commodity prices, the FBCCI president mentioned that 
the prices of all commodities at all levels of the supply chain should be put on 
the website. He also mentioned that FBCCI would recommend the wholesalers 
to write out sales slips or receipts for each transaction they would make and ask 
retailers to display the price lists of the commodities to ensure transparency. 
The FBCCI, however, noted that a section of the business community and trad-
ers were still trying to manipulate prices through their attempts to create an 
artificial crisis of commodities. However, most of the suggestions of the FBCCI 
president did not materialize. Only the DO system for sugar and edible oil trade 
was replaced by the dealership system in October 2010.
11.5.3 Other Institutions
By 19 March 2007, the BDR16 set up ‘free markets’ at seventeen places in the 
capital, as a part of the government’s efforts to stabilize the soaring prices of 
essentials.17 These ‘free markets’ sold essential commodities at fair prices to 
help the lower- and middle-income groups facing hardships due to price spi-
ralling. By 23 March, there were another eight ‘free markets’.18 The products 
sold at the BDR ‘free markets’ were cheaper than those at the regular markets 
since BDR could charge very low retail margins. However, such operations were 
limited in terms of scale and thus had little effect in curbing the market prices.
The government also continued with the OMS. This was part of the gov-
ernment’s subsidized food distribution programmes. According to the news-
paper article, in Chittagong there was a huge demand for the OMS on the 
first day with huge crowds thronging from early morning. However, many 
consumers returned home empty handed as the stalls ran out of rice stocks 
very quickly.19
16 A para-military border security force.
17 The Daily Star, 19 March 2007. 18 The Daily Star, 23 March 2007.
19 The Daily Star, 23 March 2007.
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The BB intervened in the foreign exchange markets, directly and indi-
rectly, to keep a stable exchange rate against the US$. The BB continued 
following a moderate contractionary monetary policy. During early 2010, 
in a seminar, the governor of the BB announced that the government would 
soon launch the value added agricultural project in collaboration with the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) to ensure better prices for growers.20 In May 
2010, the central bank raised the cash reserve requirement21 for banks in a 
bid to contain inflation. However, economists and businessmen thought 
that would make the businessmen’s access to bank finance difficult, and 
would also sag the investment.22 The World Bank welcomed the monetary 
policy stating that as a cautious policy stance.23 In December 2010, the BB 
took new steps to control the credit flow in an effort to contain inflation. The 
central bank issued two separate circulars. One of them directed the banks 
to take back the loans given to rice-mill owners and traders every thirty 
days, which was forty-five days earlier. In another circular, BB asked the 
banks to set the loan equity ratio at 50:50 for consumer loans. Earlier, there 
was no guideline for the loan equity ratio for consumer finance. According 
to the BB, it was done to curb the credit flow to unproductive sectors.24
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 2008 suggested the 
Bangladesh government execute tight monetary policy and termed the 
existing policy too expansionary to deal with the soaring inflation. The IMF 
suggested that the monetary policy should be less expansionary to contain 
the already high inflationary pressures.25 It seemed that BB listened to such 
advice during 2008 and in later years, though this policy suggestion was not 
welcomed by the business community.
11.5.4 Civil Society
The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), a leading private sector think tank in 
Bangladesh, praised the government’s step to fix the procurement price for 
20 The Daily Star, 22 March 2010. The ADB also confirmed that it would extend financial assis-
tance to Bangladesh to grow high-value crops including vegetables, spices, and fruits that would 
boost incomes for poor farmers and support the nation’s food security. A loan of US$40 million 
equivalent from ADB’s concessional Asian Development Fund was being provided for the Second 
Crop Diversification Project. It would be used to support the development of high-value crops in 
27 districts in the South West and North West of Bangladesh—including some of the poorest, least 
developed, and most climate-vulnerable areas in the country (source: <http://www.adb.org/news/ 
adb-40-million-loan-boost-food-security-farm-incomes-bangladesh>).
21 The reserve requirement is a central bank regulation that sets the minimum reserves each 
bank must hold against customer deposits. The reserve ratio is sometimes used as a tool in the 
monetary policy, influencing the country’s economy, borrowing, and interest rates. Any rise in 
CRR means mopping up excess liquidity from the money market by using the instrument as part 
of demand management to curb inflation.
22 The Daily Star, 5 May 2010. 23 The Daily Star, 20 July 2010.




paddy and rice, called for increasing the capacity of rice milling and stor-
age capacity, and also called for widening the scopes for social safety net 
programmes.26
As inflation continued to rise in 2009 mainly because of soaring food 
prices, civil society organizations and experts blamed volatility in the inter-
national commodity markets for the rise in the inflation rate. The sug-
gestion was that the government should monitor the global market on a 
regular basis so that the government could make a buffer stock by import-
ing essentials when the prices were low in the international market. Also, 
suggestion was for the government to reduce fertilizer prices to minimize 
production costs.27 The government reduced the fertilizer prices in the sub-
sequent months.28
Dr Akbar Ali Khan, the former finance adviser to the caretaker gov-
ernment, mentioned that the subsidy and reduction of import duty on 
essentials would help the government get a grip on the price inflation. He 
sugggested that, if necessary, the government would have to allocate funds 
from other sectors of the budget. He also held the view that various initia-
tives of the government in tackling the price hike including the sealing 
off of numerous warehouses to prevent illegal hoarding and harassment 
of business leaders were not appropriate. He advised the government to 
increase the supply of commodities in the market and, at the same time, 
enhance its own stockpile and suggested the government import more 
essentials and undertake a massive essential goods distribution programme 
for the poor. He suggets that above all, the government would have to 
put emphasis on food management for overcoming the enduring prob-
lem.29 The caretaker government eventually backtracked from its position 
to conduct drive against ‘corruption’ of businessmen, which was alleged 
to be responsible for disrupting the ‘normal’ supply chain of essential 
commodities.
11.5.5 Newspapers
The newspapers played some vital roles in publishing key news, informa-
tion, and analysis during the period under consideration. Newspapers were 
26 Rahman et al. (2008). 27 The Daily Star, 15 September 2009.
28 An article in The Daily Star on 23 October 2010 mentioned that the government for the third 
time in its tenure, to provide incentive to farmers to grow more winter crops, decided to reduce 
the prices of non-urea fertilizers—muriate of potash (MoP) and diammonium phosphate (DAP)—
by 40 and 3 per cent, respectively. This led to the prices of all non-urea fertilizers being reduced 
by almost half by 14 January 2009. The report, quoting an official at the agriculture ministry, 
mentioned that the size of the fertilizer subsidy by the government in that fiscal year would be 
Tk 22,000,000,000.
29 BBC Sanglap (Discussion), published in The Daily Star, 16 September 2009.
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the major means for disseminating the government’s decisions and policy 
actions, and the reactions of the stakeholders. A news report on 8 March 
2007, for example, revealed that the interim government, in a meeting with 
high officials of the BB and the armed forces, decided to cut import duties 
on commodities, ensure increased supply commodities in the market, and 
ask the joint forces to coordinate their drives targeting the corrupt and dis-
honest businesses only.30 The report also mentioned that the BB officials in 
the meeting drew attention to various negative impacts of the ongoing anti-
corruption drives by the joint forces. They observed that the drives panicked 
genuine traders. The meeting decided to ask the law enforcers to coordinate 
their drives against hoarding and corrupt businesses and take assistance for 
the drives from government departments concerned—NBR, Anti-Corruption 
Commission, and BB. The meeting also decided to intensify import of essen-
tials through the state-run trading agency, TCB, to reduce the prices of 
essentials.31
Another report on 19 March 2007 indicated that the commerce min-
istry did virtually nothing to control the market during the tenure of the 
immediate-past government (the government during 2001–5). There were 
two changes of commerce ministers, reportedly for their failure to exercise 
enough influence in the market to halt the rise in prices. The report added 
that the recent unbridled rise in prices was attributed to some factors, which 
included shortages of essentials in the market, caused by jitters owing to the 
crackdown by businessmen who refused to import the essentials, leaving the 
entire supply chain disrupted. The report hailed the CTG as it made a major 
move to reduce prices of foodstuffs by lifting import duties on rice and wheat 
and allowing banks to open LCs on liberal terms. The CTG also decided to 
start an open-market sale of some essentials, and also ordered the opening 
of the sealed food storages across the country as a way of keeping the sup-
ply available in the market. The report suggested the CTG take utmost care 
so that the benefit of duty concessions could really reach the consumers. 
The report also called for an effective activation of the TCB. The TCB, estab-
lished in 1972, was tasked with intervening in the market when the prices of 
essentials rose. But the immediate past government closed down the TCB in 
March 2002 with a view to leaving business to the private sector, mostly to 
its coterie. The report held the view that the TCB, in the past, had played a 
very vital role in foiling the machinations of the price syndicates and cartels 
by going into competition with the private sector importers of essentials. The 
30 The anti-corruption drive against the dishonest businessmen by the caretaker government 
created fear among the business community as a whole which disrupted the ‘normal’ business 
practices.
31 The Daily Star, 8 March 2007.
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reactivation of TCB was thus urgently required for a let-up in the price spiral. 
The report added that the government’s steps in the recent past, to vend some 
widely used commodities through the TCB and BDR personnel, brought posi-
tive results in containing the price spiral. Such vending should be restarted 
soon. The report opined that the erratic market behaviour clearly evinced 
that the syndicates and cartels were still very much active, and were trying to 
blackmail the CTG. The report mentioned that there was no policy for regu-
lating the storage of foodstuff and other commodities, which led to hoarding. 
The report suggested the CTG possess effective tools for market intervention, 
and create a monitoring system that would deter syndicates and cartels from 
market manipulation.32
11.6 The Policy-making Process
The constitution of Bangladesh is at the centre of all public policy-making 
processes. It provides the required fundamental guidelines for the formula-
tion of public policies, which includes setting the goals, objectives, and strat-
egies of national development. All these categorically emphasize the issue of 
meeting the basic needs of the people.
In Bangladesh, since independence, there have been several forms of gov-
ernment. In the early years after independence there was a parliamentary 
form of government, where the prime minister with his cabinet was respon-
sible for taking major policy decisions. The country was run by military dic-
tators for one and a half decades until 1990 when the policy decisions were 
taken by the military dictators with their chosen set of people from both 
military and civil bureaucracies. The parliamentary form of government was 
reinstated in 1991 and until now this system has continued with the excep-
tion of 2007 and 2008 when the country was run by an interim government 
backed by the military.
Under the parliamentary democratic system the cabinet is a small body of 
senior ministers responsible for directing the policy administration of the 
state. As per clause 4(ii) of the rules of business 1996, no important policy 
decision shall be taken except with the approval of the cabinet. In other 
words, the cabinet is the ultimate authority of approving a policy. It should, 
however, be mentioned that during 2007 and 2008, since there was no par-
liament, the interim government did not have any ministers and a formal 
cabinet. Instead of a prime minster, the government was run by chief advisor 
of the CTG and there were several advisors in place of the ministers. These 
32 The Daily Star, 19 March 2007.
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advisors looked after the operations of different ministries. It is understood 
from discussions with different stakeholders that though there was no formal 
cabinet, the chief advisor of the CTG used to take advice from some senior 
advisors and in particular from the chief of army.
As per the constitution of Bangladesh, a minister is in charge of formulat-
ing policies and their implementation. The minister is also responsible for 
conducting the business as well as is accountable for the actions of the minis-
try in the national parliament. Since there was no parliament during the rule 
of CTG, the advisors, in charge of different ministries, were not accountable 
for their actions in any people’s forum.
The secretary, a senior bureaucrat, is the official head of a ministry and 
is responsible for administration and related businesses. The secretary also 
plays an important role in the policy-making process. During the rule of the 
CTG, the secretaries in the MoC, MoF, and MOFDM were very active in for-
mulating and executing policies targeted at curbing inflation.
According to the constitution of Bangladesh, the MoF, and the Ministry 
of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs play very important roles in both 
the formulation and approval process of public policy. Clause 13(4) of 
the Rules of Business clearly sets out that the Finance Ministry should be 
consulted on all economic and financial questions arising out of any case, 
particularly in matters of the (a) preparation of export and import policy; 
(b) negotiation of trade and barter agreement; (c) determination of tariff 
policy; (d) determination of pricing policy; (e) determination of investment 
policy; and (f) determination of labour policy. Similarly, consultation with 
the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs is obligatory in mat-
ters of (a) all proposals for legislation; (b) all legal questions arising out of 
any case; (c) preparation of any contracts, international agreements, inter-
national conventions, and modifying international law; (d) the interpreta-
tion of any law; and (e) before authorizing or the issue of a rule, regulation, 
or bylaw. Therefore, when the MoC wanted to cut down the duties of the 
imported food items and to expand the operation of TCB, it had to get the 
endorsement from the MoF.
National Economic Council (NEC) is the highest political authority for 
consideration of development activities reflective of long-term national poli-
cies and objectives in Bangladesh. It serves as the economic mini-cabinet, 
consisting of the main economic ministers of the cabinet and headed by the 
prime minister. The ministries are responsible for adopting their policies, 
plans, and programmes according to the objectives and priorities set by the 
NEC. Members of the planning commission and the secretaries in charge of 
all ministries/divisions are expected to attend its meetings. In addition, other 
important officials who are required to attend the NEC’s meetings include 
the cabinet secretary and the governor of BB. The Planning Commission is 
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assigned to provide secretarial services to NEC. During the rule of the CTG, 
the functions of the NEC were limited.
The Planning Commission is the central planning body of the country. It 
is entrusted to prepare national plans and approve development programmes 
of the national budget. During the CTG, the planning commission was not 
involved in preparation of any national plans.
Article 76 of the Constitution provides for the constitution of a number of 
standing committees composed of the members of the National Parliament. 
In addition, the parliament also can appoint other standing committees, and 
a committee so appointed is to examine legislative proposals, or review the 
enforcement of a law, or investigate or inquire into the activities/administra-
tion of a ministry, or any matter of public importance. As mentioned before, 
in the absence of any parliament during the CTG these standing committees 
were dysfunctional. However, during the elected government after 2009, many 
of these standing committees became active in the policy-making process.
It is also important to note the providers of foreign aid play a significant 
role both in the development and formulation of plans/projects and the 
management in Bangladesh. Bilateral donors such as the USA, the UK, and 
India have important stakes in Bangladesh’s national policy-making. Multi-
lateral donors such as the World Bank, the IMF, ADB, and the European 
Union also have significant influence over the policy-making process. On 
average about 55 to 60 per cent of development expenditure in the national 
budget is supported by foreign donors and agencies. The donors also play an 
important role in injecting policy ideas and recommendation of different 
policy interventions.
11.7 Conclusion
This study has explored the political economy of food price policy in 
Bangladesh. The analysis suggests that the food price hike during 2007 and 
2009 had a profound impact on the welfare of the households in Bangladesh. 
The then government undertook several measures to contain the overall 
inflation rate generating mainly from the food inflation. Since the country 
was then run by an undemocratic, interim, and military-backed government, 
there was little accountability for its actions. Even under a democratically 
elected government there was a lack of coordination among different min-
istries and government institutions. It has also been seen that though the 
major focus of containing food prices is the MoC, they have very little power 
and tools in hand to influence the market prices. The power and tools are in 
the hand of other ministries, such as the finance ministry, though they are 
not the major focus of such discussion.
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This chapter elaborates on the global food crises in the Egyptian context, 
focusing on the period 2004–9, while highlighting the main features of the 
period of food crisis of 2006–8 and how it affected the different socioeco-
nomic variables. The chapter’s main focus is on the political economy context 
of the food price policy formulation. The effectiveness of policies adopted is 
also evaluated, and the chapter touches upon the 25 January 2011 revolution 
in relationship to food price policy and anticipating future prospects.
The research utilizes a mixture of data analysis and a number of selected 
interviews with senior government officials and other main stakeholders to 
try to understand the political economy dynamics of setting the food price 
policy in Egypt.
12.2 Setting the Scene: An Overview of the Economic and 
Political Set-ups, Agriculture Sector, and Food Policies
12.2.1 General Overview
The government of Egypt (GOE) has extended subsidies, especially in the 
energy sector, as a means to protect the population against rising living costs. 
* The research assistance of Asmaa Ezzat, Noura Abdel Wahab, and Heba El Deken is highly 
acknowledged. The author would like also to thank Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Kenneth Thomas 
Baltzer, Danielle Resnick, Robert Paarlberg, Finn Tarp, Phil Abbott, and Henrik Hansen for com-
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During the period 2001/2–2010/11, subsidies represented more than 20 per 
cent of total government expenditures. During the period of the study (2004–9) 
fuel subsidies reached skyrocketing amounts accounting for EGP 70 billion 
in 2007/8 (the exchange rate is shown in Appendix Table 12.A1) (Ministry of 
Finance 2011) leading to a sharp increase in the budget deficit. Food subsi-
dies, relatively less in terms of fiscal burden, have also remained a significant 
element of the subsidy system. The food subsidy system has been suffering 
from increasing inefficiencies associated with corruption, waste, and lack of 
right targeting. Piecemeal reforms undertaken to fix it remained incomplete 
and insufficient to tackle the roots of the system inefficiency.
Poverty in Egypt has remained high and vulnerable to changes in gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rates. By February 2009, it was estimated that 
almost 21 per cent of the population (approximately 13.5 million) was below 
the national poverty line (EGP 120 per capita per month).1 According to 
World Bank (2009), the incidence of poverty decreased between 2004/5 and 
2008, whereas the poverty gap and the severity of poverty increased slightly. 
Moreover, there is a high sectoral concentration of the poor (40 per cent) 
in agricultural activities, construction, and the informal sector (World Bank 
2009). The food subsidy system represents an important pillar in the social 
safety net and although costly and inefficient, it provided an important indis-
pensable safety net to the poor (Ahmed et al. 2001; Aboulenein et al. 2010).
The political scene in Egypt has remained stagnant over the last twenty 
years. The remaining of ex-President Mubarak in power for more than thirty 
years, the revolving of the whole governing regime around him, and the 
increasing domination of power by the ruling party (the National Democratic 
Party—NDP) implied that there is a high degree of concentration of power, 
and little room for real democracy (despite the existence of twenty-four par-
ties before the January 2011 revolution). The domination of power of the 
NDP was increasing in the last ten years carrying the seeds of the succession 
procedures of the son of the ex-president and trying to enforce the hegemony 
of the NDP on both the legislative and local council elections (ECA 2008). The 
policies committee in the NDP, created in 2006 and headed by the son of the 
ex-president, dictated policies to the government and influenced all aspects 
related to economic, social, and political life. The 2010 parliamentarian elec-
tions were viewed to be a fraud as the NDP won 81 per cent of the 420 seats 
(Wikipedia 2011), despite the heavy and significant presence of other political 
powers, namely the Moslem Brotherhood. Such political turbulences under 
1 World Bank (2009) puts the figure of poor in Egypt at 28 million people in 2005 representing 
40 per cent of the population. World Bank (2009) considers 13.6 million (19.6 per cent) in abso-
lute poverty or ultra-poverty (spending less than the minimum to cover their basic food require-
ments or less than EGP 1,423 per year per capita) and 14.5 million (21 per cent) in near poverty 
(spending between EGP 1,424 and 1,854 per year per capita).
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the surface, accompanied by the increasing level of corruption where Egypt’s 
rank in Transparency International worsened from seventy-second (out of 
158 countries) in 2005 to 111th (out of 180 countries) in 2008 (Transparency 
International 2005, 2008). The feeling of an increased level of poverty and 
lack of fair income distribution have been among the main reasons that ulti-
mately led to the January 2011 revolution. The fear from social unrest and 
the desire to push forward with the son of the ex-president as the future 
president of Egypt implied, at least during the course of our study, that any 
serious reforms to the food subsidy system (e.g., by better targeting, or reduc-
tion) could not be undertaken. Food subsidy has remained extremely impor-
tant for enhancing political stability in Egypt constituting a powerful symbol 
for the social contract between the population and any governing regime 
(Ahmed et al. 2001).
12.2.2 The Agricultural Sector and its Role in the Egyptian Economy
Agriculture contributes around 15 per cent of GDP and provides 27 per cent 
of employment. However, the agriculture sector is not likely to generate size-
able additional employment due to limited land and traditional methods 
of production (Abou-Ali and Kheir-El-Din 2010). Nevertheless, enhancing 
growth in the agriculture sector has an important role to play in poverty 
reduction due to the concentration of poor in this sector (El-Ehwany and 
El-Megharbel 2008).
Egypt remains highly vulnerable to international food price risk as it relies 
on food imports for around 50 per cent of domestic consumption and food 
accounts for more than 15 per cent of all imports (Aboulenein et al. 2010). 
Among the important crops for Egypt are wheat, rice, and maize (their impor-
tance arises from playing a paramount role in the diet of Egyptian consumers 
as well as their economic aspects (e.g., significant impact on government 
budget, exports’ proceeds, etc.)).
12.2.3 Short Historical Review of Food Price Policies
The history of the Egyptian food subsidy programme dates back to the mid-
1940s when the first programme was initiated to provide everyone (not just 
target groups) with necessities such as sugar, kerosene, edible oil, and tea. 
Since then, the food subsidy system has passed through several changes and 
remained an integral element of the Egyptian political, social, and economic 
systems. During Nasser’s regime, budget allocations for food subsidies were 
modest, and the ration card system aimed at protecting all Egyptians, with-
out targeting, from commodity shortages. The system grew during Sadat’s era 
where more commodities were introduced to the subsidy system reaching 
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eighteen products. The budget allocations for the food subsidy programme 
increased significantly, and its share in government expenditure soared in 
the 1970s. In an effort to reduce expenditures, the GOE, following the rec-
ommendations of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
announced a drastic reduction in food subsidies, including the baladi bread 
subsidy, in January 1977. This measure resulted in massive popular riots, and 
as a result the measure was reversed. By 1980/1, total expenditures on food 
subsidies jumped to 14 per cent of total government expenditures, compared 
to only 0.2 per cent in 1970/1. During Mubarak’s era several reforms were 
undertaken, while avoiding any type of political or social unrest similar to the 
one that took place in 1977 (Ahmed et al. 2001). The reforms included the 
reduction of the number of commodities on ration cards, introduction of two 
tier ration card systems (fully subsidized, and partially subsidized), as well as 
other reforms which continued until the time of the crisis (World Bank 2010). 
However, reforms remained of piecemeal nature and were never able to tackle 
the roots of inefficiency. As put by the World Food Programme (WFP) (2008b: 
7), ‘It is therefore important to understand that the subsidy system represents 
a core feature of the entire economy and that removing one element of it can 
create a very dangerous domino effect, politically, socially and economically’. 
Moreover, the nutrition aspects of the food policies have not been explicitly 
considered even though malnutrition was widespread with 26.7 per cent of 
children suffering from stunting and 10 per cent suffering from wasting in 
2007 (WFP 2008a).
The procurement policy is also one of the main policies adopted by the 
government to preserve food security and reduce vulnerability to food price 
fluctuations. In fact, the government has been the largest buyer of wheat 
(around 30 per cent of wheat production) and hence the price it sets is a lead-
ing price for other buyers. The General Agency for the Supply of Commodities 
(GASC), affiliated to the Ministry of Social Solidarity, is the key body in the 
procurement process. Yet, such practice has suffered from corruption. It was 
found that influential people (e.g., the secretary of the ex-president) had their 
private companies engaged in such tenders and was involved in manipulat-
ing prices of imported wheat.2 The government does not only subsidize food 
commodities, but also production inputs such as irrigation water, which is 
provided free of charge and subsidized or price controlled fertilizers (mainly 
through subsidizing energy requirements for public factories producing 
them, and ensuring that they sell them at certain prices). The government 
provides each farmer with a certain entitlement of subsidized fertilizers, 
which in turn has affected positively the agricultural output and sustained 
2 See Youm El Sabia (newspaper), 12 February 2012.
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the living of many poor farmers who own small plots of land (WFP 2008b). 
The subsidized fertilizer scheme has always been suffering from problems 
associated with distribution bottlenecks, lack of sufficient fertilizer entitle-
ments to farmers, and selling in the black market.
Around 20 per cent of the Egyptian population in urban areas and 24 per 
cent in rural areas are food insecure (WFP 2011). Following the latest avail-
able household budget survey of 2008/9 it was found that the budget share 
for food is around 53 per cent for the lowest decile and 33 per cent for the 
richest decile, with an average of 44 per cent. This corresponds to a 40 per 
cent weight allocated to food in the consumer price index (CPI).
12.3 Food Price Trends (2004–11)
The relationship between food domestic prices and international prices is 
shown in Figure 12.1. The spikes (downturns) in domestic prices are preceded 
by significant increases (decreases) in international prices. The correlation is 
relatively high (correlation coefficient is equal to 0.83) with the international 
prices being higher than domestic prices. Moreover, the extent of decrease in 
prices following international price reductions is low. At the domestic level, 
food inflation increased by 47 per cent between 2005 and 2008 whereas the 
overall CPI increased by 31 per cent (IAAM1 2009). The extent of integra-













































































FAO Food Price Index CAPMAS CPI Food Price Index
Figure 12.1 Food inflation in domestic and international markets
Notes and source: FAO food price index data is available at: <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsitua 
tion/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/>, while CAPMAS CPI Index data is calculated by the author 
from CAPMAS disaggregated CPI data. Data available at: <www.capmas.gov.eg>.
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Yet, domestic price changes are not caused solely by changes in international 
prices as there are other factors that have contributed to the change of prices 
in the domestic market. The existence of highly concentrated markets with 
anti-competitive behaviour prevailing in some markets could have resulted in 
higher prices at the domestic level. The fact that the pass-through effect is evi-
dent in the upturns of prices but less evident in the downturns (Figure 12.3) 
suggests the prevalence of anti-competitive behaviour3 (for a similar argu-
ment, see McCorriston 2011). The heavily subsidized system for a large num-
ber of food crops (due to government monopoly in their supply chain) forced 
the retailers and wholesalers to operate mainly in non-subsidized food prod-
ucts such as vegetables and fruits, and the fragmented nature of the local mar-
kets implied significant differences in price levels. Moreover, the subsidized 
inputs (e.g., irrigation water and fertilizers), as well as subsidizing a wide array 
of food products, have also affected the price of food staples in the domestic 
markets sometimes positively by lowering prices of final products and some-
times negatively where inefficiency in the system caused supply bottlenecks 
and created black markets. Hence, there are two opposing forces, one which 
contributes to price increases on the domestic level including the fragmented 
markets and anti-competitive behaviour, and one that could have helped to 
lower prices such as subsidies for food staples, water, and fertilizers. These 
forces have contributed to a lower price transmission between international 
and domestic prices. There is a correlation between international and domes-
tic prices, however not very strong. For example, in the case of rice, during 
the crisis while world prices were increasing (April 2008)  domestic prices 
were decreasing. This was not the case for wheat where international price 
increase was followed by domestic price increase. The increase in food prices 











Figure 12.2 Increase in Egypt’s food import prices (percentage change, over the period 
July 2006–June 2008)
Source: Abouelenien et al. (2010).
3 For example, the Minister of Social Solidarity announced in September 2011 that trade in a 
number of food products including rice and oil has been controlled by a handful of traders. This 
has also been confirmed by interviews with senior government officials.
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poverty (inability to meet basic food needs) increased by almost 20 per cent 
in February 2008 and affected about 6 per cent of the population in Egypt 
(World Bank 2009), hence emphasizing the importance of food prices and 
their crucial importance in affecting the level of poverty in the country. As 
evidence of the significance of increased food prices, there has been a limited 
scale of protests in the aftermath of the crisis, yet with some severe injuries 
and fatalities (BBC News 2008).
To sum up, the pass-through effect is difficult to measure due to the existence 
of several variables that could have affected the domestic price level. This is in 
line with other studies. World Bank (2011b) estimated a pass-through coefficient 
of 0.4, and Al-Shawarby and Selim (2012) identified that the pass-through effect 
is between 12 and 36 per cent. Moreover, and as argued by Abbott (2009) the 
policy measures adopted by any government could break the link between inter-
national and domestic prices which has been the case for Egypt where the wide 
use of price controls, kind subsidy, and other policy measures have relatively 
shielded the Egyptian consumer from a full pass-through effect (UNDP 2008).
12.4 Policy Responses to the Crisis
We classify the policy responses undertaken by the GOE into five types 
including (a) agriculture production policies; (b) trade policies; (c) safety nets; 
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Figure 12.3 Food subsidies in Egypt during the period 2005/6–2011/12
Note: *Preliminary,**budget.
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12.4.1 Agricultural Production Policies
The government adopted strict monitoring of land cultivated rice. The 
government set a maximum area of 1.2 million feddan (480,000 hectares 
(ha)) where production of rice requires a permission from the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation, however, in practice, before the crisis, the 
area actually cultivated reached 2.2 million feddan (0.92 ha). After the cri-
sis the cultivated area of rice was reduced by 18 per cent between 2009–10 
as farmers shifted to other crops due to the ban on rice exports, and the 
enforcement of a regulation setting a certain quota of water for rice farms. 
Domestic prices decreased when the government first interfered by restrict-
ing exports, at the time when international prices were increasing, but 
soon started to reverse trend and increase, and in some cases the rate was 
higher than the rate of increase in international prices. As explained by 
WFP (2008b), this was mainly due to traders holding stocks, which hap-
pened in October 2008 when international prices started to decrease, antic-
ipating that prices would rise again and hence they could profit more by 
restricting supply.
12.4.2 Trade Policies
Two main trade policies were adopted by the government to deal with the 
crisis: an export tax followed by an export ban on rice and tariff reductions.
In the case of rice, several decrees by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
were issued by the end of 2006 and during 2007 and 2008 to impose export 
taxes (levies). The aim of export taxes was to shield the local market from the 
soaring world prices, and to reduce the costs incurred by GASC when pur-
chasing rice. When such export taxes proved to be ineffective as they were cir-
cumvented by traders, a ban was imposed in April 2008. In fact, prices in the 
domestic market decreased after the rice export ban and then tended to rise 
again. The reason was that traders decided to store rice until the export ban 
ended and then export what they had stored at the international prices which 
at that time were almost double the domestic price even after the imposition 
of the export ban (Al Ahram (newspaper) of 2 June 2008; Ghoneim 2008). In 
2009 the decision to ban export of rice was relaxed on the condition that an 
equivalent amount of rice was provided by rice exporters to GASC. Such a 
system was manipulated by rice exporters, and hence the government intro-
duced a heavy export levy and then a licence auction system for exporters 
depending on the type of rice. Finally the system of licence auctioning was 
abandoned in 2011 and a ban was imposed again until October 2012. Up 
until 2012 the ban was not lifted as the harvest of rice that was supplied to 





(PBDAC) was not enough to cover the needs of the food subsidy programme 
in 2011.
The export ban had negative repercussions on the production and trade 
of rice since many large private rice mills have specialized in the produc-
tion of export quality rice, and could not profitably switch to the milling of 
local rice. Traders also reduced their supply and held large inventories to keep 
domestic prices high (WFP 2008b). The continuation of imposing such an 
export ban reduced the incentive for producing rice.
The government abolished import tariffs in April 2008 on a number of 
food items including soybean oil, cheese, rice, milk for infants, and milk sub-
stitutes, and reduced it to 5 per cent on butter and dairy products. Yet such 
reductions did not have a significant impact due to its low marginal effect 
having started from an initially low tariff.
12.4.3 Safety Nets
The social safety net schemes ranged from bread subsidies, to ration cards, to 
school feeding programmes, to cash transfers, to other community support 
type of schemes. The crisis resulted in an increase in government allocations 
of food subsidies entitlements for bread and ration cards; the widening of 
beneficiaries from ration cards; and increase in cash transfers and govern-
mental wages and salaries.
The government allocations for food subsidies increased dramatically in 
2007–8 (Figure 12.3) whether in absolute terms or as percentage of total pub-
lic expenditure or GDP.
Beginning in 2004 several reforms of the ration cards were undertaken to 
reduce fiscal costs. A massive revision to the ration card system was under-
taken in light of the food crisis in January 2008, where additional allocations 
were provided to overcome the negative impact of the food crisis (a signifi-
cant retreat from the reforms that started in 2004).
Subsidies allocated to ration cards do not constitute more than 25 per 
cent of food subsidies entitlements (including sugar, rice, and edible oil) and 
less than 4 per cent of total subsidies provided (ECES 2010). From a food 
price policy perspective, an increase of the commodity basket for subsidized 
food and additional beneficiary registration have effectively shielded poor 
households from the impact of rising international food prices (World Bank 
2010). Yet, the system suffers from massive leakages. The poorest quintile 
gets less than its proportional share in subsidized products, with the excep-
tion of wheat (Table 12.1). The system of subsidized food has been inefficient 
in terms of targeting the rural poor. For example, as put by WFP (2010), 33 
per cent of subsidized baladi bread is distributed to low expenditure rural 
households as compared to 31 per cent to middle and 36 per cent to high 
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expenditure households. Similarly, only 28 per cent of the ration card com-
modities are allocated to low-expenditure rural households compared to 
around 31 per cent allocated to middle expenditure and around 41 per cent 
allocated to high expenditure households (WFP 2010). WFP (2008a) found 
also that 15–20 per cent of the poor do not benefit from the existing system. 
World Bank (2010) found that in 2008/9 Cairo and other metropolitan gov-
ernorates received about 38 per cent of bread subsidies, while their share of 
the poor population was only 14 per cent. Adding to that corruption associ-
ated with the value chain of bread production and distribution has been a 
major concern.
There are several other reasons for the inefficiency of the food subsidy 
system including the lack of cash among the poor which implied that not 
all the commodities considered in the ration cards are bought. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, the system suffers from weak targeting and lack of 
coverage where a substantial number (no exact figures available) for poor 
and vulnerable groups to food insecurity do not possess ration cards due to 
their inability to obtain the necessary documents to obtain such govern-
ment assistance. According to El Laithy and Armanios (2011) and following 
the system adopted by the Ministry of Social Solidarity in identifying the 
poor who deserve the ration card, 23 per cent of the people who deserve to 
hold the ration card according to the criteria set by the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity do not have one, whereas 64 per cent of the people who do not 
deserve it have a ration card. World Bank (2010) argues that around 28 per 
cent of food subsidies (EGP 5.5 billion) in 2008/9 did not reach intended 
consumers, with baladi bread accounting for 68 per cent (EGP 3.7 billion) 
of the leakage and cooking oil for 20 per cent (EGP 1.1 billion). Table 12.1 
shows that the richest quintiles benefit more from subsidies when compared 
to the poorest quintiles. Finally, the inefficiency of logistics in terms of trans-
port, storage, and handling has been considered a major culprit accused of 
Table 12.1 Distribution of total benefits across quintiles, 2008/9
Per capita expenditure quintile (%)
1 (poorest) 2 3 4 5 (richest)
Subsidies for:
Baladi bread 16.69 18.30 19.93 22.31 22.77
Rice 17.08 19.66 20.49 21.10 21.67
Wheat 39.02 25.83 16.64 11.81 6.70
Oil 15.99 18.75 20.40 22.15 22.70
Sugar 18.26 19.72 20.65 21.15 20.22




leakages and waste. It was estimated that between 15–35 per cent of wheat 
and grain losses are associated with inefficient logistics, and the estimates 
were even higher as put by the government reaching 70 per cent for some 
perishable products.
The government introduced a new type of ‘smart cards’ in 2008. Those 
cards contain data on the household head’s monthly quota of subsidized 
goods. The new cards allow the government to trace the distribution and 
consumption of subsidized goods by recording transactions electronically. By 
December 2010 smart cards replaced paper cards all over Egypt (World Bank 
2010; UNDP and MOED 2010). 
While school feeding programmes and other social assistance programmes 
did not experience any significant change in response to the food crisis, 
cash transfers and governmental and public sector wages did. Regarding 
cash transfers, the number of beneficiaries4 of social pension schemes has 
increased from 650,000 beneficiaries in 2005 to one million beneficiaries in 
2007 and its value doubled. Moreover the value of the cash transfers provided 
to families as an education grant increased in 2008. In addition, and as a reac-
tion to the food crisis, and specifically in 2008 the annual increase in salary 
of public sector employees was 30 per cent, compared to a usual 10 per cent 
increase in previous years.
12.4.4 Procurement and Stocking Policies
The wheat price GASC used to offer to farmers was less than that offered by 
private traders. However in 2008 it increased the price over that offered by pri-
vate traders. This policy has helped to increase the prices of wheat produced 
domestically. However, many of the farmers still preferred to sell to local trad-
ers for three main reasons. The first reason is that private traders collect wheat 
at the farms whilst in the case of GASC farmers are required to deliver it to the 
mills. Adding to that the absence of nearby places for collection from farmers 
set by PBDAC had lowered the positive impact of the announced policy. The 
second reason is related to the cheap loans for production provided by traders 
(WFP 2008b). In October 2008 wheat prices started to fall rapidly in the world 
market. The third reason is related to the delay in announcing the purchas-
ing price by the government which always took place during the harvest or 
growing seasons, and not before the planting season. The stocking policy did 
not change in light of the crisis, due to the limited availability of silos used for 
wheat storage. Yet the government began building new silos in 2010 to allow 
it to handle more volumes of stored wheat.
4 Ministry of Social Affairs programmes available at: <http://www.mss.gov.eg>.
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12.4.5 Other Related Policies
To overcome the leakage problem of wheat bran which is highly associated 
with corruption (where the bakeries sell their assigned quotas of subsidized 
flour from the government in the black market), the government adopted 
a new system of separating production of the subsidized bread from its dis-
tribution. It established a new company to distribute baladi bread in greater 
Cairo, while in other governorates home delivery for baladi bread is done by 
NGOs (WFP 2010). The monetary policy was geared to achieve food policy 
objectives. In light of the food crisis and its negative impact on the balance 
of payments, devaluation could have taken place to restore the balance of 
payments. However, the fear from inflationary pressures, which were already 
significant at that time, made the Central Bank reluctant to undertake any 
devaluation. The fiscal policy was adjusted to count for the increase in alloca-
tions of food subsidies and increase in wages and salaries, where the sources 
of financing such outlets were financed through reduction of some energy 
subsidies, increase of taxes on cigarettes, seizing tax exemptions on energy 
intensive industries in free zones, etc. (Kandil 2010).
Finally, the government during the crisis has asked for the military to help 
with distribution, while at the same time increasing the capacity of bakeries 
managed by the military (but owned by the government) to face the increas-
ing demand on bread.
12.5 Political Economy Dynamics of Food Policy 
in Light of the Food Crisis
The key stakeholder groups include governmental institutions, particularly 
the Ministry of Social Solidarity, but also the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Resources, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Finance.
The Ministry of Social Solidarity was the main responsible governmental 
body during the food crisis responsible for handling food subsidies as it 
oversaw the ration card system, baladi bread subsidy, cash transfers and 
other consumer subsidy programmes, other than the fuel subsidy (with 
the exception of liquefied gas cylinders which fell under its mandate). The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation played an important role 
in handling the policy of fertiliz er subsidy, together with PBDAC which is 
affiliated with the Ministry. The Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources 
played an important role regard ing some crops such as rice where it sets the 
quota of water per cultivated area as well as other irrigation-related rules 





prices as fertilizers when sold from public firms to the farmers, and finally 
the Ministry of Finance has an important role in determining the amount 
of subsidies allocated in the budget whether to consumers or producers. 
The interaction between such ministries, the level of coordination, and 
the political influence of their min isters has played a paramount role in 
formulating and implementing food policy.
The other stakeholders include public companies, cooperatives, and export 
commodity councils. Several holding companies and public companies exist 
which play an important role in the production of fertilizers and chemicals, 
and in commodity trade and storage. The cases of the shortage of fertilizers 
produced by the public firms and the quota system where every farmer is 
assigned a limited amount of subsidized fertilizers prove the inefficiency of 
the system as it led to black market and smuggling. Wheat and maize pro-
curement, as well as fertilizers and certified seeds provision, are functions that 
cooperatives (semi-governmental institutions) play an important role in and 
can play an effective role in overcoming the related marketing distribution 
problems. Such organizations represent the link between the Egyptian farm-
ers and government policies. Finally, so-called export commodity councils 
are semi-governmental entities financed mainly by exporters and their secre-
tariats and are hosted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. There are eight-
een export commodity councils. One is for agricultural crops and another 
for processed food products. The members of those commodity councils 
are major exporters and representatives of small and medium exporters of 
the products. Among the other stakeholders associated with food policy are 
many think tanks and research institutions (Handoussa et al. 2009). Among 
the most important research institutions is the Egyptian Food Security 
Information Centre which was established in 2007 with the support of Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WFP, and has been affiliated with 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. The coordination com-
mittee of the Food Safety Information Center consists of representatives from 
several related ministries and agencies, with involvement of related donors.5 
Also among the important research bodies dealing with food security is the 
Information and Decision Support Centre of the cabinet (IDSC).6 IDSC estab-
lished the Egyptian Food Observatory which provides tools for monitoring 
and evaluating the situation of main agricultural crops and food commodi-
ties. In addition, the Observatory develops early warning tools which predict 
future food crises whether they are triggered domestically or internationally. 
Food security information is also collected by the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
5 http://www.efsic.com/index.html.
6 The IDSC is an influential research institute as it feeds data to the cabinet, and accordingly 
helps in shaping the decision-making process.
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The ministry has been using Geographic Information System to create vulner-
ability maps with WFP support. These maps are focused on vulnerability to 
food insecurity, where wheat quota allocated to bakeries, bakeries locations, 
as well as population relative distribution to the village level are mapped in 
several layers, which provides useful information (Handoussa et al. 2009).
There is also a series of international food-related organizations dealing 
with food policy that operate in Egypt. The most important of these are the 
WFP, and FAO, in addition to bilateral and multi-lateral donors such as World 
Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Health 
Organization (WHO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and others (Handoussa 
et al. 2009). The role of the think tanks and international organizations in 
influencing food policy has remained substantial yet not always recognized. 
Different ministries have depended mainly on the studies undertaken by 
such organizations in drawing policy and initiating reforms.
Finally, several local and international NGOs play an important role, 
though not highly publicized, in addressing issues of food security and 
providing help to farmers (Handoussa et al. 2009). Food policy has gained 
increased importance in Egyptian policy-making circles in the last fifteen 
years for several socioeconomic and political reasons. Although the govern-
ing regime was dominated by one person backed by the NDP, opposing par-
ties represented a real threat. Other important reasons forcing the governing 
regime to pay greater attention to food policy include the change of the pro-
cess of choosing the president from national referendum to open elections in 
2005 (Transparency International 2009) and the desire of the ruling regime 
for succession of the son of the president to his father. Hence, reforms were 
always postponed. The sensitivity of the food subsidies and the alarming sig-
nals of long bread queues in streets (associated with violence) did not leave 
any room for the GOE to reduce the subsidy allocations. In other words, the 
fear of the governing regime from the political and social consequences of 
any substantial reform made it always prefer status quo, while undertaking 
small adjustments that in fact added to the fiscal burden and dealt with the 
occasional symptoms of the food price policy problems, but never tackled 
the roots.
As for the role of cooperatives, their role has been disappointing for sev-
eral reasons including the lack of appointed employees by the governments, 
the lack of awareness among the farmers involved in its functioning, cor-
ruption, existence of black markets (employees in some cases insist on sell-
ing additional fertilizers for farmers in order to allow them to obtain their 
entitlements of modestly priced fertilizers),7 and the extremely insufficient 
7 Al Ahram (newspaper), 19 December 2011.
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capital needed to allow such cooperatives to function properly. During the 
period of study (2004–9) the private sector was very influential in affecting 
policy-making. Nevertheless, favouritism was highly evident in the selection 
of donors’ projects that serve the interests of the private sector (with little 
attention for its impact on consumers) as well as the lack of enforcement 
of competition law. Favouritism was also evident where a number of wheat 
flour mills were owned by members of the parliament. Moreover, influential 
people (e.g., the secretary of the ex-president) owned private firms which 
handled the importation of wheat. There was a clear conflict of interest where 
members of the legislative and/or executive bodies also acted as traders.
International organizations have been influential in shaping the food 
policy by identifying the main problems and suggesting policies to solve 
them; and exerting pressure to tackle neglected issues such as the nutritional 
dimension. The implementation of their recommendations in many cases is 
undertaken, yet not with the speed expected (due to bureaucracy and slow 
reactions by the government). Think tanks and research institutions have 
also been playing an important role in affecting food policy in Egypt.
The media’s role has been significant during the food crisis in two respects; 
namely, intensifying the pressure on the government to take fast action; and 
pinpointing the corruption cases, especially in terms of smuggling wheat 
flour. The media has always echoed the voices of the urban population more 
than the rural population. Also the military’s role has been evident during 
the crisis where it has utilized the massive production capacity of the bakeries 
managed by it to increase its bread production, as well as helping in overcom-
ing distribution bottlenecks. It has been evident that the military was able 
to handle the crisis. Despite such significant efforts to address food security, 
a coordinated approach remained lacking which is attributed mainly to the 
lack of political will to drive the reforms. During the crisis, some institutional 
set-ups for enhancing coordination emerged including ministerial commit-
tees, but the political will remained absent.
The fragile institutional set-up governing domestic trade with no competi-
tion law until 2005, and ineffective implementation after that year, implied that 
anti-competitive behaviour prevailed. The importance of food subsidies arises 
also from strengthening the Egyptian capability of meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals, especially those related to poverty and hunger reduc-
tion. Relevant food subsidy programmes, if expanded on an efficient basis, 
can help to achieve such goals (UNDP and MOED 2010). This was reflected 
in the January 2011 revolution where among its main causes and slogans was 
achieving social equity and overcoming the proliferated corruption. The estab-
lishment of the food security policy advisory board in 2010, affiliated to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, with the aim of developing a strategy for food security, 
which includes senior representatives of the ministries involved in food policy 
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and other related domestic and international organizations including FAO and 
WFP, helped to improve the coordination process. The policy advisory board 
depends on old data for analysis which throws doubt on its ability to draw the 
right strategy. However, such a board, despite all such negative aspects, still 
remains a positive step in the coordination process. In addition, the prime 
minister issued a decree for forming a ministerial committee to deal with food 
policy in 2007. The Social Solidarity Minister and the Agriculture Minister 
were on one side whereas the Finance Minister and the Trade and Industry 
Minister were on another side, which was felt during the crisis when the Social 
Solidarity and Agriculture Ministers were asking for increasing subsidies’ allo-
cation and imposing a ban on rice exports whereas the Finance and Trade and 
Industry Ministers were against such demands. Contradictory objectives have 
been evident and in many cases the overriding concern of the negative effects 
of the food crisis led to the surrender of the Finance and Trade and Industry 
Ministers. An incident of conflict was also raised where it was found that rice 
production in 2012 exceeded the domestic market requirements, and hence 
there was a suggestion to allow exports based on certain conditions. However, 
such a proposal by the Ministry of Trade and Industry was not highly welcome 
by Ministry of Irrigation and Water Supply, implying that conflicts of interests 
prevail, where in many cases the national interest remains missing. Yet, during 
the food crisis, no conflict arose (despite strong negotiations between different 
ministries for increasing food subsidies versus reducing budget outlays and 
enhancing exports), maybe due to the overriding political importance of the 
issue at that time. Also the governing regime had to respond in a faster way to 
urban consumers, which gave the (false) impression of urban consumers being 
prioritized in the agenda of the government. This has not been the case in 
reality. However, the relatively stronger bargaining power of urban consumers 
who can arrange protests, access media channels, and exert pressures on parlia-
ment members in a more efficient way when compared to rural producers and 
consumers, made their voice heard loudly when compared to rural consumers.
The food crisis resulted in food price policy affecting several other policies 
(agriculture, irrigation, fiscal, monetary, and trade). In the case of agriculture 
policy, the crisis did not result in conflicting objectives or measures. In fact 
the decision to ban rice exports was imposed after the crisis coincided with 
the agricultural and irrigation policies which have for a long while set a limit 
on the land that can be rice cultivated, yet was not strictly enforced. In other 
words, at the national level the social and political concerns coincided with 
the interest of the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, the desire to increase self-
sufficiency from wheat, which intensified during the crisis, has always been one 
of the main national goals. Food policy and agricultural as well as irrigation 
policies might have different objectives, yet they were rarely contradictory. For 
example, even in the case of the rice planted area which had to be reduced in 
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the aftermath of the food crisis, such reduction did not affect the food security 
aspect, due to the over-supply of rice, and it helped to serve the irrigation policy 
due to the nature of rice being a heavy consumer of water, which is already 
scarce in Egypt. However, this has not been the case with other policies such as 
fiscal and trade policies. In the case of fiscal policy, the food crisis and the wid-
ening of coverage of the ration card system to a larger number of households 
as well as maintaining the baladi bread price implied additional fiscal burden 
which has been reflected in the allocations of food subsidies in the years 2007 
and 2008 that increased dramatically as aforementioned. Such a trend is likely 
to continue after the revolution where social aspects including achieving social 
equity remain among the most important indispensable objectives. This has 
been reflected in the budget set after the revolution for 2011/12 where food 
subsidies remained high at EGP 18.9 billion compared to EGP 13.6 billion in 
the 2010/11 budget for food subsidies and to EGP 14.1 billion for food subsidies 
in the 2009/10 budget (Ministry of Finance 2011). Moreover, the reduction of 
tariffs on food staples in the light of the food crisis affected negatively the tariff 
revenues, though in an insignificant manner due to the low tariffs imposed on 
food products and the wide array of free trade area agreements that Egypt is 
engaged in. The possibility of lessening the fiscal burden of food policy in the 
aftermath of the January 2011 revolution is not likely to take place through 
reduction of subsidies by any means, even though the economy is in bad shape 
and the government has announced austerity measures where real GDP growth 
rate has been extremely modest after the revolution.
12.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The government’s response to the crisis is deeply embedded in the coun-
try’s socioeconomic context. The importance of quick actions undertaken 
to make the bread available and control its price was evident. The responses 
to the food crisis have certainly lessened the crisis’ negative social effect on 
the majority of the population. But this has been costly as exemplified by the 
increasing outlays for social safety nets. The core of government reactions 
focused mainly on bread availability and prices, which is by nature the cen-
tral theme of the food subsidy system in Egypt. Other policies were enacted 
including the change of the commodity mix in the ration card system while 
increasing the number of beneficiaries. Moreover, cash transfers and wages 
of government and public sector employees were increased as were pension 
holders’ transfers. Given the high correlation between food prices and the 
level of poverty in Egypt—Egyptians spend on average 44 per cent of their 
income on food and the poorest spend on average 53 per cent—the poor 
in Egypt are vulnerable to any increase in food prices. Trade policies were 
 
Heavily Dependent Low- and Middle-income Countries
270
changed including the reduction of import tariffs on a number of commodi-
ties and the imposition of the export ban on rice. These trade policies, par-
ticularly the rice export ban might have helped to solve the bread problem 
by keeping domestic rice prices lower than they would otherwise have been. 
Yet, such policies affected negatively export prospects of rice and the price of 
rice was kept stable and below the international price level. The high fiscal 
cost and the strong demand for social services raise concerns about the sus-
tainability of such policies and whether from a macroeconomic perspective 
the current and future governments are able to carry on with the burden of 
such policies. The relatively small amount of subsidies allocated to food when 
compared to fuel subsidies could imply that the burden of food subsidies is 
expected to be contained by the government for a while, especially that the 
focus of the current regime after the revolution and the future regimes will 
be on achieving social equity and lessening poverty. However, hard budget 
constraints could also imply a need for reform, at least to prevent leakage and 
attain better targeting on income and geographical levels.
The political economy of food policy in Egypt has proven to be highly com-
plex. The negative social and political repercussions that can arise from any 
serious economic reforms implied a preference of the political leadership for 
the status quo. The interaction of poverty aspects with food security dimen-
sions and the high vulnerability of a relatively large portion of the population 
to fall into the poverty trap if food prices increase added to the difficulty of 
undertaking any reforms. Lack of sincere political will, weak coordination 
among different stakeholders, proliferation of corruption, inefficient pricing 
system, modest logistics, and heavily distorted market because of the subsidy 
system all implied more difficulties for reforming the food security system.
A policy towards reducing the waste and leakages resulting from produc-
tion and distribution inefficiencies is highly needed. This can be achieved by 
reforming the pricing system and improving the logistics. The government 
should also start applying hedging for the strategic commodities, which is in 
fact applied by some of the large private corporations importing directly in 
Egypt by taking the necessary monetary measures in case of exchange price 
change. The institutional set-up (laws and regulations) is not conducive to 
including this type of activity, implying the need for an institutional reform. 
Changing the mix of commodities considered on the ration cards can help to 
avoid problems associated with obesity and improve the nutritional require-
ments (WFP 2011). Yet, there is also a need to simplify the registration process 
to make the system more effective in terms of reaching the needy people.
Diversification of main suppliers of wheat by relying on other main pro-
ducers, besides Russia, can help in securing wheat procurement from other 
countries such as the Netherlands, from which Egypt should increase its 
wheat imports. However, GASC remained constrained by its organizing law 
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that does not allow it to trade in futures, and hence it has to buy wheat on 
the spot market (where delivery takes place within two months from the 
date of purchase). Reducing leakages and shortcomings of the subsidy system 
cannot be attained by substituting cash transfers for in-kind transfers due to 
the absence of a full database of poor people, and fear from induced inflation 
(WFP 2008a, 2010). In order to pursue better coordination, a supreme council 
of food policy security should be established. It should not be under a spe-
cific ministry, and should have overriding power over related ministries and 
agencies. It could be headed by the prime minister or his deputy and should 
meet on a frequent basis. It should be guided by a serious political leadership 
providing it with clear signals on directions of reform.
Finally, announcing purchasing prices by the government of major com-
modities such as maize and wheat has always been problematic. For exam-
ple, regarding maize, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation has 
tried to encourage maize production by expanding its cultivated area through 
announcing a purchasing price set prior to the plantation time only in 2010 
and set on a  par with the price of rice (the competing crop). Yet, such policy 
suffered from similar drawbacks to those associated with wheat where farmers 
still preferred to sell to the private sector and not the government due to trans-
port facilities offered by the private sector and avoiding problems associated 
with PBDAC. Hence, the change of maize policy can be considered a long-term 
policy in light of the crisis that was enacted after a relatively long while.
The features of the Egyptian political system after the 25 January 2011 rev-
olution are still unclear. There has been a rising trend of new parties which 
represent all ideological backgrounds, and the NDP was dissolved. The role 
of Islamic-oriented parties, and especially the Moslem Brotherhood affiliated 
party, has been evident. Yet, and concerning the focus of this chapter, it is 
clear that all parties are refusing the adoption of the free market economy 
policies as has been the case in the previous era where free market policies 
were adopted without establishment of the right institutions that monitor 
anti-competitive behaviour and conflict of interest. Reviving the role of the 
government in achieving social equality and reaching better income distribu-
tion is widely discussed, yet without a clear strategy still announced. Despite 
the fact that the government as well as the existing parties emphasize such 
aspects, it is still not clear how the modalities and polices needed to achieve 
such goals will be designed and adopted. One of the main issues that has 
been raised lately has been the subsidy system and the need to reform it. 
More emphasis has been put on energy subsidies, but less emphasis has been 
devoted to the issue of food subsidy reform. What is clear is that any politi-
cal system that will evolve will pay considerable attention to social aspects 
including equity and income distribution, while creating the right institu-
tions that avoid conflict of interest and fight corruption.
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Nigeria is a net importer of food. Therefore, any crisis that occurs in the inter-
national food market will be felt in Nigeria. It is in the context of the interna-
tional dimensions of the 2008 food crisis that the nature, impact, and policy 
responses in Nigeria can be understood. Although the prices of many com-
modities slumped during the first couple of years of the new millennium, 
some commodities (coffee, cotton, sugar, rubber, cocoa, rice, etc.) started to 
witness a rebound thereafter. The main causes include the shifting funda-
mental trends in supply and demand, poor harvests, policy changes, episodic 
shocks arising from climatic fluctuations, and a variety of other natural and 
political factors. As in 2006, the increases in commodity prices in Africa were 
regarded as a commodity boom being driven by growth in other developing 
countries, especially China and India, influence of taste and preferences, cli-
matic fluctuations, conflicts in crop producing countries, high energy costs, 
and price speculation (Olomola 2007). By 2008, however, the price rises have 
assumed crisis dimensions in food markets across the developing world, 
including Nigeria. The crisis actually came to a climax during the first three 
months of 2008 and the implementation of policies to mitigate the effects 
started during the first week of May.
In Nigeria, the crisis followed a period of renewed growth in the agricul-
tural sector and the concerted effort to modernize the sector. Thus, initially 
it was felt that since there was no food scarcity of any significant proportion 
the food crisis could be regarded as mere media propaganda. On the realiza-
tion of the fact that Nigeria is a net food importer and that a price escalation 
would reduce access to food for the majority of the people who already were 
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precariously food insecure, the government made frantic efforts to address 
the situation. But what prompted the government to agree to take actions? 
What is the impact of the food crisis in Nigeria? What measures were adopted 
by the government to reduce the impact? Why did the government respond 
the way it did? How effective were the policy responses? What lessons can 
be drawn to forestall or to remedy the situation in case of future occurrence? 
These are the issues being unravelled in this chapter. Specifically, the objec-
tives of the chapter are to (i) examine the agricultural commodity price trend 
and determine the effects of the 2008 food crisis in the country; (ii) identify 
the types and time horizon of the policy measures adopted to address the 
food crisis; (iii) analyse the political economy context of the policy responses 
in terms of determining the role of key actors and the factors circumscribing 
the adopted policies; (iv) analyse the dynamics of decision-making among 
the various actors in the policy process; and (v) assess the socioeconomic 
consequences of the policy responses.
From the analysis of data gathered through interactions with policy mak-
ers and major stakeholders and from official documents, we found that price 
transmission internationally and within the local supply chains played a 
considerable role in the food crisis. The nation faced severe shocks arising 
from sharp and simultaneous increases in the international prices of food and 
crude oil in 2008. Critical supply shortages arising from inclement weather 
conditions, investment-unfriendly macroeconomic environment, and poor 
implementation of projects exacerbated the price transmission effects. The 
supply response demonstrated by farmers was clear and remarkable. Younger 
farmers were attracted to the agricultural sector.
However, consumers were worse off. Those on low incomes witnessed a 
substantial increase in the proportion of their income that was spent on 
food. There was also deterioration in their intake of calories and protein as 
they engaged in unhealthy food consumption patterns. The government—
executive and legislature—farmers’ associations, and other stakeholders 
including the mass media rose up to the challenge and came up with some 
policy actions to remedy the situation. The measures included (i) a release 
of grains from the strategic reserve at appropriate intervals to mitigate the 
impact of high food prices on consumers; (ii) the provision of the sum of 
NGN 80 billion (US$712 million) for the import of 500,000 metric tons (MT) 
of rice from Thailand and other parts of the world within five months to be 
sold locally at a subsidized rate; (iii) some adjustments in tariff measures on 
food import to ease transaction; and (iv) a campaign to sensitize Nigerians to 
the looming dangers of food shortage and the need to conserve food.
These responses generated mixed effects. In the short term it was possible 
to reduce the spike in food prices and to introduce a guaranteed minimum 
price as a safety net to stabilize producers’ income. But the release of food 
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from grain reserves was badly managed as were the financial innovations for 
agricultural commercialization. The initial momentum in the implementa-
tion of projects was lost along the line and some of the projects were uncom-
pleted due to the lack of commitment to release funds on a timely basis.
13.2 Food Price Trends and Shocks
In spite of production variabilities and fluctuations in prices and weather 
conditions, the country has not witnessed famine or food riots; neither has it 
been a beneficiary of food aid. Thus, the soaring food prices and the accompa-
nying hysteria witnessed in 2008 seem to be unprecedented. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that it took some considerable controversy before the soar-
ing food prices of 2008 could be considered as a food crisis. In general, the 
prices of many commodities have followed an increasing trend but skyrock-
eted between 2007 and 2008, especially in the case of rice, sorghum, cassava, 
soybean, maize, millet, and wheat. Even after 2008, prices of many crops 
continued to rise with the exception of rice (Figure 13.1).
The continued rise in prices beyond 2008 is partly due to demand pressures 
from neighbouring countries as Nigeria’s importance in regional (cross-border) 
trade in the Sahel region became more prominent in terms of its involve-
ment in ensuring food security through export of dry grains such as millet, 
maize, and sorghum. For instance, in the aftermath of the production short-
fall in Niger Republic in 2009 which degenerated into a demand-supply gap 
of about 400,000 tonnes of grains, exports from Nigeria effectively bridged 
the gap and helped to stabilize prices. An assessment of the situation as at 
February 2010 shows that between 80 and 100 per cent of markets in Niger 
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Figure 13.1 International wheat price transmission in Nigeria
Source: author’s illustration using data from NBS (2011).
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Nigeria, 1,750 tonnes from Benin, and 240 tonnes from Burkina Faso and this 
continued until around August that year (Diao 2010).
The fact that the prices of various commodities like rice, sorghum, cassava, 
soybean, maize, millet, and wheat surged between 2007 and 2008 irrespec-
tive of whether they are tradeables or non-tradeables is an indication of the 
complex nature of the drivers of the food price crisis in Nigeria. Ordinarily the 
international market prices of rice and wheat could be held responsible for 
the soaring prices experienced during the period. The fact that the prices of 
other commodities were rising at the same time, however, suggests that other 
factors might also be contributing. In this regard, there are three possibili-
ties. First, sorghum, millet, and beans could face a higher regional demand 
as neighbouring countries and other West African countries where food riots 
have been reported might be sourcing the food staples from Nigeria as men-
tioned earlier, thus transforming their trade configuration as they gained 
entry into the region formally or informally. The possibility of cross-border 
trade in the case of sorghum, millet, and beans cannot be ruled out. Second, 
is the substitution effect of the 2008 food crisis. Consumers in Nigeria and 
indeed in many West African countries turned from the consumption of rice 
and bread to the consumption of other food staples such as cassava products, 
yam, and maize; a trend that has been observed in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Benin, and Nigeria together with an increase in the produc-
tion and trade of cassava farina in West Africa since 2008 (NISER 2009; SWAC 
2011). The third possible source of price increase is the high cost of transpor-
tation in Nigeria during the period, particularly occasioned by the increase in 
the international price of petrol occurring simultaneously with the soaring of 
international prices of rice and wheat. As Nigeria was also importing fuel dur-
ing the same period, such increase in the price of petrol would be transmitted 
to the domestic economy leading to an escalation of transportation cost.
13.2.1 International Price Transmission
Graphical illustrations of the co-movements between the import prices 
and domestic retail prices of the commodities for annual data from 2002 to 
2010 show strong evidence of transmission of international prices (Figures 
13.1–13.3). Furthermore, a correlation analysis reveals that the co-move-
ment is strongest in the case of wheat (r = 0.84), followed by rice (r = 0.70), 
while in the case of maize, the movement is also in the same upward direc-
tion, but the correlation is weak (r = 0.37).
The shock in world food prices in 2007–8 should be expected to generate 
extraordinary effects because the rise in prices coincided with sharp increases 
in the prices of petroleum products (including petrol) imported into Nigeria 




market. Prices of refined petroleum products, fertilizer, and other agricultural 
inputs imported into the country increased, resulting in a substantial rise in 
prices of both imported and domestically produced food.
The weak exchange rate which continued to depreciate up until 2010 also 
fuelled the hike in food prices especially in view of the fact that the country is 
highly import-dependent for the supply of its agricultural inputs. In Nigeria, 
the Nigerian naira (NGN) exchange rate to the US$ continued to depreciate 
from 2005 to 2010. It was NGN 132.9 in 2005, NGN 137.4 in 2007, and NGN 
139.27 in 2008. It depreciated further to NGN 148.9 in 2009 and NGN 150.3 
in 2010. Moreover, the inflation rate which stood at a single digit before the 
crisis, rose considerably from 6.6 per cent in 2007 to 15.1 per cent in 2008 
and 12 per cent in 2009. To date, the inflation rate has not reverted to the 
pre-crisis single digit. The domestic inflationary pressure, inadequacies of the 














Figure 13.2 International rice price transmission in Nigeria
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Figure 13.3 International maize price transmission in Nigeria
Source: author’s illustration using data from NBS (2011).
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petroleum products (which jerked up transportation and production costs) 
were partly responsible for the food price crisis in Nigeria. This situation also 
partly accounts for the observed trend in which domestic food price increases 
actually exceeded world food price increases.
Apart from the transmission of international prices there are other fac-
tors which accounted for the soaring of food prices in Nigeria from 2008 to 
2010. They included food supply shortages, macroeconomic environment 
with high interest rate, the weakness of the Nigerian currency, poor imple-
mentation of projects, as well as high transportation cost.
13.2.2 Broad Impact of the Price Shifts on Stakeholders
PRODUCTION IMPACT
Although the small-scale farmers may not be able to fully capitalize on 
price rises due to limited access to markets and key production inputs such 
as seed, fertilizer, knowhow, irrigation facilities, and credit they are still 
expected to be encouraged to increase production in response to the rising 
product prices. The production trend for major commodities from 2004 to 
2009 increased (Figure 13.4), varying widely among commodities. There is 
continuous expansion in the production of cassava and yam even up to 
2009. The rice producers have not increased output significantly and this 
resonates with the unimpressive price regime in the aftermath of the import 
of rice in 2008 which effectively reversed the upward swing in price and 
dampened farmers’ enthusiasm to cultivate the crop during the following 
cropping season. The slight production increase has been spurred by incen-
tives provided by the government in the form of credit facilities and avail-
ability of modern inputs.








Figure 13.4 Production trend of food staples in Nigeria, 2005–9






EFFECTS ON FOOD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
The effects of the 2008 food crisis on food consumption can be gleaned from 
the study conducted by Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research 
(NISER) (2009) which examined the budget share various food categories con-
sumed at homes across the six geo-political zones in the country. The study 
revealed that cereals, root, and tubers as well as vegetables account for a larger 
share of the total food budget in both the rural and the urban sector. On the 
other hand, the budget shares of meat, fish, and beverages are smaller. The 
high food prices changed the share of food budget in favour of cereals in both 
the urban and the rural sectors. Similarly, between 2007 and 2008, the results 
show an increased share of roots and tubers in the food budget in some areas 
(NISER 2009). The share of meat and beverages in the food budget declined 
between 2007 and 2008 in most of the zones. Household expenditure on 
food increased from around 50 per cent in 2007 to about 75 per cent in 2008.
13.3 Policy Responses to the Crisis
In Nigeria, the policies adopted can be categorized into short-term, 




The federal government released 65,000 MT of various grains and garri to 
the public, which led to a reduction of prices of some tradable and non-
tradable food items such as maize, sorghum, millet, and garri. The states 
were enjoined to do the same but this took place at an insignificant level 
given the low stock levels. The intervention buying operation of the federal 
government was aimed at increasing the supply of rice within the next three 
months (May–July 2008) and sustain it for the following three months in 
the first instance (August–October 2008). This was expected to cause a sig-
nificant reduction in the market price for rice, based on evidence that it had 
risen much faster than the current price at the border with Benin Republic. 
The incremental import would be sold to the general public at a subsidized 
price, with a view to bringing the price down.
MOPPING UP OPERATION
This involved purchasing the current stock of imported rice in the country 
from local stores in different parts of the country. It was established that 
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price to be sold to the consuming public at subsidized prices. Although this 
was achieved within the short term, the quantity available was too small to 
generate any perceptible impact.
DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL-SCALE MACHINES
The government considered the option of processing the paddy in storage 
based on the quantity confirmed to be available. Rice Farmers Association 
of Nigeria (RIFAN) had claimed that about 4 million MT of paddy would 
be available in the short term, comprising present stock level in July 2008 
(2.5 million MT) as verified by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Resources (FMAWR) plus new harvest (1.5 million MT) in the following sea-
son in October 2008. However, the problem of processing was underscored, 
in terms of low capacity of small-scale processors and poor quality of domes-
tically milled rice in Nigeria. Thus, small-scale machines could be distributed 
to processors in the short run for the purpose of milling the paddy to be made 
available in October 2008. Therefore, the government made an attempt to 
place an order for small-scale rice processing machines from abroad. About 
1,000 small-scale milling machines were to be purchased which would need 
one month to install in all parts of the country. This was expected to reduce 
the rice price by at least 30 per cent. It was also to have favourable socioeco-
nomic implications including creation of jobs for processors, engineers, and 
others. The fact that farmers would be encouraged to produce rice made this 
option particularly attractive. The option did not go beyond the level of con-
ceptualization. It failed as a short-term measure because about two or three 
months would be required for the import of machines and putting up the 
factory buildings.
TARIFF WAIVERS
The federal government approved the suspension of all levies and duties on 
rice imports with effect from 7 May to 31 October 2008, which stimulated the 
private sector to place an order for rice import to the tune of almost 10 MT. 
The actual rice import was only 172,518 tons, which led to a 45 per cent fall 
in prices. In addition, the cross-border trade in rice probably increased. The 
socioeconomic implication was in terms of increased business among rice 
traders and consumers in the short run, which of course was at the expense 
of low morale of farmers in the long run.
13.3.2 Medium-term Measures
Subsequently the ordeal of soaring food prices was converted to an oppor-
tunity for Nigeria to institute medium- to longer-term measures for 







implementation committee comprising ministers of agriculture and water 
resources, finance, commerce, and industry. A number of medium-term 
measures emerged to address the looming food crisis.
FOOD PRODUCTION
An allocation of 1.68 per cent of the federal budget was made to the Natural 
Resources Development Fund during 2008–11 for boosting the domestic 
production of food crops, the development of the agro-allied industry, and 
research and development (R&D) on seed varieties. As discussed below, not 
all the amount was actually spent due to bureaucratic delays and untimely 
disbursement of funds.
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
NGN 10 billion was made available from the rice levy account as a credit 
scheme at a concessionary interest rate, in support of the local rice process-
ing capacity in the country. However, many small-scale producers and pro-
cessors could not access the funds. A major complaint was that the selection 
of beneficiaries was politically motivated. Furthermore the Central Bank 
of Nigeria resolved to raise NGN 200 billion funds from the commercial 
banks in two weeks. The fund would be used for commercial agriculture to 
be disbursed by accredited banks. The credit under the scheme was to be 
disbursed for crop and livestock production, the processing and marketing 
including storage and input supplies. The commercial agricultural credit 
scheme was not targeted at financing the establishment of rice mills. Thus, 
despite the introduction of this scheme the issue of inadequate rice pro-
cessing mills remained unresolved. The implementation of the scheme was 
inequitable as small-scale farmers who produced over 80 per cent of the 
agricultural output in the country received little or nothing from the credit 
scheme while large-scale producers benefitted immensely. Smallholders 
also face far more restrictions in terms of access to formal credit than the 
large-scale farmers.
FOOD RESERVE AND STORAGE FACILITY
The federal government decided to complete the outstanding storage projects 
before the end of 2008 in order to increase the national strategic food reserve 
capacity from 300,000 to 600,000 MT. The state governments were encour-
aged through moral suasion to step up their buffer stock operations, which 
involve at least 10 per cent of food output in their respective domains. It was 
envisaged that up to two million MT silos capacity would be required for the 
country. Efforts were made to complete seventeen silos which were already 
at various stages of completion across the country. The federal government 
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country. A sum of NGN 15 billion was earmarked for this purpose. To date, 
however, many of the silos remain uncompleted and the target capacity has 
not been met due to poor budget implementation especially non-release of 
appropriated funds.
CROP PROCESSING
A decision was taken by the government to increase the rice milling capacity 
by an additional 88,000 MT per annum and create about 8,000 direct and 
indirect job opportunities. The mills were to be located in the major rice 
producing states to take advantage of proximity to raw materials. The local 
capacity for the operation and maintenance of rice mills and the fabrication 
of spares was to be gradually built thereby creating employment for youth. 
Commitment to this decision seems to remain on course. The federal gov-
ernment is making arrangements to secure international financing for the 
establishment of a hundred rice mills across the country. The target date for 
the completion of the project has been put at 2015. As it turned out, the issue 
of importing rice processing equipment which failed as a short-term measure 
has been shifted to the medium-term horizon and even then it has been dif-
ficult to achieve mainly due to scarcity of investment funds and the lack of 
confidence on the part of private investors that the policy environment will 
protect their investment if they provide the necessary funds. There was also 
emphasis on the physical development of markets for livestock and birds, 
physical development of grain markets and the introduction of a guaranteed 
minimum price (GMP) scheme. This is to serve as a safety net measure for 
the farmers in terms of providing remunerative prices and stabilizing their 
income. The GMP was actually introduced but its implementation has not 
been effective.
13.3.3 Long-term Measures
Later in 2009, the federal government produced a food security strategy docu-
ment which prioritized a number of measures in the long term. The policy 
thrust behind this includes a number of desirable attributes, namely the value 
chain approach to agricultural development, commodity focus in providing 
support to producers, the visibility of the private sector, successor farmer gen-
eration, and provision of safety net. In this regard, the aspects of the policy 
response in the long term include (i) the promotion of large-scale commercial 
agriculture of between 500 and 3,000 hectares (ha) that is intended to have 
a direct linkage to the small-scale farmers with a target of 10,000 ha for a 
period of four years; (ii) the construction of 60 specialized warehouses that 
will increase storage capacity; and (iii) the setting aside of 1.68 per cent of the 





13.4 Political Economy Context
The 2007–8 food crisis was widely reported by the Nigerian mass media and 
this generated responses from all strata of the society—the executive, parlia-
ment (National Assembly), non-governmental organizations, producer asso-
ciations, development partners, scholars, and activists. This section examines 
the actual policy process that took place, the actors involved, their roles, 
and the type of links and interactions among them as well as the timing of 
responses and the factors influencing the adopted policy actions.
13.4.1 The Policy-making Process
A diverse group of stakeholders (government, donors, research commu-
nity, farmers’ associations, media organizations, and the private sector) was 
involved in the debate surrounding the food crisis and policy responses in 
Nigeria. The policy-making process did not follow the conventional linear 
model with a unidirectional flow from an agenda setting phase to the deci-
sion phase and implementation phase which actually had been flawed in 
the literature (Sutton 1999). A major characteristic of the food crisis pol-
icy (response) process is that it involved the participation of a variety of 
stakeholders dominated by the government (policy makers), politicians, 
the mass media, and producers’ associations. The policy process can best 
be described as one of disjointed incrementalism or muddling through 
(Lindblom 1980). Indeed, muddling through a ‘time bomb’ which never 
exploded offers an intriguing experience. Discussions about the nature of 
the crisis and possible solutions were going on simultaneously but a consid-
erable length of time was taken to build consensus. It was difficult for the 
stakeholders to promptly prescribe the policy agenda because of the politi-
cal colouration and connotation implied by the controversy surrounding 
whether or not Nigeria was actually facing a food crisis. As the price hike 
was becoming increasingly burdensome for consumers and food supply 
shortages were being reported and intensively analysed in the media, the 
National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA)—a more or less technical arm of the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (as the ministry was 
then known) claimed that the country was not facing any risk of food crisis. 
This position was unpopular in the country and took some time before it 
was reluctantly vacated. It effectively created a lull in policy response and 
put the executive arm of the government on the defensive rather than stay-
ing at the forefront to study the situation properly and provide the rally-
ing point to set the policy agenda to tackle the crisis. The government was 
later to be stampeded by criticisms from opposition parties (politicians), 
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soaring food prices in other countries including deadly riots and threats to 
the stability of governments.
Consequently, the process witnessed the pronouncement of decisions 
by the government even when consensus had not been reached and hur-
riedly identified solutions which turned out to be unimplementable within 
the stipulated time. Such a panicky process was exemplified by the initial 
announcement of the direct import of rice to the tune of NGN 80 billion. 
The basis for this was the fear that the soaring food prices in the world mar-
ket could introduce significant shocks into the Nigerian food market, given 
the status of Nigeria as a net food importer wherein rice and wheat predomi-
nate among others in the food import bill of US$2.8 million per annum. 
Following sharp criticism by RIFAN and opposition parties the policy had to 
be moderated by another commitment of NGN 10 billion for the provision 
of credit to farmers to boost food production. This way, the government 
was able to assuage the apprehensions of both consumers and producers. 
This is a demonstration of the fact that producers’ associations could have a 
significant influence on the policy processes. The government continued to 
muddle through the process but had to work out incentives for the benefit 
of producers in tandem with what the consumers will benefit from cheap 
imports of rice. Another example was the attempt the government made to 
import small-scale rice processing machines to be installed within one month 
in all parts of the country. The idea failed when it was later realized that the 
process of importing and putting up the factory buildings would require up 
to three months. Further details of what worked and what else failed to work 
can better be understood as we characterize the process by examining the 
role of the decision-making actors as well as the stakeholders who influenced 
the process, timing of responses, policy choices and effects, as well as the fac-
tors that circumscribed the selection of policies implemented.
13.4.2 Decision-making Actors
LEADERSHIP ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN SETTING THE AGENDA
Of the three tiers of government in Nigeria (federal, state, and local) the 
federal government maintained the leadership role in organizing and imple-
menting policy responses to the 2008 food crisis. And in the same vein, the 
executive and legislative arms of government played prominent roles. The 
response of the executive arm of government (led by the president) came 
mainly through the FMAWR while in the National Assembly (parliament), 
the House of Representatives and Senate organized public hearing, debates, 
and investigations through their respective committees on agriculture. The 
FMAWR was the fulcrum around which the policy process revolved. It has 





the Federal Executive Council (FEC), the private sector, farmers’ associa-
tions, and development partners, package the policy measures for necessary 
approval by the government and implement such policy response measures. 
During the period, approval of executive actions followed the normal proce-
dure in which the FEC comprising all cabinet ministers and chaired by the 
president, examines the policies brought before it by the relevant minister 
and arrives at a consensus after thorough consideration of the merits and 
demerits.
As part of the consensus building process, the minister of agriculture con-
vened a stakeholders’ meeting which took place at Abuja on 3 May 2008. The 
stakeholders in attendance included directors of various departments in the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, representatives of the National Food Reserve 
Agency, Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria, development partners, 
representatives of agribusiness firms, and the Rice Farmers’ Association of 
Nigeria. The agenda of the meeting was to examine the food situation in the 
country and to obtain the commitment of stakeholders towards implement-
ing the proposed policy decisions. The sole objective of the policy response 
in the short term was to bring the domestic price of rice down quickly having 
jumped by about 100 per cent in a couple of months prior to that time. It was 
established that the rice output in 2007 was 3.4 million MT out of which only 
1.4 million MT was milled leaving 2.0 million MT of rice paddy unprocessed 
because of inadequate processing capacity. It was also established that the 
requirement of the country for paddy rice for its 140 million people at 30 kg 
per caput consumption was 6.5 million MT or 4.2 million MT milled rice 
equivalent at 65 per cent recovery rate; and that the harvest of paddy in 2008 
was estimated at 3.94 million tonnes.
The timing of the legislative and executive actions taken between October 
2007 and November 2008 in response to the crisis attests to the role of 
both houses of parliament (Senate and House of Representatives) as policy 
champions (Table 13.1). The legislature demonstrated a better understand-
ing of the problem and wielded considerable influence in setting the policy 
agenda and in ensuring effective delivery of services at the implementation 
stage. This was done through organizing public hearings and conducting 
debates to ensure appropriate policy implementation was neither delayed 
nor derailed.
A major political dimension in the policy process in Nigeria was the 
involvement of the thirty-six state governors as part of the key deci-
sion actors especially in view of the federal nature of the country with a 
multi-party democracy and multi-layered governance structure. All the 
governors met with the president on 29 April 2008 to examine the policy 
response measures. The following week, 5 May, the measures were tabled 
before the stakeholders for validation prior to presentation before the FEC 
Table 13.1 Policy process of the Nigerian 2007–8 food crisis response
Time line Issues addressed and measures taken
25 October 2007 Through resolution No. 37 of 25 October 2007 the Senate alerted the nation 
to the drought in some parts of the country. This alert was mainly due 
to the devastating effects of droughts especially in view of the need to 
ensure national food security. The Senate further resolved that the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture should immediately brief the house on the status 
of the nation’s strategic grains reserve. The strategic grains reserve is the 
mandatory storage by the Federal Government of about 5 per cent of 
grains harvested nationwide. This reserve is to ensure continuous availability 
of food even in the time of famine.
25 April 2008 The Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives alerted the 
federal government to the growing food shortages and the attendant 
soaring of prices of grains. The legislative chamber thereafter invited the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture to a meeting to discuss in detail the status of 
food security in Nigeria.
29 April 2008 Based on the above articulated concerns the president convened an 
emergency meeting with all the 36 state governors to review the situation 
and take necessary actions. The meeting extensively discussed the food 
security situation in the face of the global food crisis arising from the 
shortage in the aggregate world food output and resolved that very 
urgent measures be put in place to protect the populace and develop the 
agricultural sector.
3 May 2008 A stakeholders’ meeting was convened in Abuja at the instance of the minister 
of agriculture. The agenda of the meeting was to examine the food 
situation in the country and to obtain the commitment of stakeholders 
towards implementing the proposed policy decisions.
14 May 2008 Some of the measures proposed during the meeting with the state governors 
were considered and approved by the FEC. The FEC approved inter alia 
that:
(i) the sum of NGN 10 billion be provided from the rice levy account for a 
credit scheme to support local rice processing capacity. Credit granted 
under the scheme was to attract 4 per cent interest rate, a repayment 
period of 15 years, and a five-year moratorium;
(ii) all outstanding food storage projects should be completed before the end 
of 2008 to significantly increase the national food reserve capacity from 
300,000 to 600,000 MT;
(iii) the funds accruing to the Natural Resources Development Fund (May 
2008 to 2011) be utilized as Special Intervention Fund Agriculture to 
boost domestic production of food crops and development of agro-allied 
industries as well as R&D for the production of improved varieties of seeds.
8–14 November 
2008
In its annual retreat held in Kano (north west Nigeria) the Senate held 
sessions on ‘Desertification, Climate Change and Challenge of Poverty’ 
and ‘Ensuring Food Security in Nigeria’ as part of the key issues of concern 
during the retreat. The food crisis was widely discussed. The speakers and 
discussants at these sessions were distinguished academics drawn from 
various parts of the country. The whole nation was sensitized regarding 
the need to address the main causes of the crisis and the need for the 




for approval on 14 May 2008. Thus after the initial loss of time as men-
tioned earlier, the executive evolved a participatory process of taking deci-
sions about the type of policy instruments to deploy in tackling the food 
crisis. Following the approval, the process moved into the implementation 
stage with the FMAWR being at the core of the administrative procedures. 
Even at this stage some of the key actors continued to play an active role in 
various ways.
CATALYTIC ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA
The mass media did not stop at drawing the attention of policy makers to 
the need to take urgent steps to address the soaring food prices. When the 
palliative measures were being implemented, a repentant NFRA urged the 
media to appeal to Nigerians to remain calm as the government was already 
taking measures to address the food crisis. The media monitored the process 
and reported cases of abuses and inequity in the distribution of grains that 
were released from the reserve. The parliament responded by setting up a 
panel to investigate all the issues involved. Other active participants in the 
decision-making process are the development partners who have to align 
their programmes and projects with the policy measures put in place by the 
government to tackle the food crisis.
SUPPORTIVE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS
Many of the development partners started to address the consequences of 
the food crisis through the re-allocation of resources in existing programmes, 
the mobilization of new funds to ensure delivery of food assistance, nutri-
tional care and support, supporting social safety nets for the most vulner-
able groups, and the supply of seeds, fertilizers and other basic inputs to 
smallholders. The FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) played crucial roles in this regard. In 
addressing the enormous challenges facing African agriculture and its major 
role in attaining the MDGs and poverty reduction objectives, the FAO took 
the initiative to mobilize key development partners in the establishment of 
Nigeria’s Food Security Thematic Group (FSTG).
The FSTG provided technical support for discussions and actions related to 
the soaring food prices in Nigeria including the development of the National 
Food Crisis Response Programme (NFCRP). By and large, the involvement of 
these agencies was largely in terms of strengthening their ongoing projects 
to achieve the medium-term objectives. They did not have any significant 
influence on the short-term measures taken by the government in response 
to the food crisis in 2008, neither were they directly involved in the design 
and implementation of the policy measures earlier discussed.
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ADVOCACY ROLE OF PRODUCERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
When the idea of importing rice to address the supply shortages was 
mooted, All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) and the RIFAN launched 
their opposition. They criticized the move arguing that it would be better 
to invest the funds in expanding domestic production. Some concerned 
members of the public even suggested massive imports of food to remedy 
the situation whereas representatives or sympathizers of food produc-
ers argued otherwise claiming that uncontrolled imports would dampen 
enthusiasm of farmers and constrict food production. The Association of 
Master Bakers of Nigeria threatened to stop the production of bread unless 
the price of wheat flour was brought down through massive imports of 
wheat. These arguments were going on up till May 2008 when the Federal 
Executive Council met to take the decisions highlighted earlier. The chair-
man of Lagos state chapter of the Association of Master Bakers and Caterers 
of Nigeria met with top government officials to ask them to reduce or cancel 
wheat tariffs or subsidize bakers but claimed to have received no response. 
The association therefore embarked on a one-week nationwide strike begin-
ning from 5 May 2008 arguing that flour mills have been increasing their 
prices almost every week. The millers and government blamed the soaring 
price of flour on increases in international wheat prices. Many consumers 
supported the bakers’ grievances especially in urban areas where all dwellers 
consume bread virtually on a daily basis. A similar strike action by bakers 
took place in August 2007 after the government increased taxes on flour by 
100 per cent. The price of bread then rose by about 25 per cent. Whereas 
the bakers’ association could not succeed in pressurising the government to 
subsidize the wheat industry, the AFAN and RIFAN were able to influence 
the government in setting up a NGN 10 billion loanable fund to boost rice 
production and processing capacity.
The producers’ associations were also not in support of a tariff waiver 
associated with the rice import policy. As the countdown to the 31 October 
2008 deadline for the removal of the rice import duty waiver commenced, 
mixed reactions trailed the measure. Farmers’ associations and rice millers 
who were originally against the waiver continued to advance reasons why 
it should not be extended while traders and consumers who were in sup-
port continued to canvass reasons for its extension. Some state chapters of 
AFAN regarded the waiver as a disincentive to local rice production as it has 
deprived local farmers of the income to engage in rice production. It was 
claimed that the waiver had adversely affected local rice production and 
had further impoverished the country’s rice farmers. Besides, rice farmers 
from one state had to transport their produce to other states covering great 
distances for processing; a situation which has greatly discouraged local rice 




north east argued that continued rice import was discouraging local pro-
duction, adding that local rice farmers were unable to produce enough due 
to lack of credit facilities and low investments in the sector and that tariff 
waiver would compound the problem. They complained that even though 
the waiver was temporary, it has succeeded in rendering the local produc-
ers jobless and if sustained, it will destroy the local rice production com-
pletely. The rice millers were also against the policy, claiming that efforts 
should have been made to establish new mills given the critical shortage 
of milling machines in the country. The solution proposed by the farmers’ 
associations to address the food price crisis is that the government should 
empower domestic rice producers through the supply of improved seeds 
and other modern inputs. The only alternative to the waiver according to 
them is the provision of at least 50 per cent subsidy to local rice farmers for 
tractor hiring services and for the procurement of fertilizers and improved 
seeds. The government was not convinced by these views; the waiver was 
considered to be necessary when it was suspended in May and the suspen-
sion had to be lifted in October as scheduled. In the end the views of the 
policy makers and interest of consumers prevailed as far as the waiver policy 
was concerned. The policy was a short-term response in the interest of the 
generality of the consumers. The waiver was terminated as scheduled at the 
end of October after it had helped to reverse the dramatic price hike around 
the middle of 2008.
13.4.3 Key Decision-making Factors
A close observation of the policy process, its political, administrative, and 
social dimensions as well as the role of actors shows clearly that the inter-
nal considerations weighed more heavily than external factors in deciding 
which policy response measures were to be adopted. Given the fact that glo-
balization can trigger the inflow of food crisis oppositions it is instructive 
for the government to take urgent steps to resolve the crisis. However, there 
are equally compelling reasons why the policy decisions had to be taken in 
Nigeria. Altogether, the decision-making factors are five-fold.
RISING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FOOD SECURITY
It was recognized that the increase in price has the tendency to affect 
food adequacy as well as the accessibility and affordability of basic needs 
of Nigerian households. Arising from the global food shortage and soaring 
prices, food became an increasingly worrisome item in households’ budgets 
in Nigeria where it created rising uncertainties about food security. It was 
a very contentious issue because of its diverse consequences on different 
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and enhance increased access by consumers in both rural and urban sec-
tors to adequate variety of food became a new challenge and concern of the 
Nigerian government.
SOARING FOOD PRICES CAN FURTHER IMPOVERISH 
THE MASSES OF THE PEOPLE
In Nigeria, the rise in food prices is particularly worrisome because food price 
inflation hurts the poor most and it may have tremendous consequences on 
economic growth and poverty. Concomitantly, the public spending on the 
basic investments needed for agriculture and rural economic transforma-
tion has remained grossly ineffective and inefficient to bring about ade-
quate food production. Agriculture is expected to form the fulcrum for the 
growth of the economy because it provides employment for about 70 per 
cent of the working population and has prospects for development by its 
size and spread. However, while agriculture has shown remarkable improve-
ment, with a yearly contribution of nearly 42 per cent to the gross domestic 
product, poverty remains endemic and pervasive in the sector and in the 
country in general. To date, food insecurity remains a serious challenge to 
achieving the millennium development goal of halving the proportion of 
population who suffer from extreme poverty and hunger by the year 2015. 
A particular reason for concern about the impact of high food prices arose 
from the fact that the consumers’ income being spent on food has been 
rising with deleterious effects on the financing of children’s education and 
healthcare.
NEED TO AVOID POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION
The surge in food prices witnessed during the first three months in 2008 pre-
cipitated thunderous public discourse but there seemed to be no easy agree-
ment on the best ways to resolve the issues. At the level of the executive, 
government actions were characterized by stampede and ad hockery with 
some of the panicky measures drawing criticisms from the media and the 
parliament from time to time. Understandably, an explosive food crisis was 
what the government could ill-afford at that time. The food crisis came at a 
point when the government in power was barely one year in office having 
been inaugurated on 29 May 2007. The elections that brought many of the 
political office holders to power were also being heavily contested in vari-
ous election tribunals across the country. Clearly therefore, the government 
could not ignore the concerns being expressed in the media about the soaring 
food prices. The government had to muster the necessary political support 
and adopt a participatory policy process to provide interventionist measures 
to address the food crisis. This derives from the understanding of the lack of a 





and discontent often expressed by the poor and highly vulnerable groups in 
this regard. It was felt that the food crisis has the potential to derail not only 
past achievements but ongoing pro-poor programmes aimed at reducing the 
incidence or breaking the cycle of poverty.
UNSUSTAINABILITY OF PERSISTENT FOOD IMPORT
Decisions regarding the termination of a tariff waiver and a number of the 
medium-term and long-term measures were based on the fact that the coun-
try could not afford to continue with the level of food imports recorded dur-
ing the period. This is in view of the requirement of foreign exchange for 
development in other critical sectors of the economy especially infrastructure 
and energy. Since reliance on import is not fiscally sustainable there must be 
efforts to boost domestic production hence not only short-term palliatives 
were decided upon but also medium- and long-term strategies were designed 
to transform and modernize the agricultural sector.
PHOBIA OF FOOD RIOT CONTAGION
Unpleasant consequences of the global food shortages have already been 
widely reported in many countries in terms of high prices of food, people 
eating less and less well, protests, strikes, and riots in the wake of dra-
matic rises in the prices of wheat, rice, corn, oils, and other essential foods. 
Furthermore, the food price shock has been destabilizing governments, 
igniting street riots, and threatening to send a new wave of hunger rip-
pling through the world’s poorest nations. In Africa, fourteen out of fifty-
three countries have witnessed mass disturbances following abrupt spikes 
in food prices in 2007–8. Some of the countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania) are in West Africa. In February 
2008, a severe riot also broke out over soaring food prices in Cameroon—a 
neighbouring country to Nigeria. If food riots in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Zimbabwe could be said to be far away, that of Cameroon was close 
enough to serve as a warning to Nigeria not to take the food crisis for 
granted. Thus, all the stakeholders agreed that the problem must be quickly 
nipped in the bud.
It could be puzzling to external observers why riots never broke out in 
Nigeria in spite of the price hikes and level of urbanization. The reasons 
are not far-fetched. First, Nigeria has no tradition of food riot comparable 
to other African countries and developing countries in other parts of the 
world. Second, Nigeria’s political landscape had witnessed considerable 
improvement since the return of democratic governance in 1999. Third, 
is the fact that Nigeria has been witnessing unparalleled press freedom for 
quite some time. The mass media in the country is one of the most unfet-
tered in the world. Indeed, the media organizations have been providing 
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opportunities for stakeholders to express their opinions, especially on 
food security—thus making the alternative of street protest on food issues 
unattractive.
13.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The soaring food prices of 2008 have international and national dimensions. 
The transmission price effects were exacerbated by simultaneous increase in 
international oil price. The situation was complicated by food supply short-
ages occasioned by climatic fluctuations, investment-unfriendly macroeco-
nomic environment and poor implementation of agricultural projects. The 
food crisis received considerable attention but inflicted notable impact on 
producers and consumers in Nigeria. The production trend for major com-
modities from 2004 to 2009 reveals that the impact on production is posi-
tive. There is also a positive impact on enterprise profitability as gross margin 
increased in 2008 in respect of all the commodities with the exception of 
millet and cowpea. In general, the consumers were worse off. The high food 
prices induced a change in the pattern of food consumption. For instance, 
there was a general shift in the share of food budget in favour of cereals in 
both the urban and the rural sectors in most of the zones. In terms of the 
effect on nutrition and food security we found that both the rural and urban 
dwellers consume less than the recommended minimum per capita daily pro-
tein and calorie intake implying worsening malnutrition among Nigerians in 
both the urban and the rural areas between 2007 and 2008.
A response policy was packaged to address the impact but the implemen-
tation yielded mixed results. The major problem which arose in the imple-
mentation of the short-term measures was the attempt to scuttle the flow of 
benefits by unintended beneficiaries. This was evident in the allocation of the 
grains released for distribution to various markets to cushion the effect of the 
price hikes. At the stage of implementing the palliative measures, individual 
and group interests overshadowed the interests of the targeted consumers 
thus undermining the effectiveness of the policy measures.
In the light of the foregoing, a number of lessons and policy implications 
can be drawn from Nigeria’s experience in managing the food crisis policy 
responses. First, the implementation of the NFCRP should have had provi-
sion for its continued implementation and for necessary review at a stipulated 
time. This should have made it impossible for policy makers and relevant 
actors to abandon the programme or starve it of necessary funds and political 
will to drive the process to a logical conclusion. The programme did not also 
emphasise the value chain approach which came up as an innovation in the 




avoid the distortion of targeting for personal or political purposes, there is a 
need for high transparency regarding the process and conditions of distribu-
tion of resources (grains, credit, inputs, etc.) to identified target groups. Third, 
proper design and implementation of safety nets and other forms of sup-
port will improve with participation and consultation of key stakeholders. 
Therefore, a participatory approach should always be adopted when incen-
tives are being designed to assist the farmers. Fourth, efforts should be made 
to intensify the registration of farmers across the country for proper targeting 
of support and inclusion of farmers in key decision-making processes from 
time to time.
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In mid-2008, one of Africa’s most stable democracies descended into a period 
of economic depression and growing social discontent. The sentiments of 
one taxi driver, who noted that ‘If things continue like this, we’ll have to eat 
sand’, captured the anxiety of many Senegalese as the price of rice continued 
to skyrocket.1 Between January 2007 and September 2008, the consumer price 
of imported Thai A1 rice, which is the country’s main food staple, increased 
by more than 100 per cent in the capital of Dakar. The rise in the price of 
rice and other key commodities resulted in a level of inflation not seen since 
the country was forced to devalue its currency, the Communauté Financière 
Africaine (CFA) franc, in 1994. In fact, Senegal was one of the worst affected 
by the 2007/8 global food price crisis, with food prices 24 per cent higher 
than the African average (Ndione 2008).
Senegal’s historic dependence on external markets to supply its food needs, 
coupled with two seasons of poor domestic cereals production, made it espe-
cially vulnerable to global food price rises. While the high level of price trans-
mission from the international to the domestic market impacted the rice 
sector most severely, other affected commodities included wheat and milk. 
Yet, there were a variety of long-term structural factors that contributed to 
Senegal’s vulnerability. These included the lack of a visionary agricultural 
strategy for promoting greater domestic production and commercialization 
of local goods as well as the country’s high level of urbanization and the long-
standing preference of urbanites for imported food.





The government’s initial response to the crisis was slow and characterized 
by a diverse array of interventions. After first suspending custom duties and 
value added taxes (VAT) in July 2007, the government subsequently provided 
consumer subsidies. These were accompanied by a diverse range of social pro-
tection schemes and the launch of a high-profile agricultural initiative known 
as the Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA). The 
cumulative impact of these interventions in protecting the most vulnerable 
was relatively small, while the burden on the public finances became extraor-
dinarily heavy.
Why and when did the government choose these particular policies? And 
what key factors limited their ultimate success? I  argue that the policies 
emerged from the confluence of a strong, diverse civil society placing dispa-
rate pressures on a government increasingly centralized around the personal-
ity and populist impulses of the former president Abdoulaye Wade. Having 
ascended to the presidency with the support of urbanites, Wade was loath 
to alienate this constituency. The decision to implement, and then often to 
rescind, short-term policies reflected the variable pressures exerted by differ-
ent groups. Both high levels of ministerial instability under Wade and the 
desire to please different interest groups resulted in inadequate targeting 
and implementation of policy measures and a lack of long-term planning to 
weather the crisis. In the face of competing demands by various stakeholders, 
schizophrenic policy outcomes emerged.
14.2 Contextualizing Senegal’s Agricultural Sector
Although agriculture has long represented an important sector for the 
Senegalese economy, the country imports about 60 per cent of its food 
(Ba et al. 2009). Rice in particular constitutes about 5 per cent of total imports 
and almost 70 per cent of total cereal imports (Cabral, Cissé, and Diagne 
2009). The reasons for this high food import dependence are due to the his-
toric promotion of peanuts, key structural constraints, a series of ineffective 
agricultural reforms, and rapid urbanization.
Challenges for the agricultural sector were further exacerbated when 
Senegal, along with other members of the CFA zone, devalued its currency 
in January 1994 by 50 per cent, meaning that the cost of imports purchased 
on the international market with the CFA franc increased by 100 per cent.2 
While the devaluation temporarily reduced the country’s import depend-
ence, the domestic agricultural sector did not experience a large boost in 
2 The CFA was devalued from a ratio of 50 CFA francs to 1 French franc to a ratio of 100 CFA 
francs to 1 French franc. By halving the currency, imports became twice as expensive.
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exports due to the increased cost of imported inputs. Consequently, many 
rice producers diversified into other crops. An escalation of civil conflict 
during the mid-1990s in the Casamance region, which is one of the main 
rice-producing areas, further hurt local production.3 At the same time, the 
devaluation concentrated the market structure for imported rice; while there 
were forty-three importers in 1996, there were only seven importers in 2000, 
four of which controlled 63 per cent of the total volume of imported rice 
(Ba et al. 2009).
Spurred by both the impact of the devaluation as well as Senegal’s entry 
into the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the gov-
ernment adopted in 1994 the Structural Adjustment Programme for the 
Agricultural Sector (PASA).4 PASA aimed to further liberalize the distribution 
and price of all agricultural products, privatize the rice sector and eliminate 
subsidies to the production of local rice, and progressively reduce tariffs 
with the goal of ultimately adopting a regime of general custom tariffs under 
UEMOA (IIED 2002).
14.3 Policy and Politics during Wade’s First Term (2000–7)
Senegal’s gradual economic liberalization occurred in parallel with a num-
ber of political reforms that paved the way for multi-party democracy in the 
mid-1990s.5 These reforms culminated with the victory of Abdoulaye Wade, 
leader of the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), in the 2000 presidential 
elections and ended forty years of Parti Socialist du Sénégal (PS) rule. Much 
of Wade’s initial support came from the country’s urban poor. Retaining the 
support of this constituency while also trying to expand his appeal to rural 
voters partially explains Wade’s erratic approach to the agricultural sector.
Early on in Wade’s tenure, Senegal adopted the Common External Tariff 
(CET) imposed by its membership within UEMOA. The CET was estab-
lished in 2000 in order to harmonize member countries’ customs duties on 
third-country imports and required imposing a 10 per cent levy on cereal 
imports from countries outside of the UEMOA area. In many ways, this 
increased the scope for greater rice imports since the previous customs duty 
was 20 per cent (Baris 2009). At the same time, UEMOA allows every member 
3 The Casamance civil war began in 1982 when then-President Leopold Senghor reneged on a 
promise to make the region independent. Subsequently, the Movement of Democratic Forces of 
Casamance launched a secessionist rebellion, which has now become a low-level conflict.
4 UEMOA consists of eight francophone, African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
5 Senghor paved the way for political liberalization in 1976 by allowing two additional parties 
besides the PS to compete in elections. However, it was not until constitutional changes in the 




state to choose seven categories of products that are exempt from VAT if they 
are consumed in large quantities by the poor. The Senegalese government 
chose to exempt groundnuts, cereals/manioc, fresh vegetables, fresh meat, 
fresh and frozen fish, eggs, and potatoes and onions (see IMF 2008).
Besides regional trade issues, Wade attempted to put his own mark on agri-
cultural issues. Starting in 2005, Senegal increased the share of government 
expenditure on agriculture from 4.4 to 14.1 per cent (see Fan, Omilola, and 
Lambert 2009). This exceeded the target advanced under the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) whereby African gov-
ernments committed to spending at least 10 per cent of their budgets on 
agriculture. But, instead of having a consolidated vision for the agricultural 
sector, much of Wade’s tenure was characterized by a variety of scattered 
interventions that lacked long-term planning. For instance, in 2003, Wade 
announced a ‘plan for maize’ that envisioned Senegalese farmers produc-
ing one million tons annually. Yet, the plan was announced right before the 
growing season, with little attention to the seed, fertilizer, or land require-
ments to achieve this goal (see Antil 2010). This was followed by a ‘plan for 
manioc’, ‘plan for sesame’, and then a ‘plan for bissap’. None of these ini-
tiatives were very successful, and they involved minimal engagement with 
other stakeholders.
The one exception was the Agricultural, Forestry, and Livestock Act 
(LOASP), which provided a framework for reducing poverty and diminishing 
inequalities between rural and urban populations over a twenty-year time 
horizon. To do so, the LOASP primarily was concerned with increasing agri-
cultural exports and generating incentives for private investment in rural 
areas (Stads and Sène 2011). After drafting the initial version of the LOASP, 
the Ministry of Agriculture interacted closely with other government agen-
cies and with the National Council of Rural Consultation and Cooperation 
(CNCR) in order to refine the LOASP. Established in 1993, CNCR is a federa-
tion of twenty-eight small-scale producers’ associations and due to its broad 
representation, CNCR has become the main civil society organization that 
interacts with the government on issues of agricultural policy. As such, CNCR 
organized almost 50 consultative meetings throughout the country to discuss 
an existing draft of the LOASP.
Another agricultural initiative emerged in November 2006 in the wake of 
increasingly frequent attempts by young, unemployed Senegalese to emi-
grate to Europe. A series of high-profile deportations by the main destination 
countries, Spain and Italy, led to widespread anger in the months preced-
ing the 2007 elections. Wade therefore responded by launching the Return 
to Agriculture programme (REVA), which aimed to integrate the youth into 
pilot farming centres of excellence in order to combat unemployment by 
creating 300,000 new rural jobs (see Antil 2010).
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None of these fragmented initiatives amounted to a clear and coher-
ent agricultural and rural development strategy. This was both a result 
of, and exacerbated by, the institutional landscape. Due to the increasing 
centralization of power around the presidency under Wade, he frequently 
shifted his cabinet to prevent the emergence of political competitors or to 
reflect a new perspective on how his government should be organized (see 
Mbow 2008). For instance, the portfolio of the Ministry of Agriculture was 
consistently changing during Wade’s first seven years in office. It shifted 
from being responsible for agriculture and livestock under Pape Diouf 
from 2000 until 2003, to agriculture and water under Habib Sy from 2003 
until 2006, and then to agriculture, water, and food security under Farba 
Senghor in 2006. This persistent shift in ministers undermined policy 
continuity. Furthermore, these circumstances prove highly problematic 
for the vast donor community in the country concerned with issues of 
rural development. As noted by an agricultural specialist at the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘the fundamental 
problem for USAID is that there is no interlocutor to discuss agricultural 
strategy’ (interview with Badiane 2012). Likewise, the director of the Food 
and Agricultural Office (FAO) in Senegal noted, ‘There is a lot of instability 
within the agricultural ministry since 2002, and there have been at least 
seven ministers over the last six years. These changes are often accompa-
nied by a change in the directors as well and this makes our communica-
tion less efficient, and this is honestly a problem’ (interview with Ouattara 
2012).
A similar dynamic characterized policy in other important sectors, such 
as social protection. Between 2001 and 2007, the main ministry in charge 
of social protection had its main mandate and portfolio of operations 
changed seven times, shifting from the Ministry of Social Development 
to the Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Female Enterprise, and 
Micro-Finance by the end of 2007. Not surprisingly, this institutional 
instability prevented the Department of Social Assistance, which has been 
housed in these various ministries, from implementing durable social pro-
tection programmes (Samson and Cherrier 2009). At the same time, a num-
ber of other ministries, ranging from education, labour, agriculture, and 
health, are also involved in social protection activities, leading to chal-
lenges with coordination.
Historically, Senegal’s social protection regime has been extremely limited. 
However, in 2005, the government adopted the National Social Protection 
Strategy (NSPS), which aimed to extend health insurance coverage from 20 to 
50 per cent of the population, and to implement a social protection regime to 
protect those most vulnerable to shocks. Yet, there has been little ownership 
of the NSPS, and yearly reviews of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper reveal 
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that this is the component which has the weakest implementation (interview 
with Pigois 2012).
14.4 Evolution and Manifestations of a Crisis
The above context, characterized by weak social protection measures, the 
lack of an agricultural strategy, continued food import dependence, and high 
levels of ministerial instability, provided the backdrop to the food price crisis 
in Senegal, which began in 2007 and continued through 2008. The imme-
diate cause of the crisis was twofold. First, Senegal experienced especially 
poor agricultural yields during both the 2006/7 and 2007/8 production peri-
ods. In 2006/7, a shortage in seeds and other inputs and a late start to the 
rainy season shortened the plant cycle and caused cereal yields to decline. In 
December 2006, the FAO was already warning of a crisis and noted that net 
domestic production could only meet 48 per cent of the country’s grain needs 
(FEWS NET 2006).
Torrential rainfalls in late August and September further limited output 
from the 2007/8 harvest (EIU 2007). Second, the crisis in domestic produc-
tion only increased Senegal’s dependence on food imports. High levels of 
exposure to external markets proved particularly dangerous due to global 
price increases in 2007 for key commodities that Senegal imports. In fact, 
food price inflation increased 1.4 to 7.3 per cent between 2006 and 2007 
(WFP 2008a).
14.5 Government Responses to the Food Crisis
Senegal therefore faced a crisis for a variety of major consumer products, 
in addition to rising costs for fuel, kerosene, and butane gas, which are 
critical for cooking and electricity. Yet, the government’s response to the 
crisis initially was quite slow, hindered by the priorities of the February and 
June 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively.6 Indeed, 
the director of the FAO office in Senegal observed, ‘Six months before the 
crisis in 2007, the previous [FAO] director tried to attract the attention of 
the president and his ministers to the fact that there was a looming crisis 
by showing them our statistics and early warning system. The former direc-
tor wrote a communiqué noting that the government needed to be careful 
6 Wade was re-elected as president in 2007 with 55 per cent of the vote, with strong levels of 
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because a food crisis was looming because we could see that the global food 
stocks were going down. The government was not very convinced’ (inter-
view with Ouattara 2012).
By mid-2007, radio stations increasingly were emphasizing the implications 
of rising food prices as the period of Ramadan approached. Due to growing 
social pressures, the government ultimately responded with a combination of 
trade and fiscal measures, social protection policies, and production support. 
The broad and variegated level of interventions reflected the influence of 
various interest groups, who each in turn convinced the government to sup-
port their particular cause. Figures 14.1 and 14.2 elaborate on the chronology 
of events and policy decisions over 2007 and 2008, which are detailed in the 
subsequent sub-sections.
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Figure 14.1 Timeline of events, 2007
Source: author’s compilation.


































14.5.1 Trade and Fiscal Measures
Some of the initial impetus for the government’s response to the food crisis 
emerged from the National Confederation of Senegalese Employers (CNES) 
who sent a declaration to the Ministry of Economy and Finance in early 2007 
demanding the removal of custom duties and VAT taxes on powdered milk. 
By May 2007, the CNES met with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Commerce, the Ministry of Livestock, importers, and producers of milk-based 
products affiliated with the Union of Professionals of Industries and Mines 
(SPIDS). Most stakeholders involved in the meeting disagreed with CNES, 
and subsequent studies by the Ministry of Finance revealed the negative fiscal 
impact that such measures would have (Dia et al. 2008).
The following month, a range of important consumers groups and trade 
unions organized demonstrations in which they accused traders of benefiting 
from the price rises and the government of failing to care about consumers. 
In turn, during a meeting of his ministers later that month, President Wade 
delegated the Ministry of Commerce to find a way to tackle the food crisis 
(Dia et al. 2008). In July and August, the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
subsequently announced the suspension of customs duties of 10 per cent for 
rice, 5 per cent for wheat, and 5 per cent for powdered milk that it typically 
implements as part of the CET with UEMOA. The 18 per cent VAT under 
UEMOA was also lifted on powdered milk (IMF 2008). The latter measure was 
opposed by domestic milk processors and producers who believed that the 
VAT should be maintained and re-invested into the local dairy sector (Dia 
et al. 2008).
To compensate for the revenue losses created by these interventions, the 
government attempted to undergo further fiscal policy changes. In early 
November 2007, the government announced it would reduce public sector 
salaries and introduce a progressive tax of between 1 and 30 per cent for both 
private and public sector salaries. Not surprisingly, these measures were heav-
ily unpopular and ultimately reversed. Yet, it motivated many of the country’s 
trade unions and opposition parties to announce a march on 22 November 
to protest against the rising cost of living and to demand higher salaries. The 
march coincided with a heavily violent riot in Dakar by street vendors, who 
were forced off the street by police in an effort to gentrify the city centre to 
prepare for Senegal’s hosting of the eleventh summit of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference. The government eventually quelled tensions by 
focusing more specifically on improving working conditions for vendors (EIU 
2007) rather than addressing the concern over high food costs. However, it 
did prompt President Wade to sign an agreement with the Government of 
India in March 2008 to send approximately 600,000 tons of rice to Senegal 
annually for the subsequent five years (OBG 2009).
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14.5.2 Social Protection Policies
Besides these trade and tax measures, the Ministry of Commerce implemented 
a series of price ceilings, or implicit consumer subsidies, which tended to 
have only minimal sustainability. For instance, in November 2006, wheat 
flour was added to the homologation regime, resulting in a fixed price for 
both wheat and wheat flour (Ministry of Commerce 2007; Ndiaye 2007a).7 
Yet, the world price and import price of wheat slowly increased over the sum-
mer of 2007, leading both large-scale importers and millers to demand that 
the government amend its price ceiling, noting that they were losing money 
as the price of flour and bread remained fixed. Philippe Steffan, the direc-
tor of Grands Moulins de Dakar, which is the largest importer of wheat and 
miller of flour in Senegal, alerted the government in October 2007 that his 
factory would begin firing millers if the prices were not re-adjusted (see Flipo 
2007). Bakers, however, wanted to continue retaining a profit margin from 
their sale of bread while major consumers’ organizations insisted that the 
government maintain price stability. Ultimately, the government sided with 
the millers and bakers by agreeing in late October to raise the price of bread 
by November, strategically ensuring that this increase occurred after the end 
of Ramadan.
In July 2007, the price of scented, broken rice was set at CFA 225, down from 
the CFA 250–75 national average. Yet, due to a lack of enforcement, most rice 
retailers eventually abandoned the price ceilings (Ndiaye 2007b). The price of 
milk and milk powder was not fixed until right before the start of Ramadan in 
September 2007 (Ndiaye 2007b). However, as noted in more detail below, the 
concentration of milk consumption among wealthier Senegalese meant that 
this measure did not have a large impact on protecting the poor.
In late March 2008, the government faced even greater pressure to confront 
the food crisis as a result of a demonstration by the largest and best organized 
consumer union, the Association of Senegalese Consumers (ASCOSEN), and 
supported by many key opposition parties. Since many participants wrote 
on their T-shirts On a faim, ça suffit (We are hungry, that’s enough!), this 
march was ultimately labelled in the media as the Emeutes de faim (Food riots) 
(interview with Ndao 2012). Due to the participation of opposition groups, 
President Wade claimed that the rally was only an attempt by the opposi-
tion to gain attention. Instead, he announced publicly ‘There is no famine in 
Senegal. There are no hunger riots in Senegal’ (cited by Sy 2008).
Subsequently, however, Wade invited the leader of ASCOSEN, Momar Ndao, 
to explain why he organized the protests. After explaining their concern with 
7 Homologation is a price setting mechanism that requires the government to consult with 




reducing consumer prices and the organization’s own solutions to this prob-
lem, ‘Wade called the prime minister and said “These people have some inter-
esting solutions and I ask you to organize a meeting every week in order to 
exchange ideas about how to deal with the food prices”. The State organized a 
type of task force, quasi inter-ministerial, presided over by the prime minister 
and with all the relevant ministries’ (interview with Ndao 2012).
Consequently, in April 2008, the government stated it would offer a sub-
sidy to rice distributors in order for them to maintain the price at a maximum 
of CFA 280 a kilogram (WFP 2008a). This, however, led to a rationing of rice 
supplies because the government could not pay many distributors the sub-
sidies on time. In turn, 200,000 tons of rice were stockpiled in warehouses 
around Dakar by early May 2008 and caused the retail price in Dakar to inch 
closer to CFA 300 per kg (Sylla 2008).
Indeed, the powerful National Union of Traders and Industrialists of 
Senegal (UNACOIS), which includes large-scale rice importers as members, 
believed the subsidies were a mistake. According to the organization’s sec-
retary general, ‘During the crisis, we [UNACOIS] did tell the Ministry of 
Commerce that we are in a free market and the government needs to have 
the courage to say that to the population . . . We opposed the government’s 
decision to introduce subsidies but, the government ignored us because it 
was under so much pressure and protests. But, we didn’t think this was a 
sustainable policy’ (interview with Lo 2012). The subsidy on rice was discon-
tinued in July 2008 due to budget constraints. In fact, the policy had cost the 
government CFA 11.5 billion (Daffé, Cissé, and Diène 2011), even as many 
importers and traders still remained unpaid for this consumer subsidy in the 
form of tax rebates and direct payments (Ndiaye 2009).
The crisis also demanded a greater role for the Commission for Food 
Security, which holds the country’s cereal stocks and provides price and sup-
ply information on a regular basis for millet, sorghum, rice, maize, peanuts, 
and beans. The main response of this agency to the crisis occurred in May 
2008 through its Assistance au Monde Rural (AMR) programme. The AMR 
involved the purchase of more than 20,000 metric tons of rice in order to 
target vulnerable consumers in rural areas. By August 2008, when the annual 
rains began, the distribution of rice was halted (interview with Sèye 2012).
Arguably, a more developed social protection programme would have rep-
resented the best approach for protecting vulnerable Senegalese from food 
price shocks in the short term. Despite the country’s weak social protection 
system, a range of donors in the country, including USAID, UNICEF, the 
World Food Programme, the World Bank, and the FAO have shown an inter-
est in supporting greater protection of the vulnerable. For instance, a school 
feeding program was established in Dakar in 2008 that assisted approximately 
80,000 children between the ages of 3 and 12 (Daffé, Cissé, and Diène 2011). 
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Another project, entitled ‘Targeted Child Nutrition and Social Transfers’, has 
provided vulnerable mothers of children aged 0–5 with a financial subsidy. 
A programme of food vouchers, costing approximately CFA 1.9 billion, was 
also established in 2008 for 17,400 households in a suburb of Dakar and in 
the southern region of Ziguinchor (Daffé, Cissé, and Diène 2011). Probably 
one of the clearest modes of social protection occurred through overseas 
remittances, which increased from CFA 400 to 560 billion between 2006 and 
2008 before falling in 2009 (see Daffé, Cissé, and Diène 2011).
14.5.3 Production and Commercial Support
The centrepiece of the government’s response to the food crisis was GOANA, 
which was launched in May 2008. The announcement followed another 
march on 26 April against the rising cost of living that was organized by the 
opposition coalition known as Front Siggil Senegal. Food self-sufficiency rep-
resented GOANA’s main objective. The mechanisms for doing this included 
irrigating and cultivating unused land in the River Valley, providing subsidies 
for seeds, fertilizers and phytosanitary products, assisting with rice commer-
cialization, reinforcing the capacity of producers, and introducing new varie-
ties of rice, such as the New Rice for Africa. Overall, GOANA aimed to create, 
on an annual basis, 500,000 tons of rice, 2 million tons of maize, 3 million 
tons of manioc, 2 million tons of other cereals, and 400 million litres of milk 
(Antil 2010).
The announcement of GOANA received only a lukewarm reception from 
both domestic stakeholders and international donors. While large-scale 
investments in the agricultural sector were widely supported, the specific aim 
of attaining food self-sufficiency was deemed unrealistic. Moreover, like REVA 
and previous agricultural plans, the initiative reflected Wade’s tendency for 
short-term, populist projects rather than a long-term agricultural strategy. 
According to one report, many government ministers were completely sur-
prised by the announcement of GOANA (see Antil 2010).
The CNCR in particular denounced the abandonment of the LOASP, 
which had involved large-scale stakeholder consultation, while GOANA had 
involved none. Furthermore, given that the CNCR includes many of the 
country’s small-scale producers, the organization’s members did not under-
stand how GOANA’s goals could be feasibly achieved: ‘CNCR and its members 
are surprised by the extremely ambitious quantitative objectives, which they 
consider impossible to achieve in the given time frame. The experiences and 
failures of special programmes of production for maize, manioc, sesame, and 
bissap confirm that these objectives are not realistic’ (CNCR 2008). Indeed, 
the cost of expanding rice production by the desired 500,000 tons for just one 




to the entire total budget for the agricultural sector during the previous four 
years combined (Ndiaye 2009).
Although the FAO provided US$1.5 million to buy inputs for the most vul-
nerable smallholders during the crisis, it has had no affiliation with GOANA. In 
fact, the organization had been working with the government on elaborating 
a national policy document called the National Programme to Support Food 
Security, which had a five-year time horizon and involved a diverse range of 
long-term interventions. Without consulting the FAO, the government aban-
doned the document and soon thereafter announced GOANA. According to 
the national FAO director, ‘GOANA is not a sustainable programme. In fact, 
you see every year GOANA I, II, III. If this was a good programme, it would 
have been oriented towards the medium and long term rather than changed 
every year’ (interview with Ouattara 2012). Representatives of USAID felt sim-
ilarly, noting that GOANA lacked structural support and sustainability and 
should have instead been embedded within a larger agricultural programme 
(interview with Badiane 2012).
A second and less controversial initiative undertaken specifically by the 
Ministry of Commerce was the establishment of Reference Stores. Although 
originally adopted by the government in July 2001, this project was not 
implemented until October 2007 after a consultation with the president’s 
council of ministers. The objectives of this programme were threefold. The 
first was to better integrate the food distribution network so that retail sell-
ers would be more directly linked with purchasing centres, thereby reduc-
ing transaction costs and creating competition among retailers in order to 
improve prices for consumers. The second was to promote local agricultural 
production through supporting goods in the Reference Stores such as iodized 
salt, local rice, milk, sugar, oil, tomatoes, onions, and soap. A final objec-
tive was to promote greater employment, particularly among the youth, by 
creating more retail jobs. Three private promoters (Easy Boutiques, Prista, 
and Référence Boutique) were responsible for implementing this programme 
with the support of CFA 3 billion in finance from the Ministry’s Economic 
Promotion Fund (Ministry of Commerce 2011).
Collectively then, the government encountered a broad range of 
well-organized and vocal interest groups who each possessed distinct prefer-
ences on various policy mechanisms (see Table 14.1). The type and design 
of the interventions the government ultimately took illustrated three key 
elements of policy-making under Wade. First, even though a well-targeted 
social targeting programme combined with a legitimate, long-term agricul-
tural strategy would have been the most appropriate response to the crisis, 
the government clearly was concerned with attempting to satisfy as many 
groups as possible. Second, many of these initiatives were reactionary, had 
short time-horizons, and were not well-planned. Third and relatedly, they 
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also were the outcome of presidential interference in the policy process, 
reflecting the increasing centralization and personalization of power around 
Wade that already manifested during his first term.
14.6 Impact of the Crisis and Government Responses
By the end of 2008, many of these policies had not quelled social discontent. 
Nevertheless, the collective impact of both the crisis and the government’s 
response was increasingly clear in three key domains: (1) macroeconomics 
and trade; (2) poverty, malnutrition, and household welfare; and (3) produc-
tion and commerce.
14.6.1 Macroeconomics and Trade
Both the crisis and the government’s reaction placed a huge burden on the 
country’s public finances. The rising cost of imports resulted in a trade deficit 
increase from 17.1 to 25.6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) between 
2006 and 2008. During the same period, the external current account deficit 
rose from 9.8 to 14.7 per cent (Daffé, Cissé, and Diène. 2011). Some of this 
burden was alleviated in December 2008 when the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) approved a one-year arrangement of US$75.6 million under the 
Table 14.1 Identifying key domestic stakeholders and policy preferences
Stakeholder 
Group
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Processors SPIDS (Nestlé, Saprolait, 
Senlait, Mamelles 
Jabot, etc.)





Front Siggil Senegal Advocated supporting 









exogenous shocks facility (ESF) to enable Senegal to finance the balance of 
payments impact of higher food and energy prices. This allowed Senegal to 
immediately obtain US$37.8 million from the IMF and to receive an equal 
amount upon completion of the first review under the ESF arrangement.8
The government’s collective response to the crisis resulted in a tremendous 
loss of public revenue. According to the IMF (2008), elimination of customs 
duties on rice, wheat, and milk powder, which were finally re-instated in 
September 2008, cost the government a total of CFA 12 billion during 2007. 
Similarly, the removal of the VAT on wheat flour and milk powder resulted 
in a loss of CFA 5 billion and 12 billion, respectively.9 Collectively, these rev-
enue losses were equivalent to 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2007. During 2008, the 
cost of the trade and fiscal measures increased to CFA 36 billion (FAO 2009). 
After considering the cost of other social protection policies as well as subsi-
dies that the government allocated for electricity and gas, the government’s 
overall response to the crisis amounted to CFA 374 billion (US$748 million) 
(Diouf 2011).10
Besides causing the government to lose substantial revenue, the reduction 
of the VAT on rice in particular further augmented the appeal of importing 
rice, thereby exacerbating one of the main structural weaknesses at the heart 
of the crisis (David-Benz et al. 2010).
14.6.2 Poverty, Malnutrition, and Household Welfare
The crisis demonstrated notable impacts on incomes and consumption 
within urban areas, across the rural and urban milieu, and among different 
rural regions of the country. Households engaged in a variety of strategies to 
cope with the crisis. In urban areas, households often shifted their diets to 
cheaper but more affordable goods or reduced their number of daily meals. In 
rural areas, households often depended on assistance from neighbours and 
family or bought food on credit (WFP 2011).
The poverty rates of rural households are estimated to have risen slightly 
between 2005–6 and 2009. In rural areas, Cabral (2008) found that farm-
ers who combined subsistence agriculture with livestock breeding were more 
protected from the crisis than those who relied on subsistence agriculture 
alone. Indicators of child malnutrition generally worsened in the years after 
the crisis, even in urban areas. One of the main exceptions to this trend was 
in St. Louis where child stunting in particular decreased over time. St. Louis is 
8 See <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08334.htm>.
9 For the powdered milk, Dia et al. (2008) have further estimated that the loss in public revenue 
in 2008 was CFA 10.76 billion.
10 This excludes the cost of GOANA. Subsidies for butane gas and electricity comprised some of 
the largest outlays by the government, estimated at around CFA 75 billion (see FAO 2008).
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the centre of domestic rice production and as many Senegalese shifted to con-
suming domestic varieties of rice when imported rice became too expensive, 
access to such varieties were higher in this region than elsewhere. Moreover, 
domestic rice production experienced a boost during the 2009 and 2010 
seasons.
Within urban areas, informal workers and casual labour were hurt much 
more than salaried professionals by price rises. A study on urban malnutri-
tion following the crisis revealed that residents in both Pikine, which is the 
most densely populated area of Dakar, and in Ziguinchor were more likely 
to be unable to meet their food needs than those in Kaolack, which is the 
center of millet production (WFP 2008b). Even though it is the second main 
rice producing region, Ziguinchor had the highest rates of food insecurity 
during the crisis (WFP 2011), a phenomenon tied to poor infrastructure 
connecting the region to the rest of the country and continuing low-level 
civil conflict in the broader region of the Casamance.
The VAT removals and suspension of customs duties by the government 
had disparate effects on the rural and urban segments of the population 
depending on the commodity under consideration. Estimates by the IMF 
(2008) revealed that the use of these measures in 2007 to contain the price of 
rice benefitted the two poorest quintiles of the population and those in rural 
areas more, especially given that these commodities comprise a larger share 
of the food budget for these groups. By contrast, richer Senegalese benefitted 
from the measures targeted at powdered milk. The tariff removals for bread 
were most beneficial for the urban poor, who consume a higher share of this 
commodity than their rural counterparts. Overall, the IMF (2008) concluded 
that by the end of 2007, almost 55 per cent of the benefits accumulated from 
the trade and fiscal measures accrued to households within the top 40 per 
cent of the welfare distribution.
A similar trend emerged with respect to the government’s various social 
protection policies. According to the Commission for Food Security, its efforts 
to distribute rice through the AMR were not very successful for numerous 
reasons. First, the government reduced the Commission for Food Security’s 
requested budget for the programme, from CFA 10 billion to 7.9 billion, dur-
ing a series of modifications within the National Assembly. Second, these 
resources were released to the Commission for Food Security forty-five days 
behind schedule, delaying the purchase of rice from UNACOIS and the organ-
ization of vehicles and technical capacity to deliver the rice. Third, while the 
Commission for Food Security wanted to target so-called ‘red zones’, which 
indicate the highest level of vulnerability, the government preferred to target 
everyone. Above all, the director of the Commission for Food Security argues 
that his unit’s ability to function has been hindered by high levels of minis-
terial instability: ‘We’ve been in the office of the president, the office of the 
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prime minister, the Ministry of Agriculture, and now in the Ministry of the 
Family . . . We are moving all the time, like a suitcase. In the same way, many 
other agencies and their bosses are moving’ (interview with Sèye 2012).The 
political disincentive for targeting is exacerbated by a lack of both technical 
capacity within the government and a database for identifying beneficiaries, 
the absence of a governmental body in charge of social protection, and little 
consensus on targeting (e.g., community based vs. means tested) even among 
the donor community (interview with Pigois 2012).
14.6.3 Production and Commerce
The impact of the main initiative to support production, GOANA, was posi-
tive in the short term but with few long-term benefits. On the one hand, 
Gergely and Baris (2009) estimate that the country achieved its objective of 
500,000 tons of rice production during 2008/9, mostly because of favourable 
rains, the expansion of cultivated land, and planting during the both the 
dry and wet seasons. Much of these production gains occurred in the River 
Valley around St. Louis, which accounted for approximately 70 per cent of 
the increase in production. As a consequence of this increased production 
as well as a substitution to maize, the average level of dependence on rice 
imports decreased to 65 per cent in 2010, compared with an average of 82 per 
cent over the period from 2001–10 (WFP 2011).
On the other hand, rice production fell again to 406,000 tons by the 2010/11 
growing season, suggesting that the brief period of production gains was due 
more to good rains than to the structure of GOANA. Ndiaye (2009) also notes 
that the political pressures for GOANA to succeed have prevented an objec-
tive assessment of crop surveys and the implementation of key famine early 
warning mechanisms. Furthermore, GOANA does not address processing and 
commercialization, and therefore increased production does not necessarily 
translate into increased food security for the broader population (OBG 2009). 
Therefore, while the intention underlying GOANA was laudable, the plan 
appears to have been too focused on short-term production goals rather than 
structural changes critical for ensuring the country’s long-term food security.
REVA has likewise demonstrated ambiguous results in terms of enticing 
young people to farm. As of 2010, a total of 600 jobs, rather than the antici-
pated 300,000, have been created within the fruit and vegetables sector (Daffé, 
Cissé, and Diène 2011). According to a study conducted by Sall (2012), REVA 
resulted in young people learning new farming techniques, including ways 
of farming during the typical dry season. However, a number of participants 
have still complained about the low incomes from agriculture, and some 
farms experienced noticeable dropout rates by youth from Dakar who found 
it difficult to adjust to living conditions in rural areas. Most significantly, 
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REVA’s focus on horticultural, export-oriented agriculture appears to conflict 
with the food security objectives embedded within GOANA and previous 
agricultural plans, such as the LOASP (see OECD 2007).
The Reference Stores created by the Ministry of Commerce resulted in the 
establishment of 170 stores by 2011, 119 of which were in Dakar. But, this has 
not proved to be a very sustainable programme due to the inability to retain 
store managers beyond a year or so. Many have migrated, either to other 
areas of Senegal or overseas, and some used the money they received from the 
state for other means than to purchase goods from local markets. The three 
networks managing the stores complained that part of the reason for the 
lacklustre success of this programme was the lack of support from the state 
(interview with Diouf 2012). The continued operation of the programme and 
its expansion to the rest of the country depends heavily on further invest-
ment in resources by the government (Diouf 2010).
14.7 Conclusions: Beyond 2007/8, beyond Wade
The 2007/8 food price crisis dramatically highlighted the unsustainabil-
ity of Senegal’s longstanding consumption and production patterns. The 
preference of Senegal’s large urban population for imported rice, powdered 
milk, and wheat-based bread represented the country’s Achilles heel as 
such goods became increasingly expensive. Although the preference for 
imported goods was inherited from the colonial period, successive gov-
ernments have done little to ameliorate this skewed pattern. Large-scale 
discontent, particularly in Dakar, manifested in no less than five major 
protests during the crisis period. For the former president Wade, who rose 
to power in 2000 by tapping into urban disgruntlement under his predeces-
sor, the food price crisis represented a threat to his presidential legacy. The 
crisis emerged at a time when he had already increasingly centralized power 
around the executive, launched a variety of short-term but high-profile 
plans within the agricultural sector and elsewhere, and reshuffled his cabi-
net multiple times. The resultant high levels of ministerial instability pre-
vented more long-term strategic planning within the agricultural and social 
protection sectors as well as closer engagement with the donor commu-
nity. Simultaneously, however, Senegal’s vibrant democracy resulted in the 
emergence of a broad range of well-organized interest groups advocating 
for specific policy mechanisms. In order to satisfy as many groups as pos-
sible, the government forfeited the opportunity to devise a well-targeted 
social protection programme and a long-term agricultural strategy. Instead, 
the government’s initiatives were reactionary, myopic, and resulted in sig-




and the termination of consumer subsidies only three months after their 
implementation.
These patterns were not just limited to the 2007/8 period. By 2012, the 
price of food became heavily politicized due to presidential elections sched-
uled for February. Wade’s key opponent in those elections, Macky Sall, argued 
on the campaign trail that food prices would again increase if Wade were 
re-elected for a third time (Dione 2012). To avoid attracting scorn on his 
government’s attempts to handle the 2007/8 crisis, Wade failed to respond to 
growing warnings by the donor community that a second crisis was possible 
within the Sahel. In late 2011, the FAO noted that a decline in cereal and 
agro-pastoral production in a number of West African countries, including 
Senegal, posed a new threat to food security. With a level of cereal produc-
tion that could meet only 39 per cent of the Senegalese population’s cereal 
consumption needs, the Commission for Food Security, USAID, the WFP, and 
the FAO all publicized the possibility of a new crisis but received no response 
from Wade’s government (interview with Seye 2012). Indeed, for the FAO, 
electoral motives were clearly a prime reason for this decision: ‘Another crisis 
is looming but in the electoral period, the government has said nothing and 
not asked the FAO and WFP to help because if it declares that a famine is pos-
sible, the opposition could then blame the government for this’ (interview 
with Ouattara 2012).
Ultimately, Sall ousted Wade, obtaining almost two-thirds of the national 
vote. Widely viewed as a technocrat who lacks Wade’s penchant for 
short-term populist policies, there is the potential for greater bureaucratic 
decision-making on issues of agriculture, trade, and social protection.11 Thus, 
if another global crisis occurs, hopefully the impact will not only be less 
severe but also the policy responses will target the poorest without requir-
ing exorbitant outlays of government revenue or sowing so much discontent 
among Senegal’s various stakeholders.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 





The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Vietnam
Nguyen Manh Hai and Theodore Talbot 
15.1 Introduction
It is difficult to overstate the importance—cultural and nutritional—of rice to 
Vietnam’s economy and society. As such, policies that influence rice produc-
tion and prices provide a lens through which to understand broader agricul-
tural policies both in Vietnam and other low- or middle-income economies 
where agriculture remains one of the major components of national income. 
This paper sheds light on the political economy of rice price policy in Vietnam 
by discussing the government’s response to a rapid escalation in food prices. 
We document how agricultural policy and market incentives caused domes-
tic production and prices to deviate from market-clearing equilibrium values, 
and draw broader lessons for agricultural policy in Vietnam and beyond.
This is an opportune moment to develop an understanding of how domes-
tic political processes interact with market forces to determine prices. First, 
as in many low-income countries experiencing a combination of economic 
growth and rapid urbanization, Vietnam’s arable land is under pressure: ris-
ing land prices and high prices for crops that can be produced with approxi-
mately the same inputs increase the opportunity costs of rice production. 
Second, the structural transformation of the Vietnamese economy is moving 
a large number of households away from agricultural production into higher 
value added activities, creating a large, growing, and politically influential 
group of net food consumers whose real incomes are compromised when 
food prices rise. Third, despite the primacy of industrial policy, agricultural 
policies—particularly food price policies—remain an important focal point 
for the Vietnamese government, particularly in light of dramatic 150 per 





share of the agricultural sector in the Vietnamese economy is slowly declin-
ing to 21 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, 69.8 per cent 
of the total population continues to live in rural areas where rice is either a 
major income source, a large component of the household consumption bas-
ket, or both (GSO 2011a). Finally, understanding how food prices are deter-
mined has become particularly urgent in light of countries’ vulnerability to 
food price shocks revealed by a global run-up in food prices during 2007–8. 
The Vietnamese experience was, of course, not unique in this respect.1 Prices 
reflect the interplay of market forces and government policies, and the agri-
cultural price shock has made policy formulation in low- and middle-income 
countries an important contemporary research area. While traditional eco-
nomic analysis provides partial explanation of overall price movements, a 
full account of price dynamics requires understanding the political economy 
of food price policy. This study fills a gap in the literature by focusing on 
the case of rice prices in Vietnam. Specifically, we argue that observed prices 
reveal significant market intervention by the state, and that this intervention 
appears internally inconsistent because it reflects the competing demands of 
two distinct constituencies: net rice producers and net rice consumers.
15.2 Country Context
Most authors date the end of Vietnam’s era of central planning to 1986, when 
the government implemeted the Doi Moi (commonly translated as ‘reform’ 
or ‘renovation’) process, a series of market-oriented industrial and agricul-
tural reforms reversing collectivization and successively introducing meas-
ures ranging from privately-held land use rights to decreased import taxes, 
including on key agricultural inputs like urea and fertilizer. During the 1970s, 
the country exhibited chronic low levels of agricultural production and, as a 
consequence, low levels of food consumption per capita, including localized 
instances of famine. As in many post-collectivist economies, liberalization 
generated significant increases in yields, culminating in the current situa-
tion in which Vietnam is the world’s second largest rice exporter by volume, 
with seven million tons of rice exported in 2011, second only to 8.5 mil-
lion tons exported by Thailand (VFA 2012). Vietnam’s green revolution is 
remarkable, but should be contextualized. While a large exporter, Vietnam’s 
total rice production remains lower than that of countries such as China, 
India, and Indonesia, and while the country accounts for about one-fifth of 
annual world rice exports by volume, it accounts for only around 5 per cent 
1 See, for example, Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao (2008), de Janvry and Sadoulet (2009), Wondon 





of total exports by value, indicating a combination of lower quality and lower 
value added rice exports. Vietnam’s macroeconomic performance has also 
delivered remarkable increases in average living standards. Higher agricul-
tural yields have been accompanied by dramatically higher rates of economic 
growth. From 2000 onwards, Vietnam’s real (purchasing power parity- (PPP-)
adjusted) per capita income has grown at 6 per cent per year.
While the economy continues to expand, there have been chronic struc-
tural and macroeconmic problems. Vietnamese agriculture has increased 
yields and total output but has not been able to substantially increase qual-
ity or value added. Further expansions in agricultural production are possi-
ble, but remain stymied by small, fragmented cultivation areas that prevent 
investment in agricultural equipment or exploiting economies of scale in 
crop production. The country is ranked ninety-eighth out of 183 in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business index in 2011 (IFC 2012), indicating significant 
administrative and bureaucratic barriers, including corruption. Along with 
high growth rates, the country has experienced persistent and volatile infla-
tion and, since 2009, a decline in investment, generating sufficient concern 
for the government to introduce a macroeconomic stabilization package in 
2008. Finally, as a price taker in agricultural markets and an oil producer (oil 
contributes arpproximately 20 per cent to the country’s GDP), Vietnam’s cur-
rent account is heavily exposed to international price movements.
15.2.1 Socioeconomic Context
The state sector’s share of GDP has decreased from 35.9 per cent in 2007 to 
33.2 per cent in 2009, reflecting increasing prominence of the private sector, 
including through privatization (referred to as ‘equitization’) and mergers 
and acquisitions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Vietnam weathered the global financial crisis relatively well:  growth 
rebounded from earlier slumps to reach 6.78 per cent in 2010. But the agri-
culture, forestry, and fishery (AFF) sector continues to face serious challenges, 
with estimated growth rates of value added around 3 per cent in 2010, indi-
cating serious structural issues and persistent vulnerability to price shocks.
How inclusive has this growth been? While some groups have not ben-
efited from macroeconomic growth, overall poverty has declined dramati-
cally. The share of Vietnam’s population living beneath the national poverty 
line more than halved between 1998 and 2009, from 37.4 per cent to 14.2 per 
cent, much of which has been driven by a decline in rural poverty, which 
decreased from 35.6 per cent in 2002 to 17.4 per cent in 2009, while urban 
poverty rates have been relatively static: 6.6 per cent in 2002, and 6.9 per cent 
in 2009 (MOLISA 2011). Due, in part, to the financial crisis in 2008–9, the 




While the overall trend for poverty is steeply negative, there is some fluctua-
tion around this trend, and microeconomic evidence points to localized areas 
of persistent poverty, particularly in the north of Vietnam and amongst eth-
nic minority populations (Tarp and McKay 2011).
15.2.2 Political Structure
Since 1975, Vietnam has been a Socialist Republic governed by a constitution 
promulgated in April 1992 that replaced the previous document drafted in 
1980. The constitution establishes the country as a single-party state governed 
by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), whose stated objectives include 
growth-oriented policies to increase welfare and the delivery of social services. 
A unicameral legislative system means that all laws are passed by the National 
Assembly (NA) of Vietnam. Nominally, the executive and judicial branches of 
government are subservient to the NA, which has a constitutional mandate 
of ‘close co-operation and co-ordination’ with the CPV. Government minis-
ters and senior officials are largely drawn from the membership of the NA. 
Figure 15.1 illustrates the policy-making process in Vietnam.
Despite its formal status as a one-party state, a form of electoral competition 
exists because members must be elected to the NA through locally-contested 
elections, while the Party Congress provides an opportunity for critique of 
existing policies and the introduction of radically new ones.2 As with most 
contested political competitions, the Government’s incentives to minimize 
economic volatility increase around the time of the Congress or elections 
to the NA. For the former, price volatility or inept economic management 
can result in dramatic changes in economic policy. For sitting representa-
tives in the NA, economic mismanagement may prevent re-election. These 
‘electoral’ cycles therefore create additional pressure for the state to move 
market prices.
The combination of a strong, centralized bureaucracy and a single-party 
system has resulted in a relatively stable political environment. The tone of 
CPV’s policy is increasingly oriented towards liberalization and, having previ-
ously prioritized economic growth, emphasis is shifting towards macroeco-
nomic resilience and stability.
15.2.3 Key Decision-making Actors
The key political bodies are the NA, the state president, and the government, 
led by the prime minister. The NA is the most senior decision-making body, 






determining domestic and foreign policy, including national defence and 
state security. The NA is also the only body able to revise and approve the 
constitution and draft legislation. (Vietnam has numerous, highly specific 
legislative tools, such as codes, decrees, decisions, laws, and resolutions, each 
with subtle differences in scope and authority.)
Article 4 of the Vietnamese constitution defines the role of the CPV as 
‘ . . . the leading force of the state and society’. While the CPV and the NA are 
theoretically distinct, 90 per cent of NA members are also on the membership 
rolls of the CPV, as are the majority of senior government officials, including 
the prime minister and the cabinet (ISOS 2013).
The NA has significant power over political appointments, and collec-
tively selects the president. Candidates for this office are drawn from the elite 
deputies of the NA, and the holder of this office has a mixture of legislative 
and executive responsibilities. According to Article 103 of the 1992 consti-
tution, the president promulgates legal documents adopted by the NA, has 
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Figure 15.1 The policy-making process in Vietnam
Source: adapted from Cong (2001) and McCarty (2002).
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command of the armed forces, holds the office of chairman of the National 
Defence and Security Council, and appoints or proposes the appointment of 
vice presidents, the prime minister, the chief judge of the Supreme People’s 
Court, and the head of the Supreme People’s Procuracy.3
Policies decided by the NA under the leadership of the president are imple-
mented by the government, and senior government officials are typically 
party members. The government is accountable to the NA, in particular to the 
standing committee and the office of the president. The most senior execu-
tive officers of the government are the prime minister, deputy prime minis-
ters, ministers, and the heads of ministerial level agencies.
As the head of government, the prime minister is the head of the cabi-
net and responsible for delegating authority to line ministries through their 
respective ministers. A minister or a head of a ministerial agency is directly 
responsible to the prime minister and the NA for his or her respective sector 
(CIEM 2011). While ministries’ authority is ultimately mandated to them 
by the NA, these mandates often overlap in scope and authority, an issue we 
highlight here in the inconsistent set of policies implemented in response to 
volatile rice prices in 2008.
15.2.4 Non-political Actors
More open political discourse began following the Doi Moi era, creating 
space for several non-political actors to influence government policy, includ-
ing independent and official research institutes, civil society, international 
organizations, and the media. To various degrees, each of these actors influ-
enced the government’s actions to stabilize rice prices during the price shock 
of 2008.
Government research institutes have a formal consultative role in the 
policy process, and are mandated to report to ministers or senior officials. 
The research agenda is often set by the government, but significant flexibil-
ity means research institutes have been able to develop their own research 
themes, including through cooperation with researchers outside Vietnam. 
The Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, amongst others, has a direct reporting role about 
economic policies, including food prices and agricultural policies.
Legal civil society has also emerged and has been empowered by better 
communication tools, especially widespread internet access. These organi-
zations are distinct from mass political organizations such as the Vietnam 
Fatherhood Front that are closely aligned with the government or the CPV. In 
3 This term dates to the Soviet era. The Supreme People’s Procuracy of Vietnam is tasked with 




2008, the NA passed a law formalizing such civil society organizations’ right 
to comment on draft legislation (CIEM 2011), an important step forward in 
formalizing civil society’s role in policy formation.
In addition to domestic civil society, there is extensive engagement with 
the international donor community. A consortium of donors, including the 
World Bank, the United Nations (UN) System, and several national aid agen-
cies such as AusAID, remain active in Vietnam despite the country’s recent 
graduation from low- to middle-income status. Notably, the UN and World 
Bank publicly argued against restrictions on rice exports, contradicting the 
government’s policy to impose this restriction in the second quarter of 2008.
Finally, increased space for public discussion has resulted in an increase 
in media freedom, which has increased the accountability of policy makers. 
Food prices, both international and domestic, were extensively covered dur-
ing the crisis, and national media outlets directly and publicly questioned 
senior officials about the policies implemented.
15.3 Rice Production and Prices
15.3.1 Rice Production
Collectivization of land, lack of key agricultural inputs, and a shortage of 
mechanical agricultural equipment caused chronic rice shortages until 1989, 
forcing Vietnam to import 300,000–500,000 metric tonnes of rice annually 
between 1985 and 1988 to meet domestic demand (Luu 2002), with much 
of the shortfall between domestic subsistence consumption and production 
met through food aid from the USSR. This aid was cut off shortly after the 
Soviet collapse in 1989, making agricultural reform an urgent priority.4 In 
April 1988, Resolution 10 of the Politburo assigned agricultural land to indi-
vidual households for up to fifteen years, effectively privatizing production. 
The march towards private ownership (accompanied by increases in yields) 
continued with the land laws of 1993 and 2003 that granted farmers private 
‘land use rights’.
The cumulative effect of these reforms has been a consistent increase 
in rice production from 1989 to the present, enabling the country to sat-
isfy internal demand and sell surplus production internationally. While 
the total area under cultivation has remained roughly static, paddy rice 
4 Some tentative reform efforts in fact pre-dated the collapse of the USSR. In 1981, the ‘Directive 
100’ policy assigned agricultural land to farming groups or individuals through a system of agricul-
tural cooperatives, under which farmers directed production while cooperatives had a monopoly 






production has increased from 2000–11 by almost 3 per cent per year (GSO 
2011b), largely through mechanization in some areas and planting hybrid 
rice varieties in preference to traditional open pollination varieties. In 
2009, Vietnam’s exported rice value reached 5.95 million tonnes (nominal 
US$3.23 billion).
Despite the centrality of rice to the traditional Vietnamese diet, it has a neg-
ative income elasticity of demand: wealthier households substitute away from 
rice consumption, with the effect that per capita consumption is decreasing 
(as in many other high growth Asian economies) while aggregate consump-
tion has increased due to a combination of population growth, demand for 
feedstock, and increased demand from secondary processing industries.
As shown in Figure 15.2, rice exports have persistently increased in terms of 
volume and value since measurement began in 1989, and the share of rice in 
total export value in 2011 was around 3.6 per cent,5 which has been increas-
ing since 2008 due to the high export demand. In 2008, Vietnam exported 
1.7 million tonnes of rice to the Philippines, the single largest buyer by vol-
ume (USDA 2011); this strong demand for rice exports is predicted to con-
tinue to 2030 (MARD 2006).
15.3.2 Rice Prices
Vietnam’s economy has achieved gains in spatial integration, but consider-
able regional price dispersion remains and indicates the persistence of trans-
portation costs and other frictions. There is a systematic difference in rice 
prices between 2008 and 2009 as markets priced-in the global increase in 











































































Figure 15.2 Rice exports, 1989–2010




rice prices and the data show a persistent but unstable price wedge between 
domestic and international prices.
The spatial differences in rice prices across Vietnam are relatively large 
and increasing, indicating high transaction costs: the price gap for paddy 
rice between the highest priced region and the lowest rose from 15.5 per 
cent over 1996–9 to 26.8 per cent in 2000–2. More recent data (MARD 
2006) show the percentage gap between rice prices in the Red River Delta 
and Mekong River Delta has doubled from 10.3 per cent to 20.2 per cent 
(MARD 2006). The overall picture is one of significant price dispersion 
across Vietnam, due to the interaction of transaction costs that create fric-
tions for cross-province arbitrage and regional differences in production 
costs and efficiency.6
Due to the impact of the global price shock in agricultural commodities, 
domestic rice prices were much higher in 2009 than in 2008 (Figure 15.3).
During the 2008 food price shock, the average domestic rice prices 
increased quickly, while regional rice prices varied substantially. For example, 
the Mekong River Delta had the smallest year-on-year increase in prices, in 
contrast to significant increases in urban and peri-urban areas. Prices in the 
productive Mekong River Delta area increased by 36 per cent, while Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi experienced a doubling of rice prices. These price dif-
ferentials are driven by asymmetries in agricultural efficiency, endowments, 
6 The Red River Delta and Cuu Long River Delta are the main sources of rice, accounting for 
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and transaction costs, particularly the cost of transportation from the south 
to the north.
Luu (2002) shows that rice price movements are co-integrated across 
Vietnam, so while the level of rice prices may be different due to differences in 
rice production and transportation costs, changes in prices are roughly con-
sistent over time. Domestic cost differences, where they exist, arise mainly 
from different geographical conditions, with substantially higher transporta-
tion costs in highland and mountainous regions (for example, Lao Cai prov-
ince, bordering China). Figure 15.4 shows this informally by tracking prices 
over time based on available time series data.
The ratio of the domestic to international prices provides further 
evidence of market imperfections due to price differentials. In an inte-
grated market with no changes in frictions like import tariffs, the market 
structure of importing firms, or, as we argue here, state-sponsored mar-
ket interventions, the ratio of domestic prices to world prices should be 
approximately stable over time, since changes in the world prices would 
pass one-for-one into domestic prices. In fact, this ratio fluctuates dra-
matically (Figure 15.5).
The world prices for Vietnamese rice showed modest fluctuation from early 
2009 to the fourth quarter of 2010, and the ratio of domestic to world prices is 
flat. Before that, increases in world prices accompany a less-than-proportional 
increase in domestic prices (the ratio falls below one); after that, increases in 
domestic prices exceed increases in world prices (the ratio rises above one). 
Even when world and domestic prices move in the same direction, the sizes of 
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Figure 15.4 Local rice prices (nominal Vietnamese dollar) per kilo, 2005–9
Source: authors’ calculations from GSO (2011b).
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steps towards market integration, some form of friction that is not stable over 
time evidently affected the transmission of price signals from international 
to domestic markets.
15.4 From Prices to Policies
The previous section argued that in addition to regional price dispersion 
within Vietnam, rice prices diverged from world prices during the relevant 
period. Two wedges could have caused observed prices to be different from 
(unobserved) equilibrium prices: market integration and price intervention 
policies. The previous section argued that price dispersion across Vietnam 
roughly reflects transaction costs. At the same time, domestic prices exagger-
ated world price movements, and moved in the opposite direction to world 
prices during the crisis of 2008.
Food price policies distort market prices. In some cases, distortionary poli-
cies are defensible on grounds of equity or food security; in others, they create 
opportunities for rent extraction. We do not take a position on how ‘good’ 
it is for the state to move rice prices. Rather, we argue that these price move-
ments can be understood by examining changes in government agricultural 
policy over this horizon, and that these policies were motivated in turn by a 
desire to cater to the competing demands of distinct domestic constituencies 
of net-producers and net-consumers. We start by examining the set of avail-
































































Figure 15.5 Free on board rice prices: pass-through relative to the world market prices





15.4.1 Domestic Policy Space
Policies can be implemented through the passage of legislation or through 
instruments such as decrees that govern the interpretation or implementa-
tion of existing legislation. We group the policies designed to affect rice prices 
(though not necessarily only rice prices) into two categories: long-term poli-
cies to increase yields and short-term policies to respond to price fluctuations.
To understand short-term deviations from world prices beyond those 
explained by transaction costs, we turn to a set of government policies that 
enable the state to intervene directly in markets by setting export levels and 
domestic prices when prices are high or volatile.
While investment incentives and other fiscal policies are designed to tilt 
production towards increasing agricultural output, the focus of short-term 
policies is to directly move market prices. Price decreases benefit consum-
ers. Since rice is part of every household’s consumption basket, lower prices 
increase rice consumption or enable substitution towards other foods or 
non-foods. Symmetrically, lower rice prices are a negative income shock to 
net rice producing households.
The incompatible objectives of keeping prices low to benefit consum-
ers while keeping them high to benefit producers gives rise to inconsistent 
price stabilization policies that combine procurement and price interven-
tions with quotas. When rice prices are low, the central government provides 
state-owned firms with capital to buy rice from producers, putting upward 
pressure on prices. When world prices are high, the government is able to 
impose an export quota. When world prices are above domestic equilibrium 
prices, the export quota effectively reduces prices, harming farming house-
holds while benefiting net rice consumers.
There are two tools to move rice prices: direct intervention through pur-
chasing rice and trade policy to limit rice exports. Direct intervention is 
enabled by the ‘Ordinance on Prices’ drafted by the NA in 2002 which theo-
retically subjects a range of agricultural products to price stabilization by the 
state; Article 6 of this ordinance allows the government to set minimum pur-
chase prices that large state-owned buyers and the Vietnam Food Association 
(VFA) pay for rice.
These large purchases by the state can be timed to coincide with price 
decreases to raise profits to farming households. Decision No. 1518/QD-TTg 
dated 22 September 2009 of the prime minister, for example, released govern-
ment funds to increase rice stockpiles.7 Using strategic stockpiling to move 
7 The legislation theoretically enables the government to compel private companies or traders 
to sell rice or other agricultural products to the government at prices set by state agencies; fortu-




market prices will likely remain an aspect of the Vietnamese agricultural pol-
icy over the medium-run: the state has invested heavily in storage capacity, 
and a government resolution in 2009 earmarked funds to upgrade a four mil-
lion ton rice storage facility and begin construction of a new 2.8 million ton 
storage facility. To contextualize this, the state’s export target for rice through 
2020 is around four million tons per year.
Recent government policies further institutionalize the state’s ability to 
determine market prices through controlling exports. In 2010, Decree No. 
109/2010/ND-CP was issued with the nominal goal of increasing ‘export effi-
ciency’. According to the decree, exporting firms have to meet extensive min-
imum requirements, for example owning at least one specialized warehouse 
with a minimum capacity of 5,000 tonnes and a rice milling facility with a 
minimum capacity of ten tonnes rice/hour. The net effect was to push smaller 
exporters out of the market. A reasonable recommendation, therefore, is that 
a better quality control system be implemented to replace the current licens-
ing regime that reduces competition in the rice export market.
The government’s most effective tool for moving market prices remains 
trade policy. Intervention in markets is implemented through the VFA and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT). From 2000–10, the government 
enacted numerous export measures, including several during the period of 
record increases in world agricultural prices.8
15.5 From Policies to Prices
Having established a set of tools available to the state that can plausibly affect 
market prices, we move to arguing that they were used to responding to world 
price movements during the period in question. While domestic markets are 
relatively well integrated, the price of rice is determined at the margin, so 
domestic prices reflect any manipulation of export quantities or prices. The 
balance of this chapter explores how government policies generated these 
price inconsistencies by examining the rice price crisis of 2008 and the set 
of policies that generated this crisis as well as the responsible actors and 
relationships between them, and the efficacy of the state’s overall response. 
These short-run policy responses provide a unique laboratory in which to 
understand the domestic political pressures on agricultural prices.
During non-crisis periods, price signals are transmitted relatively effi-
ciently. Internal differences exist, but are driven by unequal endowments, 
8 In addition to export controls that are sometimes implemented, taxes on rice imports remain 






productivity, and transportation costs, while an export monopsony (only 
state-owned firms and a few private companies can export) drives a wedge 
between world and domestic prices. Within these constraints, prices are set 
by bidding between exporters in light of world prices and domestic demand.
During periods of high food prices such as 2008, however, the price trans-
mission was significantly distorted by a temporary restriction on rice exports, 
motivated by concerns about domestic food security. The government’s desire 
to protect the welfare of net rice consuming households therefore caused the 
implementation of a policy that effectively taxed rice producers by depriving 
them of windfall profits.
In the first quarter of 2008, a combination of speculation on commodity 
exchanges and expectations of supply shortfalls drove up world rice prices 
across all quality classifications. Domestically, rice harvests were forecasted 
to be low. The combination of high world prices and low expected rice yields 
generated significant concern in the Vietnamese agricultural policy commu-
nity about a potentially destabilizing contraction in the quantity of rice avail-
able to domestic consumers.
In response, as global food prices rose steeply in 2008 and rice reserve stock-
piles were depleted (Pham 2009), and based on advice from the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the government issued 
Announcement No. 78/TB-VPCP, revising its export target of 4.5  million 
tonnes down to 3.5 million tonnes. A temporary restriction for rice exports 
was also applied, with a ban on signing further contracts for rice exports 
imposed between May and July of 2008. In non-crisis periods, rice prices are 
determined by the interplay of supply and demand, and world and domestic 
prices move together. However, steep increases in rice prices create domes-
tic winners and losers. Because world prices are higher than domestic prices 
under autarky, exporting results in higher domestic prices; the export ban 
and binding quota therefore reduced domestic prices and export quantities, 
effectively subsidizing domestic consumers by taxing producers.
In fact, Vietnamese rice yields (particularly in the southern provinces) were 
exceptionally high in the first quarter of 2008, while world rice prices for the 
highest quality grain reached US$1,000 (nominal 2008 prices) per tonne, a 
windfall profit above production costs that was not available to many farm-
ers due to the export ban; the government’s export restriction effectively 
deprived producers of above-average profits. At a meeting of the NA, the min-
ister of MARD admitted responsibility for the pessimistic harvest forecast and 
the resulting imposition of an export quota (Khanh 2008). Notably, once the 
export quota was imposed, it was not revised to reflect new data about agri-
cultural production or high world prices.
Following the boom in global rice prices in early 2008, commodities mar-
kets began to bid down contract prices, creating a sharp reduction in rice 
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prices across quality grades. In an effort to protect farmers from this collapse 
in rice prices, a secondary set of government actors intervened. The purpose 
and remit of the VFA are clarified by its original name: the Vietnam Food 
Import & Export Association. Hierarchically, the VFA is part of MOIT, retain-
ing the power to set a price floor for rice exports. By mid-2008, the VFA, act-
ing on policy advice from the MOIT rather than MARD, contradicted these 
signals from the international markets and established a price floor of US$600 
per tonne, raising this to US$650 in mid-August of 2008.
With world prices now below this price floor, Vietnam’s community of 
rice exporters were not able to clear the domestic market, a textbook case 
of a price control creating a mismatch between supply and demand at a 
non-market price point. Establishing a price floor was therefore ultimately 
highly inconsistent: manipulating external trade policy lowered prices while 
setting a price floor—if it became binding—would raise prices above their 
new equilibrium level.9
The first intervention, by MARD, effectively reduced export profits while 
world prices were high, while the second, by the VFA, prevented the mar-
ket from clearing when world prices were low. In both cases, lower domestic 
prices may have increased net consumers’ real incomes, but at substantial 
and potentially offsetting costs imposed on net rice-producing households. 
A key element of the mismatch of policies, problems, and policy instruments 
is that controls were implemented by two distinct sets of actors with two dis-
tinct objectives: in the first case, to insulate domestic consumers from high 
rice prices, in the second case, to ensure profits for rice producers.
15.5.1 Timing of Market Interventions
Twenty-seven agricultural policies were issued between 2000 and 2011. 
Tracking the introduction of new policies over time suggests that politi-
cal pressure and policy innovation are correlated. As rice prices increased, 
the number of agricultural policies to indirectly or directly affect rice prices 
increased dramatically. Figure 15.6 shows the number of new policies intro-
duced, and informally indicates that rising prices put pressure on the political 
establishment to act.
Relevant policies can be broadly grouped into those that affect land issues, 
infrastructure investment, agricultural extension, taxation and tax incentives, 
direct intervention through state rice purchases, and export quotas. Figure 15.7 
dates these innovations relative to rice price movements. The intention is not 
9 The office of the prime minister reacted by ordering Vietnam’s rice exporters to buy paddy rice 
based on a floor price that would ensure profits of around 40 per cent for farmers, but could not or 




to formally (i.e., econometrically) establish a causal relationship, but to provide 
suggestive evidence that the government resorted to a wide range of policy 
tools in reaction to movements in market prices, and that the use of diverse 
policy instruments increased dramatically following the crisis period 2008.
15.5.2 Evaluating the Policy Response
On balance, market intervention kept domestic prices below what they 
would have been without interventions, but not enough to prevent signifi-




















































































poor. As rice prices increased, the hardest hit amongst the poor were urban, 
low-income households. In the absence of a behavioural response (for exam-
ple, substituting away from rice), we estimate that these households experi-
enced real income reductions of 10–18 per cent. Since rice prices continued 
to rise despite government intervention, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
full set of policy tools were not used effectively to stabilize prices or protect 
the real incomes of net rice consuming households.
While net rice producing households benefited from higher prices, affect-
ing about 37.4 per cent of Vietnamese households, most of these households 
were in the rice producing regions of the Red River Delta and Mekong River 
delta. Most of them were already above the national poverty line in 2008, and 
non-poor households enjoyed, on average, twice the increase in income of 
poor households (Phung 2011).
On the other hand, banning rice exports harmed rice producers by prevent-
ing them from benefiting from dramatically higher world prices. During the 
ban, rice exporting firms agitated for a lift in the ban because of indications 
from rice-producing regions of a bumper crop.10 As mentioned above, the 
MARD acknowledged this at the end of May 2008 but continued to comply 
with the suspension of rice exports.11
The export restriction was combined with a price floor that, while intended to 
support rice producers with higher purchase prices by the export sector, in fact 
simply prevented the domestic rice market from clearing. The form and timing 
of policy interventions reflect the overlapping authority and competing interests 
of ministries and agencies within the government, which sought to simultane-
ously satisfy the competing constituencies of rice consumers and producers.
The net effect of these inconsistent policy interventions was a smaller 
decrease in real incomes of urban rice consumers relative to the counterfac-
tual (full pass-through of world prices to domestic prices) achieved through 
the introduction of several price stabilization policies, and an effective tax 
levied on rice producers.
15.6 Conclusions
We have argued that the observed time path of policies is not consistent 
with a social planning model of policy-making. Rather, it can be explained 
10 Truong Thanh Phong, general director of the Southern Food Corporation, stated that 
although rice was scarce elsewhere in the world, Vietnam, particularly the Mekong Delta, would 
not experience shortages (Vietnam News, 21 May 2008).
11 ‘The signing of rice-export contracts may continue after the 30 June deadline for them to 





by a political economy narrative in which the state attempted to balance the 
competing interests of consumers and producers. While Vietnam’s markets 
are increasingly liberalized, the state continues to have, and use, a large set of 
policy instruments that move market prices.
The issue of rice prices in 2008 suggests two potential areas for reform in the 
domestic policy-making process. First, the set of policy instruments should 
be streamlined and made more transparent. The nature of Vietnam’s politi-
cal system is that numerous actors can issue decisions with varied levels of 
relevance, policy coherence, and coverage. This introduces substantial uncer-
tainty amongst producers and consumers, and, in the case of rice prices, gen-
erated mutually incompatible policies that were not easy to reverse. Second, 
coherent policy formulation requires a large set of actors to act collaboratively 
and communicate clearly. In the case of market intervention in rice prices, 
relevant stakeholders were represented at the Ministry level by, variously, the 
MARD, the Ministry for Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the VFA, 
and others. It will be important for future agricultural policies to be shaped by 
input from each of the relevant decision-making actors.
Vietnam’s economic prognosis is generally positive. The country enjoys 
a growing economy with rising capital intensity, which has regularly deliv-
ered high rates of economic growth. To maintain this growth path, the state 
ultimately needs to develop a clear set of tools for market intervention and a 
clear framework for discussion between relevant political and non-political 
actors about which policy instruments should be used, and when. Effective 
governance will balance the competing claims of winners and losers from 
unexpected price shocks, and ultimately increase the set of feasible policy 
responses, for example funding safety nets that prevent households from 
slipping into debt or poverty due to price shocks. Vietnam is poised to realize 
significant returns on market-oriented reforms and investments in educa-
tion, public health, administration, and infrastructure, and the gains made so 
far from continued, broad-based growth highlight the importance of getting 
policy formulation right.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in India
Kavery Ganguly and Ashok Gulati 
16.1 Introduction
In the context of the global food price crisis of 2007–8, India took some big 
decisions: adopted a very restrictive export policy for essential food arti-
cles (e.g., banning exports of wheat and common rice) and not allowing 
the domestic fertilizer prices (especially urea) to increase in line with global 
prices. This helped India to contain the food price rise in 2007–8 remarkably 
well (within 5 per cent to 7 per cent only). But this food price stability did 
not last long. From mid-2009 on, India’s food prices started rising in the wake 
of (a) the severest drought in 2009 that India had experienced since 1972; 
and (b) India injected high doses of ‘fiscal stimulus’ as a part of a synchro-
nized strategy adopted by Group of 8 (G8) and major emerging economies 
to avert global economic recession in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2008. High food inflation in India continues until today (December 2012), 
hovering between 8–12 per cent in most of the quarters (since mid-2009) 
with occasional easing out in certain months and picking up spikes (even 
going up to 20 per cent) in some other months. But the composition of food 
inflation changed from cereals-led in 2009 to the one led by high-value foods 
(fruits and vegetables, and protein foods) in 2010 and 2011. This changing 
complexion of food inflation suggests increasing demand pressures emanat-
ing from rising incomes.
India as an emerging economy with a growing population is likely to expe-
rience increased demand for food. India being the second most populous 
country and home to a large number of poor in the world (41.6 per cent of 
the Indian population or 456 million people lived on less than US$1.25 a day 






its food price inflation to economically and politically acceptable levels. In 
the context of this multi-country study, it is of interest to understand the 
politico-economic underpinnings of food price policy in India as it may have 
ramifications not only for neighbouring countries but also for global prices. 
As Timmer (2011) rightly observes, political dynamics play a powerful role in 
determining the policy responses particularly in times of rising food prices, 
and it cannot be truer than in a country like India with a vibrant democracy, 
and where the government is based on multi-party coalition.
The overarching food policy in India has been driven by the objective 
of food security for a large and growing population. For this, India has 
followed the path of attaining almost self-sufficiency in the production of 
key staples like rice and wheat, and making them available to economi-
cally weaker sections at affordable (highly subsidized) prices. The food 
price policy, therefore, has twin instruments, remunerative minimum 
support prices (MSPs) for rice and wheat farmers, and subsidized prices 
through public distribution systems for poor consumers. The export bas-
ket of Indian agriculture has been expanding and diversifying. While 
India is a net exporter of cereals, it is a major importer of edible oils and 
pulses. However, overall food availability (through domestic production 
and imports) is reasonably comfortable, and increasing over time in per 
capita terms. The challenge is more on the distribution front, especially 
for the poor. Despite highly subsidized staples being distributed through 
the public distribution system, consumption and nutrition levels of the 
poor remain low and a cause for much concern. The recent food price 
crisis has infused even greater urgency to address the food and nutrition 
security concerns through strategic policy actions placed over the short, 
medium, and long term.
16.1.1 Overall Economic Performance and Macroeconomic Trends
Despite robust economic growth and significant achievements on many other 
key economic indicators, India has not been as successful in addressing its 
concerns related to poverty and food and nutritional security of a large num-
ber of vulnerable people. The number of people living below the poverty line 
(as per the national definition of poverty line) as a per cent of the total popu-
lation has declined from 55 per cent in 1973–4 to 36 per cent in 1993–4 to 
27.5 per cent in 2004–5 and further to 22 per cent in 2009. However the num-
ber of poor people has decreased only slightly from 320 million in 1973–4 to 
302 million in 2004–5 (as per national estimates, GoI 2010), indicating that 
India still has a huge burden of poverty, concentrated in less developed states.
Although India achieved high rates of overall gross domestic product 




decade of the 2000s, agri-GDP growth hovered around 3 per cent per annum, 
despite the fact that each Five-Year-Plan during this period was targeting at 
least 4 per cent. Boosting agricultural growth to 4 per cent plus will be criti-
cal in reducing poverty even faster given that agriculture employs nearly 
58 per cent of the workforce and a larger number of people are dependent 
on agriculture. While the expenditure on food subsidy is likely to touch 
US$20 billion with the introduction of the proposed National Food Security 
Act, approximately US$8 billion on the employment programme, and a 
fertilizer subsidy bill of US$15 billion, public investments in agriculture 
remain pitiably low at less than US$5 billion. The major concern with huge 
welfare and social safety net programmes is the ability to deliver services to 
the targeted population.
16.1.2 Major Food Crops: Production, Trade, and Consumption
Rice and wheat are the major cereal crops in India accounting for 57 per cent 
of the area under food grains and 75 per cent of the overall food grain pro-
duction. Augmenting the availability of food grains has been a policy priority 
in India arising from food security concerns that emanated in the 1950s and 
1960s when India witnessed several episodes of hunger and famine. Although 
the food grain production has increased manifold and per capita availability 
of food grains improved, there continues to be an over-emphasis on attain-
ing self-sufficiency and a surplus in food grains, which poses considerable 
financial and fiscal strain.
Food accounts for a large part of the total monthly budget of an average 
Indian, although its share has been declining over time and as per the 2009–10 
survey estimates, it is still almost 50 per cent of the monthly per capita 
expenditure (NSSO 2011). However, the low expenditure classes (bottom 
30 per cent) spend more than 60 per cent of their monthly expenditure on 
food. National survey estimates suggest that the demand for cereals has been 
declining over time driven by changing consumption preferences. The con-
sumption patterns are diversifying towards high-value commodities across 
rural and urban areas and also across expenditure groups. Rising income lev-
els, changing lifestyles and trends in urbanization are among the key driv-
ers of this change. India has been a net exporter of cereals, especially rice 
and corn, of meat and fish, of cotton, of oilseeds cake, and a wide variety of 
other commodities. Its imports of agri-commodites are largely concentrated 
in edible oils and pulses.
Driven by food security challenges, there have been several policy hiccups 
in liberalizing grain markets since the 1990s. Although India has moved away 
from import controls and quotas there still exist knee jerk reactions taking 




16.2 Food Price Crisis
16.2.1 Crisis Episodes: Trends and Patterns
Since 1947, India witnessed the highest inflation (measured in terms of whole-
sale price index) in September 1974, when overall inflation reached 33.3 per 
cent.1 November 1973 to December 1974 has been the worst period of infla-
tionary pressure when inflation did not drop below 20 per cent. Inflation 
hovered over and above 30 per cent for four consecutive months starting 
June 1974 (Basu 2011).
A headline inflation accelerated in the second half of 2009–10, and con-
tinued to remain high in 2010–11.2 Inflation in India has also undergone 
structural changes with food inflation being an important driver to begin 
with in mid-2009 and then outpaced by increasing energy prices post eco-
nomic crisis (RBI 2011a). India experienced lower food price volatility/spikes 
in the domestic market in 2007–8. When world prices of food commodi-
ties touched new peaks, and domestic food prices, especially for staples, in 
several countries went up by 20–40 per cent, food price increase in India 
remained within 5–6 per cent. But the relief was not long-lasting and in 2009, 
India was hit by a severe drought that set food prices soaring. The increase 
in food prices was further fuelled by somewhat loose monetary and fiscal 
policies emanating from the need to provide fiscal stimulus in the wake of 
averting global recession. Price transmission effects of international prices on 
domestic prices have been somewhat muted in the context of India, given 
the continuing ban on exports of rice and wheat during 2007–11, raising the 
fertilizer subsidy bill to contain the shocks arising from global price spikes in 
fertilizers. Rather populist measures, like loan waiver, expansion of Mahatma 
Gandhi national rural employment guarantee scheme (MGNREGS), raising 
agricultural subsidies, announced ahead of the 2009 general elections, were 
all dubbed as fiscal stimulus.
The food price index here is defined as the weighted average of the whole-
sale price index of food articles and manufactured food products. Inflation 
measured in terms of the change in monthly wholesale price index of com-
modities year on year has been highly volatile after having touched unprec-
edented levels. Domestic food prices started flaring up to mid-2009 onward 
crossing the 10 per cent mark in June 2009, the 15 per cent mark in November 
2009, touched a peak of more than 20 per cent in February 2010. Though it 
slid from those high levels, yet until November 2011, it has remained largely 
1 The monthly inflation is measured as percentage change of the wholesale price index of the 
month in the current year over the same month in the previous year.
2 The headline inflation measures the overall inflation within an economy and is significantly 





in double digits, lately hovering around 10 per cent, attracting a major debate 
in parliament (Figure 16.1). During this period nearly all food commodities 
registered a price spike, their contribution varying over a period of time.
The pressure has been on food articles which witnessed a consistent 20 per 
cent and more inflation during December 2009 until June 2010.3 Flaring up 
of prices of manufactured food products was relatively short-lived attaining a 
peak of 19 per cent for two consecutive months, December 2009 and January 
2010, and prices started cooling off thereafter.4 However, prices of manufac-
tured food products are once again on an upward swing from 2.4 per cent in 
March 2011 to more than 8 per cent since June 2011. During the course of 
the recent price spikes the contribution of individual food items and groups 
has been varying. To begin with, manufactured food products contributed 
the most to the rising inflation on food; 56 per cent in the first quarter of 
2008, followed by food grains at 23.4 per cent. Over time, the contribution 
of manufactured food products declined substantially to 3.5 per cent in the 





















































































Figure 16.1 Percentage change in wholesale price index of food articles and manu-
factured food products (per month this year over same month in the previous year)
Source: GoI, OEA (2012).
3 Food articles include food grains, fruits and vegetables, milk, eggs, meat and fish, condiments 
and spices, tea and coffee.
4 Manufactured food products include dairy products, grain mill products, bakery products, 
sugar, khandsari and gur, common salts, sugar and confectionary, edible oils, oil cakes, processed 
tea, coffee, cattle feed, and malted foods.
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the second and third quarter of 2011 (Figure 16.2). The pressure on manu-
factured food is coming from the rising wholesale price index of edible oils 
at 16.2 per cent and 14.4 per cent during the second and third quarters of 
2011. Within food articles, the contribution of cereals in total food inflation 
has come down from 30.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 to 5.3 per cent 
in the fourth quarter in 2010 and has risen to over 8 per cent in the last two 
quarters of 2011. High-value commodities such as fruits, vegetables (highly 
fluctuating), milk, meat, and eggs are contributing significantly to total food 
inflation.
It is quite evident that the pressure on food inflation is arising from 
high-value commodities in the sub-group of food articles. This is perhaps 
explained in terms of the growing demand for these commodities (consider-
ing the structural changes in consumption patterns) and the lack of adequate 
supply responses. This in turn is affected by domestic production, import 
patterns to fill up the gap, and also fragmented supply chains. This offers an 
insight into the current policy thinking that holds food grains as the key to 
food and nutrition security of the nation. With the price pressure lingering 
on and even worsening in the case of high-value commodities, there is need 






















































16.2.2 Price Trends for Key Food Crops
Rice is the staple crop in India, production of which increased at a rate of 1.0 
per cent per annum during 1999–2000 to 2009–10. During the same period, 
area under rice reduced at a rate of 0.52 per cent while productivity increased 
at a rate of 1.28 per cent annually. A large part of the total rice production is 
procured by the Food Corporation of India (FCI), together with state agen-
cies. Rice exports from India reached a peak of 6.5 million tonnes in 2007–8, 
when a ban on exports of common rice was imposed. During 2010–11, 
India exported 2.28 million tonnes of rice (basmati) worth US$2.4 billion. 
Common rice exports were opened in September 2011, and during the one 
year from October 2011 to September 2012; India exported ten million 
tonnes of rice valued around US$6 billion, becoming the largest exporter of 
rice in the world.
The wholesale price index of rice started increasing after July 2006 (over 
the corresponding months of the previous year). This upward movement in 
monthly rice prices continued until the end of 2008, and thereafter it started 
declining (Figure 16.3). However, month to month increases (of the same 
year) in prices of rice was much lower, and Indian rice prices remained much 
more subdued in relation to international prices of rice (Figure 16.4). This was 
primarily due to the ban on exports of common rice and increasing produc-
tion and stocks at home. The domestic prices started rising again in December 
2011 in the wake of the opening-up of rice exports in September 2011.
Wheat prices witnessed periods of high growth in some parts of 2006, and 




























































































to price decreases (Figure 16.5). The export ban on wheat and also increased 
import of wheat together with favourable production helped contain the 
price rise. But since July 2012, wheat prices have increased by 15 to 20 per 
cent over the corresponding months of previous year. This has happened 
despite the government having stocks of more than 40 million tonnes (in 
November 2012) compared to a buffer stock norm of 14 million tonnes. The 
large scale procurement of wheat to the tune of 38 million tonnes in the 
marketing season of 2012–13 (April to June) has left very little in the open 
market, which is putting pressures on market prices.
Domestic price of wheat is largely in line with international prices except 
for certain periods of extreme swings in international prices during the last 
two quarters of 2007, the last quarter of 2010 and first quarter of 2011. After 
almost remaining flat from 2001 until 2005, the minimum support price of 
wheat has increased signifcantly.
Maize prices have been fluctuating during this period and hovered around 
double digit inflation and since January 2011 prices have spiralled rapidly 
(Figure 16.6).
Domestic prices of maize have been relatively stable as compared to peri-
odic fluctuations in international prices of maize. The minimum support 







































































































International (Thai 25%) Domestic (Wholesale)
Rice crisis in
2008 
Figure 16.4 International and domestic price movements of rice
Note: International prices are of Thai Rice, 25 per cent broken, FOB Bangkok. Domestic prices have 
been calculated by averaging monthly data across government regulated market yards (known as 




domestic price of maize was below international price and there was a signifi-
cant increase in the export of maize during that year.
16.2.3 Price Transmission: Causes and Impact
The degree of price transmission among cereal crops has been influenced 
by the government through its various policy interventions such as export 
controls, imposition of minimum export prices, and varying tariffs. But to 




















































































































































































be far from the truth. Nevertheless, policy packages safeguard the consumers 
and producers from the brunt of price spikes and troughs in global prices. 
For example, during 2007–8 when global prices were surging, India did not 
witness large price spikes. Support prices were increased to help farmers tide 
over increasing costs of production as well as to catch up with global price 
trends (not spikes), though with a little lag. In the case of increasing global 
prices of fertilizers, the government contained the spiralling of domestic 
prices by increasing the fertilizer subsidy bill which cost nearly US$16 billion 
in 2008–9.
Chand (2008, 2009, cited in Acharya et al. 2012) states that India success-
fully restricted the snowballing of abnormally high international prices in 
2007–8 on domestic prices. Although rice and wheat witnessed high price 
inflation, it was lower than that observed in their global prices. The lack of 
a strong price transmission effect is largely attributable to a robust domestic 
production (except 2009–10 when the production was hit due to a severe 
drought), timely intervention by the government to control price rise in 
domestic markets, and the containing rise in cost of production due to a rise 
in global prices of crude oil and fertilizers. As observed by Dasgupta et al. 
2011 (cited by Acharya et al. 2012), the domestic price of wheat is weakly 
and only moderately impacted by international prices due to the policy 
intermediation of the government (export bans, lowering duties to import 
and also incentivizing production through an increase in minimum support 
price). Co-integration test results from Acharya et al. (2012) do not show any 
co-integration between international and domestic prices of rice. In the case 
of wheat, the wholesale domestic price and international price are somewhat 
co-integrated—the speed of adjustment in response to change in interna-
tional price was 4 per cent.
Although the prices of rice and wheat increased in late 2009, the increase 
was less than the international prices. The global price inflation on rice fluc-
tuated between 206 per cent in April 2008 and 4.7 per cent in March 2009. In 
contrast, domestic inflation on rice ranged from 8.7 per cent in April 2008 to 
17.1 per cent in February 2009. In the case of wheat, global inflation declined 
to negative in March 2009 from 83 per cent in April 2008 whereas domestic 
inflation on wheat hovered between 7 per cent and 5 per cent during the 
above period.
The price surge in 2009 can be partly attributed to the bad agricultural year 
when food grain production suffered a set-back. It was the worst drought 
year since 1972. Nearly 59 per cent of the Indian districts received deficient/
scanty rainfall. The actual rainfall was 23 per cent less than the normal mon-
soon rainfall (GoI 2010). Although the government took immediate steps 
to augment supply from existing stocks, and through publicly managed 
distribution centres, high food inflation persisted. It drove the government 
India
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to look at medium- to long-term measures much through the existing pub-
lic programmes geared toward augmenting productivity (for example, 
Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana, National Food Security Mission, Second Green 
Revolution).
16.2.4 Key Drivers of Food Price Inflation
Food inflation is being driven more by non-cereal commodities and the phe-
nomenon is largely demand-driven. Although there are supply-side issues 
that need to be addressed, increasing income levels are fuelling food prices. 
The soaring prices of protein rich food (meat, fish and eggs, milk and milk 
products) reflect the rise in demand owing to rising income levels and chang-
ing lifestyle. The price spikes in fruits and vegetables can be attributed to a 
large extent to fragmented supply chains and less so to supply constraints, 
although a detailed study on what is actually driving up prices of fruits 
and vegetables in not available. There is a widening gap between the prices 
received by farmers and that paid by the consumers due to a large number 
of intermediaries and fragmented supply chains, High taxes on agricultural 
commodities, market fees, and high fees charged by the commission agents in 
government-regulated markets and increasing fuel prices further fuel prices.
In brief, the food inflation in India has been driven by both supply and 
demand factors, depending upon the commodity under consideration. For 
commodities like edible oils, and pulses, there are clearly serious supply con-
straints, and rising demand is being met by huge imports. Wheat and rice 
have been largely insulated from global spikes, and it is largely the domestic 
policies (MSP, procurement, stocking, and distribution) that influence their 
prices. For fruits and vegetables, supply is not as much an issue, but frag-
mented supply chains have often contributed to the price spikes.
16.3 Key Policy Responses
Anti-inflationary policies adopted by the Government of India typically 
involve fiscal and monetary measures, the rationalization of excise and import 
duties on key commodities to safeguard the interests of the consumers, the 
use of liberal tariff and trade policies to manage demand-supply situation of 
key commodities, and the strengthening of the public distribution system to 
improve availability and accessibility of food. In addressing the broader issue 
of food and nutrition security, reforming the existing social safety net pro-
grammes (improving the delivery mechanism, moving from physical transfer 
to cash transfers), procurement and stocking policies have been on the policy 






production in a sustainable manner has been emphasized, along with reform-
ing agricultural marketing practices to cut down the marketing margins.
16.3.1 Domestic Price Policies (Consumer Prices, Minimum 
Support Prices (MSPs))
Increasing retail prices have invited varied responses. For example, when 
prices of pulses shot up, the government took measures to make available 
other varieties of low-priced pulses through government managed retail out-
lets. The issue price at which subsidized food grains are distributed to people 
under the public distribution system did not undergo any change during this 
period.
MSPs of cereal crops have seen a significant increase in order to incentiv-
ize production given the rising cost of production. After six million tonnes 
of wheat import in 2006–7, and fast rising international prices of wheat and 
rice in 2007–8, the MSP of wheat was increased by more than 30 per cent in 
2007–8 over 2006–7. The MSP of rice, maize, and pulses increased by 30–50 
per cent in 2008–9 over 2007–8, to catch up with rising global prices and 
compensate farmers for rising costs of production.
16.3.2 Trade Policies (Export Bans, Import Tariffs, Exchange 
Rate Policies)
The price control measures taken by the government included selective bans 
on exports as observed in the case of rice and futures trading in food grains, 
zero import duty on selected food items, among other measures pertaining to 
key food items. Larger quantities of rice and wheat were released from buffer 
stocks to ease pressure on domestic prices.
In response to rising global prices of food grain, the government banned 
wheat exports in February 2007 and common non-basmati rice exports in 
October 2007. About three months later, an export quota was opened for 
Bangladesh followed by very small export quotas of both rice and wheat for 
a number of other South Asian and African countries honouring the exist-
ing commitment. These highly restrictive export policies mostly remained 
in place until early September 2011. The rice export restrictions (which did 
not apply to existing export contracts) began to affect physical exports in a 
major way around March–April 2008. The government finally lifted the ban 
on wheat and non-basmati rice exports up to two million tonnes each (as 
in September 2011). While estimates for the financial year (April to March) 
2011–12 show that rice exports have reached 6.75  million tonnes, wheat 






16.3.3 Increased Agricultural Production (Input Subsidies, 
Investment, Enhanced Extension)
Input and food subsidies outpace investments in agriculture (Figure 16.7). 
Food and fertilizers account for the giant share of total agricultural subsi-
dies and both have been spiralling over time. Food, fertilizer, power and 
irrigation subsides together account for 15.1 per cent of agricultural GDP 
in 2009–10 up from 7.8 per cent in 1995–96. Food and fertilizer subsi-
dies account for the larger share of agricultural subsidies and their share 
peaked to 74.3 per cent in 2008–09, when world prices of food and fertiliz-
ers peaked.
In order to protect farmers from rapidly increasing fertilizer prices in the 
world market, the government provided subsidies of about US$16 billion in 
2008–09.
In February 2008, the finance minister announced a relief package for 
farmers which included a complete waiver of loans given to small and 
marginal farmers. The US$ 14.9 billion agricultural debt waiver and debt 
relief scheme included the total value of the loans (US$12.4 billion) to be 
waived for thirty million small and marginal farmers and a one time set-
tlement scheme (OTS) (US$2.5 billion) for another ten million farmers. 
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ahead of the 2009 general elections in India and also for the fact that this 
scheme did not include a large number of farmers who depend on infor-
mal sources of credit.
16.3.4 Larger Public Programmes to Boost Agricultural Productivity
The urgency to boost agricultural productivity particularly food grains 
resulted in the launching of the National Food Security Mission (NFSM) 
2007–8, a flagship programme aimed at boosting the production of rice 
(by ten million tonnes), wheat (by eight million tonnes), and pulses (by 
two million tonnes) by 2011–12. The geographical coverage includes the 
potential districts with a heavy representation of the eastern states. During 
2008–9 nearly 50 per cent of the NFSM-rice districts, 50 per cent of NFSM-
pulses districts, and 33 per cent of NFSM-wheat districts have recorded a 
10–20 per cent increase in productivity compared to 2006–7 (GoI 2010). 
The Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY) or the National Agricultural 
Development Programme (NADP), with an outlay of Indian rupees (INR) 
250 billion for five years, has provided the much needed impetus to 
strengthen state outlay for agriculture. The Second Green Revolution aims 
at shifting the cereal basket to the eastern region, which is largely rain-fed 
in nature and with lower yield levels providing scope for expanding the 
production frontier.
16.3.5 Safety Nets (Public Distribution System, Food 
for Work, Cash Transfers)
India has a legacy of social safety net programmes to help improve peo-
ple’s economic access to food with a particular focus on the poor and 
vulnerable. However, these programmes have not been very successful 
in improving access to food and hence improving nutritional and health 
outcomes.
Cash transfer programmes as an alternative to physical transfer of grains is 
being discussed along with a reform of the existing public distribution system 
and cash transfer programmes.
16.3.6 Procurement, Stocking, and Other Marketing Policies
There is a strong policy advocacy by a section of the think tank and policy 
makers to decentralize and eventually downsize the operation of parastatals 
in India learning from some of the international experiences (within the 
Asian region). Agricultural markets particularly that of food grains have been 






regulations (for example: procurement at minimum support price often less 
than the market price, compulsory levy on rice millers). Procurement levels 
have increased over time and have reached unprecedented levels in recent 
years. From 11.2 million tonnes of rice and wheat in 1980–1, procurement 
has increased to 56.5 million tonnes in 2010–11. Procurement of wheat in 
particular more than doubled in 2008–9 at 22.7 million tonnes from eleven 
million tonnes in 2007–8 (Figure 16.8).
With a record production of food grains, an export ban on rice and wheat 
and increasing procurement, the grain stocks are much in excess of the 
buffer stock requirement. India had accumulated 64.7 million tonnes of 
rice and wheat in June 2002, which it had to later dispose by an export sub-
sidy. The stocks plummeted to 12.4 million tonnes in October 2006 only 
to increase to sixty-four million tonnes in July 2011 against a buffer norm 
(including strategic reserves) of thirty-two million tonnes (Figure 16.9). As 
in June 2012, grain stocks have reached a record high of eighty-two million 
tonnes.
The large food grain stocks pose a huge financial burden on government 
and there are reports of grain damage owing to lack of proper and adequate 
storage facilities. Despite structural changes observed in consumption pat-
terns from cereals to high-value commodities, food grains continue to be 
the mainstay of food security in India. There is very little scope for pri-
vate sector participation in grain marketing given the controls that are in 
place arising out of food security concerns. It is difficult to liberalize the 

















































































Figure 16.8 Procurement of rice and wheat for the central pool
Source: Food Corporation of India (2011).
Large Exporters
354
will driven by the mandate to provide food for all. Efforts are on to liber-
alize high-value commodity markets such as fruits and vegetables which 
do not directly and largely impact the food security concerns. In a recent 
move (September 2011), the central government has asked states to lift all 
restrictions on the movement of fruit and vegetables, in order to eliminate 
intermediaries, reduce wastage, and tame the stubbornly high food inflation 
(Sikarwar 2011).
16.3.7 Other Policies (Environmental Policies and Land Acquisitions)
Because agriculture is dependent on monsoons and natural conditions, 
increasing environmental stress and climate change impacts on sustain-
able food production are of concern for India. The frequency of droughts 
and erratic climatic conditions are increasing over time. The inter-govern-
mental panel on climate change and the India meteorological department 
reports a 2 to 4 degrees increase in mean temperatures (FAO-GOI Mission 
2009). Production losses in wheat are likely to be around six million tonnes 
(7 per cent of the current wheat output) for every one degree increase 
in temperatures (AO-GOI Mission 2009). Also, the increasing pressure on 
water and soil in the cereal growing states in north India has necessitated 
taking the second green revolution to eastern India, which is water abun-







































































































Figure 16.9 Stocks of rice and wheat with the central pool (up to October 2012)




16.4 Political Economy Context
16.4.1 Key Decision-making Actors
India has a coalition government. The executive office of the Prime Minister 
is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the government. Given the 
parliamentary form of government, all major policy decisions that require 
legislative clearance are tabled in the parliament. The central government 
together with the Ministry of Food, Consumer Affairs, and Public Distribution 
and the Ministry of Agriculture in consultation with state governments and 
other ministries are at the helm of agriculture and food price policy-making. 
In his address at the Second Annual Conference of Chief Secretaries on 4 
February 2011, the prime minister emphasized the need to augment agricul-
tural productivity together with a paradigm shift in institutions to contain 
escalating food prices. He pointed out that the state governments need to be 
proactive in bringing about these changes—particularly reviewing the scope 
of the amended Agricultural Produce Market Committee Act, feasibility of 
waiving market and other taxes. He also reiterated the need to reform the 
public distribution system, and create adequate storage facilities for increas-
ing stocks of cereals. Rising food prices indicated gaps in supply chain man-
agement which need to be strengthened by creating a level playing field for 
the organized retailers (GoI, PMO 2011). The cabinet approval to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail (that includes food retail) in 
September 2012 was long overdue. This is held as a break away from the 
policy paralysis that the ruling government has been criticized for by various 
stakeholders both national and international. Implementation of the policy 
is likely to facilitate enhanced FDI inflows, generate employment opportuni-
ties, usher in global best practices, which altogether have the potential to 
benefit consumers and farmers and invoke greater supply chain efficiencies 
in the agricultural sector and development of critical backend infrastructure.
States have a distinct role to play in the area of agriculture policies given 
that agriculture is a state subject under the provisions of the Constitution 
of India. The states have the authority to impose taxes and levies (compul-
sory selling to the state agencies) on marketing of agricultural commodities 
and this includes rice and wheat. Punjab imposes statutory levies (taxes) 
of 14.5 per cent on wheat, which has driven the private sector away from 
markets, and hence the state has almost a monopoly over procurement. For 
rice millers, there has been an indirect taxation given that they have to sell 
50 to 70 per cent of the milled rice to state agencies at pre-determined prices. 
Also, in Madhya Pradesh, a bonus of INR 100/quintal over and above the 
MSP resulted in a record production and procurement of wheat in the state 





The Reserve Bank of India also plays a critical role. It reversed its expan-
sionary monetary policy stand beginning October 2009 by raising the cash 
reserve ratio by a hundred basis points and the policy rate or the repo rate by 
a cumulative 275 basis points; the effective tightening was about 425 basis 
points (RBI 2011b).
The Ministry of Finance continuously monitors the food price situation, 
and one of the critical steps is to rein in the rising fiscal deficit, which in many 
ways is responsible for the flaring up of prices. A road map to bring it down to 
manageable levels of 3 to 4 per cent from its current level of more than 5.5 per 
cent, over a period of five years has been a policy priority. But given the high 
fuel prices, and the impending National Food Security Bill, it remains chal-
lenging to see how and when it can be done.
The Planning Commission has also been actively involved in suggesting 
measures to contain price surge and tame inflation. The opposition politi-
cal parties play an important role in putting pressure on the government to 
be more proactive in controlling rising food inflation. In the context of the 
recent petrol price hike, one of the key alliance partners threatened a pull 
out if the government did not roll back the hike in the interest of the com-
mon man. Within a week of the prime minister stating no roll back, petrol 
prices were slashed.5 Over the period of the food crisis, opposition parties 
have staged protests against rising prices mobilizing common people around 
the country, demanding government action on containing rising food prices. 
The National Advisory Council (comprising the political representatives, pol-
icy makers, think tanks, and academia) has been quite influential in pushing 
the National Food Security Bill (which is now pending with the Parliamentary 
Committee to be examined) which gathered momentum in the wake of high 
food inflation. Research institutes (national as well as international) have 
been involved in analysing the trends in food prices, engaging in dialogue 
with the government, policy makers, and also the media to understand the 
situation and brain storm on the potential ways of containing high prices 
and smoothening them over time.
In the wake of high food price inflation, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) National Council on Agriculture has sought structural changes 
to augment growth in the farm sector, linking the farmers directly to the 
retailers and processors. It also recommended an introduction of input 
stamps whereby the farmers have the choice to avail the input subsidy that 
they require. CII has also suggested reforming the land lease markets in agri-
culture to enable the leasing of land and benefit from the economies of scale. 




It considers opening up multi-brand retailing to FDI will be critical in devel-
oping supply chains, and facilitating direct firm-farm linkages (Menon 2011).
While there have been no reports of major riots over increasing food and 
fuel prices in India, there was a report of public furore over rising prices in 
Bihar.6 There have been mass protests organized by farmers and other lobbies 
in various parts of India, and also those organized by the opposition political 
parties, demanding the government to be proactive and committed to pro-
tect the interests of the common man/woman and not subject him/her to the 
onslaught of rising prices.7 The issue of high food inflation led to a disruption 
of the parliament proceedings several times over the past few years by the 
members of the opposition parties.
The media has been active in reporting increasing food prices and the reac-
tion across various segments of the society. International institutions like 
the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Asian 
Development Bank, and others have been continuously tracking the global 
trends in prices and the forces behind them. The views expressed by interna-
tional think tanks have had their impact on the policy-thinking in India as 
observed in their being more cautionary and having a protectionist approach 
with respect to trade (export controls and bans) and in general procurement 
and stocking policies with respect to grains (resulting in record procurement 
and surmounting stocks of rice and wheat).
16.5 Conclusions
The period of high food prices since mid-2009 has raised concerns and chal-
lenges, although for India as a developing country and home to a large num-
ber of poor and malnourished people, ensuring food and nutrition security 
has always ruled the policy domain. The policy makers have been confronted 
with the difficult task of balancing higher economic growth and improving 
the social welfare of the masses. The ruling coalition government is com-
mitted to ensuring inclusive growth wherein people from different eco-
nomic and social backgrounds are part of the economic growth process. It 
is met with fierce criticism and disruption of parliamentary proceedings by 
the opposition parties, putting pressure on the government to control surg-
ing prices. Rather than providing an actual solution to the problem of ris-
ing food prices, the opposition was more vocal to downgrade the efficacy of 
6 ‘India Faces Food Price Discontent Violent Protests’. Reuters, 28 January 2010.
7 ‘India opposition parties strike over high food prices’. BBC News, 27 April 2010. Available 
at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8645725.stm> and ‘Thousands protest against high food prices 





the ruling government, failing to protect the interests of the common man/
woman. Policy decisions to hike transport and cooking fuel prices were met 
with severe criticism as these were seen to further fuel food prices. High food 
and fuel inflation is seen to thwart the high economic growth that India has 
achieved despite the fragile global economic scenario.
While short-term measures were undertaken to address the prevailing cri-
sis, emphasis was given to medium- to long-term policies to increase food 
supplies and access. The international food price increase did not change the 
Indian agricultural and food policy which was already geared towards ensur-
ing sustainable agricultural production to ensure food security of the masses, 
although it provided the extra momentum. Immediate measures like offload-
ing stocks in open markets, reducing tariffs on imported food commodities, 
raising price support or imposing export controls and bans are the general 
course of action taken time and again when prices were flaring up beyond 
tolerable limits.
As illustrated by the National Food Security Bill, perhaps the period of high 
inflation and increasing vulnerability of poor people to food price shocks 
prompted the speeding up of food security deliberations. The proponents of 
the Act had more reason to push for the enactment of the bill without tak-
ing into consideration the fiscal and financial implications. Reforming the 
public distribution system versus replacing it with other alternatives such as 
cash transfer, coupons/stamps are also being debated in the country. Recent 
research also reveals that the existing public distribution system has a leak-
age of around 40 per cent. Given this, a strategic move towards conditional 
cash transfer can be a real game changer. But some have expressed suspicion 
of the ability to do cash transfers in a society where financial inclusion of the 
poor remains a major challenge. However, under the Aadhar project, there 
are plans to install one million micro-automated teller machines (ATMs) all 
over the country and use finger prints and Aadhar’s unique number to widen 
the financial inclusion, and the government has already taken a bold deci-
sion to move towards cash transfers for twenty-nine schemes. Although the 
food and fertilizer subsidy is not currently in this scheme, the Commission 
for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) has recommended piloting a food 
subsidy at a hundred places, to be transferred through cash. This is a potential 
weapon to contain leakages in the system and enhance the effectiveness of 
social safety programmes. While the objective of seeking the food and nutri-
tion security of the masses remains the same or is rather more highlighted 
due to the crisis, the means of achieving it is still debated. There have been 
suggestions of downsizing public procurement and storage of grains, particu-
larly the operations of the Food Corporation of India, and allowing greater 
private sector participation and also allowing markets to operate. The current 
inflationary trends in India are observed to be a mix of demand-driven factors 
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and also supply factors that resulted in spikes and fluctuations in price move-
ments. Erratic supply conditions owing to weather and climatic changes 
resulted in rapid price fluctuations. On the other hand, large scale food sub-
sidies have resulted in the accumulation of large stocks of wheat and rice. 
While the evidence is weak, it appears that poverty levels have been declin-
ing. One finding is that despite rising food prices during 2007–12, real farm 
wages have increased at 6.8 per cent per annum. Given that landless labour is 
generally at the bottom rung of the economic ladder, this is heartening news 
to policy makers.
India is home to a rising middle-class population which has been driv-
ing demand patterns. This phenomenon to a large extent has fuelled the 
price inflation in high-value and protein-rich commodities. The pressure is 
on prices of non-cereal commodities driven by demand expansions and weak 
and fragmented supply lines. The focus, therefore, is on streamlining the 
supply chain, reducing the marketing margins and ensuring adequate sup-
ply response to increasing demand. Some of the policy measures that India 
adopted (largely populist in nature and part of the election manifesto) which 
helped address the concerns arising from the food and financial crisis resulted 
in inflating the fiscal deficit and adding to the inflation concerns. Increasing 
the subsidy bill (notably fertilizer) and loan waiver scheme resulted in a bal-
looning of the fiscal deficit from 4.1 per cent in 2007–8 to 8.5 per cent and 
9.5 per cent in 2008–9 and 2009–10, respectively (RBI 2011b).
The nature and extent of food price inflation in India has been less severe 
than in many other developing countries. Although met with severe criti-
cism by the opposition political parties, the flagging of issues by the media, 
and protests by civil society groups and people in general, the situation did 
not result in riots or major clashes. As for grains (rice, wheat, and maize), 
domestic prices have been fluctuating but their contribution to overall food 
inflation has eased out over time. Rising energy prices also contributed to 
a rise in inflation. The period of high food inflation has brought food secu-
rity concerns to the forefront and there is a renewed interest among the 
representatives of the government, and the policy think tanks to devise 
strategies to control prices and smooth out the impact of these price spikes 
on consumers. While immediate actions were taken to control price spikes, 
some of the medium- to long-term policy actions are aimed to ensure sus-
tainable growth in agricultural productivity and food production. In the 
wake of the crisis, this policy stand has been further strengthened although 
a consensus on the strategic approach is missing. Indian agriculture and 
food policy measures have been conservative. While the trade restrictions 
and building up of stocks helped contain flaring up of grain prices on the 




Overall, it seems the policies and political debates have ensured that there 
is ample food in the country, that the real wages of farm workers have gone 
up, and now the challenge is to bring down food inflation by controlling 
fiscal deficits, retaining somewhat tight monetary policy, improving the sup-
ply chains, and honing the social safety net programmes, besides improving 
productivity and overall food production in the country, and releasing more 
from the public stocks.
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The Political Economy of Food Price  
Policy in China
Jikun Huang, Jun Yang, and Scott Rozelle  
17.1 Introduction
Although China is often cited as one of several countries that have successfully 
dealt with the food crisis and food price volatility, there is a dearth of infor-
mation on how China responded to the crisis and whether or not the coun-
ter-measures taken were successful. This chapter seeks to understand China’s 
economic and political environment, its response to the food crisis, what the 
policy-making process involved, and the effectiveness of the policy responses. 
In addressing these questions, the chapter tries to explain why the government 
of China, in responding to the crisis, chose a specific set of policy measures 
that included the release of the government’s grain reserves in the beginning of 
the crisis, long-term future/forward contracts with trading firms in exporting 
countries, provision of subsidies and insurance to producers, cancellation of 
support for storage and transport of export grains, increased subsidies on grain 
production and input, and enhanced social protection for urban consumers. 
As in many other countries, however, China also used wider measures at the 
border to protect domestic prices from international food price fluctuations. 
Furthermore, China adjusted its long-term development strategies on biofuel 
development and strengthened the commitment to invest in agriculture.
17.2 Country Context
17.2.1 Economic Growth and Ability to Respond to External Crises
Over the past two decades, China has exhibited considerable capacity to 







crisis in the late 1990s. While the shock did affect economic growth (from 
9.7 per cent over 1985–95 to 8.2 per cent over 1996–2000), recovery there-
after was rapid. This was largely due to the fact that the government took 
decisive action to combat sluggish growth, which created the perception of 
stability, and re-established producer and consumer confidence. Fiscal spend-
ing (mainly on infrastructure), for example, was raised by 100 billion yuan to 
stimulate demand and increase the efficiency of the nation’s business envi-
ronment in the second half of 1998. Other stimulating measures were imple-
mented in 1999.
More recently, like many other countries, China was also seriously affected 
by the global financial crisis. After a 14.2 per cent growth rate in 2007, growth 
fell sharply to 9.6 per cent in 2008 and 9.2 per cent in 2009 (NSBC 2010), and 
the drop of 4.6 percentage points between 2007 and 2008 was the largest of 
any major country. However, despite the serious effects of the global finan-
cial crunch, the economy was able to recover quickly as a result of China’s 
rapid and massive response. As the financial downfall took its toll, in order to 
maintain economic growth, the country initiated an aggressive stimulus and 
monetary expansion package for 2009 and 2010 valued at four trillion yuan 
(US$586 billion), accounting for 14 per cent (or nearly 12 per cent) of China’s 
GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively.
While there was concern over the long-term impact of these expansionary 
policies, China’s massive and rapid response to the external crisis was quite 
effective––and unique. Decisions could be made quickly at the central level of 
government and implemented without any major resistance from the public 
and other stakeholders. Thus, based on China’s past responses to the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s and the recent global crunch, it will not be 
difficult to understand its similar reaction in the face of the global food crisis.
17.2.2 Political Regime and Development Goals
Based on the national constitution, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is 
the country’s sole political party in power. This fact has ramifications with 
regard to the decision-making process on national policies, including food 
policy and the government’s response to global commodity crisis. Under the 
national constitution, all rights are vested with officials who exercise their 
power through the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local congresses 
at all levels. The State Council is the highest administrative body of the 
government.
Democratic centralism guides the decision-making principle. The CPC’s 
most powerful policy- and decision-making entity is the Politburo, com-
prising the Party’s two dozen or so national leaders and its Standing 




simultaneously hold state positions with functions and tasks similar to their 
personal Politburo appointments. The role of the Politburo is mainly to 
decide on long-term development strategies and short-term policies related 
to political and social crises. China is also strongly committed to agricultural 
and rural development.
Policy formulation for agricultural and food economy is largely vested with 
the State Council, the highest government administrative body and the cabi-
net of the Chinese government. National food and agricultural policy deci-
sions are made by the premier and a vice-premier in charge of agriculture. 
These two top leaders1 consider agriculture to be a fundamental sector for 
overall economic growth, and have expressed particular interest in agricul-
tural growth, farmer income, and rural development. Grain security, how-
ever, is priority number one among the national leaders.
17.3 Food Price Transmission
To understand the political economy of China’s food pricing policy during 
the global food crisis, it is useful to have an overview of the performance of 
the nation’s food market and its functions.
17.3.1 Trends, and the Transmission of International 
and Domestic Food Prices
TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES
Figure 17.1 gives the annual prices of major foods in China and on the interna-
tional markets at border for the years 2000–10. Prior to the global food emer-
gency, domestic food prices moved with border prices. However, the domestic 
and international price co-movement weakened during 2007–9 for all food 
products analysed with the exception of soybean. When international prices 
for rice, wheat and maize increased sharply in 2007–8, domestic prices for these 
commodities increased only moderately, an indication of the likely impact of 
China’s policy responses to the global food crisis. Soybean is the exception 
because it has been fully liberalized and there is no policy tool that could be 
used to arrest price transmission between international and domestic markets.
PRICE TRANSMISSION FROM INTERNATIONAL TO DOMESTIC PRICES
To find statistical evidence of, and to evaluate, the price transmission from 
international to domestic price, we apply the cointegration analysis method 








and the error correction model (ECM). The analyses are based on monthly 
domestic wholesale market price and international price for the commodities 
examined here (rice, wheat, maize, and soybeans) for the period January 2003 
to December 2008. Domestic data are taken from the Wind database, and 
international prices are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database.
Both the cointegration analysis and ECM analysis show that China’s 
domestic agricultural prices were affected significantly by international 
prices in 2003–6 (a period prior to global food crisis in 2006–9). The cointe-
gration analysis reveals that there was a long-run transmission of interna-
tional prices to China’s domestic prices, with a statistical significance at the 
1 per cent level for all four commodities in 2003–6. The estimated long-run 
adjustment parameters indicates that the domestic price of rice, wheat, 
maize and soybean would increase by 0.54 per cent, 0.25 per cent, 0.50 per 
cent, and 0.84 per cent, respectively, in the event of a corresponding inter-
national price increase of 1 per cent.
Similar results are found with the ECM analysis. Estimated speed of adjust-
ment was statistically significant for all four commodities, ranging between 
–0.02 for rice to – 0.16 for soybean. The results also show that short-term 
effects for soybean and maize were larger than those for rice and wheat. A 1 per 
cent international price increase for soybean and maize would directly lead to 
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Farmgate Price Wholesale Price Border Price
Figure 17.1 Rice, wheat, maize, and soybean prices in China and the international 
markets (at border), 2000–10
Source: Computed by authors based on farm-gate price from the NDRC; wholesale price from the 
MoA; border price from the MoC.
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wheat and rice, the short-run adjustments are 0.07 per cent and 0.04 per cent, 
respectively, for a 1 per cent increase in their international market price. The 
higher impacts in the short term and quick adjustment speed imply that the 
time needed to transfer international price changes to the domestic market 
would be much shorter particularly for soybean, but also for maize.
17.4 Food Price Shocks and Policy Responses
17.4.1 The Threat—Rising Prices in World Food Markets
The 2006–9 global food crisis, like similar situations in the early 1970s, came 
on fast. After a long period of falling prices, international food prices began to 
rise in 2006, accelerating in 2007 and early 2008. Although prices fell sharply 
after May 2008 after the global financial crunch, international commodity 
prices remained high, with significant fluctuations.
As prices of major commodities in international markets rose, three aspects 
of China’s food economy became critically important. First, food still accounts 
for more than 35 per cent and 41 per cent of consumer budgets in urban 
and rural regions, respectively. In 2010, the bottom 10 per cent of urban 
population (measured in per capita income) spent more than 46 per cent 
of total household expenditures on food. Second, given this high share for 
food expenditure, any substantial price increase on foodstuff would almost 
certainly have implications for national price stability and overall consumer 
price inflation. Third, as the trade of many food commodities is not restricted 
across China’s borders and domestic markets are highly integrated (Huang 
and Rozelle 2006), international food prices are easily transmitted to domestic 
markets. By mid-2007 when international food price increases started to accel-
erate, officials were concerned that rising prices were becoming a problem that 
could threat China’s food economy and overall price inflation (Wen 2008).
17.4.2 Short-term Responses
With the rapid rise in food prices on the international market, particularly for 
imported soybean, edible oils and other foods, China recognized that this could 
become a threat to domestic food security and undertook a series of policy 
responses in late 2007 to mid-2008.
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
The first agricultural policy response was the grain reserve scheme in late 
2007, which released rice, wheat and maize from government reserves. This 








domestic grain price stability. Grains that had been stored mainly as a precau-
tion against natural disasters and to control seasonal price fluctuations were 
now released through the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and the State Grain Administration (SGA) in consultation with 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and other relevant ministries. The size of 
China’s grain stocks is not generally known, but Premier Wen Jiabao’s (2008) 
press announcement in March 2008 indicated that even after several months 
of sales, China still had between 150 and 200 million tons of grain available 
for stabilizing domestic prices.
The second short-term response in agricultural policy was the effort to find 
external sources for grain and meat during the last quarter of 2007. As grain 
reserves declined, the NDRC officials, in consultation with the Ministry of 
Commerce (MoC) and MoA, authorized the China National Cereals, Oil and 
Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (COFCO) to sign long-term future 
and forward contracts for grain (and meat) with exporting countries. In late 
2007, escalating domestic prices for pork also triggered a policy response from 
NDRC to provide subsidies (and insurance) to producers. When it became clear 
that China would not be able to import large volumes of food due to high world 
prices, government action in the second half of 2007 focused on efforts to 
increase domestic supplies, and to try to hold down local prices.
Third, short-term measures were taken to create a disincentive for cereal 
exports late in 2007. As international food prices continued to rise, the NDRC 
and the MoC undertook increasingly strong action to prevent the cereal 
released from domestic stocks from being exported. International prices had 
increased to such an extent that domestic grain traders (mainly national and 
provincial grain reserve agencies and COFCO) were beginning to recognize 
the benefits of shipping the relatively low priced grain to global markets. 
Maize was the first target, as it had historically been exported in large vol-
umes, and government (NDRC) measures made it increasingly expensive to 
continue to do so.2 In November 2008, subsidies for the storage and trans-
port of export-destined maize were suspended. But as international grain 
prices continued to mount through the first part of 2008, the NDRC and 
the Office of the State Council decided to cancel valued added tax (VAT) 
rebates. At the same time, there was also apprehension over rice and wheat. 
As no transport or storage subsidies had been applied to the export of these 
grains, China recalled the policy on VAT reductions. A mere month later, to 
further dampen export incentives for wheat, maize and rice, China assigned a 
5 per cent export levy on all shipments, except those destined to Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Macao.
2 Ministry of Finance and General Administration of Customs of China (2008), and personal 
interviews with officials from the SGA.
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The fourth short-term policy reaction to the dire global food situation came 
late in the winter of 2008. Even after the release of stocks and cancellation 
of export subsidies (and introduction of export levies), national leaders and 
NDRC decision makers were not convinced that the measures were enough 
to offset the continuing surge of international food prices. Stronger meas-
ures were needed, and the nation’s top leaders announced a total ban on the 
export of food and feed commodities. Wen Jiabao (2008) proclaimed that ‘in 
order to control rising food prices, China will strictly restrict the use of food 
by industry and for grain exports’. Chen Xiwen (2008), one of the chief archi-
tects of China’s agricultural policy, sanctioned the ban, emphasizing that the 
restrictions, which would be in effect only for 2008, were necessary in order 
to keep up domestic supplies. Thus, between the period from summer 2007 
to March 2008, China had shifted its stance from exports subsidization to 
levies and quantitative restrictions on exports; it clearly did not want traders 
buying domestic grain to sell on export markets.
Fifth, the government turned its attention to fertilizers in February 2008. 
Similarly to the rise in global grain prices in late 2007, international fertilizer 
prices also increased significantly, and this increase was largely transmitted 
to China’s domestic markets in 2007 and 2008. For example, the rising inter-
national chemical fertilizer and energy prices meant an increase of more than 
40 per cent between July 2007 and June 2008 (NBSC 2008). The extra cost of 
fertilizers lowered demand particularly from grain producers, posing a further 
threat to production, and therefore to the increasing food prices.
In response, in early 2008 the Chinese leaders approved the NDRC and 
MoA proposal of export taxes on fertilizers. Phosphate fertilizers were first, 
and on 15 February 2008 all exports of phosphate fertilizers and any chemical 
fertilizers containing phosphates were to be taxed. In April, an additional 30 
per cent was applied to triple super phosphates, and in May, 35 per cent on 
urea exports. Finally, in an effort clearly designed to halt all chemical fertilizer 
exports, a 100 per cent export levy was announced in mid-May. These policies 
were in effect until the end of 2008 when international food and fertilizer 
prices fell significantly because of the global financial crisis.
CONSUMERS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
Consumer and social protection targeted to low-income groups has been 
enhanced in recent years during and after the global food crisis in 2006–9. 
Although most of China’s poor live in rural areas, the share of food expen-
ditures in 2008 for the urban population in the bottom 5 per cent of the 
income scale was as much as 49 per cent (NBSC), making these people highly 
vulnerable to increasing food prices. Fortunately, prior to the crisis, China 
already had in place a comprehensive safety and social protection system 




urban poor. This system was enhanced during the global food crisis period by 
increase of food subsidies.
17.4.3 Long-term Responses
BIOFUEL POLICY
Faced with the growing dependency on oil imports and the need to improve 
energy security, in the early 2000s China began to formulate an ambitious 
biofuel programme that was aimed at producing ten million tons of bioetha-
nol and two million tons of biodiesel annually by 2020. Several supporting 
policies were implemented to ensure the achievement of these goals. By 2006, 
China produced 1.3 million tons of bioethanol. Maize is the primary feedstock 
of the biofuel firms in the northeast, and wheat is the other important feed-
stock for bioethanol in Henan, the nation’s top wheat production province.
However, after 2007 the policies supporting biofuel expansion shifted dra-
matically. Concerns about rising food prices and national food security trig-
gered a moratorium on the building of the new biofuel programme. By the 
end of 2007, China decided to revise its biofuel development strategy and 
decreed that: (i) biofuel production should not compete with grain for land; 
(ii) biofuel expansion should not vie with humans for food; and (iii) feed-
stock for biofuel should not compete with livestock over feed. While existing 
biofuel plants could continue production, their expansion was to be based 
on the use of alternative feedstock such as sweet sorghum, sweet potatoes, 
cassava, and other non-grain products.
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The global food crisis also prompted China to increase commitment to agri-
culture and rural development. China normally dedicates the first policy doc-
ument of the Central Committee of CPC, often called the Number-One Policy 
Document, to the country’s most significant issue. To re-affirm the commit-
ment to agriculture and rural development, the Number-One Policy Document 
in 2004–6 underlined these issues. While the continued emphasis on agricul-
ture for 2007–12 in the Number-One Policy Document is mainly indicative of 
China’s national development policies, the rising concern for food security trig-
gered by the global food crisis may also have contributed.
Two recent reports among these Number-One Documents are worthy of men-
tion as they are directly related to food security: (i) the 2011 document which 
outlined plans to invest about US$630 billion in water conservancy over the 
next ten years to ensure food and water security; and (ii) the 2012 document 
which specifically highlighted innovation in agricultural science and technol-
ogy for boosting farm productivity and substantial increases in investment in 






and development expenditure increased in real terms from an average of 16 per 
cent in 2000–9 to more than 20 per cent in 2010–11. This is expected to become 
higher in the coming years.
17.5 Political Economy Context
Why and how was China able to apply policy responses to the global food 
dilemma so quickly? In addition to the country’s political regime and devel-
opment goals that were briefly discussed earlier, this section reviews the back-
ground of its political economy with a special focus on the framework and 
partners that make up the decision-making process in agricultural economy.
17.5.1 The Decision-making Framework for Long-term Development 
Strategies and Law
Three political bodies are vital with respect to agricultural policy and the rele-
vant laws. The State Council is the highest body of government; the CPC central 
committee decides the basic principles and mandates of agricultural policy, and 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) is in charge of the constitution and the 
laws and thus, in theory, has an important voice in supervising and auditing the 
state’s fiscal budgets. Each of these three bodies carries out its mission in collabo-
ration with other relevant organizations. Under the State Council, the MoA, 
the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance, and several other ministries related to agri-
culture are the major organs that formulate the annual five-year and long-term 
plans and policies on agricultural development. Within the National People’s 
Congress, there are nine special committees, three of which3 are important in 
setting laws related to agriculture. They also have a supervisory and a consul-
tancy role with regard to implementation.
Normally, the general procedure for policy-making is as follows: The CPC 
central committee in conjunction with the State Council decides the issues to 
be considered by NPC. Based on the outcome, the State Council then prepares 
the implementation plan for approval by the NPC. The NPC then authorizes 
the State Council to implement the plan.4
3 The Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee of Finance, and the 
Committee of Environment and Natural Resources.
4 For example, the fifth session of the sixteenth CPC central committee adopted as its theme 
the modernization of agriculture and the steady promotion of the development of a new social-
ist countryside. This was outlined in the ‘Suggestions on the 11th Five-Year Plan of the National 
Economy and Social Development’. Based on documentation, the State Council drew up ‘the 
Outline (draft) of the 11th Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development’ and 
sent it to the 4th session of the 10th NPC for discussion, recommendations, and approval. After 






17.5.2 Key Actors of the Decision-making Framework within Food 
and Agricultural Policy
OVERALL PROFILE
In China the major actors embodied in the decision-making process are the 
CPC and various government organizations as well as major research insti-
tutes. These include the State Council and two inter-ministerial governance 
organs under CPC jurisdiction, known as the ‘leading groups’ (one specializ-
ing in finance and economy, the LG-FE, and one on rural works, the LG-RW). 
Other entities such as the NDRC, MoA, and the Ministry of Commerce are 
included as well. Key research institutes and think tanks also have a vital say 
in the national decision-making mechanism. The role of the private sector is 
limited. Political lobby is not a common phenomenon. However, views and 
interests of the private sector and the public with respect to national food 
policy can be aired at least partly through the media, which is expected to 
have indirect effect on national policies.
THE STATE COUNCIL
The State Council, as the cabinet of the government of China, is respon-
sible for all major policies on social and economic development. It meets 
approximately once a month to decide on current matters of national sig-
nificance, agriculture included. The top body within the State Council is its 
standing committee. Comprising the premier, four vice-premiers, and five 
state councillors, the daily administration of the government is handled by 
the State Council’s standing committee. Agriculture and food is handled by 
one vice-premier.
THE LEADING GROUPS OF THE CPC
The leading groups are inter-ministerial governance bodies. Each leading 
group has an executive office headed by an official at the level of a minister. 
Under the jurisdiction of the CPC and the State Council, the LG-FE led by 
the premier and the LG-RW (one of the few sector- or area-specific LGs) led 
by a vice-premier play a vital role in decision making of China’s agricultural 
policy. The executive offices of these leading groups prepare national policy 
documents, coordinating with the relevant ministries and various tiers of 
government. Currently, the LG-RW executive office is headed by Chen Xiwen 
who is also deputy head of the executive office of LG-FE.
THE MoA
The MoA is primarily responsible for agricultural production. Contrary to 
other countries, responsibility for agricultural input and output marketing 








Commerce, and SGA. But MoA does submit policy suggestions on matters 
affecting agricultural input and output prices, tariff adjustment, market-
ing, rural credit, taxation, rural financial subsidies, and rural economic 
reform.
NDRC AND OTHER RELEVANT MINISTRIES
The NDRC is a key player in the formulation of development plans and 
responding to crises in all sectors, including agriculture. One of its major 
functions is to find a balance between the interests of the different ministries 
or sectors. The NDRC is also in charge of the state reserve of strategic com-
modities and materials; it handles and supervises the collection, utilization, 
rotation, management, and price fluctuation of agricultural products and 
inputs.
RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND THINK TANKS
Research institutes5 and leading economists and scientists have an impor-
tant role in proposing, consulting, and preparing national policy. Policy 
research institutes and think tanks under the auspices of the government 
(e.g., NDRC and MoA) normally mirror the stance of the supervising author-
ities. Agencies affiliated with academia have greater autonomy to express 
their views.
MEDIA
Although the media in China has traditionally been run by the state,6 inde-
pendent media coverage is emerging. Since 2000 the internet has emerged as 
an important communication medium, and there were more than 485 mil-
lion internet users in China in 2010. While politically related issues are often 
censored, news on economic development and food security face less regu-
lation. The role of the media in the decision-making mechanism has been 
growing.
In order to analyse the media coverage given to, and its likely role in, 
China’s policy responses to the global food crisis, we selected the following 
four widely distributed newspapers: two are run by the state (People’s Daily, 
the most influential official newspaper in China, and Farmers’ Daily), and 
two are independent, commercial papers (South Weekend and 21st Century 
Business Herald). These papers were reviewed daily from 1 January 2007 to 
31 December 2008, and the major content of each report noted.
5 Major research institutes and think tanks that have influenced agricultural policies include 
the Policy Research Department of CPC, Development Research Center of the State Council, 
Academy of Macroeconomic Research of NDRC, Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Rural Economic Research Center of MoA.






Figure 17.2, giving the average number of reports related to food prices 
during 2007–8, clearly illustrates its increasing appeal among China’s media. 
Interestingly, the trend of media coverage in Figure 17.2 resembles the trend 
in global food prices, except for the break in February 2008 (coinciding with 
the Chinese Spring Festival). The number of articles rose significantly in 
March–April 2008, but as global food prices fell after May 2008, so did media 
coverage.
17.6 The Policy-making Mechanism Guiding the Responses 
to the Global Food Crisis and their Policy Impact
17.6.1 The Policy-making Process on Major Policy Responses
Faced with rising global food prices, recognizing the threat of transmis-
sion of international food prices to domestic market, and overheating and 
high inflation in the late 2007, the State Council quickly decided to take 
counter-measures to stabilize domestic food prices. Given the one party-rule 
and a decision-making mechanism based on internal democratic central-
ism, it is not difficult to understand how China was able to make such 
quick decisions when the economy faced a challenge. China’s massive and 
effective responses (discussed early) to financial crises, first in Asia in the 
late 1990s and then more recently in 2008–10, may also help to understand 
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THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS RELATED TO SHORT-TERM 
POLICY RESPONSES
As policy decisions in the short term do not affect long-run national devel-
opment strategies, institutions, or laws, the State Council and relevant min-
istries are the key decision-making organs. While it is not easy to determine 
who initiated this policy process, we were told that NDRC and LG-FE played 
an important role in securing approval from the State Council for introduc-
ing the stabilizing counter-measures. Once the State Council decided to con-
tain food price inflation in late 2007, each relevant ministry had to identify 
its own approach for achieving this aim. In designing the detailed counter-
measures to be implemented in various stages during 2007–8, major think 
tanks were also invited to several policy consultant meetings for comments 
and suggestions.
One major initial change in policy was to release the government’s grain 
reserve. Recognizing the threat posed by the global food situation, particu-
larly after the number of food reports in the media continued to climb in the 
second quarter of 2007 (Figure 17.2), the State Council, NDRC, and LG-FE 
convened several times to discuss the likely future trends of international and 
domestic prices and whether China should start to control its food prices. In 
late 2007, the State Council made a final decision to release grain reserves 
for the market––as its first effort to deal with the likely significant grain-price 
hike before the end of the year.
The decision to open the government’s grain reserve met no resistance. 
NDRC and the SGA are major governmental departments in charge of grain 
reserves and were thus the decision-making actors to have directly influ-
enced the State Council (or the premier) to adopt this recourse. This was 
necessary because of the pressure from escalating domestic prices as border 
prices increased. Furthermore, grain stock adjustments had been a standard 
approach in the past. There was no opposition from the farmers as China 
does not have a national or regional or any large-scale farmers’ association.
Once the State Council had decided to take steps to counter food inflation, 
each relevant ministry decided on its own proposal for stabilizing domestic 
prices. Based on its mandate of increasing agricultural production and farmer 
income, the MoA would have favoured a moderate rise in farm prices but the 
ministry has little authority in the control of domestic food prices. In gen-
eral, MoA follows the decisions made by the State Council, and by NDRC in 
particular. Thus, the ministry proposed a plan for expanding the production 
of grain and other foods through non-price methods such as better techno-
logical service and measures for controlling natural disasters. It also recom-
mended a subsidy on swine to increase pork production. Supported by NDRC 
and the Ministry of Finance, this proposal was approved by the State Council 




authorize China’s largest oil and food importer and exporter, COFCO, to sign 
forward contracts with grain trading firms in exporting countries. All these 
decisions were made within a couple of months.
When domestic inflation topped 6 per cent in late 2007, climbing to more 
than 8 per cent in early 2008, and international food prices were still rap-
idly climbing, the State Council undertook further action to improve existing 
policy implementation and explore new stabilizing measures in 2008. Policy 
responses included: limiting and later banning the exports of maize and 
other grains, restricting fertilizer exports, increasing input subsidies to farm-
ers, revising existing plans on biofuels, and supporting low-income urban 
consumers and students. During this period, major government-affiliated 
policy think tanks frequently participated in the decision-making mecha-
nism. Given the need for speed in the policy-making procedure, academic 
think tanks had no major role except to provide information on the current 
economic situation and likely future trends.
At this time, NDRC and LG-FE, working closely with the ministries of com-
merce and agriculture, the SGA, the People’s Bank and other government 
authorities under the State Council, coordinated directly with the national 
leaders. This is only natural, because contrary to other ministries, the juris-
diction of NDRC and LG-FE is not restricted to a special sector or field, which 
makes these organs key players in the face of any emerging economic issue. 
The restriction on grain was easy because international trade of rice, wheat 
and maize is managed by state-owned enterprises. The limitation on ferti-
lizer exports, however, did invoke some opposition from the industry, but 
this was dampened by the significant increase in domestic fertilizer prices in 
2007–8. The policy outlining extra input subsidies for farmers was applauded 
by all ministries because it complemented the goals of the NDCR, MoA and 
LG-FE for improved farmer income, although it was now up to the Ministry 
of Finance to find the budget to do so. Based on the division of governmen-
tal functions, support to low-income urban consumers is the responsibility 
of local government. Despite the resulting budgetary implications for the 
local government, their commitment to the central government to maintain 
a ‘harmonious society’––i.e., local social and political stability––and to avoid 
unruly demonstrations or rebellious acts was more important
Local government and industry played a very minor role in China’s 
policy-making process. For example, the ban on maize exports initially did 
raise protests from the local government in the northeast (China’s major 
maize production zone) and from maize exporters. This did not alter the situ-
ation, although agricultural subsidies were nevertheless increased (covering 
nearly all farmers in addition to maize growers) in 2007 and 2008 (Huang 
et al. 2011). The chemical industry was aware of the proposed policy to limit 
fertilizer exports and appealed for compensation, but without results because 
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domestic fertilizer prices had also increased significantly, albeit less than on 
the international market.
Experts had a two-sided role in the decision-making framework that 
worked either to facilitate or impede the process. Policy research institutes 
and think tanks continued to provide information and comments on stabi-
lization policies but opinions among the experts differed. Debates centred 
mostly around the issue of whether or not China should let grain prices trend 
up, a topic widely examined in the media and internal reports. On the one 
hand, arguments favoured rising grain prices because (i) higher prices meant 
greater incentive for grain production, thereby promoting food security; 
(ii) improvement in the income of poor farmers and grain producers was 
more important than food price inflation or urban consumers, as these were 
covered by social protection programmes; and (iii) inflation in 2007–8 was 
also partially due to macro-investment and monetary policies. On the other 
hand, arguments supporting the control of prices included (i) apprehension 
over high inflation; (ii) increasing living costs for low-income consumers in 
urban areas; and (iii) the need to avoid social instability.
Media reports reflect the level of concern among the different stakeholders. 
As Table 17.1 shows, comments in the media were frequently from the jour-
nalists themselves (33 per cent), then from officials (30 per cent), and experts/
scholars (18 per cent). As can be expected, comments by officials were largely 
supportive of all food-price control measures; on the other hand, opinions 
of the experts differed. The agriculture-oriented think tanks were strongly in 
favour of farmer benefits, while macroeconomic analysists supported con-
sumer interests. Agricultural think tanks reported on the causes of food price 
increases, including the role of biofuel expansion in the rest of the world. 
Articles by the journalists themselves concentrated on food price increases in 
the domestic and international markets, or at times, outlined their newspa-
per’s stand on national policies.
Table 17.1 Views and opinions reported in four selected newspapers in China, 2007–8
Views expressed by:
Officials Experts Consumers Farmers Companies Journalists Total
Total 30 18 2 5 11 33 100
People’s Daily 39 7 2 7 7 39 100
Farmers’ Daily 29 17 1 2 7 44 100
South Weekend 17 20 10 3 13 37 100
21st Century Business 
Herald
31 28 1 7 22 9 100
Source: Compiled from authors’ survey.
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There is some divergence among the views and opinions reported by the 
four papers. The People’s Daily is the top newspaper owned by the central 
government, and journalists’ views mirror the official stance, accounting 
together with the Farmers’ Daily for 78 per cent of the reports. South Weekend 
and 21st Century Business Herald, as commercial newspapers, reported the view-
points of experts and of companies more frequently. Interestingly, except for 
South Weekend, consumer views were almost non-existent. Farmer voice in 
the media was minimal, and accounted for only 2–7 per cent of all reports.
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS OF LONG-TERM POLICY RESPONSES
The response to the global food crisis generated two major long-term policy 
modifications to China’s biofuel development plan and agricultural commit-
ment.7 The nature of these policy changes, which were introduced as long-term 
development strategy and short-term modifications, suggests that the rel-
evant decisions were taken at the central level of government by the highest 
decision-making bodies, the CPC central committee and the State Council. It 
was clearly announced on several occasions that there was to be no trade-off 
between biofuels and food, and that increasing agricultural productivity 
through investment was the primary tool to ensure the country’s food security.
These decisions, although quickly made, were based on a round of con-
sultations. The same was true for biofuel. Discussions with experts as well 
as the media reports on the likely impact of biofuel on global and domes-
tic food security convinced the national leaders that renewable energy or 
biofuels utilizing grain as feedstock, even though vitally important for the 
country’s future energy security, had no role to play. However, the existing 
biofuel plants that utilized maize and wheat as feedstock for ethanol pro-
tested. Negotiations between the biofuel industry and NDRC eventually led 
to a compromise: existing biofuel firms using grain as feedstock could con-
tinue to operate and produce bioethanol up to the 2007 production level, but 
future expansion would have to depend on non-grain feedstocks.
China’s commitment to improve national food security and investment 
in agriculture were pre-existing policy stands but additional measures were 
taken after the global food crisis. Key decision makers were members of the 
policy document preparation team coordinated by LG-FE. These included 
representatives from the major think tanks and different ministries.8
7 This was communicated through several Number-One Policy Documents (see Section 17.4).
8 For example, in drafting the Number-One Policy Documents on agriculture and rural develop-
ment for approval by the CPC central committee and the State Council, the LG-FE works closely 
with NDRC, Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministries of Finance, of Agriculture, 
and of Water Resources as well as others related to agriculture. These policy documents, together 
with the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15) in agriculture, as prepared by the MoA and approved by 




17.6.2 Impacts of Policy Responses
IMPACTS EXAMINED WITH A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS
To assess the effect on domestic agricultural prices of China’s counter-measures 
in the face of the global food crisis, we need to trace the monthly food price 
fluctuations on international and China’s domestic markets. The results are 
presented in Figure 17.3, which shows that China did well in keeping domestic 
prices from rising as much as international prices. Between January 2005 and 
December 2008 the trajectories of domestic and international prices differed 
distinctly. While international prices of the three cereals increased steeply 
starting in 2007, domestic prices went upward only gradually (Figure 17.3).
Why were China’s grain-price trends so different from those on the inter-
national markets? The explanation is, of course, the policy responses intro-
duced. Although trade liberalization policies had allowed domestic prices 
to move towards international prices before the middle 2000s (Huang et al. 
2009), the pattern was broken when China released grain stocks onto domes-
tic markets and closed its borders. This forced domestic prices to fall below 
world market prices after 2007.
The trends in soybean prices, however, reveal another interesting story. 
China is the world’s largest importer of soybean, more than three-quarters 
of the domestic soybean consumption is imported. As shown in Figure 17.3, 
domestic and international soybean monthly prices moved very closely 
because, unlike grains, soybean is not a state-traded product, and was thus 
subjected to only a 3 per cent tariff and 13 per cent VAT. China had no policy 
measures in place to force down domestic prices in the short run. Importantly, 
the relation between China’s grain prices and those on the international mar-
ket was restored roughly two years after the onset of the financial crunch. 
For example, the domestic price of rice moved slightly upward and has been 
approaching the international level since late 2008. Prior to 2006, the price 
of wheat in China corresponded roughly to the global level, but during the 
crisis, world market price surpassed China’s. Since late 2008, the two price 
trajectories have moved in parallel. The price development of maize is simi-
lar. By the end of 2010, the price difference between China and international 
markets reflected just international transportation costs plus value-added tax 
at the border.
IMPACTS EXAMINED WITH A SIMULATION MODEL ANALYSIS9
Impacts of the major factors affecting China’s grain prices in 2005–8 have 
been quantitatively analysed in our recent study (Yang et al. 2008). Yang et al. 
(2008) finds that rising international oil prices and the biofuel expansion had 










































































































































































































































Figure 17.3 Graphical analysis of international and domestic monthly prices of rice, 
wheat, and maize, January 2005–December 2010
Source: International prices are from International Monetary Fund (2011). Domestic prices are 
from China’s MoA’s wholesale market price database.
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affected grain prices in China. Had there been no other effects, the higher 
international price of oil would have pushed up the price of rice, wheat, and 
maize from 16.6 to 27.9 per cent (Yang et al. 2008). This would have been 
enough to account for 85 per cent of the actual price increase in rice. Similarly, 
had there been no other factors, the price of wheat and maize within China 
would have risen by 190 per cent and 105 per cent, respectively, while in real-
ity these rose by 11.2 per cent for wheat and 26.5 per cent for maize. The price 
of oil would have also forced up soybean price by 39 per cent. We also find 
that the emergence of the global biofuel production added a similar upward 
pressure on China’s grain prices. All other factors being equal, biofuel expan-
sion in 2005–8 would have pushed up the price of rice by about 16 per cent, 
maize 20.6 per cent, and soybean 24.5 per cent.
The results also find evidence of the effectiveness of China’s price stabiliza-
tion policies during the global food crisis. Although other factors may have 
had some role, it is likely that the government’s policy responses did lower 
the price of rice by 16.6 per cent. Given the actual 19.5 per cent increase 
during 2005–8, this implies that had it not been for government measures, 
the upsurge would have been 35.1 per cent. Likewise, wheat would have 
increased by an additional 29.6 per cent and maize 27.7 per cent. The results 
on soybean also show that domestic policy does not matter for fully liberal-
ized commodities (Yang et al. 2008).
IMPACTS BASED ON PRICE TRANSMISSION ANALYSIS
The price transmission analysis presented in previous sections shows that 
China was fully integrated into world markets and international prices had 
been transmitted to domestic markets prior to 2006. However, based on recent 
data, our analysis finds that the above results either disappear or become con-
siderably weaker in 2007–8. The results further indicate that China’s policy 
responses were important and that they were effective in preventing price 
transmission from international to domestic markets.
During the 2006–8 global food crisis, the previous and significant long-run 
correlation between rice and wheat faded. While a long-run association still 
existed for maize, the estimated parameter (0.18) was much smaller (0.50) 
than in 2003–6.10 The short-term price transmission in 2007–8 did not affect 
rice and wheat, and even for maize, the degree of price transmission in the 
short run fell from 0.15 to 0.08. Moreover, the speed of adjustment was 
not statistically significant. Over time, however, the transmission of price 
seems to have become pronounced, as the long-run cointegration coefficient 
increased from previous 0.84 to 0.99. The short-term price transmission for 




soybean also speeded up somewhat, from – 0.16 to – 0.18. Greater change 
occurred in the short-run adjustment parameter, which increased from 0.22 
in 2003–6 to 0.90 in 2007–8. This is as expected because (i) China’s soybean 
imports have increased significantly in recent years (rising from about one 
million tons in 1996 to more than 52 million tons in 2009) (NBSC 2000–10); 
(ii) China’s soybean market has been fully integrated in the world market; 
and (iii) no policy instruments existed that could have effectively intervened, 
as was discussed earlier.
17.7 Concluding Remarks
Given China’s unique characteristics—its economic and political environ-
ment, the nature of the agricultural market, the national goal of food security, 
the large share of food expenditure in consumption budget, the country’s 
past experiences in responding to external economic shocks—it is not sur-
prising that the government’s reaction to the global food crisis was swift and 
decisive. Counter-measures were introduced in the early stages of the cri-
sis and covered a wide ranges of domestic and border policies. Short-term 
counter-measures, implemented with considerable speed, were comprehen-
sive, and extended to domestic grain supply, demand, and trade. Moreover, 
fulfilment of the national goal of improved food security was further boosted 
through modifications to the biofuel development strategy and strength-
ening of the nation’s commitment to agricultural development and food 
security. Investment in agriculture, particularly agricultural technology and 
water, has increased significantly in recent years and is expected to continue 
to increase further.
The decision-making process in China reflects the country’s unique char-
acteristics. The decision on the overall direction to stabilize domestic food 
prices and ensure national food security in the short term was made by the 
CPC and the State Council in the fall of 2007. The NDRC and the LG-FE 
as well as some major government-sponsored think tanks played an impor-
tant role. Media reports had some influence as they collated information and 
options from different stakeholders. Once the overall policy direction had 
been set by the CPC and the State Council, each relevant ministry established 
its own path for promoting the policy goals in the short term.
There was no significant resistance from the relevant stakeholders to either 
the decisions or implementation. Again, China’s political system––decision-
making based democratic centralism and balanced policies––directed the 
different stakeholders. The primary focus of agricultural policies is food 
security, and this objective was commonly sanctioned by all ministries. 




the trade-off between producers and consumers, the decision to stabilize 
food prices and concurrently to increase subsidies to producers and low-
income consumers was made by the national leaders. Furthermore, even 
though limiting fertilizer exports for a few months delayed its upward price 
trend, the chemical industry did benefit from price increases on the domes-
tic market. All stakeholders related to agriculture, including farmers and 
consumers, will benefit from China’s renewed commitment to invest in 
food and agriculture.
Policy response impacts were impressive. With the exception of soybean 
which was fully liberated, domestic grain price increased only moderately. 
After the global financial crunch, grain prices in relation to the interna-
tional trend returned to levels that had existed prior to the global food crisis. 
Soybean and edible oil prices increased, and consumers faced higher prices 
on several commodities, but fortunately most of China’s poor live in rural 
areas. This means that they might have some land for subsistence farming 
and there are few truly destitute residents. On the other hand, China has sig-
nificantly increased investment in agriculture, and this will have important 
implications for long-term food security.
China’s food price stabilization policies have helped the nation to reach its 
food security goals by safeguarding domestic grain prices from the increas-
ing trends seen on international markets, but it is worth noting that this 
does not imply that all of these policies are beneficial for the world. China’s 
counter-measures to keep domestic food prices down might also have helped 
to exacerbate the difficult global food situation, as the levy of export tariffs 
prevented major grains and fertilizers, agricultural commodities and other 
inputs from reaching world markets. Of course, China did not act alone: 28 
other countries (World Bank 2008) responded to rising international prices 
with measures to levy export taxes or to prohibit exports. To deal with similar 
emergencies in the global food supply, it is essential there is a new global gov-
ernance system, which can effectively coordinate action among major food 
importers and exporters.
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The Political Economy of Food Price 
Policy in Brazil
Bernardo Mueller and Charles Mueller* 
18.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of and the reactions to the world food cri-
sis of 2007–8 in Brazil. It shows that the reactions by society and by the gov-
ernment were relatively subdued as compared to many other countries. It 
is argued that this outcome is surprising as there are good reasons to expect 
the government to be particularly concerned with the potential impacts of 
a shock of this nature. These reasons are related to the political incentives 
faced by the government, and particularly the president, to pursue social 
inclusion subject to monetary and fiscal discipline. The chapter traces the 
emergence of these incentives to a pair of beliefs that emerged after Brazil 
redemocratized in 1985. The first is a belief that policy must pursue social 
inclusion as a primary concern. It emerged as a reaction to the historic 
inequality in the country and the trauma from the authoritarian period 
from 1964 to 1985. The second belief is a fear of inflation that arose from 
the ten-year experience with hyperinflation from 1985 to 1994. Together 
these beliefs constrain government policy to prioritize fiscally sound social 
inclusion. Given these incentives, the food crisis of 2007 and 2008 posed a 
dual threat, as it undermined both social inclusion and price stability. The 
absence of any great reaction by the government is therefore somewhat of 
a puzzle.
* This chapter benefited from the comments and suggestions of Kenneth Baltzer, Antônio 
Márcio Buainain, Aercio S. Cunha, Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Danielle Resnick, Pedro Zuchi, as well 






The main purpose of the chapter is thus to explain this puzzle. This is done 
by first describing the sharp transformation undergone by the country’s 
economy and polity in the past two decades. In the economic realm Brazil 
has tamed inflation, reached investment grade in 2008, accumulated over 
US$350 billion in reserves, become an agricultural powerhouse, discovered 
extensive oil reserve, reduced poverty and for the first time in its history sig-
nificantly reduced inequality. It is true that in this period economic growth 
was lacklustre and many economic problems persisted, yet it remains the case 
that an impressive transformation has taken place.
In terms of political institutions the country has also experienced a dra-
matic transformation, with a clear consolidation of democracy. The chapter 
argues that despite the fact that political institutions give the Brazilian presi-
dent substantial powers, they simultaneously provide for a series of checks 
and balances which constrain that power to be used for the greater good 
rather than to pursue private interests. The upshot is that the president (irre-
spective of party or ideology) faces strong incentives and constraints to use 
those powers to pursue the agenda of fiscally sound social inclusion described 
above.
Given this economic and political background the chapter proceeds to 
describe the circumstances that mitigated the impact of the food crisis when 
it hit in 2007–8, so that only minor policy adjustments were needed. The first 
of these circumstances is the fact that Brazil is a major producer and exporter 
of agricultural goods. Ferreira et al. (2009) show that although this shock did 
in fact reduce household welfare hitting the poorest the hardest, the com-
pensating effect of income from labour in agriculture, together with transfers 
from governmental social programmes, mitigated that impact considerably. 
This was especially true for the poorest deciles, which were thus spared from 
the brunt of the crisis.
Brazil already had in place, prior to 2007, an extensive system of social pro-
tection through which the government realized transfers to the poorest cohorts 
of the population. These programmes, headed by the Bolsa Família conditional 
cash transfer schemes, have managed to redistribute resources without gen-
erating perverse work incentives or other major distortions. When the food 
crisis hit the country the pre-existence of these mechanisms meant that only 
parametric changes to the level of benefits were needed, as opposed to having 
to set up a new programme. In the same vein the government was able to use 
its networks of large public banks to increase the level of credit in the economy 
as a reaction to the concurrent financial crises, thus also contributing to insu-
late consumers and the economy from the potential hardships of food price 
increases. The upshot was that the pass-through of higher world food prices to 
inflation and the exchange rate was relatively limited, not endangering either 
of the government’s core concerns: inflation and social inclusion.
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The chapter also discusses the Brazilian biofuel programme in the light 
of the criticism that such use of agricultural resources could be a cause of 
the food crisis. It is argued that the Brazilian programme, based on alcohol 
made from sugar cane, is energetically efficient and given the availability 
of land and water in Brazil does not crowd out the production of food 
crops.
18.2 Country Context
Brazil has recently undergone such a dramatic process of change that it is in 
many respects a much different country than it was a couple of decades ago. 
Understanding these changes is crucial to understand why Brazil was affected 
in the way it was by the food price crisis and why the different actors reacted 
as they did. This section will simply describe the changes, leaving to a later 
section a political economy analysis of how and why these changes came 
about.
From 1913 to 1980 Brazil was one of the fastest growing countries in the 
world. It industrialized over that period through a process of import substitu-
tion with high levels of state dirigisme. During this period Brazilians came to 
believe that this process of intense growth would lead the country to devel-
oped nation status. Endowments in the form of land, natural resources, cli-
mate, geography, population, and a huge potential internal market seemed 
to provide the necessary conditions for continued prosperity. Yet this confi-
dence in the future did not last. Starting in the mid-1970s the country stag-
nated with falling levels of productivity and near-zero economic growth until 
the end of the century, an experience which substituted the confidence and 
optimism with an obstinate cynicism and disbelief about the country’s ability 
to ever get back on track.
The defining mechanism through which this perverse situation was 
reached was the period of severe hyperinflation that started after the demise 
of the military dictatorship in 1985. That regime had steered the coun-
try through the ‘Brazilian miracle’ of 1968–73, but gradually lost power as 
a deteriorating economy added to the dissatisfaction due to the political 
repression. With redemocratization there came to dominate a rejection of 
anything associated with the old authoritarian ways, ushering in a domi-
nant belief in inclusion, democracy, participation, transparency, citizen-
ship, and other similar values. Far from being innocuous statements of 
intent this belief became a crucial determinant of many political choices 
that shaped the country’s path to the present day. We will argue below that 





One of the first consequences of this belief was a rejection of the fiscal and 
monetary austerity of the last decade of the military dictatorship. In the new 
regime policies had to be inclusive and open. Notwithstanding the merits of 
such values, the lack of concomitant forces for assuring the fiscal viability 
of these new policies resulted in a prolonged process of hyperinflation. 
Brazilian history in the twentieth century had been a succession of recur-
ring periods of high inflation interspersed with a brief periods of reprieve. 
But what the country experienced from 1985 to 1994 were several orders of 
magnitude more painful and disrupting, with average annual inflation at 
1,050 per cent and a maximum of 2,012 per cent in 1989. This was an experi-
ence that severely traumatized the Brazilian people. As one government plan 
after another failed to improve the situation, there came to prevail a sense 
of hopelessness and a feeling that inflation and all its perverse consequences 
were an integral part of Brazilian life.
In 1994 inflation was finally tackled with the creation of a new currency, 
the Real, instituted by a plan lead by Fernando Henrique Cardoso who would 
be the president of Brazil until 2002. Yet despite the success on the monetary 
front, few people at that time would have predicted the changes that the 
country would go through in the following years. At that point the coun-
try had been through a political opening, with a massive extension of the 
franchise, and was in the midst of economic liberalization, with removal of 
trade barriers, privatization, and a reduction of the state’s role as a producer. 
Nevertheless, both the economy and the polity remained in many ways so 
dysfunctional and suffered from so many seemingly intractable problems, 
that even the most optimistic analysts would not have dared dream of the 
transformation that was to come.
The key to understanding this transformation is the rise of a new belief that 
complemented in a crucial way the belief in inclusion, both of which remain 
active to the present day. This new belief is a strong aversion to inflation, that 
is, recognition by policy makers, politicians, voters, and society in general of 
the perils of inflation. It translates into an unwillingness to accept policies 
and choices which may lead to short-term benefits at the risk of sparking of a 
renewed process of inflation. Perhaps the best evidence of the real constrain-
ing force of this belief was the surprising conversion of President Lula once in 
office in 2003, reneging the leftish policy agenda his party had defended for 
years in the opposition, only to continue the fiscally disciplined macroeco-
nomic policies of his predecessor.
It is the conjugation of these two beliefs, inclusiveness and fiscal disci-
pline, that has been the determining force of policy-making in Brazil in the 
past decade and a half. It thus follows that consideration of these constrain-
ing forces is essential to understand how policy makers reacted to the food 
price crises in Brazil. Note that an increase in food prices has the potential 
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to directly affect issues which lie at the core of both of these beliefs: (i) ris-
ing food prices overwhelmingly affect the poor and excluded; and (ii) food 
price increases are a direct threat to inflationary expectations. Therefore, 
there are very good reasons why policy makers and society in general would 
have been concerned with the crises and willing to take measures to dispel 
their perverse potential effects. What measures were effectively taken will 
be addressed in the following sections, as will a political economy argu-
ment that explains why that was the chosen line of action. Before this, in 
the rest of this section we will briefly describe the transformation that has 
taken place in Brazil.
When the Brazilian economy was hit by a crisis in 1999 that forced a mas-
sive devaluation of its currency, there were suspicions that the hard-earned 
price stability would be lost. Staving off this fate would require a level of fiscal 
discipline that many doubted the country could muster. Nevertheless, since 
then macroeconomic policy has been centred on stringent primary surplus 
targets that have prioritized fiscal discipline and monetary stability over all 
other policies and goals. This is quite a remarkable accomplishment as the 
cuts required to meet those targets go against the natural instincts of politi-
cians who typically have short political horizons.
The benefits of this line of macroeconomic policy have not yet been 
reflected in particularly high rates of growth of gross domestic product 
(GDP), which has been rather average. The new circumstances have, how-
ever, laid a foundation of stability and order that has been crucial for other 
transformations that not only reflect important achievements but should 
also facilitate future growth. Perhaps the most conspicuous sign of this 
transformation was the achievement of ‘investment grade’ in 2008, which 
has improved the country’s access to international capital markets. This 
promises to have a big economic impact as the lack of savings is often recog-
nized as one of the major constraints on growth in Brazil (Hausmann 2008). 
Partly as a consequence of this change Brazil has lately been one of the 
major recipients of foreign direct investment in the world. Together with 
high commodity prices this has led to an unprecedented level of foreign 
reserves, which has provided considerable financial security to the country 
in the midst of the current global crisis. This level of reserves is currently 
higher than the country’s external debt, which has always been perceived 
by Brazilians as evidence of their country’s weakness and vulnerability. In 
this sense the fact that in 2010 Brazil became a creditor to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and has, in 2011, offered to help out financially with 
the European crisis, has been particularly symbolic. Another sign of the new 
times has been inclusion of Brazil in the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa (BRICS) group of large emerging nations, and with it the status 
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of being a key player in international fora, in contrast to the very marginal 
position it held just a few years back. Similarly the choice of Brazil to hold 
the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics reflects the country’s new-found 
prestige.
Two other changes that are of extreme importance for the analysis of the 
impact of food price increases in Brazil are the recent falls in the level of pov-
erty and of income concentration. Poverty rates have been halved since 1993 
(from 43 per cent to 21 per cent of the population) and income concentra-
tion has fallen almost every year since 1995 (Gini index of 0.601 to 0.543). 
These changes have been brought about by, among other factors, the end of 
inflation, conditional cash transfer programmes, and real increases in the 
minimum wage (Barros et al. 2007), which in turn are consequences of the 
dual beliefs in fiscally sound inclusion. These changes are unprecedented and 
highly consequential. Brazil has traditionally been one of the most unequal 
countries in the world, a position that until very recently has been impervi-
ous to all the policies that sought to rectify that situation. These changes have 
given access to millions of new consumers to markets that used to be beyond 
their reach, dramatically expanding the extent of the internal market and its 
future growth possibilities.
Even in education, an area where Brazil has always been most vulnerable, there 
have been important improvements in recent years. Although it remains low 
in international rankings, the past decade has seen persistent improvements. 
More importantly, these improvements have been the result of extensive and 
innovative reforms based on a willingness to measure, evaluate, and benchmark 
performance at many different levels (OECD 2010). These reforms have focused 
not only on funding but also on testing, community participation, completion 
rates, teacher wages and training, and increases of the school day/calendar/cur-
riculum among other areas. Over half a million graduates and 10,000 PhDs are 
now produced every year and the share of published scientific papers among all 
countries has risen from 1.7 per cent to 2.7 per cent since 2002.1
A final area where dramatic improvement has materialized in the past 
decade has been agriculture. Brazilian agriculture has historically been 
plagued by distortions and inefficiencies that have impeded the full poten-
tial of its natural endowments from being realized. Problems such as exces-
sive concentration of land ownership, low productivity, poor infrastructure, 
and thin markets have often been exacerbated by the very policies that 
sought to address them (Rezende 2006). Perverse subsidies and ill-conceived 
land and rural labour reforms have led to inverted price signals for capital 
and labour relative to the country’s natural endowments of these factors. 
1 The Economist, 6 January 2011.
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Rather than achieving redistribution land reform has weakened property 
rights and distorted land use decisions, for example leading to an underuse 
of tenancy (Alston and Mueller 2010). Up until the mid-1990s the stand-
ard diagnostic of Brazilian agriculture was that severe structural change, 
through a real land reform and greater government involvement, was the 
only way to set the sector on the right path. It is thus surprising that by the 
mid-2010s Brazil had, with barely any such structural change, become one 
of the world’s agriculture powerhouses. Today Brazil is either the major or 
one of the major, producers and exporters of a long list of products such as 
coffee, sugar, orange juice, beef, pork, chicken, soybeans, maize, cotton, and 
a major player in an even longer list. This achievement has been reached 
through investment in high-level agricultural research and innovation. The 
Economist (28 August 2010) has even suggested that the recent Brazilian 
model of agriculture could be a template to help solve African agricultural 
problems. Additionally Brazil is currently one of the few countries in the 
world that still has a viable expanding agricultural frontier, even without 
including the Amazon. Similarly the availability of water and great scope 
for growth as infrastructure improves, means that Brazilian agriculture will 
likely occupy an even more prominent place in the production of food and 
fuel in the future.
While in many ways Brazil is undergoing the positive transformation 
described above, a myriad other constraints on the country’s economic 
growth and the improvement of the population’s quality of life still persist or 
are getting worse. Infrastructure is crumbling or lacking, corruption is high, 
taxation is excessive, social security marches towards insolvency, etc. This 
section has not argued that Brazil has overcome all the major problems it 
faces, but rather that it has undergone a fundamental and unexpected trans-
formation in recent years. It is thus a much different country than it was 
just a decade ago and as such the impact and reaction to the food price cri-
sis has been much different than it would have been in the absence of this 
transformation.
18.3 The Evolution of Food Prices in Brazil
18.3.1 The Impact of the Food Crisis on Internal Prices in Brazil
Figure  18.1 shows the annual change in the general price level in the 
Brazilian economy and the variation in the food component of inflation. 
Because of its hyperinflationary past the price index is closely followed by 
policy makers. Unexpected upward variations can trigger immediate policy 





items increased dramatically, suggesting a strong transmission from inter-
national markets. The effect of food inflation was felt in total inflation con-
tributing to a rise of approximately 2 per cent from early 2007 to mid-2008. 
Although this was not enough to derail the Central Bank from its official 
target, it was certainly enough to raise concerns. In Figure 18.2 we show the 
changes in food prices at a more disaggregated level. The increases were not 
homogenous across food items. Of the six items we show, cereals suffered 
the greatest variation, having reached price increases of approximately 60 
per cent in mid-2008. Similarly the price of meats and milk exhibited sharp 
increases, whereas vegetables, which are not typically tradable, actually fell 
over most of 2007.
As shown in Figure 18.3, although there is some pass-through from world 
market prices for staples, the volatility is significantly less in the domestic 
market. Finally, Figure 18.4 shows the evolution of the price of a basket of sta-
ples that is deemed the minimum necessary for an average family to survive 
for one month. This is a common index of the cost of living that is often used 
in Brazil. The data shows a sharp increase in early 2007 above the trend. This 
is a good indication that the cost of living was directly affected by the world 
food crisis and that it was felt by the poor that normally spends a large frac-



























































































Figure 18.1 Total inflation and food inflation, 2007–11




18.3.2 Political Institutions, Policy-making Process, 
and Policy Outcomes in Brazil
In this section we provide a brief description of political institutions in 
Brazil. We have already described the intense economic and social trans-
formations that have taken place in Brazil in the past two decades. Here 
we analyse the concomitant political changes that have been both cause 
and consequence of those transformations. The focus is on describing who 
are the main actors, what are their motivations, how they interact and 
what are the characteristics of the policies that emerge from these political 
transactions.
The most important aspect of political institutions in Brazil is the over-
whelming power of the president. The Brazilian president has a series of pow-
ers and prerogatives that in essence have allowed him/her to closely control 
the agenda in congress, such as strong decree power, line-item veto, monop-
oly of proposal in some specific areas, and a series of political currencies with 
Figure 18.2 Consumer price increase for selected food items



































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18.3 Prices received by farmers in Brazil vs. world market prices
Source: Prices received by farmers in Brazil from Instituto de Economia Agrícola (<http://www.iea. 
sp.gov.br/out/index.php#>). The original data in Brazilian Reais for a 60 kg sack was transformed 




which to buy support.2 The upshot has been high levels of governability and 
the ability to approve much of the president’s reform agenda. Given the his-
tory in Latin America of poor outcomes associated with strong executives, 
this characteristic of Brazilian political institutions might seem like cause for 
alarm. However, contrary to most Latin American cases of caudillos, juntas, 
and populist strongmen, Brazilian presidents in the past two decades have 
increasingly faced a series of constraints and incentives that have checked the 
power of the executive thus restricting the use of that power towards direc-
tions generally more compatible with public welfare than with that of private 
groups. This has gradually led to greater rule of law and inclusiveness and is 
in great part responsible for the above mentioned impressive transformation 
in the economy.
The two key beliefs that permeate the Brazilian society influence what 
kind of policies emerge. Together they provide a bias toward fiscally sound 
inclusion that affects policy-making in a fundamental way and constrain 
the president’s choices, shaping his/her incentives. In particular, every presi-
dent in Brazil today is acutely aware that if inflation returns he/she will be 
punished by voters who rightly recognize that the end of monetary stabil-











































































































































Figure 18.4 Price of basic staples for a typical family
Source: Dieese (<http://www.dieese.org.br>) nominal prices.
2 For greater details on Brazilian institutions and how the current arrangements evolved 
through recent history, see Alston and Mueller (2006); and Alston et al. (2008).
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markets would punish the country almost automatically if fiscal discipline 
even started to slide. That represents a credible threat and an important 
constraint for the president’s choice of macroeconomic policy given that 
Brazil has highly evolved and internationally integrated financial markets 
and thus much to lose if credibility is undermined. The discipline provided 
by these electoral and financial constraints have been manifest through an 
unwavering policy of high primary surpluses since 1999, under presidents 
of very different ideological lines, which in turn has led to the hard-earned 
credibility epitomized in the raising of the country’s sovereign debt to 
investment grade status.
The beliefs in inclusion and monetary stability do not imply that policy and 
its outcomes are generally efficient or that they always achieve their intended 
goals. Because achieving inclusion generally involves redistribution, espe-
cially in such an unequal country as Brazil, those groups that stand to lose 
from policy changes resist and use their political and economic power to 
avoid losing rights, privileges, and transfers. Some redistribution and inclu-
sion is realized, but at the same time distortions, inefficiencies, and waste-
fulness are generated. To most observers, including much of the Brazilian 
population and academics studying the country, these distortions are glar-
ingly apparent and given that there are so many superior alternative ways 
of organizing policy and socioeconomic relations, it simply seems absurd 
that things are done this way. The insistence on such inefficient behaviour 
is often written off as some form of irrationality or a cultural trait. In reality, 
these outcomes are driven by the beliefs that constrain policy in this way. An 
important result is that together with the highly visible distortions some hard 
to observe inclusion also takes place. While the distortions have immediate 
impact, the inclusion is silent and often only has impact in the long term. 
Nevertheless there is a large literature that argues that political and economic 
openness has been the key determinant of economic growth historically. We 
argue that much of the improvement in Brazil in the past decades is rooted in 
the inclusion that has silently taken place over this period. Clearly it would 
be preferable to have the inclusion without the distortions, but given the way 
things work in Brazil you cannot have one without the other. This is a process 
which we call ‘dissipative inclusion’.
A quintessential example is land reform which has, over the past half cen-
tury, given incentives for land invasions, violence, rural conflict, deforesta-
tion, and undermining of property rights (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999, 
2010). At the same time an area of land equal to France and Portugal has 
been redistributed to landless peasants providing access to land, credit, and 
citizenship. That is, there has been dissipation of rents and also inclusion and 
it is not readily apparent what is the net effect. Alston et al. (2011) show that 
dissipative inclusion is not limited to land reform but is rather a ubiquitous 
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characteristic of policy-making in Brazil. In the next section we will show 
that this process also affects policies related to food prices.
One of the main mechanisms through which the powers of the execu-
tive are constrained is the existence of a series of checks and balances that 
together constrain and incentivize fiscally sound pursuit of social welfare by 
the president. These checks and balances involve an independent judiciary 
including a Supreme Court that routinely goes against the interest of the 
executive; a free, combative, and high quality press; a diverse civil society 
that has carved several institutionalized entry points into the policy-making 
process; independent and legally savvy public attorneys that view their man-
date to protect society from the failings of government, among others. Even 
congress, where the executive always manages to build a majority governing 
coalition serves as a check of extreme behaviour by the president (Alston and 
Mueller 2006).
What are the characteristics of policies that emerge from such a system? 
Alston et al. (2008) argue that there are four related categories of policies 
in the Brazilian policy-making process. The first is a series of policies that 
aim to assure monetary stability, based on fiscal discipline, stringent primary 
surpluses, inflation targets and high levels of taxation, among others. These 
policies form a fiscal imperative that takes precedence over all other types of 
policies. That is, if inflation starts to rise, all other policies will be cut or put 
on hold to assure the fiscal imperative.
The second category involves a series of policies which the executive uses 
to purchase political support in congress and across political parties. This is a 
process of the exchange of ‘pork for policies’ which involves the distribution 
of relatively small concessions of pork and jobs in the federal government 
structure to coalition partners (small compared to the level of pork in the US 
Congress). These exchanges give the president the political governability to 
do whatever it takes to maintain the fiscal imperative.
The third category of policies is composed of those which have been hard-
wired into the country’s budget and are thus insulated against opportunistic 
changes by politicians including the president. These policies make up more 
than 90 per cent of the budget and are composed mostly of social security, 
civil service, education, and health. These are mandatory expenditures over 
which the executive has very little discretion and can thus not be cut to help 
with the fiscal imperative.
The final category includes all the remaining policies, which are not hard-
wired and over which the president has full discretion. These residual policies 
include investment in infrastructure, social policies such as anti-poverty pro-
grammes, environmental policy, land reform, etc. Importantly for the pur-
pose of this chapter, many policies which would typically be used to address a 
shock in food prices are included in this category. Residual policies tend to be 
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volatile for two reasons. The first is that when the fiscal imperative is threat-
ened, this is where the cuts will happen to re-establish monetary stability. The 
second is that these policies are funded by the small slice of the budget which 
is not hardwired and over which the president has full discretion (less than 
10 per cent of the budget) so that whenever the officeholder changes many 
of these policies and programmes also change.
18.4 The Political Economy of the Food Price Crisis in Brazil
18.4.1 Introduction
Figure 18.5 shows a timeline for events that are relevant to the food price 
crisis in Brazil. What stands out the most from the timeline is the relative 
absence of major governmental or societal reactions to the crisis. Although 
there are some government policies that are related to the impact of higher 
food prices especially on the poor, these are all quite minor adjustments of 
programmes and policies that were already in place, motivated by the over-
arching belief in social inclusion. The Bolsa Família programme, for example 
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Figure 18.5 Timeline of the food crisis in Brazil
Source: Total and food inflation from IBGE Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor (INPC). 





(discussed in greater detail in the next two sub-sections) was instituted in 
2004 by unifying several other social programmes that were already in place, 
some since the mid-1990s. The increase in benefit levels (in real terms) that 
took place as a reaction to the increase in food prices in 2007 and 2008 was 
just the fine tuning of a policy instrument that was already in place and work-
ing. Another remarkable fact shown by the figure is that Brazil had already 
been through a food price shock in 2002 and 2003. This shock was in fact 
greater than that experienced five years later but was motivated instead by 
the political uncertainty and exchange rate devaluation associated with the 
coming to power of a left-wing government for the first time in the country’s 
history. This experience with a drastic price shock before 2007–8 may have 
helped prepare the country to deal with that subsequent shock.
18.4.2 The Impact of the 2007–8 Food Price Shock 
Across Households
In order to analyse the political impact of the increase in food prices it is nec-
essary not only to have a measure of the magnitude of that shock but also of 
its incidence across different types of households. If we want to understand 
the response by government to the food price crisis it is necessary to con-
sider explicitly how different social groups, and particularly the poor, were 
affected.
A recent study by Ferreira et  al. (2011) seeks to measure the impact of 
food price increases across percentiles of income classes. This study not only 
measures the effect on households’ expenditures, but also the countervailing 
impacts of increased wage income for those engaged in food production as 
well as the increases in social transfers by the government as direct measures 
to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the poor. The net measured effect is 
thus the result of the sum of three related components, an expenditure effect, 
a market income effect, and a transfer income effect.
Taking into account the countervailing effect on wages is particularly impor-
tant in a country like Brazil that is deeply integrated in international agricul-
tural markets and that thus stands to gain from commodity price increases. 
The results are presented using an assumption of 50 per cent pass-through of 
agricultural prices to wages.
In the same manner changes in official social protection programmes must 
be taken into account as they can mitigate the impact of increased food 
expenditure for the lower income percentiles. In Brazil this effect is poten-
tially large as more than 11 million families (approximately 23 per cent of the 
population) receive transfers through the federal government’s flagship pro-




This amounts to a transfer of approximately 0.4 per cent of GDP. Brazil was 
one of the pioneering countries to adopt means-tested programmes in the 
late 1990s and today the Bolsa Família is the largest conditional cash transfer 
programme in the developing world.
The fact that these cash transfer programmes were already set up and run-
ning when the food price crisis hit in 2007 made it very easy for the govern-
ment to use these channels to provide some compensating income to the 
poor. Because these programmes work through electronic cards that can be 
used in automated teller machines (ATMs) across the country, the transfers 
are more finely targeted at the beneficiaries avoiding being captured by local 
political intermediaries as was often the case in assistential programmes in 
the past. The government increased the benefits of the Bolsa Família and 
other programmes at both the intensive and extensive margins as an explicit 
response to the increase in food prices in 2008 (Neri 2011). According to 
Ferreira et al. (2011: 13) citing the Minister of Social Development, the aver-
age benefit of the Bolsa Família was increased in 2008 by 8 per cent with the 
stated ‘objective of improving the purchasing power of low-income families 
in the midst of the world food crisis’.
The final equation that is estimated explains the overall proportional 
change in household welfare bh due to the food price shock, as:
 

















 are the budget shares for each commodity i, pi is the price of com-
modity i, wh is the market component of non-farm income, and τh is the 
transfer received by household h. Thus equation 1 explains the change in 
household welfare due to the food price shock as the sum of the three terms 
on the right hand side, respectively the expenditure, income, and transfer 
effects.
Figure 18.6 shows the results for the entire country. The expenditure effect 
is negative for all households but affects the poor considerably more than 
the rich. Households at lower percentiles suffered a welfare drop of approxi-
mately 12 per cent while the households at the higher percentiles lost only 
around 2 to 3 per cent. The average reduction in welfare across all households 
was of 7.5 per cent. However, once the labour income and transfer effects 
are added to the analysis the net impact changes considerably. The benefits 
of higher food prices accrue especially to the poorer households, especially 
in rural areas (Figure 18.7). The price incidence curve now takes an inverted 
U-shape with the very poor and the rich suffering little welfare loss and those 
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Figure 18.6 Price increase incidence curve: net effect, Brazil
Note: This figure uses 50% pass-through of commodity prices to agricultural wages.
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Figure 18.7 Price increase incidence curve: net effect, rural areas
Note: This figure uses a 50% pass-through of commodity prices to agricultural wages.
Source: Ferreira et al. (2011) with data from IBGE Household Survey (POF) 2002/3.
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7 per cent on average. The transfer effect also improves household welfare, 
although the impact accrues mostly to the poorer twenty percentiles and is 
much smaller than the labour income effect.
The negative expenditure in rural areas was stronger than for the country 
as a whole, but once the other two effects are taken into account, the impact 
of the shock is significantly mitigated, with the poorest 10 per cent suffering 
almost no loss of welfare. The compensating effects of labour income and 
transfers were particularly important in rural areas. The expenditure effect 
in urban areas is smaller than in rural areas but the compensating income 
effect is also smaller, as there is little agricultural activity (Figure 18.8). The 
net effect is regressive with the poor faring worse than the rich, except for the 
very poor (the lowest 5 per cent), which receives a significant boost in welfare 
from governmental transfers (Figure 18.9).
These results help us understand why the response to the food price cri-
sis was limited to an adjustment of existing programmes. Only a marginal 
increase of the transfers in social programmes was needed. The benefits from 
the increased value of agricultural production also had other indirect posi-
tive effects. A report by Federação da Indústria do Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN) 
(2011) that calculated an index similar to the UN’s Human Development 
Index for each Brazilian municipality found that especially in the Centre 
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Figure 18.8 Price increase incidence curve: net effect, urban areas
Note: This figure uses a 50% pass-through of commodity prices to agricultural wages.
Source: Ferreira et al. (2011) with data from IBGE Household Survey (POF) 2002/03.
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from agriculture lead to higher tax receipts by municipal governments that 
in turn offered better public services to the population.
18.4.3 The Role of Social Programmes in Mitigating the Food Price Crisis
In 2003 when President Lula came to office the flagship programme of his 
government was the ‘Zero Hunger Programme’. Because this was the first 
time in Brazilian history that a left wing party had made it to the presidency, 
there were great expectations that social programmes would be given an 
absolute priority so as to set right what was seen as a historic social debt 
towards the poor and excluded. An Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security 
was created to administer the ‘Zero Hunger Programme’ in 2003. Keeping in 
the tradition of being inclusive and fostering participation, the programme 
is accompanied by a National Council of Food and Nutritional Security 
which has fifty-seven seats, thirty-eight of which are filled by representa-
tives of civil society and nineteen representatives from ministries and the 
federal government. In the spirit of dissipative inclusion, this broad level 
of participation makes the process open and democratic but at the same 
time often leads to paralysis and irrelevance. This programme did not really 
create the means-tested cash transfer programmes in the Bolsa Família but 
rather brought together and expanded on a series of separate programmes 
that had already been created by the previous government as well as other 
sub-national governments. One of the sub-programmes within the ‘Zero 








































































objective of simultaneously strengthening small scale agriculture and pro-
viding food to the extreme poor. The idea is to link these social groups by 
purchasing the produce from family farms that find it hard to participate 
in regular markets and distributing it to vulnerable social groups, such as 
public schools, day care centers, asylums, soup kitchens, etc. According to 
Chmielewska and Souza (2011: 18) more than US$1.5 billion where used 
in this programme between 2003 and 2009 to purchase 2.6 million tons of 
food. In 2009 this benefited 138,000 family farms and provided food for 
approximately 13 million people.
The point to be stressed here once again is that these programmes were 
already in place when the food price crisis hit in 2007–8, reflecting a deep 
existing concern with poverty and food security. The ready availability of 
these policy instruments together with the mitigating effect of higher agri-
cultural labour income described in the previous sections, meant that the 
reaction to the crisis could take place by simply strengthening actions that 
already existed.
18.4.4 Public Banks and Anti-cyclical Credit Expansion
While social programmes and gains in agricultural labour income were 
important compensating mechanisms that helped to mitigate the impact 
of the food price crisis on the poor, it was also the case that the crisis did 
not have a very significant impact on the rest of the population that is not 
directly affected by those mechanisms. One important reason for this was 
the anti-cyclical policy adopted by the federal government to counteract the 
financial crisis that took place almost simultaneously with the food price cri-
sis. Contrary to much of the developed world, where interest rates were close 
to zero, Brazil had much leeway for monetary policy given one of the highest 
interest rates in the world. The government also expanded its Programme 
for Growth Acceleration to counteract the effects of the global depression. 
In addition, as a complementary instrument against the effects of the finan-
cial crisis the government promoted a strong expansion of the availability of 
public credit making up for the retraction of credit from the public national 
and foreign banks. This policy was very effective in propping up the level of 
economic activity, avoiding unemployment, and generally deflecting many 
of the debilitating symptoms of the financial crisis (IPEA 2011). As private 
credit diminished in the wake of the crisis public credit increased, avoiding 
a fall in total credit. This policy could be quickly deployed because Brazil has 
a very highly developed system of public banks composed of a development 
bank (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES)), a commercial bank 
(Banco do Brasil), and a savings and loans bank (Caixa Econômica Federal). 




the banking system (and there are lots of controversies over this structure of 
the banking system in Brazil) the fact is that in the recent crisis it provided the 
government with a quick and effective instrument to counteract the effects 
of the global depression. Together with other measures, including reductions 
in various taxes on durable goods, these policies propped up the level of eco-
nomic activity and consumption, with the result that consumers in Brazil 
were largely oblivious to the real extent of the world crisis. As a result of these 
policies millions of consumers made first-time purchases of goods such as 
refrigerators, cars, computers, as well as services such as airplane trips and 
holidays. The impact of these anti-cyclical policies also played an important 
role in counteracting the harmful effects of the food crisis and helps explain 
why the country was so lightly affected.
18.4.5 Biofuels and the Food Price Crisis
The use of agricultural land to produce biofuels is one of the main culprits 
listed in almost any discussion of the determinants of food price hikes.3 
Because Brazil is one of the most advanced countries in the production and 
use of biofuels—practically all cars sold today can run on both gasoline and 
ethanol—it is worthwhile to consider to what extent this suggested link actu-
ally holds in the Brazilian case. We will just make two points about this issue. 
The first is to note that the nature of biofuel production in Brazil is signifi-
cantly different than in most other countries, where the criticism is more 
applicable. According to The Economist (24 February 2011):
Not all ethanols are the same. Brazil, the world’s second-largest producer, makes 
its fuel mainly from sugar. Processing plants can go back and forth between etha-
nol and crystallised sugar at the flick of a switch, depending on prices. Brazil gets 
eight units of energy for every unit that goes into making it, so the process is 
relatively efficient and environmentally friendly. In contrast, American ethanol 
produces only 1.5 units of energy output per unit of input, but its inefficiency is 
underwritten by government subsidies and high tariff walls.
The second point to note is that although the area dedicated to sugar cane 
and other crops used for producing biofuels has grown significantly in the 
past decade in Brazil, this has not led to much displacing of the production of 
food crops. Brazil has over 400 million hectares (ha) of arable land, of which 
less than 40 million are currently in use; while the United States, with slightly 
less than 400 million ha of arable land, already uses approximately half that 
area (The Economist, 28 August 2010). In addition Brazil also holds access to 
3 See Runge (2010) for a review of the scientific research finding against the environmental 
merits of biofuels and making the link to higher food prices. In 2007 a UN expert called biofuels 




more water than practically any other country, though it is true that other 
inputs such as roads and ports are still constraining. Although the issue is 
clearly more complex than the two points raised here, they should at the least 
suggest that also when it comes to the issue of the link between food prices 
and biofuels, compared to most other countries there are several mitigating 
circumstances in the Brazilian case.
18.5 Conclusions
This chapter portrayed the subdued reaction by the Brazilian government 
and other players to the food price crisis of 2007–8 as a paradox. Given the 
incentives inherent in the country’s political institutions one would have 
expected that the threat presented by significantly higher food prices to have 
elicited a more rambunctious reaction. The chapter has shown that although 
the threat was indeed real, such a response was not needed. This was so partly 
because the crisis presented several benefits to the Brazilian economy that 
mitigated the effects on the poor and on inflation. Additionally, incentives in 
political institutions had, even before the crisis, led to the creation of several 
programmes and mechanisms to promote social inclusion and to maintain 
price stability, so that when those pressures emerged from the international 
hike in food prices, those objectives were already insulated or could be easily 
defended. These circumstances were not a coincidence or a stroke of luck, 
but rather structural characteristics of the Brazilian economy and political 
institutions, so that if food prices continue to increase, as seems likely to be 
the case, the analysis in this chapter indicates that Brazil will be well-placed 
to respond.
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The South African agricultural and food economy is characterized by some 
stark realities. On the one hand, there is a large productive agricultural and 
agribusiness sector ensuring national food security. On the other hand, 52 per 
cent of households experienced hunger in South Africa in 2005 while almost 
fourteen million, or about 35 per cent, of the South African population are 
generally considered to be food insecure and categorized as poor. Given the 
fact that the affordability of food should be an important political issue in 
South Africa, it is important to understand the structure of the agricultural 
and food industry and to evaluate the policies and programmes the govern-
ment has introduced in this sector to deal with the broader issue of food 
security.
For almost sixty years during the twentieth century South African agricul-
tural and food markets were controlled and regulated by the government. 
Several parastatals performed a number of functions such as import control, 
price control, and issuing of licences, quotas, and permits on behalf of the 
state. This era of controlled food marketing came to an end in the mid-1990s 
and since then South Africa had a liberalized agricultural and food market 
with limited, if any, border controls and no control over the behaviour of 
farmers, traders, food companies, and retailers in the food value chain. The 
spirit of liberal capitalism was in full operation. Since the period of deregu-
lation South Africa experienced two periods of food price crises: in 2002/3 
and again 2007/8. As will be shown later the 2002/3 crisis was largely caused 
by a sharp depreciation of the South Africa exchange rate but was amplified 





Development Community (SADC) region. In 2007/8 global commodity price 
trends were dominant factors in the South African food price inflation.
The main objective of this chapter1 is to understand the food price 
trends during these two periods and to unpack the political reaction and 
policy responses to the food price crises. We will show in this chapter that 
agricultural and food policy in South Africa remained largely unchanged 
with no controls or regulations introduced. The policy of unregulated 
agricultural and food markets continues although the Competition 
Commission increased the number of investigations into uncompetitive 
behaviour in food supply chains resulting in heavy fines for a number of 
food companies.
19.2 Country Context
19.2.1 South Africa’s Political Dispensation Post-1994
South Africa’s recent political history is characterized by the advent of 
democracy in 1994 and the various policies and government programmes 
introduced to rid South Africa of its racial injustices and its deep poverty, 
extreme inequality, and high unemployment. The African National Congress 
(ANC) is the ruling party since 1994 and attracts around 66 per cent of the 
popular vote and thus dominates the national assembly as well as the legisla-
tive assemblies in the different provinces (except the Western Cape Province). 
The policies of the government over the last seventeen years have mainly 
focused on the delivery of basic services, reducing poverty and expanding 
the payment of social grants to poor communities. The ideology of ‘growth-
with-redistribution’ dominated for more than a decade after 1994 but in the 
last five years or so more policy decisions are now framed in terms of South 
Africa’s political ambition to build a ‘developmental state’ (Gumede 2011). 
The policy framework for a ‘developmental state’ focuses on a strong role of 
the state to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the population and the 
strong believe that only the state can deliver development. As a result many 
government programmes are focused on the delivery of basic services, infra-
structure, education, and health.
The key policy-making institution in South Africa is the policy conference 
of the African National Conference that takes place every five years. The pol-
icy resolutions taken at this conference shape the ‘programme of work’ for 
the government, as well as the legislative programme of parliament.






Various sectors have undergone dramatic reform over the twenty-year 
period of democratic government in South Africa. Included here, and rel-
evant for this chapter, are water reform (a new Water Act), land reform, and 
liberalization of the agricultural sector. The latter involved the abolishment 
of all market controls and all agricultural control boards and the liberaliza-
tion of prices and import controls. A bias against the so-called privileged and 
protected commercial farmers, as well as believing that food can be cheaper 
if imported, informed the political support for the liberalization of agricul-
tural markets. This exposed South African agriculture to all the volatilities of 
the international commodity markets. South African agriculture has since 
1994 been fully integrated in global agricultural commodity markets with the 
majority of tariff lines carrying a zero tariff.
19.2.2 Agriculture in the National Economy of South Africa
Primary agriculture contributes 3 per cent of South Africa’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) while the broader more inclusive definition of the agricul-
tural, food, and fibre sector contributes between 8 and 10 per cent of the 
national economy with around 10 per cent of workers employed in this sector 
(National Department of Agriculture 2009). The two most important features 
of the South African agricultural economy are its dualistic structure and the 
process of deregulation of commercial agriculture that has taken place over 
the past two decades. These features have to be seen against the background 
of the country’s resource endowment. Of the 100 million hectares (ha) of 
agricultural land, only some 14 per cent receive enough rainfall for arable 
farming, while the remainder is used for extensive grazing. Only 1.35 million 
ha of the arable land is irrigated, yielding at least one-third of total agricul-
tural output (National Department of Agriculture 2009).
Some 40,000 commercial farmers (or farming units) occupy almost 87 per 
cent of the total agricultural land in the country, and produce more than 
95 per cent of marketed output. Only 7 per cent of these farms—or 2,900 
units—are considered large-scale units. In contrast, African smallholder farm-
ers are found mostly in the former homeland areas, which make up some 13 
per cent of the agricultural land (National Department of Agriculture 2009). 
These areas were established under the notorious Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, 
and are characterized by traditional forms of land tenure, which were regu-
lated by a series of laws and regulations, mostly proclaimed in terms of the 
Black Administration Act of 1927.
Deregulation of the agricultural output market has increased productivity 
(Vink and Kirsten 2003) and the change in trade policy has expanded market 
access and caused a shift from field crops to horticultural and animal prod-




Over the past fifteen years, the value of imports of agriculture products 
have been growing by an average rate of 13 per cent per annum, while the 
value of exports have grown, on average, by 12 per cent annually. Strong 
growth in agriculture imports can be attributed to significant increases in 
the value of processed agriculture imports. The top ten imported commodi-
ties account for around 70 per cent of total agricultural imports in 2010 and 
include wheat and rice.
Since stock levels do play an important role in inflationary trends and out-
looks it is important to review the opening stocks of maize, wheat, and sun-
flower seed (all kept by private agribusiness firms). This is presented in the 
two panes in Figure 19.1 below. The low maize stock levels in 2002 and 2008 
are noteworthy.
19.3 Food Price Trends and Shocks
19.3.1 Previous Food Price Crises
Before the food price changes in the 2007–9 period can be analysed it is impor-
tant to have a more long-term perspective on food inflation in South Africa. 
South Africa experienced a number of food prices crises between January 
1991 and January 2011. The periods of extreme food inflation were 1991/2; 
1994/5; 2002/3; and then again in 2008/9. We now provide a brief overview 
of the main causes of the last two spikes in food price inflation.
South Africa experienced two periods of sharp increases in food prices 
during the period from 2000 to 2010 and they were not caused by a national 
drought as was the case in 1991/2. The first period of food price increases 
occurred towards the beginning of 2002, when the prices of staple food 
commodities skyrocketed, and kept on increasing throughout 2002. As 
expected, food retail prices were not long to follow, and double-digit infla-
tion rates seemed once again to be the order of the day. As an immediate 
response the government appointed on 28 November 2002 a Food Pricing 
Monitoring Committee (FPMC) to investigate the sharp increases in food 
prices. While FPMC was busy implementing its mandate during 2003, food 
price levels improved and food inflation remained low for most of 2004, 
2005, and 2006.
During its investigations the committee established that higher local 
commodity prices (helped by world prices and the exchange rate) were 
largely responsible for increases in retail food prices during 2002. The 
exchange rate which depreciated from around R8 to the US$1 to around R12 
to the US$1 had a profound impact on local prices since international com-





Although it was clear that the depreciation of the South African currency 
had the biggest effect on the local market, some suspicion remained about 
the role of futures market traders and speculators in driving commodity 
prices to these high levels. Later criminal procedures against one such trad-
ing group confirmed these suspicions. Several measures to regulate the 
trader behaviour on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were subsequently 
introduced following the recommendations of the FPMC and following 
3500000
(a): Maize opening stocks (2001–10)










































































SA - Opening stock: White maize (t) SA - Opening stock: Yellow maize (t)
Figure 19.1 Opening stocks for maize and wheat
Source: South African Grain Information Service, available at <http://www.sagis.org.za>.
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the outcome of the court case against the specific trader. It is worth noting 
that this process was pursued by the financial services board (that regu-
lates financial markets in South Africa) and the governing board of the 
Johannesburg stock exchange. It is not evident that there was any political 
pressure responsible for this.
The investigations by the FPMC as well as an earlier report by Kirsten and 
Vink (2002) for the National Treasury summarized the main drivers of the 
food price shock in 2002 as follows:
(a) increasing international prices;
(b) a lack of competition in the supply chain beyond the farm gate, espe-
cially at the retail level;
(c) a fast and severe depreciation in the value of the currency;
(d) a shortage of maize in the SADC region; and
(e) a climate of uncertainty, created specifically by the unfortunate cir-
cumstances surrounding the land reform programme and the election 



















































































































Figure 19.2 The exchange rate of the South African Rand against US$, January 2000 –
December 2010
Source: own calculations based on South African Reserve Bank exchange rate database.
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These factors jointly caused the maize and therefore other food prices to rise 
substantially. It is generally believed that the depreciation of the exchange 
rate was dominant. Commentators generally ascribed the deprecation of the 
exchange rate to a number of events in the global currency market and the 
limited confidence in emerging economies as well as several political deci-
sions in South Africa that reduced investor confidence.
The second period of rapid food price increases happened during the 
2007–8 period with food price inflation peaking at 18.5 per cent in July 2008. 
Food inflation remained above 10 per cent for the rest of 2008 and first half 
of 2009. During 2010 food prices at retail level remained high but the rate of 
price increases was significantly lower than that experienced in 2009. During 
2010, food and non-alcoholic beverages inflation contributed less to head-
line inflation in 2010 compared to its contribution in 2008 and 2009. The 
details of this price shock are discussed in the detailed analysis below.
19.3.2 Price Trends for Key Food Items
Although we had access to retail and commodity prices for a large number 
of agricultural and food products we limit our discussion on price trends to 
maize, wheat, and rice. It was important to include rice since it is one of South 
Africa’s major imports and a key component of the dietary intake of South 
African consumers.
The price of maize meal (processed from white maize) is the most impor-
tant food price in South Africa’s food economy. Maize meal is the main food 
item in the diet of the poorest 40 per cent of the population and the domi-
nant starch for most of the majority black population group.
With urbanization and increased affluence bread becomes the preferred 
starch. The price of bread is therefore just as politically sensitive as that of 
maize. Since South Africa has always been a net importer of wheat and there-
fore the local commodity price for wheat has since the period of deregulation 
been at import parity levels and therefore depending on the international 
price of wheat and the value of the South African currency. Ever since the 
spike in food prices in 2002 the retail price of bread has continued its upward 
trajectory. Price only stabilized for short periods of time but never got back to 
the levels of the year 2000.
South Africa produces no rice but imports large quantities from Thailand, 
Malaysia, and China. It is therefore expected that the value of the South 
African currency versus other currencies and the levels of international rice 
prices will impact directly on the retail price of rice.
During the 2002 food price crisis the analyses of the FPMC showed how the 
exchange rate influenced prices. In the case of rice, international commodity 




manufacturer (mainly doing cleaning and packaging) of the Tastic Rice brand 
increased the retail price in 2002 in response to the rising landed cost of rice. 
As the exchange rate appreciated, prices improved immediately. By late 2003 
prices were back to their 2001 levels confirming that with limited processing 
costs within South Africa, prices will track international prices and exchange 
rate influences.
Without going into the detail of the analysis on food price trends we sum-
marize the main developments in the decade long time line to illustrate the 
main break points in the prices time series. This is summarized in Table 19.1. 
The table also presents the different price levels in different time periods and 
thus provides a comprehensive review of the speed of change in the different 
price trends. The information also helps to provide important time lines for 
the discussions to follow on media reporting and policy responses.
19.4 Policy Responses and the Policy-making Process
19.4.1 Introduction
There have been very few policy responses following the food price crises of 
2002/3 and 2007/9. The timeline presented in Figure 19.3 provides a useful 
perspective on all the policy repsonses during the specific ten-year period. 
Apart from the appointment of the FPMC in 2003, some partial responses 
in the form of immediate relief for the most needy and poorest households, 
and aspects related to market information and anti-competitive behaviour by 
food manufacturers and retail chains, no real substantive changes in govern-
ment food and agricultural policy or in the social welfare programmes were 
announced. The same happened during 2007–9. These facts were at first veri-
fied through a review of government policy statements and key announce-
ments but were confirmed through interviews with senior government 
officials in leadership positions in the National Department of Agriculture 
during the two crisis periods.
19.4.2 Policy-making Process and Policy Impact
South Africa is still, after twenty years of democracy, largely a divided society 
and only a few people and institutions outside the inner core of the ruling 
party are trusted with policy-making and drafting policy positions. Parliament 
therefore acts only as a rubber stamp and any large differences between poli-
ticians are usually swept away by majority vote. Sometimes new legislation 
that contravenes principles of the constitution is challenged by the opposi-




Table 19.1 Time line of price changes on selected food items
Commodity Prices began 
increasing in:
Price at start  
of increase
Months when 




Prices peaked in: Peak price Prices came 
down in:













Spot price of white maize May 2001 R755.09 Nov. 2001 20.95 Mar. 2002 R2,006.89 Apr. 2002
April 2005 R545.95 Mar. 2007 23.89 June 2008 R2,005.75 July 2008
Maize meal (1 kg) Feb. 2002 R3.14 Apr. 2002 10.88 May/Jun. 2003 R4.36 July 2003
May 2006 R3.39 Apr. 2008 8.13 July 2008 R5.72 Aug. 2008














Wheat Dec. 2006 R1,728.06 Feb 2008 18.31 Jun. 2008 R4,071.63 Jul. 2008
White bread (700 g) Dec. 2006 R4.89 May 2008 7.60 Feb. 2009 R7.92 Mar. 2009
Brown bread (700 g) Dec. 2006 R4.42 May 2008 9.70 Feb. 2009 R7.29 Mar. 2009
International rice price Sep. 2007 US$330.00 Apr. 2008 50.92 Apr. 2008 US$1015.21 May 2008
Rice (1 kg) Feb. 2008 R8.46 July 2008 21.71 Feb. 2009 R17.52 Mar.2009



















































South African General Elections
Figure 19.3 A timeline showing price peaks and policy responses between 2000 and 2011
Source: own interpretation based on personal recollection and media reports.
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in the bill of rights in the constitution, agriculture and food issues are never 
major debates in parliament and in society. It is hardly ever contentious bar 
the issue of land and land reform.
Food security was nevertheless included as a priority policy objective 
in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)—which was 
the main policy framework guiding the reconstruction of post-apartheid 
South Africa in the years immediately after 1994. As a result, the govern-
ment re-prioritized public spending to focus on improving the food secu-
rity conditions of historically disadvantaged people. That policy brought 
about increased spending in social programmes of all spheres of govern-
ment such as school feeding schemes; child support grants; free health ser-
vices for children between 0–6 years, for pregnant and lactating women; 
pension funds for the elderly; working for water; community public works 
programmes; provincial community food garden initiatives; and more. The 
national school nutrition programme was one of the programmes imple-
mented by the government in post-apartheid South Africa to deal with 
hungry and malnourished children at primary schools and was one of the 
presidential-led projects under the RDP. By 2005/6 the programme was feed-
ing approximately 4.5 million primary school learners. The programme has 
later on been augmented by a school food gardens project, implemented 
with the support of the Department of Agriculture, local authorities, and 
non-governmental organizations.
Food Security initiatives in the various South African government depart-
ments were too fragmented without coherent strategy and in 2000 changes 
became necessary to improve this unsatisfactory situation. As a result, the 
cabinet decided to formulate a national food security strategy that would 
streamline, harmonize, and integrate the diverse food security programmes 
into the integrated food security strategy (IFSS) (FAO 2004). The cabinet 
finally in July 2002 endorsed the IFSS as a priority programme of the social 
sector cluster action plan with the specific instruction that an implementa-
tion programme be developed. The social cluster of departments has been 
mandated by the cabinet to ensure that the IFSS is effective. The integrated 
food security and nutrition programme, later on the IFSS, was developed 
based on five programmes forming the pillars: (1) food production and trade; 
(2) food safety and nutrition; (3) community asset development; (4) social 
safety net and food emergencies; and (5) food insecurity vulnerability infor-
mation and mapping system. Despite these good intentions this strategy 
never got funded and was never comprehensively implemented.
Given the fact that the policy-making process in South African agriculture 
is rather non-transparent this section was rather tricky to deal with since most 
researchers and technocrats are not members of the inner core of the ruling 
party. Nevertheless the interviews with the directors general of agriculture 
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who were leading the department during the time of the two food crises con-
firmed our initial hypotheses, as well as the anecdotal evidence.
19.4.3 Policy Responses Following the 2002/3 Crisis
The responses of the South African government following the food price 
spike in 2002/3 did not really include major policy changes but as mentioned 
earlier the response was mainly targeting short-term measures. The FPMC 
report of 2003 provides a detailed overview of the immediate government 
responses in 2002 (FPMC 2003: 39–42) and can be summarized as follows:
The immediate government responses during the 2002/3 crisis were mainly 
focussed on a number of initiatives to provide relief to the most vulnerable 
communities. The most important were:
•	 Poverty	relief	measures	to	cushion	the	effect	of	rocketing	food	prices	on	
the country’s poor in the form of cheaper maize meal and welfare incre-
ments (known as the food emergency scheme).
•	 Agricultural	‘starter	packs’	distributed	by	the	government	among	poor	
rural farmers. These packs include: seed; fertilizer; information packs; 
basic tools, such as hoes and hand tools; day-old chicks; point-of-lay 
chickens; pregnant cows; and bulls.
The food emergency scheme was launched to provide emergency food parcels 
for a period of three months by which time the agricultural starter packs would 
have enabled households to produce their own food. The emergency scheme 
was plagued by lack of coordination, long delays in issuing starter packs, and 
also problems relating to the identification of beneficiary households. All in all 
the government response seemed to be rather superficial covering only a small 
portion of the most needy households and with little coordination between 
departments within the social cluster. Capacity issues in government, avail-
ability of finance, and non-compliance with the public tender and procure-
ment system limited the further and continuous roll out of this programme.
The appointment of the FPMC in 2003 was in itself an immediate govern-
ment response to the food price crisis of those years. One can argue that 
the committee’s appointment in some way focussed public attention on the 
food price issue but at the same time reduced the possibility for opportunism 
during the period of rising prices. The FPMC made a number of important 
recommendations following its investigations of the 2002/3 food price crisis:
1. The implementation of a reliable and consistent food price monitoring 
network.
2. Improvement in the accuracy of crop estimates by means of better tech-




3. Increased budgetary allocation for agricultural information and 
statistics.
4. The government should introduce a statutory measure compelling 
all grain traders to report on a weekly basis on realized and planned 
(i.e., a finalized contract) imports and exports of whole grain and grain 
products.
5. An annual publication, to be known as the South African Food Cost 
Review, should be published by the National Department of Agriculture 
to disseminate information on food costs and trends in retail prices and 
farm-retail price spreads as widely as possible.
6. School feeding programmes should be expanded.
7. The competition commission should be requested to conduct a thor-
ough investigation into the market structure of the food industry, as 
well as the agricultural input industry.
A number of the recommendations dealt with the issue of information given 
since it was argued that not enough information was around in the market 
regarding stocks, crop estimates, export trends, and the size of the harvest in 
other countries of southern Africa. In the grain markets of southern Africa it 
is often argued that one of the main drivers in formulating prices is the esti-
mation of the local crop, as well as the regional crops. The underestimation of 
the maize crop by one million tons during 2002 was considered to be one of 
the main drivers of the spike in maize commodity prices. The improvement 
of the crop estimates in South Africa and the southern African development 
community could contribute substantially towards household food security. 
Intervention to improve the accuracy of crop estimates would cost the gov-
ernment far less than strategic stock holding and would contribute substan-
tially towards household food security.
Certain of the FPMC recommendations were implemented:
•	 National	Agriculural	Marketing	Council	(NAMC)	and	Statistics	South	
Africa (STATS SA) and provincial departments of agriculture formed a 
food price monitoring network.
•	 The	NAMC	issue	quarterly	food	price	monitoring	statements	and	since	




tions into anti-competitive behaviour in the food chain and has found a 
number of large food companies guilty of price collusion. Some of these 
investigations were concluded during the most recent food price spike.
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All the monitoring work and the large volume of information made avail-
able in the aftermath of the FPMC’s tenure and a much more vociferous 
Competition Commission have not prevented the 2007–9 price increases. It 
could be argued that the openness of the South African market and the strong 
transmission of world prices into the South African market made it rather 
difficult for the South African government to shield the poorest households 
from these price spikes. It, however, also suggests a limited understanding of 
the global and national food economy but also clearly illustrates a limited 
appreciation by top officials of the importance of analytical evidence.
19.4.4 Policy Responses Following the 2007–9 Crisis
The political statements during the 2007–9 period were not really commit-
ting any firm ‘new’ policy responses or any change in the general policy direc-
tion. In early 2008 the then Minister of Finance suggested that public policy 
responses to rising food prices should focus on two main areas—income sup-
port to the most vulnerable and efforts to increase production. This was also 
the position in 2002/3 and summarizes the South African government’s posi-
tion on food price inflation. It is in this regard that the ‘social relief of distress 
grant’ was introduced as a temporary social grant aimed at dealing with pre-
cisely these types of emergencies. He then went on to mention other options 
to mitigate the effects of rising food prices such as (a) increase the coverage of 
school feeding schemes; (b) increase support to non-governmental organiza-
tions and community-based organizations that run soup kitchens and similar 
feeding schemes; and (c) broaden the social security net by raising the thresh-
old on means tests and by extending the grant. Here again only options were 
presented but nothing substantial was committed.
The notions presented here by the Minister of Finance correspond to the 
points made by the government officials who were interviewed but also show 
little deviation from the responses in 2003. It furthermore illustrates the lack 
of urgency despite acknowledging that the poor will be negatively impacted 
by the increase in food prices. The treasury—which to a large extent influences 
the government policy because it holds the purse—rejected the possibility of 
introducing any form of price controls or any other form of government 
intervention in the market economy. The interviews also confirmed that the 
option of controls or any form of market intervention was never considered 
by any of the ministries.
It seems clear now with having the benefit of hindsight and the collective 
memory of government officials that the treasury was driving the govern-
ment’s policy response to the food price crisis. Proposals on food reserves 
(more specifically a virtual food reserve) were circulated and debated in 2002/3 




be too high and therefore never implemented resulting in money being allo-
cated for immediate relief programmes for the neediest.
In light of this policy context the process of dealing with the increasing rise 
in food prices in 2008/09 has been a major challenge for the South African 
government. The National Department of Agriculture introduced the Ilima/
Letsema campaign to promote household food production by accelerating 
and improving agricultural crop production. The campaign was launched 
nationally in eight provinces (excluding the North West Province) in pursuit 
of national and household food security to mobilize communities to lever-
age land as a resource to fight poverty and hunger. As part of the campaign, 
agricultural starter packs (similar to those provided in 2003) were provided 
for household vegetable production and promotion of food gardens.
Additional funds were also allocated for production projects such as mass 
food production, investments in production-enhancing infrastructure, includ-
ing irrigation schemes and soil reclamation. Obviously these programmes were 
not blanket interventions and were only applied in selected communities.
One of the provincial governments, Gauteng, argued that one of the best 
ways to deal with high food prices and the unaffordability of food was to 
develop community gardens. The province established a total of 29,579 
homestead food gardens between 2004/5 and the 2007/8 financial years. 
Additionally, over R108 million was spent on establishing 2,447 community 
food gardens.
The perceived lukewarm approach by the South African government to 
the crisis can partly be explained by the comprehensive social welfare system 
that has been in place since 1998 and managed by the Department of Social 
Development. The welfare and safety net programmes are central to the 
‘developmental state’ paradigm in South Africa. The numbers below report 
the extent of these programmes in 2007—just at the time the second period 
of high food price inflation was observed. Income transfers to households, 
mainly through social assistance grant programmes, stood at R77 billion in 
2007. In April 2007, 12.1 million South Africans were receiving social assis-
tance grants, amounting to R5.1 billion. Grants are disbursed in the following 










These grants amount to some R61 billion a year, about 3.3 per cent of GDP, and 
contribute more than half of the income of the poorest 20 per cent of house-
holds. This is obviously an important state intervention but in the context 
of this chapter it should be mentioned that these programmes have been in 
place for a number of years and no major budgetary increases related to these 
programmes were introduced during the crisis period of 2008–9. It can there-
fore with reasonable certainty be argued that South Africa’s well-developed 
safety net programme for all practical purposes prevented a major crisis in the 
wake of rapid food price inflation in 2008.
19.4.5 Summary
The government response during the two periods of rapid food price infla-
tion can typically be classified as responses in the so-called ‘second class’ of 
interventions (see Watson 2011). The second-class actions target the poorer 
populations in an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of price changes and 
include elements such as welfare payments, school feeding programmes, food 
parcels, and related interventions. These responses did not require any regula-
tory or legislative changes but were possible in terms of current government 
mandates and only required additional funding from the treasury. This addi-
tional funding was small compared to the 3.3 per cent of GDP that has already 
been allocated to social welfare payments in years prior to the 2008–9 crisis. 
The funding for the additional small interventions was made available fairly 
quickly given the seriousness of the crisis in terms of political repercussions. 
Note should be taken that 2004 and 2009 were election years in South Africa 
and distributing food parcels or providing food relief thus useful instruments 
to show that the government was looking after its people! Nevertheless, South 
Africa has a well-funded social safety net programme in place which provided 
an important cushion during the periods of high food prices.
19.5 Political Economy Context
19.5.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, the South African government did not implement any 
major policy changes in the aftermath of the two periods of food price infla-
tion. Most responses were in the category of responses introduced to mitigate 
the impact of food price inflation on the poorest communities. South Africa 
had, as part of the developmental state paradigm, already in place a compre-
hensive social welfare programme that served as an important buffer during 






South Africa therefore did not experience any food riots, civil unrest, and 
did not introduce any mechanism to control food reserves and food trade. 
Given the history of the political economy related to agriculture, land and 
food, there are important political dimensions to be considered. Why, then, 
did the food crises not lead to civil unrest or any political instability in the 
country during the height of the food price crises. The following sections 
endeavour to provide an answer.
It should, however, be mentioned that a few months after the comple-
tion of the initial phase of the research for this chapter—during the period 
November 2012 to January 2013—the main agricultural export crop produc-
ing regions of the Western Cape experienced large farm labour unrests as a 
result of demands for higher wages. The Department of Labour set the mini-
mum wage for farm labour and this rate was not up for review for at least 
another year. It is now clear that the increased cost of living, perhaps inflated 
by higher food costs, contributed to the demands for a doubling of the farm 
worker wage. There were however a number of anecdotal stories of political 
opportunism and criminality that were the main factors behind the unrest. 
Nevertheless high cost of food is a fact and poverty is rife and therefore pro-
vided fertile ground for any revolutionary ideas.
19.5.2 Political Institutions in the Context of Food and Agricultural Policy
Since 1994 South Africa has been a democracy based on the principle of 
majority rule but with an element of proportional voting also entrenched 
in the way members of parliament are elected. The ANC has since the first 
democratic elections in 1994 secured just under two-thirds of the votes in 
all the general elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. As such the party and 
its officials play an important role in policy formulation and execution. 
It is also a well-established fact that the National Executive Committee, 
the highest organ of the ANC, is the most important policy-making insti-
tution in South Africa that produces documents and policy positions. In 
the years between the National Conference that takes place every five 
years the National Executive Committee convenes a policy conference, as 
a recommendation-making body on any matter of policy. The National 
Executive Committee has to convene a national policy conference at least 
six months before the national conference to review policies of the ANC 
and to recommend any new or to amend any present policy for consid-
eration by the national conference (last policy conference took place in 
June 2012).
The National Executive Committee makes recommendations on the 
deployment of ‘cadres’ to ministerial and public servant positions and thereby 




Many of these positions do not really pass through parliament. Policy posi-
tions and programmes have to be confirmed by cabinet which is preceded by 
agreement in the economic cluster of ministries.
Food and agricultural policy forms part of the economic cluster and there-
fore necessitates a discussion on the country’s economic policy in broad 
terms. The economic policy adopted by the ANC is often criticized by ana-
lysts and observers arguing that the promise of the struggle has been sacri-
ficed to a market-oriented economic policy that is tailored to the demands of 
national and global capital. Authors like Terreblanche (2002) offer interesting 
analyses and explanations of how the ANC was attracted to the benefits of 
business and global capitalism during the transition years between 1991 and 
1994. He argues that this led to a behind the scenes compact between busi-
ness and the political elite of the ANC which led the ANC to dispense with 
an emphasis on state-led growth and social expenditure in favour of the pro-
business growth, employment and redistribution programme, betraying the 
ANC’s core constituency, the working-class poor.
Terreblanche’s detailed analysis of the South African political economy 
unpacks this alliance between South African capital and business and the 
governing party and how it influenced and directed the economic policy. 
Economic policy was therefore typically embedded in the Washington 
Consensus of liberal market capitalism steering thus a non-intervention-
ist role of the state. This economic policy made it difficult for the govern-
ment to deal with the structural problems of the post-apartheid state and to 
make meaningful contributions to alleviating poverty and most likely also 
informed many of the decisions in the aftermath of the food price crises.
It is quite astonishing that this blend of economic policy is so well-
entrenched in government policy despite the fact that the ANC is strongly 
aligned with the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in what is known as the tri-
partite alliance (ANC-SACP-COSATU) and which typically represents workers 
and left wing interests. Add to this the fact that the ANC in itself is not mono-
lith and is intensely divided along many divisions it is no wonder that most 
spheres of government policy-making—especially in agriculture, food, land, 
and rural development matters—are experiencing ‘policy paralysis’ or the 
inability to make important decisions. This situation of paralysis is present in 
land reform policy, general agricultural policy, but was certainly also present 
during the food price crises. This ‘policy paralysis’ can be ascribed to the fact 
that government (and the party) has succumbed to deep ideological divisions 
within the ruling alliance, which prevent any agreement on the way forward. 
It may well be that officials and minsters really do not know what to do or 
it could be that any sensible policy proposal is considered to be too contro-
versial so it seemed easier to appoint a committee or to commission a study.
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This paralysis was not present when the new democratic government intro-
duced sweeping and quick agricultural policy reforms in the late 1990s when 
all state support, subsidies and guarantees to commercial agriculture (mainly 
white farmers at the time) were abolished. Although agricultural economists 
argued for these changes for many years in order to improve the efficiency in 
the sector, it is now clear that the ANC stalwarts thought by removing all farm 
policy benefits to white farmers it would encourage farmers to sell out and 
thereby speed-up the process of land reform. At the same time it was believed 
land values would drop to be closer to productive values and thereby assist 
the state to acquire land for land reform purposes. Given the racial history of 
South Africa it was considered critical to remove all privileges to whites.
Removing the privileges and importing cheap food was considered to be a 
useful policy to bring cheaper food to the working class and the impoverished 
groups. The ruling party only after 2002 realized that relying on imported 
food does not necessarily bring cheaper food and gradually brought a stronger 
appreciation for the role of commercial agriculture in South Africa. The crisis 
in 2008/09 emphasized this point and with a new global recognition of the 
role of agriculture following the World Development Report in 2008 (World 
Bank 2008)  it became apparent to policy makers in the ANC and govern-
ment that agriculture should not be neglected. Local food production and 
ensuring a positive agricultural and food trade balance became an important 
national objective. Despite this acknowledgement, support to agriculture did 
not increase but at least there was no anti-agriculture bias any more.
More evidence of this new appreciation of the role of agriculture in the 
South African economy and specifically in the challenge of alleviating poverty 
and creating jobs was to be found in the National Development Plan—Vision 
2030 released by the National Planning Commission (2011). The document 
highlights the importance of agriculture in growing the rural economy and 
recommends a set of policies and programmes to ensure that agriculture cre-
ates an additional one million jobs.
Koch (2011) also argues that political support for food security is now high. 
He bases this conclusion on the fact that the ruling party needs the political 
support and votes of the white commercial farmers to maintain a healthy and 
successful tripartite alliance between the ANC, trade unions, and the SACP. 
By politicizing agriculture and food security the ANC managed to ensure high 
political support of agriculture and food security. This was also emphasized in 
the 2009 election manifesto of the ANC.
As an illustration of the limited ‘direct’ action by government during the 
different food price crises we have reviewed different statements of the South 
African cabinet on the issue of high food prices. The various extracts con-
firm our interpretation and views throughout this chapter. Before this can 
be done it is important to understand that any cabinet decision would have 
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been prepared by the individual government departments and after which 
it would be discussed at the economic and employment cluster and then 
prepared for submission to cabinet.2 To some extent this process confirms the 
limited role of the parliament. The parliament has a legislative mandate and 
also has oversight over the expenditure and programme design of the differ-
ent ministries. But most policy decisions are rooted in the National Executive 
Committee of the ruling party and within the cabinet and its various clusters.
Most of the cabinet statements illustrate the non-interventionist and rather 
neutral approach by the government. The statements have not indicated any 
major policy shifts and thus confirm our initial hypothesis of no or limited 
policy response. The social welfare programmes have, since they already take 
a large chunk of the budget, not been boosted as a result of the crisis. There 
were only small areas of targeted interventions by different ministries. The 
government, however, refrained from intervening in any of the agricultural 
commodity markets or changing its trade policy.
19.5.3 Pressure Groups, Public Uprising, and Food Riots
In South Africa the various labour unions, specifically COSATU, were very 
vocal while the different consumer lobby groups also made a lot of noise dur-
ing the two periods of sharp food price increases. Most of these institutions 
blamed the food manufacturers and then later on the retailers for the sharp 
food price increases. The same line of critique was presented by the ANC’s 
alliance partner, the SACP, in a press statement issued in October 2002 (avail-
able at: <http://www.sacp.org.za/>).
The pressure from COSATU, the SACP, the Consumer Union, and NGOs as 
well as some suspicion within government circles increased the concern that 
there is collusive behaviour in some sectors of the economy, particularly in 
the food industry. These concerns as well as specific complaints lodged at the 
Competition Commission led to several investigations by the Commission 
into the conduct of several food companies. A number of them were found 
guilty of misconduct and fined large penalties.
At the same time the media used the food price crisis to stir sensation and 
hype while academics, commodity traders and farmers’ groups tried to explain 
the trends on the basis of market fundamentals and supply chain realities. We 
compiled a simple analysis to track the number of media reports related to the 
different periods of high food prices to assess the media hype and sensation 
2 The economic and employment cluster is a meeting of the minsters and their directors general 
from the following departments: rural development and land reform (chair); science and technol-
ogy (deputy chair); agriculture, forestry and fisheries; communications; economic development; 
finance; higher education and training; labour; mineral resources; public enterprises; rural devel-




around the topic. Figure 19.4 presents this very rough review of articles carry-
ing an issue on food prices over the last decade. We only reviewed the major 
print media to get a sense of whether what the media was reporting corre-
sponded with periods of high food prices. The 2008/9 crisis received much 
more coverage in the local media than was the case in the 2002/3 period.
Although the media covered the food price crisis during 2008 heavily 
it did not really have much impact. Most of the articles were informed by 
international media reports and furthermore only reported on the cabinet 
statements mentioned earlier or highlighted the information released by 
NAMC through its quarterly food price reviews. The numbers presented by 
the NAMC showed sharp retail price increases and provided useful material 
for the media in a period where other news was very stale and uninteresting. 
It was also good material to highlight the plight of the middle class and the 
poor in the run-up to the general election in May 2009.
Apart from the farm labour unrest in the Western Cape at the end of 2012–13— 
years after the last food price crisis—South Africa had no civil unrest and/or 
riots that could directly be linked to the food price crisis. It therefore played 
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Figure 19.4 Newspaper articles on food prices in South Africa, January 2000–December 
2010




Since the period of agricultural market deregulation, South Africa experienced 
two periods of food price crises: in 2002/3 and again 2007/8. The 2002/3 crisis 
was largely caused by a sharp depreciation of the South Africa exchange rate 
but was amplified by staple food shortages in the SADC region. In 2007/8 
global commodity price trends were dominant factors in South African food 
price inflation.
The main objective of this chapter was to understand the food price 
changes during these two periods and to unpack the political reaction and 
policy responses to the food price crises in these two periods. Our personal 
recollection of events during the past decade, interviews with former poli-
ticians and state officials as well as a thorough investigation of all cabinet 
and government documents released during the specific years provided us 
with the conclusion that there were no major policy responses or changes 
in policy direction following the two periods of rapid food price inflation. 
It could be argued that the comprehensive social welfare programmes that 
were in place since 1998 would have provided a sufficient safety net for the 
most vulnerable suggesting to government decision makers that there is no 
need for substantive policy response. What the crisis did, however, is bring 
about a greater appreciation amongst politicians and members of the ruling 
party of the role of a domestic agricultural sector and how important it is not 
to depend on international trade for domestic food needs. This new ‘under-
standing’ did, however, not bring about specific policy changes.
We established that the policy of neo-liberal capitalism is so well-entrenched 
that it was difficult for the cabinet or bureaucrats to contemplate radical inter-
ventions in the market for agricultural commodities and food products. The 
fairly neutral response by government happened despite the call for action by 
the trade unions, the South African Communist Party and some strong media 
reporting. The evidence clearly suggests that the government’s response was 
more focussed on the line of statements and comments by senior politicians 
and a few pockets of government programmes introduced to deal with the neg-
ative consequences of the crisis within the neediest communities. The social 
safety net programme by the government that reaches about fourteen million 
people also provided some reassurance that the poorest people are already pro-
tected by substantial government programmes. At the same time the govern-
ment made sure that any possible collusion by agribusiness firms and food 
companies was dealt with effectively by the Competition Commission.
We have shown in this chapter that agricultural and food policy in South 
Africa remained largely unchanged with no controls or regulations intro-




although the Competition Commission increased the number of investiga-
tions into uncompetitive behaviour in food supply chains resulting in heavy 
fines for a number of food companies.
Taking into account all the government responses during the two periods 
of rapid food price inflation, the South African government implemented 
actions that can typically be classified as responses in the so-called ‘second 
class’ of interventions that mostly target the poorer section of the population 
in an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of price changes and include 
elements such as school feeding programmes, food parcels, etc. In the South 
African government these responses did not require any regulatory or legisla-
tive changes since they could be taken care of under the existing social wel-
fare system and were thus possible in terms of current government mandates 
and in some cases only required additional funding from the treasury. This 
was made available fairly quickly given the seriousness of the crisis in terms 
of political repercussions. Note should be taken that 2004 and 2009 were 
election years in South Africa and distributing food parcels or providing food 
relief were thus useful instruments to show that the government was looking 
after its people. Nevertheless, South Africa had a well-funded social safety net 
programme in place prior to the crisis period and thus provided an important 
cushion during the periods of high food prices.
In closing it is worth noting that South Africa still does not have a compre-
hensive food security policy in place. The oversight role for food security is 
allocated to the National Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
and specifically to a weak directorate in the department. This in essence pro-
hibits the South African government from introducing a comprehensive and 
coordinated food security strategy. It could well be argued that the current 
social welfare payments are insufficient and that much more coordinated 
and well planned food security interventions are needed in the neediest com-
munities of South Africa. This, however, is part of an ongoing debate in South 
Africa and not necessary following from the crises in 2008–9.
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US Policy Contributions to Agricultural 
Commodity Price Fluctuations, 2006–12
Gordon C. Rausser and Harry de Gorter 
20.1 Introduction
The recent food commodity price boom and bust follows the pattern of those 
that preceded it, with broad and sharp co-movement of commodity prices. 
Such booms and busts have the heaviest economic and social impact on 
developing nations, where agriculture accounts for a sizable portion of eco-
nomic activity, households spend a large share of their disposable income on 
food commodities, and economies depend heavily on food commodity trade. 
Typically, food commodity price spikes––and volatility in general––resonate 
with populists and affect social welfare more dramatically than most (if not 
all) other asset price volatility or spikes.
For storable food commodities, price spikes and volatility result from a 
sequence of supply and/or demand shocks that reduce inventories to low lev-
els.1 Although the specific factors that cause each dramatic increase in volatility 
and/or price are nuanced they include the dynamics of commodities stockhold-
ing and speculation; macroeconomic phenomena observed through nominal 
interest rates, real interest rates, and exchange rates; cross-commodity linkages 
or general equilibrium effects through factor substitution and input costs; and 
governmental policies. When such events combine with macroeconomic fis-
cal and monetary policies that result in disequilibria between nominal and 
real rates of interest, the incentives for stockholding change. Moreover, export 
quotas and other trade restrictions can aggravate (and have aggravated) the 
1 The linkages between supply and demand shifts, inventory situations, and commodity price 






volatility of food commodity prices and send the wrong price signals to domes-
tic markets (Carter, Rausser, and Smith 2011). To the extent that such price vol-
atility is not temporary, the cross-commodity linkages through competition for 
land allocation and demand substitutability often create spill-over effects from 
one food commodity to another. Still another causal force that has emerged 
over our recent history is the growing global demand––sourced with higher 
income levels in emerging markets––for higher quality sources of protein.
Public policy responses frequently amplify the consequences of these internal 
and external market forces. In this chapter, we demonstrate how US public poli-
cies have contributed to recent global price spikes and volatility. We examine 
agricultural and macroeconomic policies, which have always played a signifi-
cant role in generating grain price volatility. But we also focus on new causal 
mechanisms that have emerged since 2006 in the form of energy and environ-
mental policies. These policies have made biofuel and food grain prices interde-
pendent. We also highlight the ways in which various US biofuel policies have 
interacted both with each other and with biofuel policies in the rest of the world. 
For example, US biofuel policies contributed to the 2007–8 episode of food price 
volatility (which was magnified by both US fiscal and monetary policies). Since 
biofuel policies in the USA and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries interact with fossil fuel energy markets, 
the level and variability of crop prices are highly susceptible to changes in oil 
prices and macroeconomic conditions, especially those that cause major shifts 
in transportation fuel demand.
The net effect of these new causal mechanisms is that US biofuel policies have 
ultimately increased rather than lowered world prices (without reducing vola-
tility). High oil prices elevated crop prices in 2006–8; lower oil prices in 2008–9 
helped make crop prices plummet. Lately, crop prices have risen again almost to 
their 2008 peak levels, and some studies have even argued that oil prices have 
led increased food grain commodity prices (e.g., Baffes and Haniotis 2010). In 
short, the economics of commodity price volatility have recently become more 
complex. Interaction effects now depend not only on the source of the shock 
(oil prices versus crop supply/demand shocks), and on which biofuel policy 
determines the world biofuel market price (e.g., tax credit versus mandate), but 
also on the interactions across the various environmental, energy, and agricul-
tural policy instruments within a country as well as across countries.
US biofuel policies were a critical factor in instigating the increase in food 
grain commodity prices that began to emerge in 2006 (Carter, Rausser, and 
Smith 2012),2 as were biofuel policies in the rest of the world, especially in the 
2 We focus on the USA, the European Union, and Brazil because the USA accounts for 42 per 




European Union and Brazil. US biofuel, agricultural, and macroeconomic pol-
icies contributed substantially to the rise in food grain commodity prices that 
emerged in 2008.3 From that point forward, US fiscal and monetary policies, 
combined with US biofuel policies, generated the roller-coaster ride that lasted 
from 2008 through 2012. For example, when the USA negotiated the release of 
Japanese rice stocks, this move allegedly caused rice prices to begin to decline 
from their peak in 2008 (Slayton 2010). But US monetary and fiscal policies 
that were devised in order to respond to the 2008 financial crisis—which itself 
was induced by failed regulatory and financial policies—substantially affected 
commodity prices and thus volatility.
US energy and environmental policies have also played a role in the evolv-
ing political-economic landscape in which traditional agricultural policies are 
determined. In one clear instance, the deliberations concerning the upcom-
ing US Farm Bill have been substantially tilted towards revenue insurance 
programmes (in place of direct and countercyclical payments) and allowed 
farmers to be subsidized by high prices (Zulauf and Orden 2012; Babcock and 
Paulson 2012). The expiration of the ethanol tax credit and import tariff at 
the end of 2011 could also be described as a policy response to high and vola-
tile crop prices. Although these policy changes had little immediate impact, 
there are longer run consequences.
20.2 US Food, Agricultural, and Biofuel Policies
Since 1985, the Farm Bill legislation that defines US agricultural policy has 
slowly been transformed into a ‘food bill’. The Food Security Act of 1985 
included programme commodity provisions that focused on loan pro-
grammes, target prices, deficiency payments, acreage reduction, and public 
grain stock reserves. Export provisions in this legislation included food aid 
and cargo preferences. Conservation reserve programmes were introduced 
with the stated intent of removing highly erodible land and wetlands from 
production and thus, indirectly, managing supply response (Rausser 1992). 
This Act also authorized three alternative market promotion programmes 
and continued food stamp programmes.4
After the Uruguay Round concluded, the 1996 Farm Bill (the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act) replaced the previous target price 
3 Many papers in the literature have noted the influence of biofuels on commodity prices. For 
excellent surveys of this literature, see Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008), Hochman et al. (2011), and 
Zilberman et al. (2012).
4 After this 1985 legislation was passed, export subsidies from both the European Union and 
USA created a prisoner-dilemma global competition, with the net effect of decreasing world food 





deficiency payments with fixed ‘production flexibility contract payments’ 
over the course of seven years. Both the crop basis and the acreage reduc-
tion programmes were eliminated. For the first time, farmers participating in 
US government programmes were allowed to make their own planning deci-
sions, free of government regulations (with minor restrictions). In the politi-
cal economic process that influenced this legislation, various commodity 
organizations and agribusiness interests coalesced, in the hope that a more 
market-oriented agricultural policy would develop. Political economic forces 
squelched this hope with the passage in 2002 of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act. Over a six-year period, this new Act budgeted almost US$40 
billion for commodity programmes and almost another US$10 billion for 
conservation.
In the movement from legislation that had focused largely on agricul-
ture to legislation focusing on food consumption, more than 50 per cent 
of the allocations made in the 2002 Act (US$149.6 billion) were directed to 
food stamps and other nutrition title programmes. This trend accelerated 
with the passage of the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act. In this 
most recently implemented legislation, ‘nutrition’ subsidies accounted for 
more than 75 per cent of the outlays for authorized programmes. The total 
budget authority over five years for this act amounted to US$284 billion 
(Congressional Budget Office 2008).
In the current century, the USA—and the world—has shifted from chronic 
excess supply (due to greater growth in farm productivity than in demand) 
to chronic excess demand and rising real food prices. The USA’s agricultural 
sector has become, on average, more prosperous relative to the rest of the 
economy, so that the distributional justification for many agricultural poli-
cies in the USA has ceased to exist (Gardner 1992). In this sense, contin-
ued agricultural subsidies were rewarding rent-seeking and political muscle. 
As the agricultural industry realized the value of developing new sources of 
demand for agricultural commodity that has a higher price elasticity, biofuels 
became increasingly attractive.
It is not surprising, then, that the most recent agricultural policy legis-
lation includes energy. Although the 2008 Act explicitly budgeted only 
a small amount for energy expenditures (approximately US$643  million 
over a five-year period under Title IX), when combined with US renewable 
energy legislation,5 the increased legislative support for US biofuel policies 
becomes evident. One of the major economic motives for the renewable 
5 Although the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was not enacted until 2005, bills containing 
variants of the RFS were repeatedly debated by the US Congress (in 1978, 1987, 1992, 2000, 2001, 
2003, and 2004). All were strongly supported by the corn lobby. These lobbying efforts led the RFS 
for corn ethanol to be doubled in 2007. The 2007 RFS specifies minimum renewable fuel produc-
tion each calendar year from 2007 through 2022: the 2022 standard is four times that of 2008.
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energy legislation—and for resulting US biofuel policies—was that they led to 
increases in prices of corn, oilseeds, and wheat as feedstocks. A second motive 
was the widespread political desire to reduce highly visible programme com-
modity subsidies (e.g., deficiency payments). Such legislation and the poli-
cies it spawned have led to increased demand for corn, oilseeds, and wheat 
as feedstocks for biofuel production: between 2003 and 2012, US ethanol 
production increased sevenfold. Meanwhile, EU biodiesel production also 
increased sevenfold, and Brazilian ethanol production increased threefold.
The political economic landscape underlying US biofuel policies has been 
shaped by a broad spectrum of energy-, agricultural-, and environmental-policy 
objectives. Here, we focus on energy security, farm policy, and environmental 
goals.
20.2.1 Energy Security Goals
The US government first implemented tax credits for ethanol fuel blenders 
and import tariffs for foreign ethanol producers in 1978 and 1980, respec-
tively. Proponents justified these measures by citing the need to improve 
energy security and to counter oil supply disruptions such as those that had 
occurred in the 1970s. The tax credits and tariffs were designed to reduce 
dependence on oil in order to address rising public concern about dwindling 
oil supplies and rising and unstable oil prices.
20.2.2 Farm Policy Goals
After oil prices declined in the mid-1980s, the farm lobby continued to use 
ethanol policy for its own purposes. The farm lobby claimed that fostering 
ethanol production via mandates, tariffs, and tax credits would help achieve 
farm policy goals by improving farm incomes and promoting rural develop-
ment. In the meantime, the higher prices farmers received for their crops 
(especially corn) meant lower costs to taxpayers of price contingent govern-
ment farm subsidies. However, the complex links among biofuel policies, 
farm income, and rural development produce novel effects. For example, an 
implicit tax on value added agriculture (such as the livestock, dairy, and poul-
try sectors), in the form of higher prices for corn and other feedstocks, can 
reduce the incomes of these farmers. This result would ultimately defeat the 
same US farm policy goals that supposedly justify ethanol support. Ethanol 
support measures can also constrain economic growth in rural areas, even 
if biofuel production brings in increased revenue for some rural farmers or 
processors. Since ethanol production is capital-intensive, its primary effect on 






20.2.3 Environmental Policy Goals
Concern among the American public about greenhouse gas emissions has 
prompted more vigorous efforts to strengthen environmental policy. However, 
protecting the environment became a political driver in Washington only 
after energy security concerns and farm policy goals had been articulated. In 
contrast to the European Union, where concern about greenhouse gas emis-
sions has been one motivation for energy policy for several years, US policy 
makers have, in general, become motivated only very recently to advocate 
measures that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, corn produc-
ers’ lobbying groups were one of the first groups to promote biofuels based on 
projected greenhouse gas reductions.
20.2.4 Types of US Biofuel Policies and their Effects on Grain Prices
The US biofuel policies that were implemented during the period 2006–12 
include the following:6
•	 biofuel	consumption	subsidies,	such	as	the	tax	credits	(implemented	in	
1978) that expired at the end of 2011;
•	 formal	ethanol	mandates	such	as	the	Renewable	Fuel	Standard,	which	
took effect in 2005 (and was revised upwards in 2007);
•	 de	facto	mandates	that	ethanol	be	used	in	fuel	to	satisfy	environmental	
regulations, such as provisions of the Clean Air Act in the 1990s resulting 
from the banning of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE);
•	 production	subsidies	for	both	biofuels	and	feedstocks;7
•	 import	tariffs	and	tariff	rate	quotas,	such	as	the	US$0.54/gallon	(gal)	ethanol	
import tariff (implemented in 1980) that expired at the end of 2011; and
•	 0,	1	sustainability	standards: the	standard	that	1	gal	(energy	equivalent)	
of corn ethanol must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent 
relative to the 1 gal of gasoline it is assumed to replace.8
Although each type of policy affected corn prices, it did so through various 
channels at various times and magnitudes. The key to understanding how 
these biofuel policies affect grain commodity prices is to recognize the links 
between ethanol prices and corn prices:9 ethanol prices are indirectly linked 
6 Many of the federal incentives, subsidies, and mandates listed here have been complemented 
by similar state measures.
7 In addition to direct production subsidies for biofuels, many federal and state ‘infrastructure’ 
subsidies were created, such as subsidies for alternative vehicles and fuelling stations.
8 It is ‘0, 1’ in that if greenhouse gas emissions for corn production are below the threshold, 
ethanol is not eligible for tax credits or to be counted toward the mandate.





to gasoline prices (through mandated premiums above the tax credit), and 
gasoline prices are a direct function of oil prices.10 The corn ethanol price 
transmission elasticity is the key driver for corn prices (de Gorter and Just 
2008), and hence, as we will show later, for all grain prices.11
US biofuel policy began to noticeably affect food grain commodity prices in 
October 2006. Until that date, as Figure 20.1 reveals, corn prices held steady 
even though oil prices steadily increased (and even crossed the US$40/barrel 
threshold in mid-2004).12 Since the products that initially competed with 
ethanol as gasoline additives (oxygenated and octane enhancers, particularly 
MTBE) were petroleum based, ethanol prices followed crude oil-derivative 
gasoline prices (Figure 20.1). As one state after another banned MTBE, con-
tinued upward pressure was exerted on ethanol prices. When a federal court 
failed to grant immunity against lawsuits for firms using MTBE in July 2006, 
ethanol prices reached their all-time highs. Until that date, corn markets were 
relatively stable (Figure 20.2a), even though rising ethanol prices were lead-
ing ethanol plant capacity to escalate (Figure 20.2b).13
Beginning in October 2006, the corn price finally reacted to higher oil and 
ethanol prices.14 Coupled with the de facto ban on MTBE, high oil prices 
activated the otherwise dormant ethanol blenders’ tax credit by providing 
a premium on ethanol over gasoline prices. Ethanol prices soared to a peak 
of US$3.65/gal in July of 2006 (Figure 20.1).15 By September 2007, corn and 
ethanol prices had become tightly linked (Figure  20.3), and corn ethanol 
markets reached equilibrium. Between October 2006 and September 2007, 
markets were in adjustment, from the disequilibrium situation depicted in 
Figure 20.1 to the equilibrium linking corn to ethanol prices.
Meanwhile, soybean prices (in the USA) and rapeseed oil prices (in the 
European Union) became tightly linked to biodiesel prices. Like corn 
10 An indirect link between oil and corn prices always exists through input costs, since corn uses 
energy-intensive inputs. This factor has been characterized as a major driver of commodity price 
increases. See, e.g., Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) and Baffes and Haniotis (2010).
11 The links between rapeseed, soybean, and palm oil prices and biodiesel prices, and between 
biodiesel and diesel gasoline prices, are equally important, as is the link between sugarcane, sugar, 
and ethanol prices in Brazil. Note that ethanol production creates a large distillers’ grain market, 
which, owing to the high protein content, serves to displace soybean meal consumption and drive 
down soybean price and production.
12 In the 2005–6 crop year, the US farm price of corn averaged only US$2/bu, even though 
world commodity trade had been increasing sharply for years, following the fastest-ever growth 
of emerging economies.
13 As Carter, Rausser, and Smith (2012) show, by mid-2006, corn stockholding was beginning to 
expand in anticipation of demand from ethanol plants.
14 Enders and Holt (2012) determine a structural break in corn prices for October 2006 using 
sophisticated econometric techniques, confirming our analysis in Figures 20.1 and 20.2a, and 
20.2b that October 2006 was an important month.
15 Ethanol prices have never regained this peak. As of this writing (April 2012), the ethanol price 
is US$2.12/gal. Meanwhile, the recent oil prices were close to their all-time monthly average high 
of US$133/barrel (June 2008).
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ethanol production, non-corn ethanol biodiesel production also affects 
prices. Although the volume of total biofuels production in OECD coun-
tries (excluding US corn ethanol) is only half that of US ethanol produc-
tion, this non-US OECD biodiesel production requires much more land 
area per gallon of biofuel yielded (e.g., wheat for ethanol or rapeseed and 
soybeans for biodiesel). As a result, non-corn ethanol biodiesel production 
has a disproportionate impact on food grain prices. Because soybean and 
corn are largely substitutable on land in the USA, and because prices among 
alternative oilseeds are directly linked because of very high substitution in 
demand, any change in land use for biodiesel production will have one-to-
one impacts on oilseed and corn prices (and vice versa for corn ethanol 
production on oilseed prices). Owing to competition for land and substi-














































































































































Figure 20.1 Oil, ethanol, and corn prices, January 2004–September 2006
Source: Authors’ computation, based on data as given below:
Corn price  =  No. 2 yellow US—Central IL $/bu (available at:  <http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
data-products/feed-grains-database/feed-grains-yearbook-tables.aspx>).
Ethanol price = Nebraska rack $/gal (available at: <http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html>).
Oil price  =  World Bank Pink Sheets (available at:  <http://www.econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21574907~menuPK:7859231~pageP 
K:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>).




corn (and coarse grains in general) and oilseed prices. In contrast, we would 
expect the rice price to be less closely related to coarse grain and oilseed 
prices in the short run, since there is no need for the rice price (in contrast 
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Ethanol plant capacity or under construction
Ethanol price
Figure 20.2(b) Ethanol prices leading ethanol production capacity
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The environmental and renewable energy policies of the USA, in combina-
tion with those of other OECD countries, have evidently also been critically 
important in establishing the link between food grain commodity prices and 
biofuel prices (Tyner 2008) and for supporting the surge not only in corn, 
oilseeds, and other coarse grain prices but also in wheat and rice prices dur-
ing 2006–8. As oil prices dropped in 2008–9, biofuel policy moderated the 
ensuing decline in food grain commodity prices. Ever increasing biofuel price 
premiums over gasoline and diesel prices and the subsequent rise in oil prices 
in 2011 resulted in all-time high prices for corn and other grains and oilseeds.
20.2.5 A Domino Effect
Once corn and oilseed prices had become more closely linked to crude 
oil prices through ethanol and gasoline markets, and crude oil prices had 
increased, corn and soybean prices inevitably followed suit. In contrast, 
although wheat is used for ethanol production in Canada and Europe, there 
is no evidence that wheat prices follow ethanol prices. Nonetheless, wheat is 
related to other grains because of competition for land and demand substitu-






































































































Corn price Ethanol price
Figure 20.3 US corn and ethanol prices
Source: Authors’ computation, based on corn price Iowa farm US$/bu and ethanol price Iowa US$/





rates). Like wheat prices, rice prices are not directly linked to biofuels, but in 
India, rice competes for land with wheat, and in many parts of the world, 
rice is substitutable in demand for both wheat and corn. It is therefore not 
surprising that all four price categories (coarse grains, oilseeds, wheat, and 
rice) rose to their peaks in mid-2008, at about the same time when crude oil 
prices peaked (Figures 20.4, 20.5, and 20.6). Similarly, prices for all of these 
commodities rose again in 2010.
The month of October 2006, when corn prices increased, is pivotal to 
understanding this domino effect. The central Illinois farm price for corn 
increased 88 per cent between August 2006 and February 2007 (Kansas City 2 
No. 2 white corn prices increased 107 per cent in the same time period). 
Although world wheat production was down by 3.9 per cent in 2007, over-
all grain production was essentially unchanged that year. But wheat prices 


























































































Figure 20.4 Corn and wheat price developments
Note: Wheat price = US$/tonne [(US), no. 1, hard red winter, ordinary protein, export price deliv-
ered at the US Gulf port for prompt or 30 days shipment].
Corn price = US$/bu [Maize (US), no. 2, yellow, free on board (FOB) US Gulf ports] (Figures 20.5 
and 20.6).
Rice price = Rice [(Thailand), 100% broken, A.1 Super, government standard, FOB Bangkok].






Ukraine’s export bans on wheat occurred immediately after corn prices finally 
reacted to high oil prices and skyrocketed to their interim peak in February 
2007. Immediately following these two wheat export bans, increases in the 
price of wheat (which had risen about US$3/bu since January 2005) actu-
ally overtook the corn price increase. Wheat price increases began the last 
leg of their ascent (basically straight up) after the October 2007 rice export 
ban by India, moving from US$7 to US$11/bu in a very short period. Wheat 
prices peaked before corn prices and also began to come down before corn 
did (although wheat prices blipped up again two months before corn’s price 
peak, while corn prices were still rising). But wheat prices declined again one 
month before corn prices did and continued their slide for months.
Thus, biofuel policies and corn markets started a ball rolling that spilled over 
into the wheat market and subsequently into the political decision-making of 
Asian governments. Their policy responses set off speculation, including hoard-
ing, which caused rice prices to spike.16 As Figure 20.3 shows, once corn prices 
16 No major supply or demand shocks occurred at this time in the rice market: ‘Rice market fun-
damentals were not the cause. The rice crisis was not caused by adverse shocks to rice production 
or low rice stocks. The world rice to stock ratio was roughly constant in the three years preceding 
the crisis. World rice trade in the first four months of 2008 . . . was 20 per cent higher than in the 
first four months of 2007. The favourable situation as regards production, stocks and trade strongly 
suggests factors other than basic market fundamentals were at work’ (Dawe and Slayton 2010).























































Figure 20.5 Wheat and rice price development
Note and Source: See Figure 20.4.
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were finally linked to ethanol prices (August 2007), corn (and oilseed) prices 
began to follow oil prices. Contrary evidence in the literature (Zilberman et al. 
2012; Serra 2012) on these links between the ethanol, energy, and corn price is 
largely based on reduced-form time series analysis. But our analysis shows that 
although these links were not visible prior to October 2006 (and remained in 
flux for nearly another year), beginning in September 2007, ethanol and corn 
prices did begin to move in the same direction month after month. As a result, 
any time series analysis that begins well before 2006 and ends in either 2007 
or 2008 misses some key episodes in the development of links between biofuel 
policies, corn (and oilseed) prices, and energy prices. (It should also be noted 
that ethanol prices can float above and away from gasoline [oil] prices when 
mandates become binding and temporarily de-link corn and oil prices.)
20.2.6 The Corn Ethanol Price Transmission Coefficient17
The global corn price increases approximately US$0.04/bushel (bu) for every 











































































Figure 20.6 Rice and corn price development
Note and Source: See Figure 20.4.
17 For a summary of what the structure of biofuel policy predicts regarding food grain commod-
ity prices, see de Gorter and Just (2010b); Drabik (2011); Cui et al. (2011); de Gorter and Drabik 
(2012b); and Lapan and Moschini (2012).
18 Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) claim that the change in the corn price is two times the tax 




the ethanol price has exceeded the ‘no policy’ ethanol price, on average, by 
US$0.65/gal (Drabik 2011). As previously explained, this difference equals 
more than the value of the tax credit. The corn ethanol price transmission 
coefficient was estimated to be 3.85 in 2010 (Drabik 2011). Multiplying 3.85 
by the US$0.65/gal ethanol price premium would imply a corn price increase 
of US$2.50/bu, on average. This is not expected, because part of the etha-
nol price premium is redundant: the intercept of the ethanol supply curve 
is above the free market ethanol price (for an explanation, see de Gorter and 
Just 2008). Nonetheless, for 2010, the corn price has been estimated to have 
been 45 per cent higher than it would have been had the various US ethanol 
policies not been enacted (Drabik 2011).19 But even this figure is an underesti-
mate, because the supply and demand curves that Drabik (2011) calibrated for 
corn ignore the effects of US biodiesel and biofuel policies on the rest of the 
world. These other biofuel policies continue to drive corn prices higher: US 
biodiesel policy, for example, causes farmland to be reallocated from corn to 
soybeans, increasing the ‘no ethanol’ corn price. Since other biofuel policies 
(including those in the rest of the world) have caused the counterfactual corn 
price (i.e., the price assuming no effect from US ethanol policy) to be higher 
than would otherwise have been the case, the Drabik estimate of a 45 per cent 
increase in corn prices for 2010 does not reflect all of the feedback loops.
20.2.7 The Interactions of Global Ethanol Policies
In 2010, the USA not only became a significant net exporter of ethanol but the 
world’s largest ethanol exporter. World ethanol prices in 2010–12 were seem-
ingly determined on the margin in the European Union and Brazil, where 
ethanol prices were significantly higher than they were in the USA.20 Brazil 
had suspended its import tariff in 2009; meanwhile, the US managed to nego-
tiate an agreement with at least five EU countries that allowed 2.1 per cent 
denatured ethanol to be classified as a blended fuel. This agreement meant 
that US exporters only had to pay one-third of the approximately 67 per cent 
EU import tariff on ethanol. In addition, the US tax credit on ethanol exports 
to the European Union and Brazil acted as a production subsidy for US ethanol 
producers, in the form of higher ethanol market prices (de Gorter, Drabik, 
and Just 2011; Kliauga, de Gorter, and Just 2011). Indeed, 80 per cent of US 
ethanol exports received the tax credit for as long as it existed (until well 
into 2011). However, in December 2011, two events altered this protection 
19 For an alternative structural explanation, focusing on stockholding behaviour, that generates 
similar results, see Carter, Rausser, and Smith (2012).





of US ethanol production and exports: the European Union closed the tariff 
loophole the USA had negotiated with some of the Union’s members that 
had classified ethanol exports as fuel, 21 and the US ethanol tax credit on all 
exports expired. These two events combined to cause US ethanol prices to 
decline sharply.
In Brazil, market developments in the sugarcane and sugar ethanol mar-
kets since 2009 have been relatively dramatic (de Gorter, Drabik, and Kliauga 
2012). Brazil’s ethanol production has expanded threefold since 2003, and, 
as noted above, Brazilian ethanol market prices exceeded US prices from 
mid-2009 onwards. At the same time, Brazil’s peak ethanol consumption of 
22.8 billion litres in 2009 declined by 19 per cent in 2011, to about 18.5 bil-
lion litres. Meanwhile, gasoline consumption in Brazil has increased 24 per 
cent since 2008. Brazil’s ethanol exports peaked at 2.4 billion litres in 2008 
and have been around one billion litres in the last two years.
Ethanol prices in Brazil have been driven upward by a strong currency and 
a sugar export demand shock that took place when world sugar prices reached 
record levels. In addition, a domestic ethanol demand shock has occurred; 
demand for ethanol as a transportation fuel has increased as incomes have 
grown and more consumers buy cars, especially flex-fuel cars. Domestic etha-
nol supply shocks have also occurred: two years of bad weather, longer rota-
tion in sugarcane crop, and some lingering effects of the financial crisis. The 
Brazilian ethanol mandate (currently, 20 per cent of the gasoline ethanol 
mixture is required to be anhydrous ethanol), and governmental control of 
the gasoline price below the world market price have also helped stimulate 
both gasoline and anhydrous ethanol consumption.
These developments in Brazil strongly affect US and world ethanol prices. 
Had it not been for these trends, for example, the US ethanol mandate (RFS) 
might have resulted in much lower US domestic ethanol prices. The key point 
is that since 2010, developments in grain markets directly affect the sugar 
market and vice versa. Some commodity markets have now become more 
closely linked now that US corn prices are linked, through energy markets, to 
sugar prices and vice versa.22
20.2.8 The Effect of Biodiesel Policies on Commodity Markets
Before the middle of 2010, when the US biodiesel mandate was finally 
enforced, the impact of the US biodiesel tax credit on commodity markets 
21 In late 2011, the EU’s Customs Code Committee raised the import tariff on such ethanol 
blends. See http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2011/10/18/ eu-boosts-tariffs-to-block-low- 
cost-us-ethanol/.
22 Even though Mitchell (2008) correctly recognized that for earlier periods Brazilian sugarcane 




was influenced by Canadian and EU biodiesel policies (de Gorter, Drabik, 
and Just 2011). US biodiesel production was essentially zero until 2004 and 
then increased sharply in 2005–08, when US biodiesel exporters became eli-
gible to receive a US$1/gal tax credit for the biodiesel fuel they exported, 
even when they simply added small amounts of diesel fuel to much larger 
amounts of biodiesel (‘splash and dash’).23 Some of the biodiesel was 
imported from other countries, such as palm oil from Malaysia.24 This tax 
credit helped raise the US price of biodiesel by making exports to the EU 
more profitable. It therefore led to increased soybean prices, which, in turn, 
raised the price of corn, as land was taken out of corn production and put 
into soybean production.
However, US biodiesel production (and domestic prices) fell sharply in June 
2008, when the European Union began to investigate the ‘splash and dash’ 
practice. US biodiesel prices and production plunged, because the US tax 
credit had acted as a biodiesel production subsidy (even though it was actu-
ally a consumption subsidy) when biodiesel prices were determined outside 
the USA (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just 2011). Although the US tax credit was 
still valid, it could no longer keep prices at historical levels. After the European 
Union instituted anti-dumping and countervailing duties in March 2009, US 
biodiesel prices stabilized at lower levels than those prior to mid-2008. The 
US–EU biodiesel price gap, which had widened sharply in 2008, persisted 
until mid-2010. At that point, however, the US biodiesel mandate was finally 
enforced. Since mid-2010, US biodiesel prices and production have increased 
sharply: current prices (April 2012) are just under US$5/gal, well above what 
prices would likely be if the only US biodiesel policy were the US$1/gal tax 
credit. In fact, the expiration of the biodiesel tax credit at the end of 2011 
has had little effect on US biodiesel prices. Currently, domestic prices of US 
biofuel are not directly linked to world prices.25
20.2.9 Interaction Effects between Mandates and Subsidies
The literature on the economics of biofuel policies has generated the impor-
tant insight that biofuel mandates interact with production, consumption, 
and input subsidies through mechanisms that sometimes create unexpected 
results (de Gorter and Just 2010a). For example, when a premium on the 
23 ‘Splash and dash’ refers to the practice of mixing a small amount of diesel (as little as 0.1 per 
cent––hence the term ‘splash’) into a boatload of biodiesel so that exporters could receive the 
blender’s tax credit of US$1/gal and then export the mixture to Europe.
24 In 2007 and 2008, all Canadian biodiesel production was exported, triple-dipping with 
domestic production subsidies, the US tax credit, and then selling in EU markets with high prices 
due to tax exemptions at the pump.




ethanol price is greater than a tax credit, both measures are clearly not nec-
essary. Moreover, the tax credit subsidizes fuel consumption, most of which 
is gasoline (de Gorter and Just 2009). The tax credit, therefore, is inherently 
inconsistent with the environmental and energy goals outlined earlier. The 
same reasoning applies to production subsidies for both biofuels and their 
feedstock inputs (e.g., corn production subsidies), although the exact eco-
nomic mechanisms vary (for details, see Drabik 2011).
The literature has emphasized the superiority of mandates over subsi-
dies from a welfare perspective (Lapan and Moschini 2012). Rajagopal and 
Zilberman (2007) express concern that enforcing mandates will amplify high 
commodity prices during periods of commodity shortages. They suggest that 
biofuel mandates should be temporarily suspended under such conditions. 
This recommendation has been incorporated into laws but not yet imple-
mented. However, Babcock (2012) suggests that even if mandates are tempo-
rarily lifted, their impact on corn prices will be very small because oil refiners 
have already made substantial investments in the technology of using etha-
nol as an octane enhancer and face serious switching barriers.
20.2.10 Biofuel Policies, Market Shocks, and Grain Price Volatility
The volatility of corn prices, whether caused by corn supply or oil price shocks, 
depends on whether a tax credit or a mandate is binding (Yano, Blandford, 
and Surry 2010, 2011). When a fuel blender’s tax credit is binding, the corn 
price is directly linked to the oil price. Under such a binding tax credit, exog-
enous shocks to corn supply or demand sourced with bad weather, exchange 
rate depreciation, increasing demand for corn in developing countries, and/
or the initial levels of stocks in the supply-of-storage model have no effects 
on the corn price level or on corn price volatility (unless the change in etha-
nol production changes the oil price or there is a resulting regime switch to 
a mandate) (de Gorter and Drabik 2012a). The volatility in the oil price gets 
translated into corn price volatility when oil prices determine ethanol prices 
(through the binding tax credit), because under any biofuel policy, ethanol 
prices influence corn prices (Drabik 2011).
However, if a fuel blend mandate (rather than a tax credit) determines the 
ethanol market price, corn prices do respond to corn supply and demand 
shocks. This vulnerability occurs because the blend mandate significantly 
weakens the link between ethanol and oil prices (de Gorter and Just 2009). In 
fact, higher oil prices mean lower corn prices, because fuel consumption gen-
erally declines. Given a fixed ethanol blend requirement, ethanol production 
contracts as well when oil prices rise, with the result that both ethanol and 
corn prices decline. But a countervailing effect also exists: a higher oil price 




corn prices (Baffes and Haniotis 2010). The net change in corn prices due to 
an oil price increase is indeterminate a priori.
Any analysis of corn price volatility must recognize which biofuel policy is 
operative (e.g., a tax credit/tax exemption or a blend mandate). It must also 
analyse the volatility that results from switching between mandates and tax 
credits (an oil price shock could precipitate such a switch) or from interac-
tions between policies across countries. Surely, in a ‘but-for’ world without 
tariffs, the USA would likely have been importing ethanol and so tempering 
any volatility resulting from corn ethanol linkages.26
20.2.11 Evolutionary Assessment of Biofuel Policies 
and Grain Price Fluctuations
It is important to recognize that the first two categories of biofuel policies, 
tax credits and mandates, do not, by themselves, discriminate against inter-
national trade. But other policies do, and the fact that many were in place for 
over thirty years in the USA explains, in part, why we have observed increas-
ing corn ethanol production in the USA (rather than, for example, import of 
less expensive sugarcane ethanol from Brazil). Such anti-international trade 
policies also contributed to sharp increases in US ethanol production after 
2005, so that world food grain commodity prices increased more sharply. 
Furthermore, the gap in distribution of welfare gains and losses between 
developed and developing countries widened.
Imported sugarcane ethanol from Brazil was unable to supply the ethanol 
market in the near term around 2005. Brazil needed time and significant invest-
ment in order to increase sugarcane production and expand infrastructure to 
move ethanol to ports. This obstacle led US corn ethanol production to increase 
sharply as farmers converted land from other uses in order to increase supply 
immediately. Here, long-term policies had large short-term implications. If no 
trade discriminatory biofuel policies had existed, more money would likely have 
been invested in foreign ethanol production. The sugarcane crop in Brazil, for 
example, would almost certainly have had a higher production base, and more 
ethanol infrastructure would have been built to supply world sugar and ethanol 
markets. Likewise, if US environmental policies had been implemented more 
gradually, US biofuels would not have had such a dramatic effect on commodity 
prices. In this respect, US biofuel policies constitute new episodes in the saga of 
distortionary agricultural policies that not only cause world price instability but 
also harm the welfare of consumers in food-importing developing countries.
26 Developing country policy responses to higher commodity prices in 2008 (caused by US and 
EU biofuel policies) in the form of export taxes, for example, further exacerbated commodity price 




Thus, while US agricultural and macroeconomic policies have strongly 
affected food grain commodity prices and volatility, so have US environmen-
tal and energy policies. The roller-coaster ride in market volatility since the 
financial crisis of 2008, and the re-emergence of peaks in corn, wheat, and 
soybean prices in 2011, can be traced to all three forms of intervention: US 
renewable-energy, environmental, and agricultural policies. An open ques-
tion remains as to their relative effect on the level and volatility of grain prices 
compared to crop supply/demand shocks. In 2009–10, however, corn prices 
would surely have fallen lower than US$3.21/bu if US renewable energy and 
biofuel policies had not supported the market.
US agricultural and biofuel policies have not been the sole influences 
on programme commodities (especially corn, soybeans, and wheat). 
Heavy-handed US governmental intervention in domestic and global sugar 
systems has also influenced world corn prices. US import quotas and inter-
nal insulated sugar price supports initially depressed world sugar production 
and prices. This price depression led Brazil to reallocate sugarcane produc-
tion away from sugar to ethanol markets. Brazilian sugar ethanol production 
also responded to increases in crude oil prices that have occurred since the 
mid-1970s. Currently, however, US biofuel policies are helping to stabilize 
the ethanol market in Brazil that was earlier destabilized by US sugar policy.
20.3 The Political Economy of US Farm, Energy, 
and Environmental Policies
The major groups that have been promoting biofuel policies include cer-
tain growers’ associations, fuel transporters, biofuel producers, automak-
ers, some environmentalists, and the energy security community.27 Many of 
these groups continue to support biofuel policies. Even some environmen-
tal groups that opposed tax credits and tariffs now seek to retain mandates. 
However, other groups are coalescing in opposition to mandates, tax credits, 
and subsidies. Because ethanol policies support feed grain markets through 
higher prices, other groups, such as livestock, dairy, and poultry producers, 
are beginning to form organized opposition to continued support for ethanol 
producers. So are food processors that no longer enjoy the low market prices 
that traditional agricultural policies supported. One example of these new 
interest groups is BalancedFoodandFuel.org, whose members include various 
meat, livestock, poultry, and dairy producer associations (Hahn 2008).
27 Members of the energy security community include retired US Army General Wesley Clark, 
who is affiliated with Growth Energy. Along with the Renewable Fuels Association, Growth Energy 





20.3.1 Implications for Future US Biofuel Policies
Current biofuel policies confirm the information and agency problems of mod-
ern political theory. This term refers to the claim that politicians and lobby 
groups deceive voters (or withhold information from ‘rationally ignorant 
voters’) because such groups stand to benefit from doing so.28 Obfuscation 
increases politicians’ chances of re-election by making it more difficult for 
voters to accurately assess policies and programmes that may not serve vot-
ers’ interests and by attracting support from those who benefit from such 
policies. Voters’ ignorance of such policies’ concealed costs (such as dis-
guised transfers) enhances the political strength of proactive interest groups. 
Specifically, current US biofuel policies have yielded concentrated benefits 
for farmers and ethanol producers to the detriment of domestic and inter-
national consumers. The implication of these information and agency prob-
lems for biofuel policy is that the multitude of different policy goals and 
their complex interactions facilitates this obfuscation—and may even make 
it inevitable (Johnson and Libecap 2001; Lawrence 2010).
Even if less distortionary policies are instituted, the political theory of 
enforcement and commitment problems helps explain why such policies may 
not be fully implemented. Political economic trades between individuals and 
groups rely on contracts and promises that are not enforceable. Governments 
and political candidates may renege on their policy promises, and citizens 
may renege on their promised votes. Such enforcement and commitment 
problems explain why biofuel policies can be difficult to reform. These 
problems also undermine the possibility of reaching efficient cooperative 
outcomes.
20.4 Conclusion
US macroeconomic and agricultural policies have always played a significant 
role in grain price levels and volatility. Up until the period that has been the 
focus of our analysis (2006–12), even though US agricultural policies often 
fostered greater world price volatility, they did so largely by depressing world 
prices. In sharp contrast, more recent US biofuel policies have introduced 
new causal mechanisms that have elevated not only domestic but also world 
prices. For some policy regimes, a direct link has been established between 
grain prices and energy prices. These commodity prices initially rose in 
2006–8, then plummeted in 2008–9 alongside lower oil prices, and finally 
rose again in 2011 almost to their 2008 peak levels.
28 ‘Rationally ignorant voters’ prefer to remain ignorant of issues because they believe the cost 





These effects partly explain why we emphasize the unique role of the US 
energy and environmental policies that have been enacted during the last six 
years. These policies, directed toward energy security, farm policy, and envi-
ronmental goals, have fostered a more direct link between crude oil, etha-
nol, and grain prices (particularly corn and soybeans). The actual causal links 
among these policies did not emerge until September 2006, because prior to 
that date, tax credits were dormant and mandates had not yet been instituted. 
From October 2006 through August 2007, a period of disequilibrium adjust-
ments unfolded, and finally, a direct link between corn and ethanol prices 
was established. Subsequent causal links to crude oil markets via the ethanol 
market have depended on the policy regime: the link to crude oil can be nega-
tive (mandates) or positive (tax credits). Accordingly, US policies that directly 
affect commodity prices have moved beyond the policy instruments emerg-
ing from US Farm Bills to include environmental and energy legislation.
Recognizing that the USA has been a dominant (‘large country’) player in 
the implementation of biofuel policies, we have also identified strong link-
ages between biofuel policies in the USA and in other countries. We have 
presented evidence that the interactions of biofuel policies instituted by the 
European Union and Brazil established a nexus for supporting price surges 
not only for corn, oilseeds, and other coarse grains, but also for wheat and 
rice. Moreover, the temporary agreement between the USA and five EU coun-
tries that allowed the US tax credit on ethanol exports to the European Union 
to take the form of a production subsidy for US ethanol producers had both 
short- and long-term effects, including some that failed to increase energy 
efficiency or to decrease global inequalities. Along similar lines, since the 
middle of 2010, when the US biodiesel mandate was finally enforced, interac-
tions have taken place between US, Canadian, and EU biodiesel policies that 
have also increased prices and volatility. Finally, in contrast to some other 
countries that responded directly to commodity price spikes and volatility, 
the USA’s responses to such phenomena have been largely inconsequential.29
In summary, the organized interest group landscape for US agricultural 
commodity policy has changed in recent years. It is now in the throes of a 
potential transformation. The ‘iron triangle’ that once influenced govern-
mental intervention in programme commodity markets has expanded into 
an ‘iron maze’ of environmental, energy, and agricultural organized inter-
est groups—not to mention at least three executive branch agencies (the 
Department of Energy, the United States Department of Agriculuture (USDA), 
and the Environmetal Protection Agency (EPA)). Despite—and because of—
these developments, it remains to be to be seen whether such changes can 
lead to more enlightened policies.
29 An exception was the negotiation by the USA of the release of Japanese rice stocks in 2008 
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Food Price Volatility and EU Policies
Johan Swinnen, Louise Knops, and Kristine van Herck*  
21.1 Introduction
The period 2007–11 was characterized by high volatility in global food prices. 
In many countries of the world this triggered important policy reactions with 
food exporters imposing export taxes or outright bans, and food importers 
lowering their import tariffs.
In this study we discuss the impact of the changes in world food prices on 
EU policies. We analyse how the changes in global prices have affected pro-
ducers and consumers in the EU, and how this has resulted in policy reactions 
through the political process. We also discuss how EU policy changes, in turn, 
have influenced global food prices.
Traditional economic and political models of agriculture and food policies 
often focus on the impact of prices and policies on three types of agents: pro-
ducers, consumers and taxpayers (see e.g., Gardner 1987; Swinnen 1994). 
Price changes directly affect producer and consumer welfare and may trigger 
demands by these groups for policy interventions. Because of expenditures on 
social policies and agricultural/food subsidies, taxpayers have always been an 
important actor in food policy discussions. In the EU their role in the policy 
debate has increased in recent years. With the shift from price and trade inter-
ventions to direct payments (in the 1990s), most of the support to farmers now 
comes through budget expenditures. In addition, the financial and economic 
crisis has had a major impact on member states’ budgets and on their fiscal 
policy. This affects their willingness to allocate funds to EU policies (including 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and food aid) and to spend on domestic 
social policies.
* The authors thank Per Pinstrup-Andersen, participants at the Project Meeting ‘The Political 





Such a traditional political economy framework is useful when thinking 
about the economic and political relationship between food prices and EU 
policies. However, to get a more realistic perspective it is necessary to dis-
aggregate the concept of ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ and to include the 
impact on and influence of other types of agents––such as trading partners, 
landowners, environmental groups, the energy and financial sectors, etc. 
Landowners have lobbied intensively on EU farm policies in recent years 
as farm subsidies have been shifted from price and trade interventions to 
land-linked subsidies, directly affecting land prices (Swinnen and Vranken 
2009; Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 2010). Environmental groups have been 
increasingly vocal in agri-food policy debates and played a significant role 
in the 2003 reform (Swinnen 2008). As recent price spikes have been related 
to energy investments (‘biofuels’) and financial transactions (‘speculation’), 
policy initiatives to regulate these have drawn energy and finance interest 
groups into the food policy debate as well. Further, the relationship between 
EU policies and global food prices is influenced by pressure from trading 
partners (Josling 2008).
Finally, decision-making in the EU is affected by various institutional fac-
tors. Some policies are set at the member state level (such as social poli-
cies), others at the EU level (such as agricultural policies). Some policies 
can be changed on a short-term basis (such as management of food policies 
within existing policy frameworks), others are fixed in multi-annual agree-
ments (such as EU budget allocations and major CAP decisions). For some 
policies the EU Parliament has co-decision power, for others not, and some 
policies are constrained by international agreements, such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
agreements.
Given the length constraints of this chapter it is impossible to integrate all 
these different policies, actors and institutional constraints into a single, inte-
grated model. We will therefore take a rather pragmatic approach, referring 
to key agents and institutions, which influenced policy decisions on specific 
policies.
21.2 Impacts of Changes in Global Food Prices in the EU
The period 2007–11 was characterized by high volatility in global food prices. 
Figure 21.1 illustrates how average producer prices in the EU followed a simi-
lar trend to global food prices, although the scale of these changes was much 
smaller than those of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) food price 
index. Compared to the 2005 prices, average prices for producers increased 




during the second price spike. Figure 21.2 shows that EU price volatility was 
lower than global price volatility indicators. There are important differences 
between agricultural commodities: EU cereal prices increased by 113 per cent, 
five times more than milk prices which increased by only 22 per cent between 
the first quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2008 (Figure 21.3). There are 
also large differences in price inflation between member states (see Swinnen, 
Knops, and Van Herck 2013).
These price changes are imperfect indicators of changes in producer welfare 
since they only capture part of the effects. Grain prices are output prices for 
grain producers, but input prices for livestock producers. In addition, there 
were significant changes in energy prices over the same period. The grain/ferti-
lizer price ratio in the EU has been very volatile over the 2005–12 period, with 
a rapid increase in 2006 and 2007, a strong decline in 2008 and significant 
growth in 2010 (Figure 21.3). In contrast, the milk/animal feed price ratio has 
consistently declined since 2005. The 2012 ratio was 25 per cent lower than in 
2005 as increases in dairy prices have been offset by increases in animal feed 
prices. Hence the impact of the global price changes on EU farmers was mixed.
There was little volatility in average consumer prices in the EU (Figure 21.1). 
The latter increased slightly over the 2005–12 period, with real food prices 





























































































































































EU Consumer Food Price Index EU Producer Farm Price Index FAO Food Price Index
Figure 21.1 Evolution of EU 27 and global price indices (2005=100; real prices)
Source: FAO and EUROSTAT.
1 There is also large heterogeneity between member states with respect to the change in con-
sumer prices. In general, the figures on consumer price inflation were higher in the new member 










































Figure 21.2 Coefficient of variation for global and EU food prices


























































Figure 21.3 Evolution of the ratio of cereal over fertilizer prices and the ratio of milk 




the cost of raw material is a small share of the price of the final food products 
in the EU. For example, the share of agricultural raw materials in the cost of 
bread is merely 5 per cent and on average 20 per cent for meat and livestock 
products (EC 2007).
The impact of these price changes on consumer welfare also depends 
on how much consumers spend on food. European consumers spend on 
average 15 per cent of their household budget on food. Changes of food 
prices therefore had a limited impact on the average EU household’s wel-
fare. However, there are significant differences between and within member 
states. Poorer families spend more on food. The share of the household 
budget spent on food varies from 10 per cent in the UK to more than 40 per 
cent in Romania.
Other factors had a significant effect on EU consumer incomes over 
the same period: the increase in energy prices, increasing costs for trans-
port, heating, etc., and the economic and financial crisis causing falling 
employ ment and wages. There was zero growth on average in the EU27 
and unem ployment increased by more than 2 percentage points between 
2007 and 2012 (see Figure 21.4). Macroeconomic changes also seem to 
have impacted food prices. Average food prices fell over the 2005–11 period 
in the countries hit the strongest by the economic crisis such as Portugal, 
Greece, Spain, and Ireland.
21.3 EU Policy Responses
The most important policy responses were: (i) policies to protect EU consum-
ers; (ii) regulating ‘speculation’ on agricultural commodities; (iii) tightening 
sustainability requirements in the EU biofuel policy; (iv) international devel-
opment and food aid; and (v) changes in the EU’s CAP.
21.3.1 Social Policy and Food Aid
Social policies, such as unemployment benefits, pensions and disability 
payments, are still the responsibility of the member states. The increase 
in food prices induced pressures from consumers, in particular the poor-
est, to increase social spending. Increases in other prices, such as those 
for energy and transport, reinforced this pressure. While the financial and 
economic crisis constrained governments’ budgets, social expenditures 
in the EU increased by approximately 7 per cent between 2005 and 2010 
(Figure 21.5). Not surprisingly, there are large disparities among member 







Since 1987, the EU has a food aid programme for the poor and the needy 
of Europe. First, this scheme consisted of the distribution of stocks of surplus 
food. However, reforms of the CAP towards a more market-oriented policy in 
the 1990s and 2000s reduced the amount of surpluses in the EU. As a conse-
quence, the food aid scheme was revised in 2008 to buy products from the 
market. In 2010, the European Commission (EC) put a ceiling of €500 mil-
lion/year on it and in 2011, under financial pressure, the EC proposed a drastic 









(a) Evolution of real GDP in the EU27








































































































































































































































in periods of rising food prices that such programmes were most needed. 
Negotiations took place on the amount of food aid and on (member states’) 
co-financing requirements. Several member states argued that ‘social policy’ 
is a national competence. An agreement was finally reached to maintain the 
level of funding for the (€500 million) for 2013 only.
21.3.2 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 2: Fighting 
Speculation on Food Commodities
The first version of the (MiFID 1) entered into force in 2007, just before the 
financial and food crises. MiFID 1 and its implementation were seen as suc-
cessful but recent changes in trading techniques (e.g., computer-based high 
frequency trading), coupled with the financial crisis, induced the EC to review 
MiFID to evaluate whether more regulation was needed.
Whilst the commodity and commodity derivatives markets were ‘exempted’ 
from MiFID 1, they now represent a focus-area of MiFID 2, in response to 
claims of speculation on food commodities.2 While there is increasing evi-
dence that speculation did not play a major role in the food price develop-
ments of recent years (Irwin 2012), the EC launched a public consultation in 
2010. This revealed a clear division between the stakeholders in the debate. 
Unsurprisingly, the financial actors made a plea for more ‘flexibility’ and 


































Figure 21.5 Evolution of social expenditures in the EU27 (in real terms)
Source: EUROSTAT.
2 After the first food price spike, many international observers (e.g., De Schutter 2010; UNCTAD 
2011; World Development Movement 2012) argued that increasing volumes of financial invest-
ments in commodity derivatives since 2004 and the related increase in speculative behaviour was 
one of the main factors explaining the food price spikes (for the complete references, see Swinnen, 




the entire EU economy, while a group of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) recommended that commodity markets should be further regulated 
to increase transparency and to discourage speculation.
It is unclear at this stage whether the outcome of MiFID 2 will effectively 
introduce regulation on commodity markets in the EU, as the EC proposal 
leaves latitude for different national implementations. This could allow strict 
regulation in some countries and more flexible regimes in others (with the UK 
clearly being in favour of a light regulation). The recent European Parliament 
(EP)’s response, amending the EC proposal, aims at removing loopholes and 
reinforcing the European regulatory oversight on commodity markets. A final 
agreement on has yet to be reached.
21.3.3 Strengthening Sustainability Requirements 
for Biofuel Production
The EC proposed what the press and industry have qualified as a policy 
U-turn on biofuels. From strongly encouraging this sector through bind-
ing targets and blending mandates (i.e., its target of 10 per cent of biofuel 
for transport by 2020), the EC is now backtracking and seeks to minimize 
the use of food crop-based biofuels. Biofuels have been an important driver 
of increasing food prices (de Gorter et al. 2013) and are claimed to be less 
environmentally-friendly than originally thought, because of indirect effects 
of land use change (Rausser and de Gorter, Chapter 20).
The 2009 EU biofuel sustainability scheme includes the following criteria: 
green house gas emissions (GHGE) savings from biofuels shall be at least 35 per 
cent; biofuels shall not be made from raw material obtained from land with 
high biodiversity or high carbon stock, or peat land; and EU agricultural raw 
materials used for biofuels shall satisfy the environmental requirements under 
the CAP. In 2012, the EC proposed limiting the use of food-crop-based biofuels 
at 5 per cent (EC 2012).
21.3.4 International Food and Development Aid
Somewhat paradoxically, despite high food prices the EU has not provided 
more (in-kind) food aid to poor countries. In fact Figure 21.6 illustrates that 
food aid declined from more than 3.5 million tons/year in the early 1990s, 
to close to zero. There are two reasons: studies showing that food aid could 
have detrimental effects on the local economies caused a shift from food aid 
towards development aid (OECD 2012a), and EU food aid was especially dis-
tributed when EU food stocks were high.
Instead, in 2008 the EU established a €1 billion ‘food facility’, including 





measures to increase the agricultural production capacity and help meet the 
food needs of the most vulnerable. Whilst the EC presented the Food Facility 
as its ‘highest profile instrument’ in development aid (EC 2010), the EP ques-
tioned the automatic extension of this instrument, as its ability to tackle food 
insecurity had been rather difficult to assess. The EP also emphasized the need 
to adopt a global and comprehensive response, to overcome the proliferation 
of separate actions since 2008 (EP 2011).
In 2008, French President Sarkozy proposed to make price volatility a 
Group of 20 (G20) priority. The G20 ‘Action Plan on Food Price Volatility 
and Agriculture’ aimed, amongst other objectives, to improve and develop 
risk management tools for governments, firms and farmers in order to build 
capacity to manage and mitigate the risks associated with food price vola-
tility, in particular in the poorest countries. In 2011, the G20 in Cannes––
still under the French presidency––focused on improving the regulation and 
supervision of commodity derivatives markets, and in general on reinforcing 
transparency on agricultural markets (G20 2011).
21.4 The CAP and Global Food Prices
21.4.1 A (Very) Brief Historical Perspective
The relationship between food price volatility and the EU’s CAP is arguably 
the most interesting from a (global) food policy perspective. For decades, sur-
plus production resulted from a CAP system which provided strong protec-







































































Figure 21.6 International food aid by the EU (thousand tons of wheat)





subsidies.3 While this created stability on the EU market it created instability 
on world markets, and distortions throughout the economy. High import tar-
iffs and growing surpluses, exported with subsidies, caused already low prices 
on global food markets to decline even further. This system was particularly 
important for commodities such as cereals, beef, sugar, and dairy products.
In the 1980s, pressure increased to reduce the CAP distortions both from 
inside the EU and from outside––most importantly from the EU’s trading 
partners and exporting nations and from developing countries and interna-
tional organizations which argued that these policies were hurting the poor 
by contributing to low farm prices.
In response, the EU introduced a series of reforms to change the CAP into 
a policy system that maintains support to farmers, while creating less distor-
tion on international markets (Josling 2008; Swinnen 2008). Reforms in the 
1980s introduced supply constraints (quotas) in the sugar and dairy sectors. 
Reforms in the 1990s reduced price supports, tariffs and export subsidies and 
replaced these by payments for land and animals. These reforms were part of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the GATT/WTO.
After 2000, partly in anticipation of a Doha Round agreement, the single 
farm payment (SFP)––a payment decoupled from production––was intro-
duced (Swinbank and Daugbjerg 2006).4 These reforms resulted in a decline 
in agricultural support in the EU, and in particular in a strong decline of the 
use of the most distortionary instruments (Figure 21.7). Agricultural support, 
measured by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)’s % Producer Support Estimate (PSE), declined from approximately 36 
per cent in the period 1991–3 to approximately 20 per cent in 2009–11, and 
the %PSE for the coupled support fell below 10 per cent. Similarly, another 
measure of protection, the nominal rates of assistance (NRA) to agriculture 
estimates by Kym Anderson and the World Bank, show that the EU’s NRA fell 
from 54 per cent in 1991–5 to 11 per cent in 2005–10.
21.4.2 Reactions to Recent Price Changes
Paradoxically, after the EU had gone through decades of reforms to reduce 
the CAP’s (negative) impact on global food prices, the world became con-
cerned with high food prices. After the price spikes of 2007–8, it was argued 
3 Political economists have explained this growth in protection by the decline in farm incomes 
compared to rapidly growing incomes in the rest of society as well as declining opposition of 
consumers and industry with less worker expenditures on food and increased organization of 
agribusinesses and food companies (Swinnen 2009).
4 The political economy factors which made these radical reforms possible are discussed in 
Swinnen (2008). The impact of the GATT/ WTO on the shift towards less distorting policy instru-




that urban consumers were suffering from high food prices but also that 
rural households were suffering since there was imperfect price trans-
mission of international prices and because many were net food buying 
households––arguments suspiciously absent from the pre-2008 discussions 
(Swinnen 2011).5
The timing of the recent food price changes coincided with important dis-
cussions in the EU on the future of the CAP. The first increase coincided with 
the conclusion of the so-called ‘health check’ reforms. The second price spike 
occurred when a new round of CAP reform discussions had been launched.
A series of policy adjustments were taken, mostly within the existing policy 
framework. The EC changed some market management measures to increase 
the supply of food in 2008: intervention stocks were sold, the 10 per cent 
obligatory set-aside for farmers was suspended, most import duties on cereals 
were lifted, and milk quotas were increased by 2 per cent.
At the same time the EC confirmed the agenda to stay on course to a more 
market-based CAP. Reforms further decoupled support and reduced interven-
tion in markets for pig meat, cereals and dairy products. This, according to 
the EC, aimed to ‘modernize, simplify and streamline the CAP and remove 
restrictions on farmers, thus helping them to respond better to signals from 
the market and to face new challenges’ (EC 2008).
In response to the crisis in the dairy sector, where farmers saw their income 
decreasing with increasing costs (see above), a so-called ‘milk package’ was 
introduced in 2010. Despite considerable pressure of dairy organizations, the 

































































Figure 21.7 Agricultural support in the EU (%PSE and %NRA)
Source: OECD and World Bank.
5 See Swinnen, Squicciarini, and Vandemoortele (2011) for a political economy explanation.
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Instead the policy initiatives focused on strengthening the position of farm-
ers in the supply chain (by improving contracts between farmers and dairies 
and strengthening farmers’ collective bargaining power).
The price changes also affected discussions on the longer term CAP frame-
work itself, and the discourse of interest groups and policy makers, how-
ever generally without fundamentally altering their proposals. For example, 
COPA-COGECA (2011), the main EU farmers’ organization, now argues that, 
despite high prices, farmers are losers because of volatility, high input prices 
and ‘food chain imbalances’. They––and other interest groups––asked for 
more regulations, moving away from the long-term liberalization strategy for 
the CAP. So far, however, the EU has (i)  reaffirmed the engagement of the 
EU towards an open trade policy––also by underlining the harm done by the 
restrictive export policies implemented by some countries in response to price 
volatility; and (ii) stayed on course with its reform proposals in specific sectors 
such as dairy and sugar (phasing out the quota regime), despite a slight change 
in argumentation, i.e., by also linking the motivation to price volatility.
21.4.3 Negotiations on the Future CAP: A Return 
to Intervention or Not?
There is uncertainty whether this course will be continued in the future, as 
the EP, which now enjoys full legislative influence in the CAP reform process 
(Roederer-Rynning 2003), seems to be leaning towards a more intervention-
ist approach, possibly because interest groups which favour more regulation, 
such as some of the farmers associations, appear to be more influential in the 
EP than in the EC.
The 2011 EC proposal on the future CAP proposed to introduce some 
minor changes in the form of payments but without a return to market 
interventions. The changes in the payments can be summarized in three key 
words: convergence, greening and capping: support is to be more equally dis-
tributed (convergence), better linked to environmental objectives (greening) 
and with a maximum ceiling (capping). The proposals use price volatility as a 
justification to maintain the CAP direct payments (as ‘safety net’) to protect 
farmers against price volatility: they give ‘basic financial security to farmers, 
without distorting international markets’ (EC 2011).
The proposal also includes a new ‘crisis reserve fund’ and a ‘crisis manage-
ment toolkit’ (to respond rapidly to extreme events of price volatility), which 
include funds for crop and weather insurance, and income stabilization to 
compensate farmers if their income drops by 30 per cent (EC 2011). Bureau 
(2012) concludes that various conditionalities such as maximum quantities 
on intervention, limits on compensation and co-financing requirements 




In addition, the EC proposes to allocate a €4.5 billion envelope for research 
and innovation on food security, the bio-economy and sustainable agricul-
ture but the impact is likely modest since a large share is a reallocation within 
the EU Budget (Bureau 2012).
There are clear signals that the EP prefers a more interventionist approach 
and more market regulation. This was evident from the EP’s reactions to the 
EC proposals on MiFID2, the EC communication on ‘A Better Functioning 
Food Supply Chain in Europe’, on competition rules in agriculture and in 
the debate on the end of sugar quotas. The EC has several times confirmed 
the ending of the sugar quota regime by 2015, arguing that, considering ris-
ing demand, maintaining sugar quotas would be completely counterproduc-
tive in the context of price volatility. However, key members of the EP have 
argued that the extension of the sugar quota regime is crucial to stabilize 
markets at a time of increasing price volatility, a position backed by the major 
sugar producing countries. Hence, both groups argue that their solution 
would reduce volatility and improve the competitiveness of the sugar sector 
(Matthews 2012).
In conclusion, the food price spikes have influenced the debate on the 
future CAP reform and its outcome is still uncertain. So far the effect has been 
minimal, mostly affecting arguments, much less the main policies, as the cur-
rent CAP proposals do not fundamentally alter the trend followed by the EC 
before 2008. The EC has used price volatility as a justification to move towards 
more market liberalization in the agricultural sector and reduce intervention 
mechanisms, and as a justification to maintain existing CAP payments (as 
‘safety net’) to protect farmers against price volatility. However, the outcome 
of the current CAP reform negotiations are still uncertain and the EP, which 
now has a much larger policy influence in this policy field, appears to favour a 
return to a more interventionist approach. The amendments on CAP reform, 
adopted by the EP in 2013, indicate that the EP is indeed trying to reinforce 
public intervention.
21.5 Political Economy Considerations
From a political economy perspective it is interesting to observe how EU 
policies have (not) responded to price volatility and the impact of the insti-
tutional organization of the decision-making. It is well-known that there 
are important political incentives for decision makers to adjust policies to 
changing market conditions. The so-called anti-cyclical policy pattern is 
well-documented as interest groups turn to governments to assist them when 
market conditions turn against them (Swinnen 1994; Olper 1998) and there is 




(e.g., Swinnen 2009) and elsewhere (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Anderson, 
Rausser, and Swinnen 2013). It is therefore logical to expect that policies in 
the EU, as elsewhere, may have been adjusted in response to the dramatic 
changes on the world food markets.
First, the lack of major interventions is consistent with the fact that 
incomes of EU farmers have increased on average over the 2005–11 period 
(Figure 21.8). They have benefited from higher prices while receiving con-
stant levels of payments from the EU. However, as mentioned earlier, there 
were major differences among farmers. In particular the dairy sector has seen 
an income decline. The introduction of the milk package to assist the dairy 
sector is a response to this.
Second, compensation for higher food prices to consumers has occurred 
mostly through increased social spending, not through food market regula-
tions. Several factors play a role here: social spending is a more efficient and 
more targeted instrument than limiting the price of food, in particular in a 
large and heterogeneous EU27. This heterogeneity is also reflected in large 
variations in the share of food in consumer expenditures in the EU27, which 
should have triggered very different consumer reactions. Social spending is 
also more efficient because farm prices make up a small share in consumer 
food prices.
Third, most policy discussions on the CAP in the past years have focused 
on how to reform the farm payments, as increased pressure from taxpayers 
and demands from environmental groups challenge the need to continue the 
type of payments as they currently exist. Farmers’ organizations have con-
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Figure 21.8 Index of real farm income per annual working unit (2005=100)
Source: EC-DG Agriculture and Rural Development.
EU
471
shift towards more regulation. They have been supported by landowners who 
are benefiting from higher land prices with land-based payments (Ciaian, 
Kancs, and Swinnen 2010).
Fourth, an interesting issue is the different position of the EC and the EP, 
with the latter taking a more interventionist stance. It is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions on this since the policy is still debated and the issue has not been 
resolved yet. Still it appears that the differences can be related to (at least) two 
factors. The EC has played a leadership role in steering the CAP reforms in the 
1990s and 2000s and, as a bureaucracy that had the right to table the policy 
proposals combined with strong leadership and a strong capacity in analysis 
and policy preparation, has been able to steer the reforms through the politi-
cal process, carefully arranging a qualified majority of votes in the European 
Council, and largely ignoring the EP (Swinnen 2008). Another factor is that 
the EC is very well aware of the international dimensions, in particular the 
WTO constraints and ongoing negotiations, since they have been intensely 
involved in these negotiations where the agricultural commissioner has col-
laborated with the trade commissioner. It appears that the EC wants to stay 
on course in moving the CAP towards more market orientation, continuing 
its 20-year strategy, and legacy.
In contrast, the EP does not have such a legacy as it is just now being involved 
in the actual decision-making. Moreover, the Agricultural Committee of the EP, 
where the key positions are prepared, is filled with members who are linked to 
traditional agricultural interests, such as farmers’ organizations, former minis-
ters of agriculture, etc. (Crombez, Knops, and Swinnen 2013; Roederer-Rynning 
2003). This contrasts with the EC’s approach in the past decade to broaden 
the support base for the CAP by reaching out to environmental groups, con-
sumers, etc. Farmers’ organizations have started to target the EP’s Agricultural 
Committee as their key area for lobbying activities. However, obviously, also 
here the WTO agreements do impose real constraints on policy reactions.
Finally, the limited response in important EU policies to price volatility has 
also to do with the fact that policies such as the CAP and any policy relying 
on EU budgetary expenditures is regulated within a multi-annual agreement, 
and can only be changed after long negotiations. Hence, policy reactions 
from 2007 to now have been constrained by the CAP and budget agreements 
covering the 2006–13 period.
21.6 Impact of EU Policies on Global Food Prices
As explained in the previous section, the impact of the current CAP on global 
prices is much smaller than in the past. Several studies show the large impact 




Tongeren 2002). Recent studies on the price volatility of major food commodi-
ties (Anderson and Nelgen 2012; Anderson, Ivanic, and Martin 2012) show that 
EU policies had little or no impact on volatility in the grain and oil seed market.
Unlike other countries, the EU has neither introduced export constraints 
for food nor caused a major use of agricultural products for biofuels so far. The 
new proposal to change the EU biofuel targets may have a significant impact 
in the future (compared to the situation if this would not be the case).
Increased social policies and development aid may have had some indirect 
effects by compensating consumers in the EU and in developing countries for 
higher food prices and thus stimulating more consumption and thus higher 
prices, but there are no estimates on the impact of these spending increases.
The CAP of the 1970s and 1980s would have had a much stronger effect in 
countering high food prices than the current CAP as the surplus production and 
the large food stocks in the EU could have been used to export food (including 
cereals) and thus to reduce prices when they were rising, both as commercial 
exports and as food aid. The policy reforms over the past two decades which 
have reduced the distortionary effects of EU policies on world food markets have 
also reduced its capacity to quickly increase food exports during price spikes.6 
This is illustrated by the fact that EU food aid to developing countries was at its 
lowest during the past five years, when food prices spiked (see Figure 21.6).
21.7 Conclusions
The period 2007–11 was characterized by high volatility in global food prices. 
EU producer prices followed a similar trend to global prices, but the size of the 
changes was much smaller with important differences between agricultural 
commodities. For example, cereal prices increased much more than dairy 
prices. Dairy farmers’ income decreased with input feed prices increasing 
more than output prices.
Food prices for EU consumers have increased only slightly, with real 
food prices 5 per cent higher in 2012 than in 2005 and very little volatil-
ity. Changes of food prices therefore had a limited impact on the average 
EU households’ welfare, but with significant heterogeneity within the EU. 
The EU and member states responded to the price volatility by a series of 
actions to mitigate short- and medium-term effects of the food price shock, 
to increase agricultural supply and to tackle the global effects of the price rises 
on the poor. In this study we focused on policies to protect EU consumers, 
attempts to regulate ‘speculation’ on agricultural commodities, revisions of 




sustainability requirements for biofuels, international development and food 
aid and changes in the EU’s CAP.
Arguments that increasing volumes of financial investments in commod-
ity derivatives led to speculative behaviour in food markets causing increased 
price volatility triggered EC initiatives to regulate this. The financial sector 
argued against ‘over-regulation’ of financial markets while other groups 
insisted on further regulation to increase transparency and to discourage 
speculation. A final agreement on a directive has yet to be reached.
The EC proposed large changes in its biofuel strategy when it became clear 
that biofuel production was an important factor in increased food prices and 
when arguments and evidence appeared on uncertain environmental bene-
fits because of indirect effects of land use. From encouraging biofuels through 
binding targets and blending mandates, the EC now seeks to minimize the 
use of food crop-based biofuels.
Food aid declined over the past two decades due to a shift from food aid 
towards development aid and because of falling intervention food stocks due 
to CAP reforms. The EU established a €1 billion ‘food facility’ and supported 
G20 initiatives to reduce price volatility and to reinforce transparency on 
agricultural markets.
For decades the CAP depressed global food prices as the EU imposed high 
tariffs on imports and exported its subsidized food surplus production. 
A series of reforms led to a policy system that maintains large government 
support to farmers, while creating less distortion on international markets.
Global price volatility induced a series of relatively minor policy adjust-
ments that could be taken within the existing policy framework. So far the 
EU has reaffirmed its engagement towards an open trade policy and stayed 
on course with its reform proposals in specific sectors, despite a change in 
argumentation, i.e., by linking the motivation to price volatility.
The lack of major interventions is consistent with the fact that incomes 
of EU farmers have increased on average over the 2005–11 period, except 
for sectors such as the dairy sector, where the EU has responded by support-
ing this sector through new initiatives. Farmers’ organizations have concen-
trated more on lobbying to secure the existing CAP payments rather than on 
a major shift towards more regulation, as increased pressure from taxpayers 
and demands from environmental groups challenge the need to continue 
the type of payments as they currently exist. Farmers have been supported in 
these political pressures by landowners.
Compensation for consumers has occurred mostly through increased 
social spending, not through food market regulations. Despite (or because of) 
the financial and economic crisis, social expenditures by EU member states 
increased by approximately 7 per cent between 2005 and 2010. Social spend-
ing is a more efficient and more targeted instrument than limiting the price 
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of food, in particular in a large and heterogeneous EU27 and because farm 
prices make up a small share in consumer food prices.
There is uncertainty whether this course will be continued in the future, as 
the EP, which now enjoys full legislative influence in the CAP reform process, 
seems to be leaning towards a more interventionist approach.
While the EC wants to continue its twenty-year strategy in moving the CAP 
towards more market orientation and broadening the support base for the 
CAP by reaching out to environmental groups, consumers, etc., the EP does 
not have such a legacy as it is just now being involved in the actual decision-
making. The Agricultural Committee of the EP is controlled by members with 
links to more traditional agricultural interests. Discussions on the future of 
the CAP (for the 2013–20 period) have been on-going since 2009, but the 
decision-making process is slow because of the institutional framework and 
because of the simultaneous negotiations on the EU budget. Decisions are 
likely to be taken in 2013.
The limited response in important EU policies to price volatility has also 
to do with WTO agreements on agricultural policies which do impose real 
constraints on policy reactions and the fact that policies such as the CAP 
(and any policy relying on EU budgetary expenditures) are regulated within a 
multi-annual agreement. Policy reactions from 2007 to now have been con-
strained by the CAP and budget agreements covering the 2006–13 period.
Finally, the impact of the current CAP on global prices is much smaller than 
in the past. Recent studies show that EU policies had no or very little impact 
on volatility in key food markets. Increased social policies and development 
aid may have had some indirect effects by compensating consumers in the 
EU and in developing countries for higher food prices and thus stimulating 
more consumption and thus higher prices, but there are no estimates on the 
impact of these spending increases.
Paradoxically, the CAP of the 1970s and 1980s would have had a much 
stronger effect in countering high food prices than the current CAP. Policy 
reforms over the past which have reduced the distortionary effects on world 
food markets have also reduced the EU’s capacity to quickly increase food 
exports, either as commercial exports or as food aid.
References7
Anderson, K., and Y. Hayami (1986). The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Protection: East Asia in International Perspective. London: Allen and Unwin.
7 For a more complete list of relevant official documents of the European Institutions, see 




Anderson, K., and S. Nelgen (2012). ‘Agricultural Trade Distortions during the Global 
Financial Crisis’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28(1): 235–60.
Anderson, K., M. Ivanic, and W. Martin (2012). ‘Food Price Spikes, Price Insulation 
and Poverty’. Paper presented at the NBER conference, 15–16 August. Seattle.
Anderson, K., G. Rausser, and J. Swinnen (2013). ‘Political Economy of Public 
Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets’. Journal of 
Economic Literature 51(2), 423–77.
Bureau, J. C. (2012). ‘Where Is the Common Agricultural Policy Heading?’ 
Intereconomics 47(6): 316–21.
Ciaian, P., D. Kancs, and J. Swinnen (2010). EU Land Markets and the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
COPA COGECA (2011). ‘The Future of the Common Agricultural Policy 
Post-2013: COPA COGECA’s Reaction to the Commission’s communication’. 
Brussels: COPA COGECA.
Crombez, C., L. Knops, and J. Swinnen (2012). ‘Reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy Under the Co-decision Procedure’. Intereconomics 47(6): 336–42.
de Gorter, H., D. Drabik, D. R. Just, and E. M. Kliauga (2013). ‘The Impact of OECD 
Biofuels Policies on Developing Countries’. Agricultural Economics (forthcoming).
De Schutter, O. (2010). ‘Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price 
Crises: Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price Volatility’. Briefing Note 02. 
New York: United Nations.
European Commission (EC) (2007). ‘The Impact of the Developments in Agricultural 
Producer Prices on Consumers’. Document CM/WM/PB 34703. Brussels: EU.
European Commission (2010). ‘An EU Policy Framework to Assist Developing 
Countries in Addressing Food Security Challenges’. Document COM (2010) 127 
(final). Brussels: EU.
European Commission (2011). ‘A Budget for Europe 2020’. Document SEC (2011) 
867 final, COM (2011) 500 (final). Brussels: EU.
European Commission (2012). ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 98/70/EC and amending Directive 
2009/28/EC. Brussels: EU.
European Parliament (EP) (2011). ‘Resolution on an EU Policy Framework to assist 
Developing Countries in Addressing Food Security Challenges’. Document 
(2010/2100(INI)). Brussels: EP.
G20 (2011). ‘G20 Leaders Summit final Communiqué’. Agricultural Ministers 
Communiqué, 3–4 November. Cannes.
Gardner, B. L. (1987). The Economics of Agricultural Policies. New York: Macmillan.
Irwin, S. H. (2012). ‘Does the Masters Hypothesis Explain Recent Food Price Spikes?’ 
International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, 18–24 August, 
Foz do Iguacu, Brazil.
Irwin, S. H. (2013). ‘Does the Masters Hypothesis Explain Recent Food Price Spikes?’ 
Unpublished Manuscript.
Josling, T. (2008). ‘External Influences on CAP Reforms: An Historical Perspective’. In 
J. Swinnen (ed.), The Perfect Storm: The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
High-income Countries
476
Matthews A. (2012). ‘The Political Economy of Eliminating Sugar Quotas 
in 2015’. CAPreform.eu. Available at: <http://www.capreform.eu/
the-political-economy-o f-eliminating-sugar-quotas-in-2015>.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2012a). 
‘Creditor Reporting System’. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2012b). 
‘Producer and Consumer Support Estimates Database’. Paris: OECD.
Olper, A. (1998). ‘Political Economy Determinants of Agricultural Protection 
Levels in the EU Member States: An Empirical Investigation’. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 25(4): 463–87.
Roederer-Rynning, C. (2003). ‘From “Talking Shop” to “Working Parliament”‘? The 
European Parliament and Agricultural Change’. Journal of Common Market Studies 
41(1): 13–35.
Swinbank, A., and C. Daugbjerg (2006). ‘The 2003 CAP Reform: Accommodating 
WTO Pressures’. Comparative European Politics 4(1): 47–64.
Swinnen, J. (1994). ‘A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection’. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 76(1): 1–14.
Swinnen J. (2008). ‘The Perfect Storm’. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Swinnen J. (2009). ‘The Growth of Agricultural Protection in Europe in the 19th and 
20th Centuries’. The World Economy 32(11): 1499–537.
Swinnen, J. (2011). ‘The Right Price of Food’. Development Policy Review 29(6): 667–88.
Swinnen, J., and L. Vranken (2009). ‘Land & EU Accession’. Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies.
Swinnen, J., A. Banerjee, and H. de Gorter (2001). ‘Economic Development, 
Institutional Change and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: An 
Empirical Study of Belgium since the 19th Century’. Agricultural Economics 
26(1): 25–43.
Swinnen, J., A. Olper, and T. Vandemoortele (2012). ‘Impact of the WTO on 
Agricultural and Food Policies’. The World Economy 35(9): 1089–101.
Swinnen, J., P. Squicciarini, and T. Vandemoortele (2011). ‘The Food Crisis, Mass 
Media and the Political Economy of Policy Analysis and Communication’. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 38(3): 409–26.
Swinnen, J., L. Knops, and K. Van Herck (2013), ‘Food Price Volatility and EU 
Policies’, Working Paper No. 2013/032. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Develoment) (2011). ‘Price 
Formation in Financialized Commodity Markets: The Role of Information’. 
New York and Geneva: UNCTAD.
Van Meijl, H., and F. van Tongeren (2002). ‘The Agenda 2000 CAP Reform, World 












This brief concluding chapter addresses the most important general 
policy-related lessons learned from the research reported in the previous 
chapters. Many more lessons are reported in the syntheses shown in 
Chapters 2 to 5.1 Recommendations for specific policy interventions that 
national policy makers may wish to follow are context specific and should be 
made within the relevant country context. They are found in Chapters 6 to 
21.2 Eight policy recommendations expected to be relevant for many coun-
tries are presented in this chapter.
The aim of this chapter is to highlight lessons that may assist governments 
in designing and implementing policies to deal with future increases in food 
price volatility. Contrary to a world in which policies are made exclusively 
on economic efficiency grounds, there is no unique definition of what is a 
better or worse policy in a political economy framework. What is good for 
one stakeholder group may be bad for another. In theory, policies could be 
guided by the goal of maximizing a social welfare function in which each of 
the stakeholder groups is assigned a relative weight. While such a goal may, in 
fact, be implicit in some policy-making, the assignment of relative weights—if 
1 See in particular Baltzer’s four categories of countries and their price transmission based on a 
synthesis of trade status (Chapter 2); Bryan’s classification of the study-countries into three cat-
egories on the basis of the extent of policy intervention (Chapter 3); Babu’s 12 lessons drawn from 
an analysis of the policy processes (Chapter 4); and Watson’s 11 political economy claims based 
on a synthesis of the country studies (Chapter 5).






attempted—tends to be subjective depending on who does the assignment 
and would be an obscure and non-transparent process. Furthermore, since 
as demonstrated in the country studies, most governments do not operate as 
unitary decision-making units, attempts to assign relative weight by different 
government agencies are likely to result in very different outcomes. Although 
as mentioned by Watson in Chapter 5, improved food security was the stated 
overall goal of several of the study-country governments, the choice of policy 
interventions points towards the protection of government legitimacy as the 
ultimate goal.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, rapid increases in the world market prices for 
rice, wheat, and maize beginning in 2007 and followed by large price fluc-
tuations, attracted much attention in both high- and low-income countries. 
The news media and some international organizations and non-government 
organizations (NGOs) were particularly vocal. Doomsday-Sayers had a field 
day because they finally got support for their view that the world was rapidly 
moving towards a situation of not being able to feed itself. They were often 
supported by exaggerated reports and speculation by the news media. Some 
NGOs and national and international organizations called for more atten-
tion and—sometimes self-serving—financial support for agricultural devel-
opment and other food-security-related activities. The Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) reported that the food price increases in 2007–8 caused 
a large increase in the number of undernourished people, a claim it subse-
quently revised. The spill-over from the world market food price fluctuations 
to developing countries through the news media and other information 
sources made policy makers nervous and feel they should take action even if 
the ‘crisis’ was not visible in their domestic markets.
In fact the impact of the world market price increases and volatility was 
much less than expected in most developing countries, including the study-
countries, because a relatively small fraction of the world market price change 
was transmitted to these countries (Chapter 2). While the price transmission 
varied among study-countries and food commodities, on average about one-
third of the world market food price changes were transmitted to developing 
countries and the transmission may take place over an extended period of 
time.
The low price transmission from the world market and the much larger 
impact of national factors, such as extreme weather events, poorly functional 
domestic markets, and limited international food trade, on domestic prices 
in most developing countries, meant that the behaviour of food prices in 
the domestic markets of many developing countries during the period of the 
so-called ‘food crisis’ was not very different from the behaviour in prior peri-
ods with price volatility. Developing countries experience high food price 
volatility with great frequency. What was different in 2007–12 was that the 
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price volatility occurred in the world market and therefore got much more 
international attention.
However, irrespective of whether price volatility in domestic markets is a 
result of food price volatility in the world market or caused by national and 
local factors, governments are faced with demands for policy interventions. 
Of course, the choice of specific interventions and their impact will depend 
on what brought the volatility about. There are no signs that the food crisis 
led to enduring shifts in food policy or significant policy reforms. In fact, 
most of the policy interventions were aimed at bandage solutions such as 
short-term price subsidies for food and fertilizers. This is understandable 
because it was a crisis response and most of the interventions were similar to 
those used in previous food price fluctuations. Lip service was paid to struc-
tural changes with expected long-term impact, such as structural changes in 
the agricultural sector, but as soon as the food prices came back down, few of 
the countries implemented them. There is reason to believe that the coun-
tries are in no better position to deal with future food price fluctuations than 
they were in 2007. Some of the countries considered policy interventions 
aimed at a higher degree of food self-sufficiency and reduced dependence on 
the world market but these interventions were primarily focused on higher 
prices to farmers, which were short-lived because of high fiscal costs and the 
accumulation of food surpluses in the hands of governments. However, price 
subsidies to farmers did result in production expansions in some countries.
It is important to differentiate between food price increase and food 
price volatility. An increasing food price trend is likely to require different 
policy interventions than fluctuations around the mean. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, much of the literature concerning food price increases and increas-
ing volatility since 2007 fail to make such a distinction and it is unclear 
whether policy recommendations and design were aimed at reducing food 
price increases, volatility, or both. What seems clear from the country stud-
ies reported in this volume is that, except for countries with politically pow-
erful agricultural sectors such as Brazil, governments were much more likely 
to take action on the up-side of a food price spike than on the downside, 
reflecting a consumer-bias. However, some countries, including India and 
Zambia, introduced agricultural price support aimed at the dual purpose of 
increasing farmer incomes and expanding food supplies on the downside. 
Several other countries introduced fertilizer subsidies, presumably for the 
same reasons although some of those subsidies were initiated prior to the 
food crisis. However, both price and fertilizer subsidies quickly became an 
unacceptable fiscal burden. The rest of this chapter focuses on policies to deal 
with volatility although some of the interventions are likely to also serve 
to deal with longer term price trends. The extent to which these policies 
can be implemented in a particular country context will depend on the 
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existing political economy, including the goals and relative power of the 
various stakeholder groups participating in the policy formation.
The choice of intervention will depend on political economy factors, e.g., 
perceived gains and losses by various stakeholder groups and the relative 
power of each of them. In its most simplistic version, we can conclude that 
policies to keep food prices from increasing would hurt farmers and benefit 
consumers while the impact of policies to reduce price volatility is tenuous. 
Attempts to keep food prices from increasing without reducing price volatil-
ity would send two signals to farmers not to increase production: lower prices 
and higher risks. This, in turn, would reduce supplies and increase prices to 
the consumer, thus countering the efforts to keep food prices low. At the same 
time, failure to reduce volatility would increase risks of transitory food inse-
curity and malnutrition among low-income consumers although the impact 
on chronic food insecurity is less clear. Thus, a single-minded policy focus on 
the price level while ignoring the negative effects of price volatility may not 
have a positive food security outcome unless it is accompanied by effective 
risk management tools for farmers and consumers.
A more complete political economy analysis needed to guide national poli-
cies would include several other stakeholder groups such as traders, millers, 
and other food processing agents and different groups of farmers and con-
sumers, each of which would be affected by both price increases and volatility.
One of the overriding issues facing governments in a situation of either 
increasing food prices or increasing price volatility is whether to intervene 
in the prices or leave price formation to the market and redistribute gains 
and losses through taxes, subsidies, and transfers. Interfering with price sig-
nals may have perverse results, e.g., attempts to keep prices low are likely to 
reduce supply and increase demand thus putting more upward pressures on 
prices. Transfers to low-income population groups with high-income elastic-
ity for food may expand demand which also adds to the upward pressures on 
food prices.
Leaving prices resulting from market fundamentals (changes in demand 
and supply) alone and compensating losers from price fluctuations instead of 
intervening in price formation is usually preferable because it permits the cor-
rect signals to be sent to producers and consumers to change production and 
consumption. However, price stabilization may be justified to deal with price 
spikes of a duration shorter than a growing season because farmers will not be 
able to adjust production. A much better information base will be needed to 
predict the length of a price increase with acceptable accuracy.
Notwithstanding the above suggestion that the choice of specific poli-
cies should be made within a context-specific framework, some recommen-




22.2 Strengthen the Policy-related Evidence Base
Although most of the countries had experienced periods of very significant 
food price volatility in the past, the response to the 2007–8 volatility appears 
not to have been well-organized. Many of the governments responded to the 
food price volatility in an ad hoc manner. Policy reversals were common and 
delayed policy action reduced the effectiveness of the interventions. Failure 
to coordinate action by various government agencies added to the problem. 
Repeating past policy interventions was common and very little policy inno-
vation was observed. Policy makers in most of the countries did not have 
access to relevant, reliable, and timely information about policy options and 
expected impact of each of such options on the various stakeholder groups. 
There is an urgent need to enhance access to such information within each 
country. This would include an improved data base, timely monitoring, and 
projections of food prices and those variables most likely to influence them. 
Projections and policy advice should be made within a political economy 
framework.
Strengthening the capacity to provide and make available to policy mak-
ers timely market information including high-probability forecasts is key to 
prepare orderly policy interventions and to manage a situation in which the 
access to relevant information is likely to vary among stakeholder groups. 
Such strengthening should take place between crises as exemplified by South 
Africa’s introduction of a price monitoring board. Furthermore, there is a need 
to enhance the exchange of such information across countries. Expectations 
about impact in one country may be more realistic if knowledge is avail-
able about the results from similar policy options pursued in other countries. 
International organizations such as the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and the United Nations FAO could strengthen their role in 
this regard. The recently created Agricultural Market Information System 
(AMIS) is a step in the right direction.
22.2.1 Appropriate Use of Trade Policy and Interference 
in Price Signals
Trade policy was widely used by the study-countries to reduce price trans-
mission from the world market and stabilize domestic prices. In response to 
increasing world market prices, traditional exporters introduced export bans 
and other trade restrictions and importers removed import tariffs. Reducing 
world market supplies and increasing demand contributed to continued price 
increase in the world market. Such ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies are com-
mon to meet domestic policy goals at the expense of orderly trade. Before the 






are needed within the World Trade Organization (WTO) to strengthen the 
rules for abrupt and large changes in exporting countries’ trade policies. Such 
negotiations have been tried before with very limited success and it is unclear 
whether the food crisis and the contributions the introduction of export 
restrictions will make will render such negotiations more likely to succeed. 
Permitting the transmission of world market prices to domestic markets and 
maintaining unrestricted trade would greatly reduce the magnitudes of price 
fluctuations in the international market. It would also send the right signals 
to producers, consumers and traders to adjust supply and demand. Attempts 
to keep prices from increasing, whether through trade policy or price con-
trols, would do the opposite. Farmers and consumers would not be enticed to 
produce more and consume less.
Since, as mentioned above, most of the food price volatility in developing 
countries is caused by national and local factors and not by the world market, 
maintaining open trade would reduce price volatility in the domestic market. 
The impact of fluctuations in domestic production on domestic supply and 
prices would be dampened by changes in import or export. Sharing national 
production fluctuations with the rest of the world would help in stabiliz-
ing domestic prices. Some stakeholders would lose and others would gain 
from such policies, depending on whether prices without stabilization would 
have been higher or lower. Compensating losers may be a more effective way 
to meet government goals than interfering in the price signals in countries 
where the institutional framework for transfers and subsidies is in place.
International coordination of domestic policies, particularly trade policies, 
with well-defined rules and binding commitments might be mutually benefi-
cial to exporters and importers. Uncertainty about individual countries’ next 
move may encourage other countries to make moves that in the end would 
make all participating countries worse off. Without such coordination, the 
beggar-thy-neighbours policies we saw during the food crisis are likely to be 
repeated.
22.2.2 Reduce Fiscal Costs of Short-term Interventions
Export bans and other restrictions as well as elimination of import tariffs 
and reductions or elimination of value added taxes (VAT) on food caused 
significant fiscal revenue losses in many of the countries. Furthermore, some 
countries incurred large costs from the introduction or expansion of food and 
fertilizer subsidies and transfer programmes. Strengthening international 
agreements about export bans and restrictions might provide the support 
needed by national governments to withstand pressures from stakeholder 
groups for interventions in exports. This would maintain the revenues from 




producers and exporters would make funds available for transfer programmes 
for consumers to compensate for the higher prices.
To help keep costs down, subsidies and transfer programmes such as ferti-
lizer and food subsidies and safety net programmes should be targeted to those 
stakeholder groups that the government wishes to compensate. Low-income 
people who spend a large share of their income on food and are at risk of 
food insecurity and malnutrition would be a logical target group for govern-
ments that claim that improved food security and nutrition is an important 
policy goal. Some countries did in fact target food transfers and safety nets on 
these groups, but many others focused on lower-middle-class urban consum-
ers, presumably because they are more likely to threaten the government’s 
legitimacy. Except for fertilizer subsidies, which most often were targeted on 
smallholder farmers, subsidies, and transfers were targeted on consumers, pri-
marily but not exclusively urban consumers.
22.2.3 Investments to Increase Food Supply Elasticity
Policies to facilitate the transmission of food price changes to farmers will 
only result in appropriate supply changes if farmers are able to respond. 
Investments to increase the supply elasticity, i.e., making the supply more 
price sensitive, of single food commodities and the total farm output is criti-
cally important to keep domestic food price fluctuations within reasonable 
margins. The specific measures to make this happen are context specific but 
in most developing countries the most important government action would 
be to invest in the public goods needed to develop a rural infrastructure that 
supports well-functioning input and output markets, competitive supply 
chains, and private investment. That includes rural roads, particularly feeder 
roads, as well as irrigation infrastructure, contract enforcement, institutions 
of various kinds, and other public goods. Policies to promote a competitive 
supply chain are important to avoid barriers to price transmission between 
producers and consumers.
A large share of the poor in all the study-countries is smallholder farmers. 
Most are net buyers of some food. Food price changes would affect them the 
same way other consumers would be affected. That was used by some govern-
ments to justify policies to keep food prices from rising. After all, it would 
be good for poor farmers as well as urban consumers. However, pursuing a 
policy of low food prices is unlikely to be sound in the longer run. First, while 
smallholders may be net buyers of some foods they are likely to be net sellers 
of others. Second, the main reason why many smallholders are net buyers of 
food is that low and falling prices between the middle of the 1970s and the 
end of the century made investment in farming unproductive and forced the 




rural infrastructure, domestic markets and unit-cost and risk-reducing agri-
cultural research and technology may bring them back to become net sellers. 
Thus, governments wishing to strengthen the agricultural sector on the basis 
of smallholders should reassess policies to keep food prices lower than the 
export or import parity prices.
22.2.4 Facilitating Effective Risk Management Tools
More effective risk management tools are needed by farmers, traders, and 
consumers to cope with extreme weather events and market fluctuations. 
Governments can play an important role in facilitating the development and 
maintenance of such tools. Much of what has been mentioned above, such as 
better market forecasts, timely dissemination of weather-related information, 
and research to develop risk reducing technology such as drought-tolerant 
and pest-resistant crop varieties may help managing risks and uncertainties. 
Effective monitoring of the domestic and international food supply, demand, 
and prices, and related factors such as weather patterns, market development, 
and timely dissemination of the results is key to strengthen resilience to food 
price volatility.
22.2.5 Improve the Management of Public Sector Grain Stocks
Several authors of country studies found that poor management of govern-
ment grain reserves contributed to food price volatility. Untimely release of 
grain on the domestic market aimed at slowing price increases failed to do 
so and government purchases during periods of price increases put further 
upward pressure on prices and resulted in accumulation of surplus stocks 
in excess of storage capacity. While faulty forecasts undoubtedly played a 
role, deliberations among stakeholders and difficulties in arriving at a timely 
decision appear to have delayed the release. Untimely government purchases 
may have been a result of faulty expectations about future prices.
To avoid these problems in the future, it would be useful to create an insti-
tutional arrangement that, independent of stakeholder interests, would man-
age government grain reserves including the timing and quantity to release 
and purchase. The political economy process would be used to set guidelines 
for such an institution but the release and purchase decisions would not be 
subject to political deliberations.
22.2.6 Make Demand for Raw Materials for Biofuel Price-related
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the rapid expansion of biofuel production based 






contributor to food price fluctuations in 2007–8. Blending mandates that are 
unrelated to the price of maize and other raw materials for biofuel, such as 
those currently found in the USA and the European Union, contribute to 
food price volatility because the quantity needed to comply with the man-
date is removed from the maize market irrespective of its price. If food com-
modities, such as maize and soybeans, are to be used for biofuel, the impact 
on food price fluctuations would be reduced by replacing the mandate to a 
market-based programme in which the quantity demanded would be influ-
enced by the market price. As the appropriate technology becomes available, 
biofuel production should be based on resources and commodities that do 
not compete with food supplies.
22.2.7 Improve Collaboration between the Public and Private Sector
Mutual mistrust between the public and private sectors was identified by 
several authors of the country studies as contributing to food price volatil-
ity. Large, abrupt, and unexpected policy interventions in the food and agri-
cultural markets make it difficult for the private sector—whether farmers, 
traders, or processors—to operate efficiently. A higher degree of predictability 
and transparency in the behaviour of governments and the private sector is 
called for. Corruption in the public sector and anti-competitive behaviour 
in the supply chain contribute to food price volatility. Preparation of policy 
interventions to be implemented in future periods of increased food price 
volatility should be made before such periods occur. The preparations should 
be undertaken in a public-private partnership with participation by all rel-
evant stakeholder groups. While this may sound naive, steps in that direction 
might reduce the problems associated with delayed, ad hoc interventions 
taken in a crisis mode as illustrated by action in some of the study-countries.
Irrespective of food price volatility, sustainable food security for all will 
only be achieved with both the public and the private sectors doing their 
jobs. Creative tension between the two sectors may be useful but mistrust, 
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